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

Richard Ashhurst Rouse.

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THE

WORKS

OF THE LATE

RIGHT HONORABLE

HENRY ST. JOHN,

LORD VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE.

IN FIVE VOLUMES, COMPLETE.

PUBLISHED BY

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A

LETTER

TO

SIR WILLIAM WINDHAM:

WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1717.

A LETTER TO SIR WILLIAM WINDHAM.

I WAS well enough acquainted with the general character of mankind, and in particular with that of my own countrymen, to expect to be as much out of the minds of the tories during my exile, as if we had never lived and acted together. I depended on being forgot by them, and was far from imagining it poſſible that I ſhould be remembered, only to be condemned louldly by one half of them, and to be tacitly cenſured by the greateſt part of the other half. As ſoon as I was ſeparated from the pretender and his intereſt, I declared myſelf to be ſo, and I gave directions for writing into England what I judged ſufficient to put my friends on their guard againſt any ſurpriſe concerning an event which it was their intereſt, as well as mine, that they ſhould be very rightly informed about.

As ſoon as the pretender's adherents began to clamor againſt me in this country, and to diſperſe their

their ſcandal by circular letters every where elſe, I gave directions for writing into England again. Their groundleſs articles of accuſation were refuted, and enough was ſaid to give my friends a general idea of what had happened to me, and at leaſt to make them ſuſpend the fixing any opinion till ſuch time as I ſhould be able to write more fully and plainly to them myſelf. To condemn no perſon unheard is a rule of natural equity, which we ſee rarely violated in Turky, or in the country where I am writing: that it would not be ſo with me in Great Britain, I confeſs that I flattered myſelf. I dwelt ſecurely in this confidence, and gave very little attention to any of thoſe ſcurrilous methods which were taken, about this time, to blaſt my reputation. The event of things has ſhewn, that I truſted too much to my own innocence, and to the juſtice of my old friends.

It was obvious, that the Chevalier and the Earl of *Mar* hoped to load me with the imputation of treachery, incapacity, or neglect; it was indifferent to them of which. If they could aſcribe to one of thoſe their not being ſupported from France, they imagined that they ſhould juſtify their precipitate flight from Scotland, which many of their faſteſt friends exclaimed againſt; and that they ſhould varniſh over that original capital fault, the drawing the Highlanders together in arms at the time and in the manner in which it was done.

The Scotch, who fell at once from all the ſanguine expectations with which they had been footh-ed, and who found themſelves reduced to deſpair, were eaſy to be incenſed: they had received no ſupport whatever; and it was natural for them rather to believe, that they failed of this ſupport by my fault, than to imagine their general had prevailed on them to riſe in the very point of time when it was impoſſible that they ſhould be ſupported from France,

France, or from any other part of the world. The Duke of *Ormond*, who had been the bubble of his own popularity, was enough out of humor with the general turn of affairs to be eaſily ſet againſt any particular man. The emiſſaries of this court, whoſe commiſſion was to amuſe, had impoſed upon him all along, and there were other buſy people who thought to find their account in having him to themſelves. I had never been in his ſecret whilſt we were in England together: and from his firſt coming into France he was either prevailed upon by others, or, which I rather believe, he concurred with others to keep me out of it. The perfect indifference I ſhewed whether I was in it or no, might carry him from acting ſeparately, to act againſt me.

The whole tribe of Iriſh and other Papiſts were ready to ſeiſe the firſt opportunity of venting their ſpleen againſt a man, who had conſtantly avoided all intimacy with them; who acted in the ſame cauſe, but on a different principle, and who meant no one thing in the world leſs than raiſing them to the advantages which they expected.

That theſe ſeveral perſons, for the reaſons I have mentioned, ſhould join in a cry againſt me, is not very marvellous: the contrary would be ſo to a man who knows them as well as I do. But that the Engliſh tories ſhould ſerve as echoes to them, nay, more, that my character ſhould continue doubtful at beſt amongſt you, when thoſe who firſt propagated the ſlander are become aſhamed of railing without proof, and have dropped the clamor, this I own that I never expected, and I may be allowed to ſay, that as it is an extreme ſurpriſe, ſo it ſhall be a leſſon to me.

The whigs impeached and attainted me. They went farther—at leaſt in my way of thinking that ſtep

ſtep was more cruel than all the others—by a partial repreſentation of facts, and pieces of facts, put together as it beſt ſuited their purpoſe, and publiſhed to the whole world, they did all that in them lay to expoſe me for a fool, and to brand me for a knave. But then I had deſerved this abundantly at their hands, according to the notions of party-juſtice. The tories have not indeed impeached nor attainted me; but they have done, and are ſtill doing ſomething very like to that which I took worſe of the whigs, than the impeachment and attainder: and this, after I have ſhewn an inviolable attachment to the ſervice, and almoſt an implicit obedience to the will of the party; when I am actually an out-law, deprived of my honors, ſtripped of my fortune, and cut off from my family and my country for their ſakes.

Some of the perſons who have ſeen me here, and with whom I have had the pleaſure to talk of you, may, perhaps, have told you, that far from being oppreſſed by that ſtorm of misfortunes in which I have been toſſed of late, I bear up againſt it with firmneſs enough, and even with alacrity. It is true, I do ſo: but it is true likewiſe, that the laſt burſt of the cloud has gone near to overwhelm me. From our enemies we expect evil treatment of every ſort, we are prepared for it, we are animated by it, and we ſometimes triumph in it: but when our friends abandon us, when they wound us, and when they take, to do this, an occaſion where we ſtand the moſt in need of their ſupport, and have the beſt title to it, the firmeſt mind finds it hard to reſiſt.

Nothing kept up my ſpirits when I was firſt reduced to the very circumſtances I now deſcribe, ſo much as the conſideration of the deluſions under which I knew that the tories lay, and the hopes I entertained of being able ſoon to open their eyes,

and

and to juſtify my conduct. I expected that friendſhip, or if that principle failed, curioſity at leaſt would move the party to ſend over ſome perſon, from whoſe report they might have both ſides of the queſtion laid before them. Though this expectation be founded in reaſon, and you want to be informed at leaſt as much as I do to be juſtified, yet I have hitherto flattered myſelf with it in vain. To repair this misfortune, therefore, as far as lies in my power, I reſolve to put into writing the ſum of what I ſhould have ſaid in that caſe: theſe papers ſhall lie by me till time and accidents produce ſome occaſion of communicating them to you. The true occaſion of doing it, with advantage to the party, will probably be loſt: but they will remain a monument of my juſtification to poſterity. At worſt, if even this fails me, I am ſure of one ſatisfaction in writing them; the ſatisfaction of unburdening my mind to a friend, and of ſtating before an equitable judge the account, as I apprehend it to ſtand, between the tories and myſelf. "Quantam humano "concilio efficere potui, circumſpectis rebus meis "omnibus, rationibuſque ſubductis, ſummam feci "cogitationum mearum omnium, quam tibi ſi po-"tero breviter exponam."

It is neceſſary to my deſign that I call to your mind the ſtate of affairs in Britain from the latter part of the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten, to the beginning of the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifteen, about which time we parted. I go no farther back, becauſe the part which I acted before that time, in the firſt eſſays I made in public affairs, was the part of a tory, and ſo far of a piece with that which I acted afterwards. Beſides, the things which preceded this ſpace of time had no immediate influence on thoſe which happened ſince that time; whereas the ſtrange events which we have ſeen fall out in the king's reign were owing, in a great meaſure,

ſure to what was done, or neglected to be done, in the laſt four years of the queen's. The memory of theſe events being freſh, I ſhall dwell as little as poſſible upon them. It will be ſufficient that I make a rough ſketch of the face of the court, and of the conduct of the ſeveral parties during that time. Your memory will ſoon furniſh the colors which I ſhall omit to lay, and finiſh up the picture.

From the time at which I left Britain I had not the advantage of acting under the eyes of the party which I ſerved, nor of being able from time to time to appeal to their judgment. The groſs of what happened has appeared, but the particular ſteps which led to thoſe events have been either concealed or miſrepreſented. Concealed from the nature of them, or miſrepreſented by thoſe with whom I never agreed perfectly, except in thinking that they and I were extremely unfit to continue embarked in the ſame bottom together. It will, therefore, be proper to deſcend, under this head, to a more particular relation.

In the ſummer of the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten, the queen was prevailed upon to change her parliament and her miniſtry. The intrigue of the Earl of *Oxford* might facilitate the means, the violent proſecution of *Sacheverel*, and other unpopular meaſures might create the occaſion, and encourage her in the reſolution: but the true original cauſe was the perſonal ill uſage which ſhe received in her private life, and in ſome trifling inſtances of the exerciſe of her power; for indulgence in which ſhe would certainly have left the reins of government in thoſe hands, which had held them ever ſince her acceſſion to the throne.

I am afraid that we came to court in the ſame diſpoſitions as all parties have done; that the principal ſpring of our actions was to have the government of the ſtate in our hands; that our principal views

views were the conſervation of this power, great employments to ourſelves, and great opportunities of rewarding thoſe who had helped to raiſe us, and of hurting thoſe who ſtood in oppoſition to us. It is however true, that with theſe conſiderations of private and party intereſt, there were others intermingled which had for their object the public good of the nation, at leaſt what we took to be ſuch.

We looked on the political principles which had generally prevailed in our government from the revolution, in one thouſand ſix hundred and eighty-eight, to be deſtructive of our true intereſt, to have mingled us too much in the affairs of the continent, to tend to the impoveriſhing our people, and to the looſening the bands of our conſtitution in church and ſtate. We ſuppoſed the tory party to be the bulk of the landed intereſt, and to have no contrary influence blended into its compoſition. We ſuppoſed the whigs to be the remains of a party, formed againſt the ill deſigns of the court under King *Charles* the Second, nurſed up into ſtrength and applied to contrary uſes by King *William* the Third, and yet ſtill ſo weak as to lean for ſupport on the Preſbyterians and the other ſectaries, on the bank and the other corporations, on the Dutch and the other allies. From hence we judged it to follow, that they had been forced, and muſt continue ſo, to render the national intereſt ſubſervient to the intereſt of thoſe who lent them an additional ſtrength, without which they could never be the prevalent party. The view, therefore, of thoſe amongſt us who thought in this manner, was to improve the queen's favor, to break the body of the whigs, to render their ſupports uſeleſs to them, and to fill the employments of the kingdom down to the meaneſt with tories. We imagined that ſuch meaſures, joined to the advantages of our numbers and our property, would ſecure us againſt all attempts during

ing

ing her reign; and that we ſhould ſoon become too conſiderable, not to make our terms in all events which might happen afterwards: concerning which, to ſpeak truly, I believe few or none of us had any very ſettled reſolution.

In order to bring theſe purpoſes about, I verily think that the perſecution of Diſſenters entered into no man's head. By the bills for preventing occaſional conformity and the growth of ſchiſm, it was hoped that their ſting would be taken away. Theſe bills were thought neceſſary for our party intereſt, and beſides were deemed neither unreaſonable nor unjuſt. The good of ſociety may require that no perſon ſhould be deprived of the protection of the government on account of his opinions in religious matters, but it does not follow from hence that men ought to be truſted in any degree with the preſervation of the eſtabliſhment, who muſt, to be conſiſtent with their principles, endeavor the ſubverſion of what is eſtabliſhed. An indulgence to conſciences, which the prejudice of education and long habits have rendered ſcrupulous, may be agreeable to the rules of good policy and of humanity: yet will it hardly follow from hence, that a government is under any obligation to indulge a tenderneſs of conſcience to come; or to connive at the propagating of theſe prejudices, and at the forming of theſe habits. The evil effect is without remedy, and may therefore deſerve indulgence; but the evil cauſe is to be prevented, and can therefore be intitled to none. Beſides this, the bills I am ſpeaking of, rather than to enact any thing new, ſeemed only to enforce the obſervation of antient laws; which had been judged neceſſary for the ſecurity of the church and ſtate, at a time when the memory of the ruin of both, and of the hands by which that ruin had been wrought, was freſh in the minds of men.

The bank, the Eaſt-India Company, and in general the monied intereſt, had certainly nothing to appre-

apprehend like what they feared, or affected to fear, from the tories, an entire ſubverſion of their property. Multitudes of our own party would have been wounded by ſuch a blow. The intention of thoſe, who were the warmeſt, ſeemed to me to go no farther than reſtraining their influence on the legiſlature, and on matters of ſtate; and finding at a proper ſeaſon means to make them contribute to the ſupport and eaſe of a government, under which they enjoyed advantages ſo much greater than the reſt of their fellow-ſubjects. The miſchievous conſequence which had been foreſeen and foretold too, at the eſtabliſhment of thoſe corporations, appeared viſibly. The country gentlemen were vexed, put to great expences, and even baffled by them in their elections: and among the members of every parliament numbers were immediately or indirectly under their influence. The bank had been extravagant enough to pull off the maſk, and when the queen ſeemed to intend a change in her miniſtry, they had deputed ſome of their members to repreſent againſt it. But that which touched ſenſibly, even thoſe who were but little affected by other conſiderations, was the prodigious inequality between the condition of the monied men and of the reſt of the nation. The proprietor of the land, and the merchant who brought riches home by the returns of foreign trade, had during two wars bore the whole immenſe load of the national expences; whilſt the lender of money, who added nothing to the common ſtock, throve by the public calamity, and contributed not a mite to the public charge.

As to the allies, I ſaw no difference of opinion among all thoſe who came to the head of affairs at this time. Such of the tories as were in the ſyſtem above-mentioned, ſuch of them as deſerted ſoon after from us, and ſuch of the whigs as had upon this occaſion deſerted to us, ſeemed equally convinced of the unreaſonableneſs and even of the impoſſibility of conti-

continuing the war on the ſame diſproportionate foot. Their univerſal ſenſe was that we had taken, except the part of the States General, the whole burden of the war upon us, and even a proportion of this; while the entire advantage was to accrue to others: that this had appeared very groſsly in one thouſand ſeven hundred and nine, and one thouſand ſeven hundred and ten, when preliminaries were inſiſted upon, which contained all that the allies, giving the greateſt looſe to their wiſhes, could deſire, and little or nothing on the behalf of Great-Britain: that the war, which had been begun for the ſecurity of the allies, was continued for their grandeur; that the ends propoſed when we engaged in it might have been anſwered long before, and therefore that the firſt favorable occaſion ought to be ſeized of making peace; which we thought to be the intereſt of our country, and which appeared to all mankind, as well as to us, to be that of our party.

Theſe were in general the views of the tories, and for the part I acted in the proſecution of them, as well as of all the meaſures acceſſory to them, I may appeal to mankind. To thoſe who had the opportunity of looking behind the curtain I may likewiſe appeal for the difficulties which lay in my way, and for the particular diſcouragements which I met with. A principal load of parliamentary and foreign affairs, in their ordinary courſe, lay upon me: the whole negotiation of the peace and of the troubleſome invidious ſteps preliminary to it, as far as they could be tranſacted at home, were thrown upon me. I continued in the Houſe of Commons during that important ſeſſion which preceded the peace; and which, by the ſpirit ſhewn through the whole courſe of it, and by the reſolutions taken in it, rendered the concluſion of the treaties practicable. After this I was dragged into the Houſe of Lords in ſuch a manner, as to make my promotion a puniſhment, not a reward, and was there left to defend the treaties almoſt alone.

It

It would not have been hard to have forced the Earl of *Oxford* to uſe me better. His good intentions began to be very much doubted of: the truth is, no opinion of his ſincerity had ever taken root in the party; and which was worſe, perhaps, for a man in his ſtation, the opinion of his capacity began to fall apace. He was ſo hard puſhed in the Houſe of Lords in the beginning of one thouſand ſeven hundred and twelve, that he had been forced, in the middle of the ſeſſion, to perſuade the queen to make a promotion of twelve peers at once; which was an unprecedented and invidious meaſure, to be excuſed by nothing but the neceſſity, and hardly by that. In the Houſe of Commons his credit was low, and my reputation very high. You know the nature of that aſſembly: they grow, like hounds, fond of the man who ſhews them game, and by whoſe halloo they are uſed to be encouraged. The thread of the negotiations, which could not ſtand ſtill a moment without going back, was in my hands: and before another man could have made himſelf maſter of the buſineſs, much time would have been loſt, and great inconveniencies would have followed. Some, who oppoſed the court ſoon after, began to waver then: and if I had not wanted the inclination, I ſhould have wanted no help to do miſchief. I knew the way of quitting my employments and of retiring from court when the ſervice of my party required it: but I could not bring myſelf up to that reſolution, when the conſequence of it muſt have been the breaking my party, and the diſtreſs of the public affairs. I thought my miſtreſs treated me ill, but the ſenſe of that duty which I owed her came in aid of other conſiderations, and prevailed over my reſentment. Theſe ſentiments, indeed, are ſo much out of faſhion, that a man who avows them is in danger of paſſing for a bubble in the world: yet they were,

in the conjuncture I ſpeak of, the true motives of my conduct, and you ſaw me go on as chearfully in the troubleſome and dangerous work aſſigned me, as if I had been under the utmoſt ſatisfaction. I began, indeed, in my heart, to renounce the friendſhip, which till that time I had preſerved inviolable for *Oxford*. I was not aware of all his treachery, nor of the baſe and little means which he employed then, and continued to employ afterwards, to ruin me in the opinion of the queen and every where elſe. I ſaw, however, that he had no friendſhip for any body, and that with reſpect to me, inſtead of having the ability to render that merit which I endeavoured to acquire an addition of ſtrength to himſelf, it became the object of his jealouſy, and a reaſon for undermining me. In this temper of mind I went on, till the great work of the peace was conſummated, and the treaty ſigned at Utrecht: after which a new and more melancholly ſcene for the party, as well as for me, opened itſelf.

I am far from thinking the treaties, or the negotiations which led to them, exempt from faults. Many were made no doubt in both, by thoſe who were concerned in them, by myſelf in the firſt place: and many were owing purely to the oppoſition they met with in every ſtep of their progreſs. I never look back on this great event, paſſed as it is, without a ſecret emotion of mind, when I compare the vaſtneſs of the undertaking, and the importance of its ſucceſs, with the means employed to bring it about, and with thoſe which were employed to traverſe it. To adjuſt the pretenſions and to ſettle the intereſts of ſo many princes and ſtates, as were engaged in the late war, would appear, when conſidered ſimply and without any adventitious difficulty, a work of prodigious extent. But this was not all. Each of our allies thought himſelf entitled to raiſe his demands to the moſt extravagant height.

height. They had been encouraged to this, firſt, by the engagements which we had entered into with ſeveral of them; with ſome to draw them into the war, with others to prevail on them to continue it; and ſecondly, by the manner in which we had treated with France in ſeventeen hundred nine and ten. Thoſe who intended to tie the knot of the war as hard, and to render the coming at a peace as impracticable as they could, had found no method ſo effectual as that of leaving every one at liberty to inſiſt on all he could think of, and leaving themſelves at liberty, even if theſe conceſſions ſhould be made, to break the treaty by ulterior demands. That this was the ſecret, I can make no doubt after the confeſſion of one of the † plenipotentiaries who tranſacted theſe matters, and who communicated to me and to two others of the queen's miniſters an inſtance of the Duke of *Marlborough*'s management at a critical moment, when the French miniſters at Gertrudenberg ſeemed inclinable to come into an expedient for explaining the thirty-ſeventh article of the preliminaries, which could not have been refuſed. Certain it is, that the king of France was at that time in earneſt to execute the article of *Philip*'s abdication: and therefore the expedients for adjuſting what related to this article would eaſily enough have been found, if on our part there had been a real intention of concluding. But there was no ſuch intention; and the plan of thoſe who meant to prolong the war was eſtabliſhed among the allies, as the plan which ought to be followed whenever a peace came to be treated. The allies imagined, that they had a right to obtain at leaſt every thing which had been demanded for them reſpectively: and it was viſible that nothing leſs would content them. Theſe conſiderations ſet the vaſtneſs of the undertaking in a ſufficient light.

† *Buys* penſionary of Amſterdam.

The importance of ſucceeding, in the work of the peace, was equally great to Europe, to our country, to our party, to our perſons, to the preſent age, and to future generations. But I need not take pains to prove what no man will deny. The means employed to bring it about were in no degree proportionable. A few men, ſome of whom had never been concerned in buſineſs of this kind before, and moſt of whom put their hands for a long time to it faintly and timorouſly, were the inſtruments of it. The miniſter who was at their head ſhewed himſelf every day incapable of that attention, that method, that comprehenſion of different matters, which the firſt poſt in ſuch a government as ours requires in quiet times. He was the firſt ſpring of all our motion by his credit with the queen, and his concurrence was neceſſary to every thing we did by his rank in the ſtate: and yet this man ſeemed to be ſometimes aſleep, and ſometimes at play. He neglected the thread of buſineſs, which was carried on for this reaſon with leſs diſpatch and leſs advantage in the proper channels, and he kept none in his own hands. He negotiated, indeed, by fits, and ſtarts, by little tools, and indirect ways: and thus his activity became as hurtful as his indolence; of which I could produce ſome remarkable inſtances. No good effect could flow from ſuch a conduct. In a word, when this great affair was once engaged, the zeal of particular men in their ſeveral provinces drove it forward, though they were not backed by the concurrent force of the whole adminiſtration, nor had the common helps of advice till it was too late, till the very end of the negotiations; even in matters, ſuch as that of commerce, which they could not be ſuppoſed to underſtand. That this is a true account of the means uſed to arrive at the peace, and a true character of that adminiſtration in general, I believe the whole cabinet council of that time will bear me witneſs. Sure I am, that moſt of them have

joined with me in lamenting this ſtate of things whilſt it ſubſiſted, and all thoſe who were employed as miniſters in the ſeveral parts of the treaty felt ſufficiently the difficulties which this ſtrange management often reduced them to. I am confident they have not forgot them.

If the means employed to bring the peace about were feeble, and in one reſpect contemptible, thoſe employed to break the negotiation were ſtrong and formidable. As ſoon as the firſt ſuſpicion of a treaty's being on foot crept abroad into the world, the whole alliance united with a powerful party in the nation to obſtruct it. From that hour to the moment the congreſs of Utrecht finiſhed, no one meaſure poſſible to be taken was omitted to traverſe every advance that was made in this work, to intimidate, to allure, to embarraſs every perſon concerned in it. This was done without any regard either to decency or good policy: and from hence it ſoon followed, that paſſion and humor mingled themſelves on each ſide. A great part of what we did for the peace, and of what others did againſt it, can be accounted for on no other principle. The allies were broke among themſelves before they began to treat with the common enemy. The matter did not mend in the courſe of the treaty: and France and Spain, but eſpecially the former, profited of this diſunion.

Whoever makes the compariſon, which I have touched upon, will ſee the true reaſons which rendered the peace leſs anſwerable to the ſucceſs of the war than it might, and than it ought to have been. Judgment has been paſſed in this caſe, as the different paſſions or intereſts of men have inſpired them. But the real cauſe lay in the conſtitution of our miniſtry, and much more in the obſtinate oppoſition which we met with from the whigs and from the allies. However, ſure it is, that the defects of the peace did not occaſion the deſertions from the tory party which happened

pened about this time, nor thoſe diſorders in the court which immediately followed.

Long before the purport of the treaties could be known, thoſe whigs who had ſet out with us, in ſeventeen hundred and ten, began to relapſe back to their party. They had among us ſhared the harveſt of a new miniſtry, and like prudent perſons they took meaſures in time to have their ſhare in that of a new government.

The whimſical, or the Hanover-tories continued zealous in appearance with us, till the peace was ſigned. I ſaw no people ſo eager for the concluſion of it †. Some of them were in ſuch haſte, that they thought any peace preferable to the leaſt delay, and omitted no inſtances to quicken their friends who were actors in it. As ſoon as the treaties were perfected and laid before the parliament, the ſcheme of theſe gentlemen began to diſcloſe itſelf entirely. Their love of the peace, like other paſſions, cooled by enjoyment. They grew nice about the conſtruction of the articles, could come up to no direct approbation, and, being let into the ſecret of what was to happen, would not preclude themſelves from the glorious advantage of riſing on the ruins of their friends and of their party.

The danger of the ſucceſſion, and the badneſs of the peace, were the two principles on which we were attacked. On the firſt, the whimſical tories joined the whigs, and declared directly againſt their party. Although nothing is more certain than this truth, that there was at that time no formed deſign in the party, whatever views ſome particular men might have, againſt his majeſty's acceſſion to the throne. On the latter and moſt other points, they affected a moſt glorious neutrality.

† *Hanmers'* Letter.

Inſtead

Inſtead of gathering ſtrength, either as a miniſtry or as a party, we grew weaker every day. The peace had been judged with reaſon to be the only ſolid foundation whereupon we could erect a tory ſyſtem; and yet when it was made we found ourſelves at a full ſtand. Nay the very work, which ought to have been the baſis of our ſtrength, was in part demoliſhed before our eyes, and we were ſtoned with the ruins of it. Whilſt this was doing, *Oxford* looked on, as if he had not been a party to all which had paſſed; broke now and then a jeſt, which favored of the inns of court, and the bad company in which he had been bred: and on thoſe occaſions, where his ſtation obliged him to ſpeak of buſineſs, was abſolutely unintelligible.

Whether this man ever had any determined view beſides that of raiſing his family is, I believe, a problematical queſtion in the world. My opinion is, that he never had any other. The conduct of a miniſter, who propoſes to himſelf a great and noble object, and who purſues it ſteadily, may ſeem for a while a riddle to the world; eſpecially in a government like ours, where numbers of men different in their characters and different in their intereſts are at all times to be managed: where public affairs are expoſed to more accidents and greater hazards than in other countries; and where, by conſequence, he who is at the head of buſineſs will find himſelf often diſtracted by meaſures which have no relation to his purpoſe, and obliged to bend himſelf to things which are in ſome degree contrary to his main deſign. The ocean which environs us is an emblem of our government; and the pilot and the miniſter are in ſimilar circumſtances. It ſeldom happens, that either of them can ſteer a direct courſe, and they both arrive at their port by means which frequently ſeem to carry them from it. But as the work advances, the conduct of him who leads it on with

with real abilities clears up, the appearing inconſiſtencies are reconciled, and when it is once conſummated, the whole ſhews itſelf ſo uniform, ſo plain, and ſo natural, that every dabler in politics will be apt to think he could have done the ſame. But on the other hand, a man who propoſes no ſuch object, who ſubſtitutes artifice in the place of ability, who, inſtead of leading parties and governing accidents, is eternally agitated backwards and forwards by both, who begins every day ſomething new, and carries nothing on to perfection, may impoſe a while on the world: but a little ſooner or later the myſtery will be revealed, and nothing will be found to be couched under it but a thread of pitiful expedients, the ultimate end of which never extended farther than living from day to day. Which of theſe pictures reſembles *Oxford* moſt, you will determine. I am ſorry to be obliged to name him ſo often; but how is it poſſible to do otherwiſe, while I am ſpeaking of times wherein the whole turn of affairs depended on his motions and character?

I have heard, and I believe truly, that when he returned to Windſor in the autumn of ſeventeen hundred and thirteen, after the marriage of his ſon, he preſſed extremely to have him created Duke of *Newcaſtle* or Earl of *Clare*: and the queen preſuming to heſitate on ſo extraordinary a propoſal, he reſented this heſitation in a manner which little became a man who had been ſo lately raiſed by the profuſion of her favors upon him. Certain it is, that he began then to ſhew a ſtill greater remiſſneſs in all parts of his miniſtry, and to affect to ſay, that from ſuch a time, the very time I am ſpeaking of, he took no ſhare in the direction of affairs, or words to that effect.

He pretended to have diſcovered intrigues which were ſet on foot againſt him, and particularly he complained of the advantage which was taken of his abſence, during the journey he made at his ſon's marriage,

marriage, to undermine him with the queen. He is naturally inclined to believe the worſt, which I take to be a certain mark of a mean ſpirit and a wicked ſoul: at leaſt I am ſure that the contrary quality, when it is not due to weakneſs of underſtanding, is the fruit of a generous temper, and an honeſt heart. Prone to judge ill of all mankind, he will rarely be ſeduced by his credulity; but I never knew a man ſo capable of being the bubble of his diſtruſt and jealouſy. He was ſo in this caſe, although the queen, who could not be ignorant of the truth, ſaid enough to undeceive him. But to be undeceived, and to own himſelf ſo, was not his play. He hoped by cunning to varniſh over his want of faith and of ability. He was deſirous to make the world impute the extraordinary part, or to ſpeak more properly, the no part, which he acted with the ſtaff of treaſurer in his hand, to the queen's withdrawing her favor from him, and to his friends abandoning him: pretences utterly groundleſs, when he firſt made them, and which he brougnt to be real at laſt. Even the winter before the queen's death, when his credit began to wain apace, he might have regained it; he might have reconciled himſelf perfectly with all his antient friends, and have acquired the confidence of the whole party. I ſay, he might have done all this; becauſe I am perſuaded that none of thoſe I have named were ſo convinced of his perfidy, ſo jaded with his yoke, or ſo much piqued perſonally againſt him as I was: and yet if he would have exerted himſelf in concert with us, to improve the few advantages which were left us, and to ward off the viſible danger which threatened our perſons and our party, I would have ſtifled my private animoſity, and would have acted under him with as much zeal as ever. But he was uncapable of taking ſuch a turn. The ſum of all his policy had been to amuſe the whigs, the tories, and the jacobites, as long as he could, and to keep his power

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as long as he amuſed them. When it became impoſſible to amuſe mankind any longer, he appeared plainly at the end of his line.

By a ſecret correſpondence with the late Earl of *Halifax*, and by the intrigues of his brother, and other fanatical relations, he had endeavored to keep ſome hold on the whigs.

The tories were attached to him at firſt by the heat of a revolution in the miniſtry, by their hatred of the people who were diſcarded, and by the fond hopes which it is eaſy to give at the ſetting out of a new adminiſtration. Afterwards he held out the peace in proſpect to them, and to the jacobites, ſeparately, as an event which muſt be brought about before he could effectually ſerve either. You cannot have forgot how things which we preſſed were put off, upon every occaſion, till the peace: the peace was to be the date of a new adminiſtration, and the period at which the millenary year of toryiſm ſhould begin. Thus were the tories at that time amuſed: and ſince my exile I have had the opportunity of knowing certainly and circumſtantially that the jacobites were treated in the ſame manner, and that the pretender was made, through the French miniſter, to expect that meaſures ſhould be taken for his reſtoration, as ſoon as the peace had rendered them practicable. He was to attempt nothing, his partiſans were to lie ſtill, *Oxford* undertook for all.

After many delays, fatal to the general intereſt of Europe, this peace was ſigned, and the only conſiderable thing which he brought about afterwards was the marriage I have mentioned above: and by it an acceſſion of riches and honor to a family whoſe eſtate was very mean, and whoſe illuſtration before this time I never met with any where but in the vain diſcourſes which he uſed to hold over claret. If he kept

kept his word with any of the parties abovementioned, it must be supposed that he did so with the whigs; for as to us we saw nothing after the peace but increase of mortification and nearer approaches to ruin. Not a step was made towards completing the settlement of Europe, which the treaties of Utrecht and Radstat left imperfect; towards fortifying and establishing the tory party; towards securing those who had been the principal actors in this administration against future events. We had proceeded in a confidence that these things should immediately follow the conclusion of the peace: he had never, I dare swear, entertained a thought concerning them. As soon as the last hand was given to the fortune of his family, he abandoned his mistress, his friends, and his party, who had bore him so many years on their shoulders: and I was present when this want of faith was reproached him in the plainest and strongest terms by one of the honestest * men in Britain, and before some of the most † considerable tories. Even his impudence failed him on this occasion: he did not so much as attempt an excuse.

He could not keep his word which he had given the pretender and his adherents, because he had formed no party to support him in such a design. He was sure of having the whigs against him if he made the attempt, and he was not sure of having the tories for him.

In this state of confusion and distress, to which he had reduced himself and us, you remember the part he acted. He was the spy of the whigs, and voted with us in the morning against those very questions which he had penned the night before with *Walpole* and others.——He kept his post on terms which

* Lord *Trevor*.

† Duke of *Ormond*, Lord *Anglesey*, Lord *Harcourt*, and myself, in *Oxford*'s lodgings in St. *James*'s house.

no

no man but he would have held it on, neither ſubmitting to the queen, nor complying with his friends. He would not, or he could not, act with us, and he reſolved that we ſhould not act without him, as long as he could hinder it. The queen's health was very precarious, and at her death he hoped by theſe means to deliver us up, bound as it were hand and foot, to our adverſaries. On the foundation of this merit he flattered himſelf that he had gained ſome of the whigs, and ſoftened at leaſt the reſt of the party to him. By his ſecret negotiations at Hanover, he took it for granted that he was not only reconciled to that court, but that he ſhould, under his preſent majeſty's reign, have as much credit as he had enjoyed under that of the queen. He was weak enough to boaſt of this, and to promiſe his good offices voluntarily to ſeveral, for no man was weak enough to think them worth being ſolicited. In a word, you muſt have heard that he anſwered to Lord *Dartmouth* and to Mr. *Bromley*, that one ſhould keep the privy ſeal, and the other the ſeals of ſecretary; and that Lord *Cowper* makes no ſcruple of telling how he came to offer him the ſeals of chancellor. When the king arrived, he went to Greenwich with an affectation of pomp and of favor. Againſt his ſuſpicious character, he was once in his life the bubble of his credulity: and this deluſion betrayed him into a puniſhment, more ſevere in my ſenſe than all which has happened to him ſince, or than perpetual exile; he was affronted in the manner in which he was preſented to the king. The meaneſt ſubject would have been received with goodneſs, the moſt obnoxious with an air of indifference; but he was received with the moſt diſtinguiſhed contempt. This treatment he had in the face of the nation. The king began his reign in this inſtance, with puniſhing the ingratitude, the perfidy, the inſolence which had been ſhewn to his predeceſſor.

Oxford

Oxford fled from court, covered with ſhame, the object of the deriſion of the whigs, and of the indignation of the tories.

The queen might, if ſhe had pleaſed, have ſaved herſelf from all thoſe mortifications ſhe met with during the laſt months of her reign, and her ſervants and the tory party from thoſe misfortunes which they endured during the ſame time; perhaps from thoſe which they have fallen into ſince her death. When ſhe found that the peace, from the concluſion of which ſhe expected eaſe and quiet, brought ſtill greater trouble upon her; when ſhe ſaw the weakneſs of her government, and the confuſion of her affairs encreaſe every day; when ſhe ſaw her firſt miniſter bewildered and unable to extricate himſelf or her; in fine, when the negligence of his public conduct, and the faucineſs of his private behavior had rendered him inſupportable to her, and ſhe took the reſolution of laying him aſide, there was a ſtrength ſtill remaining ſufficient to have ſupported her government, to have fulfilled in a great part the expectations of the tories, and to have conſtituted both them and the miniſters in ſuch a ſituation as would have left them little to apprehend. Some deſigns were indeed on foot which might have produced very great diſorders: *Oxford*'s conduct had given much occaſion to them, and with the terror of them he endeavoured to intimidate the queen. But expedients were not hard to be found, by which thoſe deſigns might have been nipped in the bud, or elſe by which the perſons who promoted them might have been induced to lay them aſide. But that fatal irreſolution inherent to the Stuart-race hung upon her. She felt too much inward reſentment to be able to conceal his diſgrace from him: yet after he had made this diſcovery, ſhe continued to truſt all her power in his hands.

No

No people ever were in ſuch a condition as ours continued to be from the autumn of one thouſand ſeven hundred and thirteen, to the ſummer following. The queen's health ſunk every day. The attack which ſhe had in the winter at Windſor, ſerved as a warning both to thoſe who wiſhed, and to thoſe who feared her death, to expect it. The party which oppoſed the court had been continually gaining ſtrength by the weakneſs of our adminiſtration: and at this time their numbers were vaſtly encreaſed, and their ſpirit was raiſed by the near proſpect of the ſucceſſion taking place. We were not at liberty to exert the ſtrength we had. We ſaw our danger, and many of us ſaw the true means of avoiding it: but whilſt the magic wand was in the ſame hands, this knowledge ſerved only to encreaſe our uneaſineſs; and whether we would or no, we were forced with our eyes open to walk on towards the precipice. Every moment we became leſs able, if the queen lived, to ſupport her government: if ſhe died, to ſecure ourſelves. One ſide was united in a common view, and acted upon an uniform plan; the other had really none at all. We knew that we were out of favor at the court of Hanover, that we were repreſented there as jacobites, and that the elector, his preſent majeſty, had been rendered publicly a party to that oppoſition, in ſpite of which we made the peace: and yet we neither had taken, nor could take, in our preſent circumſtances, any meaſures to be better or worſe there. Thus we languiſhed till the twenty-ſeventh of July, one thouſand ſeven hundred and fourteen, when the queen diſmiſſed the treaſurer. On the Friday following, ſhe fell into an apoplexy, and died on Sunday the firſt of Auguſt.

You do me, I dare ſay, the juſtice to believe, that whilſt this ſtate of things laſted I ſaw very well, how little mention ſoever I might make of it at the time,

time, that no man in the miniſtry, or in the party, was ſo much expoſed as myſelf. I could expect no quarter from the whigs, for I had deſerved none. There were perſons amongſt them for whom I had great eſteem and friendſhip; yet neither with theſe nor with any others had I preſerved a ſecret correſpondence, which might be of uſe to me in the day diſtreſs: and beſides the general character of my party, I knew that particular prejudices were entertained againſt me at Hanover. The whigs wanted nothing but an opportunity of attacking the peace, and it could hardly be imagined that they would ſtop there. In which caſe, I knew that they could have hold on no man ſo much as myſelf: the inſtructions, the orders, the memorials had been drawn by me; the correſpondence relating to it in France, and every where elſe, had been carried on by me; in a word, my hand appeared to almoſt every paper which had been writ in the whole courſe of the negotiation. To all theſe conſiderations I added that of the weight of perſonal reſentment, which I had created againſt myſelf at home and abroad: in part unavoidably by the ſhare I was obliged to take in theſe affairs; and in part, if you will, unneceſſarily by the warmth of my temper, and by ſome unguarded expreſſions for which I have no excuſe to make, but that which *Tacitus* makes for his father-in-law, *Julius Agricola:* "honeſtius putabam offendere "quam odiſſe."

Having this proſpect of being diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of my party, in the common calamity, by ſeverer treatment, I might have juſtified myſelf, by reaſon and by great authorities too, if I had made early proviſion, at leaſt to be ſafe, when I ſhould be no longer uſeful. How I could have ſecured this point I do not think fit to explain, but certain it is that I made no one ſtep towards it. I reſolved not to abandon my party by turning whig, or, which is worſe

worſe a great deal, whimſical, nor to treat ſeparately from it. I reſolved to keep myſelf at liberty to act on a tory bottom. If the queen diſgraced *Oxford*, and continued to live afterwards, I knew we ſhould have time and means to provide for our future ſafety: if the queen died and left us in the ſame unfortunate circumſtances, I expected to ſuffer for and with the tories, and I was prepared for it.

The thunder had long grumbled in the air, and yet when the bolt fell, moſt of our party appeared as much ſurpriſed as if they had had no reaſon to expect it. There was a perfect calm and univerſal ſubmiſſion through the whole kingdom. The *Chevalier* indeed ſet out as if his deſign had been to gain the coaſt and to embark for Great Britain, and the court of France made a merit to themſelves of ſtopping him and obliging him to return. But this, to my certain knowledge, was a farce acted by concert, to keep up an opinion of his character, when all opinion of his cauſe ſeemed to be at an end. He owned this concert to me at Bar, on the occaſion of my telling him that he would have found no party ready to receive him, and that the enterpriſe would have been to the laſt degree extravagant. He was at this time far from having any encouragement: no party, numerous enough to make the leaſt diſturbance, was formed in his favor. On the king's arrival the ſtorm aroſe. The menaces of the whigs, backed by ſome very raſh declarations, by little circumſtances of humor which frequently offend more than real injuries, and by the entire change of all the perſons in employment, blew up the coals.

At firſt many of the tories had been made to entertain ſome faint hopes that they would be permitted to live in quiet. I have been aſſured that the king left Hanover in that reſolution. Happy had it been for him and for us if he had continued in it; if the moderation of his temper had not been overborne by the violence

violence of party, and his and the national intereſt ſacrificed to the paſſions of a few. Others there were among the tories who had flattered themſelves with much greater expectations than theſe, and who had depended, not on ſuch imaginary favor and dangerous advancement as was offered them afterwards, but on real credit and ſubſtantial power under the new government. Such impreſſions on the minds of men had rendered the two houſes of parliament, which were then ſitting, as good courtiers to King *George*, as ever they had been to Queen *Anne*. But all theſe hopes being at once and with violence extinguiſhed, deſpair ſucceeded in their room.

Our party began ſoon to act like men delivered over to their paſſions, and unguided by any other principle; not like men fired by a juſt reſentment and a reaſonable ambition to a bold undertaking. They treated the government like men who were reſolved not to live under it, and yet they took no one meaſure to ſupport themſelves againſt it. They expreſſed, without reſerve or circumſpection, an eagerneſs to join in any attempt againſt the eſtabliſhment which they had received and confirmed, and which many of them had courted but a few weeks before: and yet in the midſt of all this bravery, when the election of the new parliament came on, ſome of theſe very men acted with the coolneſs of thoſe who are much better diſpoſed to compound than to take arms.

The body of the tories being in this temper, it is not to be wondered at, if they heated one another, and began apace to turn their eyes towards the pretender: and if thoſe few, who had already engaged with him, applied themſelves to improve the conjuncture and endeavored to liſt a party for him.

I went about a month after the queen's death, as ſoon as the ſeals were taken from me, into the

country, and whilſt I continued there, I felt the general diſpoſition to jacobitiſm encreaſe daily among people of all ranks; among ſeveral who had been conſtantly diſtinguiſhed by their averſion to that cauſe. But at my return to London, in the month of February or March, one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifteen, a few weeks before I left England, I began for the firſt time in my whole life to perceive theſe general diſpoſitions ripen into reſolutions, and to obſerve ſome regular workings among many of our principal friends, which denoted a ſcheme of this kind. Theſe workings, indeed, were very faint, for the perſons concerned in carrying them on did not think it ſafe to ſpeak too plainly to men who were, in truth, ill diſpoſed to the government, becauſe they neither found their account at preſent under it, nor had been managed with art enough to leave them hopes of finding it hereafter; but who at the ſame time had not the leaſt affection for the pretender's perſon, nor any principle favorable to his intereſt.

This was the ſtate of things when the new parliament, which his majeſty had called, aſſembled. A great majority of the elections had gone in favor of the whigs; to which the want of concert among the tories had contributed as much as the vigor of that party, and the influence of the new government. The whigs came to the opening of this parliament full of as much violence as could poſſeſs men who expected to make their court, to confirm themſelves in power, and to gratify their reſentments by the ſame meaſures. I have heard that it was a diſpute among the miniſters how far this ſpirit ſhould be indulged, and that the king was determined, or confirmed in a determination, to conſent to the proſecutions, and

and to give the reins to the party by the repreſentations that were made to him, that great difficulties would ariſe in the conduct of the ſeſſion, if the court ſhould appear inclined to check this ſpirit, and by Mr. W———'s undertaking to carry all the buſineſs ſucceſsfully through the Houſe of Commons if they were at liberty. Such has often been the unhappy fate of our princes: a real neceſſity ſometimes, and ſometimes a ſeeming one, has forced them to compound with a part of the nation at the expence of the whole; and the ſucceſs of their buſineſs for one year has been purchaſed at the price of public diſorder for many.

The conjuncture I am ſpeaking of affords a memorable inſtance of this truth. If milder meaſures had been purſued, certain it is, that the tories had never univerſally embraced jacobitiſm. The violence of the whigs forced them into the arms of the pretender. The court and the party ſeemed to vie with one another which ſhould go the greateſt lengths in ſeverity: and the miniſters, whoſe true intereſt it muſt at all times be to calm the minds of men, and who ought never to ſet the examples of extraordinary inquiries or extraordinary accuſations, were, upon this occaſion, the tribunes of the people.

The council of regency, which began to ſit as ſoon as the queen died, acted like a council of the holy office. Whoever looked on the face of the nation ſaw every thing quiet; not one of thoſe ſymptoms appearing which muſt have ſhewn themſelves more or leſs at that moment, if, in reality, there had been any meaſures taken during the former reign to defeat the Proteſtant ſucceſſion. His majeſty aſcended the throne with as little contradiction and as little trouble, as ever a ſon ſucceeded a father in the poſſeſſion of a private patrimony. But he, who had the opportunity, which I had till

my diſmiſſion, of ſeeing a great part of what paſſed in that council, would have thought that there had been an oppoſition actually formed, that the new eſtabliſhment was attacked openly from without, and betrayed from within.

The ſame diſpoſition continued after the king's arrival. This political inquiſition went on with all the eagerneſs imaginable in ſeizing of papers, in ranſacking the queen's cloſet, and examining even her private letters. The whigs had clamored loudly, and affirmed in the face of the world, that the nation had been ſold to France, to Spain, to the pretender: and whilſt they endeavored in vain, by very ſingular methods, to find ſome color to juſtify what they had advanced without proof, they put themſelves under an abſolute neceſſity of grounding the moſt ſolemn proſecution on things whereof they might indeed have proof, but which would never paſs for crimes before any judges, but ſuch as were parties at the ſame time.

In the king's firſt ſpeech from the throne, all the inflaming hints were given, and all the methods of violence were chalked out to the two houſes. The firſt ſteps in both were perfectly anſwerable: and to the ſhame of the peerage be it ſpoken, I ſaw at that time ſeveral lords concur to condemn, in one general vote, all that they had approved of in a former parliament by many particular reſolutions. Among ſeveral bloody reſolutions propoſed and agitated at this time, the reſolution of impeaching me of high treaſon was taken: and I took that of leaving England, not in a panic terror improved by the artifices of the Duke of *Marlborough*, whom I knew even at that time too well to act by his advice or information in any caſe, but on ſuch grounds as the proceedings which ſoon followed ſufficiently juſtified, and as I have never repented building upon. Thoſe who blamed it in the firſt heat

heat were ſoon after obliged to change their language; for what other reſolution could I take? The method of proſecution deſigned againſt me would have put me immediately out of condition to act for myſelf, or to ſerve thoſe who were leſs expoſed than me, but who were, however, in danger. On the other hand, how few were there on whoſe aſſiſtance I could depend, or to whom I would, even in thoſe circumſtances, be obliged? The ferment in the nation was wrought up to a conſiderable height; but there was at that time no reaſon to expect that it would influence the proceedings in parliament in favor of thoſe who ſhould be accuſed. Left to its own movement, it was much more proper to quicken than ſlacken the proſecutions: and who was there to guide its motions? The tories who had been true to one another to the laſt were an handful, and no great vigor could be expected from them. The whimſicals, diſappointed of the figure which they hoped to make, began, indeed, to join their old friends. One * of the principal amongſt them was ſo very good as to confeſs to me, that if the court had called the ſervants of the late queen to account, and had ſtopped there, he muſt have conſidered himſelf as a judge, and have acted according to his conſcience on what ſhould have appeared to him: but that war had been declared to the whole tory party, and that now the ſtate of things was altered. This diſcourſe needed no commentary, and proved to me, that I had never erred in the judgment I made of this ſet of men. Could I then reſolve to be obliged to them, or to ſuffer with *Oxford?* As much as I ſtill was heated by the diſputes in which I had been all my life engaged againſt the whigs, I would ſooner have choſe to owe my ſecurity to their indulgence, than to the aſſiſtance of the whimſicals: but I thought baniſhment, with all her train of evils,

* Earl of *Angleſey*. I told the fact to the biſhop of *Rocheſter* that night or the next day.

preferable

preferable to either. I abhorred *Oxford* to that degree, that I could not bear to be joined with him in any caſe. Nothing perhaps contributed ſo much to determine me as this ſentiment. A ſenſe of honor would not have permitted me to diſtinguiſh between his caſe and mine own: and it was worſe than death to lie under the neceſſity of making them the ſame, and of taking meaſures in concert with him.

I am now come to the time at which I left England, and have finiſhed the firſt part of that deduction of facts which I propoſed to lay before you. I am hopeful, that you will not think it altogether tedious or unneceſſary: for although very little of what I have ſaid can be new to you, yet this ſummary account will enable you with greater eaſe to recall to your memory the paſſages of thoſe four years, wherewith all that I am going to relate to you has an immediate and neceſſary connexion.

In what has been ſaid I am far from making my own panegyric. I had not in thoſe days ſo much merit as was aſcribed to me: nor ſince that time have I had ſo little as the ſame perſons allowed me. I committed without diſpute many faults, and a greater man than I can pretend to be, conſtituted in the ſame circumſtances, would not have kept clear of all: but with reſpect to the tories I committed none. I carried the point of party-honor to the height, and ſacrificed every thing to my attachment to them during this period of time. Let us now examine whether I have done ſo during the reſt.

When I arrived in France, about the end of March, one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifteen, the affairs of England were repreſented to me in another light than I had ſeen them in, when I looked upon them with my own eyes very few weeks before. I found the perſons, who were detached

tached to ſpeak with me, prepared to think that I came over to negotiate for the pretender: and when they perceived that I was more ignorant than they imagined, I was aſſured by them, that there would be ſuddenly an univerſal riſing in England and Scotland. The leaders were named to me, their engagements ſpecified, and many gentlemen, yourſelf among others, were reckoned upon for particular ſervices, though I was certain you had never been treated with. From whence I concluded, and the event has juſtified my opinion, that theſe aſſurances had been given on the general characters of men, by ſuch of our friends as had embarked ſooner, and gone farther than the reſt.

This management ſurpriſed me extremely. In the anſwers I made, I endeavored to ſet the miſtake right: to ſhew that things were far from the point of maturity imagined; that the *Chevalier* had yet no party for him, and that nothing could form one but the extreme violence which the whigs threatened to exerciſe. Great endeavors were uſed to engage me in this affair, and to prevail on me to anſwer the letter of invitation ſent me from Bar. I alledged, as it was true, that I had no commiſſion from any perſon in England, and that the friends I left behind me were the only perſons who could determine me, if any could, to take ſuch a ſtep. As to the laſt propoſition, I abſolutely refuſed it.

In the uncertainty of what would happen, whether the proſecutions would be puſhed, which was moſt probable, in the manner intended againſt me, and againſt others, for all of whom, except the Earl of *Oxford*, I had as much concern as for myſelf; or whether the whigs would relent, drop ſome, and ſoften the fate of others; I reſolved to conduct myſelf ſo as to create no appearance which might be ſtrained into a pretence for hard uſage,

uſage, and which might be retorted on my friends when they debated for me, or when they defended themſelves. I ſaw the Earl of *Stair*, I promiſed him that I would enter into no jacobite-engagements, and I kept my word with him. I writ a letter to Mr. Secretary *Stanhope*, which might take off any imputation of neglect of the government; and I retired into Dauphiné to remove the objection of reſidence near the court of France.

This retreat from Paris was cenſured in England, and ſtiled a deſertion of my friends and of their cauſe: with what foundation let any reaſonable man determine. Had I engaged with the pretender before the party acted for him, or required of me that I ſhould do ſo, I had taken the air of being his man; whereas I looked on myſelf as theirs: I had gone about to bring them into his meaſures; whereas I never intended, even ſince that time, to do any thing more than to make him as far as poſſible act conformably to their views.

During the ſhort time I continued on the banks of the Rhone, the proſecutions were carried on at Weſtminſter with the utmoſt violence, and the ferment among the people was riſen to ſuch a degree, that it could end in nothing better, it might have ended in ſomething worſe, than it did. The meaſures which I obſerved at Paris had turned to no account; on the contrary, the letter which I writ to Mr. Secretary *Stanhope* was quoted as a baſe and fawning ſubmiſſion: and what I intended as a mark of reſpect to the government, and a ſervice to my friends, was perverted to ruin me in the opinion of the latter. The act of attainder, in conſequence of my impeachment, had paſſed againſt me, for crimes of the blackeſt dye: and among other inducements to paſs it my having been engaged in the pretender's intereſt was one. How well

well founded this article was has already appeared; I was juſt as guilty of the reſt. The correſpondence with me was, you know, neither frequent nor ſafe. I heard ſeldom and darkly from you, and though I ſaw well enough which way the current ran, yet I was entirely ignorant of the meaſures you took, and of the uſe you intended to make of me. I contented myſelf, therefore, with letting you all know that you had but to command me, and that I was ready to venture in your ſervice the little which remained, as frankly as I had expoſed all which was gone. At laſt your commands came, and I ſhall ſhew you in what manner I executed them.

The perſon who was ſent to me arrived in the beginning of July, one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifteen, at the place where I was. He ſpoke in the name of all the friends whoſe authority could influence me, and he brought me word that Scotland was not only ready to take arms, but under ſome ſort of diſſatisfaction to be with-held from beginning; that in England the people were exaſperated againſt the government to ſuch a degree, that far from wanting to be encouraged, they could not be reſtrained from inſulting it on every occaſion; that the whole tory party was become avowedly jacobite; that many officers of the army, and the majority of the ſoldiers were very well affected to the cauſe; that the city of London was ready to riſe, and that the enterpriſes for ſeiſing of ſeveral places were ripe for execution: in a word, that moſt of the principal tories were in a concert with the Duke of *Ormond*, for I had preſſed particularly to be informed whether his grace acted alone, or if not, who were his council; and that the others were ſo diſpoſed that there remained no doubt of their joining as ſoon as the firſt blow ſhould be ſtruck. He added, that my friends were a little ſurpriſed to obſerve that I lay neuter in ſuch a conjuncture.

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He repreſented to me the danger I ran of being prevented by people of all ſides from having the merit of engaging early in this enterpriſe; and how unaccountable it would be for a man impeached and attainted under the preſent government, to take no ſhare in bringing about a revolution ſo near at hand and ſo certain. He entreated that I would defer no longer to join the *Chevalier;* to adviſe and aſſiſt in carrying on his affairs, and to ſolicit and negotiate at the court of France, where my friends imagined that I ſhould not fail to meet with a favorable reception, and from whence they made no doubt of receiving aſſiſtance in a ſituation of affairs ſo critical, ſo unexpected, and ſo promiſing. He concluded by giving me a letter from the pretender, whom he had ſeen in his way to me, in which I was preſſed to repair without loſs of time to Commercy: and this inſtance was grounded on the meſſage which the bearer of the letter had brought me from my friends in England. Since he was ſent to me, it had been more proper to have come directly where I was: but he was in haſte to make his own court, and to deliver the aſſurances which were entruſted to him. Perhaps too, he imagined that he ſhould tie the knot faſter on me by acquainting me that my friends had actually engaged for themſelves and me, than by barely telling me that they deſired I would engage for myſelf and them.

In the progreſs of the converſation he related a multitude of facts, which ſatisfied me as to the general diſpoſition of the people; but he gave me little ſatisfaction as to the meaſures taken for improving this diſpoſition, for driving the buſineſs on with vigor if it tended to a revolution, or for ſupporting it with advantage if it ſpun into a war. When I queſtioned him concerning ſeveral perſons whoſe diſinclination to the government admitted of no doubt, and whoſe names, quality, and experience were very eſſential to the ſucceſs of the undertaking, he owned to me, that they

they kept a great reſerve, and did at moſt but encourage others to act, by general and dark expreſſions.

I received this account and this ſummons ill in my bed: yet important as the matter was, a few minutes ſerved to determine me. The circumſtances wanting to form a reaſonable inducement to engage did not eſcape me. But the ſmart of a bill of attainder tingled in every vein: and I looked on my party to be under oppreſſion, and to call for my aſſiſtance. Beſides which, I conſidered, firſt, that I ſhould certainly be informed, when I conferred with the *Chevalier*, of many particulars unknown to this gentleman; for I did not imagine that you could be ſo near to take arms, as he repreſented you to be on no other foundation than that which he expoſed: and ſecondly, that I was obliged in honor to declare, without waiting for a more particular information of what might be expected from England; ſince my friends had taken their reſolution to declare, without any previous aſſurance of what might be expected from France. This ſecond motive weighed extremely with me at that time: there is however more ſound than ſenſe in it, and it contains the original error to which all your ſubſequent errors, and the thread of misfortunes which followed, are to be aſcribed.

My reſolution thus taken, I loſt no time in repairing to Commercy. The very firſt converſations with the *Chevalier* anſwered in no degree my expectations: and I aſſure you with great truth, that I began even then, if not to repent of my own raſhneſs, yet to be fully convinced both of yours and mine.

He talked to me like a man who expected every moment to ſet out for England or Scotland, but who did not very well know for which: and when he entered into the particulars of his affairs, I found that

that concerning the former he had nothing more circumſtantial nor poſitive to go upon, than what I had already heard. The advices which were ſent from thence contained ſuch aſſurances of ſucceſs, as it was hard to think that men, who did not go upon the ſureſt grounds, would preſume to give. But then theſe aſſurances were general, and the authority ſeldom ſatisfactory. Thoſe which came from the beſt hand were verbal, and often conveyed by very doubtful meſſengers; others came from men whoſe fortunes were as deſperate as their councils; and others came from perſons whoſe ſituation in the world gave little reaſon to attend to their judgment in matters of this kind.

The Duke of *Ormond* had been for ſome time, I cannot ſay how long, engaged with the *Chevalier*. He had taken the direction of this whole affair, as far as related to England, upon himſelf, and had received a commiſſion for this purpoſe, which contained the moſt ample powers that could be given. After this one would be apt to imagine, that the principles on which the pretender ſhould proceed, and the tories engage in this ſervice, had been laid down; that a regular and certain method of correſpondence had been eſtabliſhed; and that the neceſſary aſſiſtances had been ſpecified, and that poſitive aſſurances had been given of them. Nothing leſs. In a matter as ſerious as this, all was looſe and abandoned to the diſpoſition of fortune. The firſt point had never been touched upon. By what I have ſaid above you ſee how little care was taken of the ſecond: and as to the third, the duke had aſked a ſmall body of regular forces, a ſum of money, and a quantity of arms and ammunition. He had been told in anſwer by the court of France, that he muſt abſolutely deſpair of any number of troops whatever, but he had been made in general to hope for ſome money, ſome arms, and ſome ammunition:

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a little ſum had, I think, been advanced to him. In a caſe ſo plain as this, it is hard to conceive how any man could err. The aſſiſtances demanded from France at this time, and even greater than theſe, will appear, in the ſequel of this relation, by the ſenſe of the whole party to have been deemed eſſentially neceſſary to ſucceſs. In ſuch an uncertainty therefore, whether even theſe could be obtained, or rather with ſo much reaſon to apprehend that they could not, it was evident that the tories ought to have lain ſtill. They might have helped the ferment againſt the government, but ſhould have avoided with the utmoſt care the giving any alarm, or even ſuſpicion of their true deſign, and have reſumed or not reſumed it as the *Chevalier* was able or not able to provide the troops, the arms, the money, &c. Inſtead of which thoſe who were at the head of the undertaking, and therefore anſwerable for the meaſures which were purſued, ſuffered the buſineſs to jog merrily on. They knew in general how little dependence was to be placed on foreign ſuccour, but acted as if they had been ſure of it: while the party were rendered ſanguine by their paſſions, and made no doubt of ſubverting a government they were angry with, both one and the other made as much buſtle, and gave as great alarm as would have been imprudent even at the eve of a general inſurrection. This appeared to me to be the ſtate of things with reſpect to England, when I arrived at Commercy.

The Scots had long preſſed the *Chevalier* to come amongſt them, and had of late ſent frequent meſſages to quicken his departure, ſome of which were delivered in terms much more zealous than reſpectful. The truth is, they ſeemed in as much haſte to begin, as if they had thought themſelves able to do the work alone; as if they had been apprehenſive of no danger but that of ſeeing it taken out of their hands, and of having the honor of it ſhared by others. However,

However, that which was wanting on the part of England was not wanting in Scotland: the Scots talked aloud, but they were in a condition to riſe. They took little care to keep their intentions ſecret, but they were diſpoſed to put thoſe intentions into immediate execution, and thereby to render the ſecret no longer neceſſary. They knew upon whom to depend for every part of the work, and they had concerted with the *Chevalier* even to the place of his landing.

There was need of no great ſagacity to perceive how unequal ſuch foundations were to the weight of the building deſigned to be raiſed on them.—The Scots, with all their zeal and all their valor, could bring no revolution about, unleſs in concurrence with the Engliſh: and among the latter nothing was ripe for ſuch an undertaking but the temper of the people, if that was ſo. I thought therefore, that the pretender's friends in the north ſhould be kept from riſing, till thoſe in the ſouth had put themſelves in a condition to act; and that in the mean while, the utmoſt endeavors ought to be uſed with the king of France to eſpouſe the cauſe; and that a plan of the deſign, with a more particular ſpecification of the ſuccours deſired, as well as of the time when, and the place to which they ſhould be conveyed, ought to be writ for: all which, I was told by the marſhal of *Berwic*, who had the principal direction at that time of theſe affairs in France, and I dare ſay very truly, had been often aſked, but never ſent. I looked on this enterpriſe to be of the nature of thoſe which can hardly be undertaken more than once; and I judged that the ſucceſs of it would depend on timing, as near as poſſible together, the inſurrection in both parts of the iſland, and the ſuccours from hence. The pretender approved this opinion of mine. He inſtructed me accordingly: and I left Lorain after having accepted

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the ſeals much againſt my inclination. I made one condition with him. It was this: that I ſhould be at liberty to quit a ſtation which my humor and many other conſiderations made me think myſelf very unfit for, whenever the occaſion upon which I engaged was over, one way or other: and I deſire you to remember that I did ſo.

I arrived at Paris towards the end of July, one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifteen. You will obſerve that all I was charged with, and by conſequence that I am anſwerable for, was to ſolicit this court, and to diſpoſe them to grant us the ſuccours neceſſary to make the attempt, as ſoon as we ſhould know certainly from England in what it was deſired that theſe ſuccours ſhould conſiſt, and whether they ſhould be ſent. Here I found a multitude of people at work, and every one doing what ſeemed good in his own eyes: no ſubordination, no order, no concert. Perſons, concerned in the management of theſe affairs upon former occaſions, have aſſured me this is always the caſe. It might be ſo to ſome degree; but I believe never ſo much as now. The jacobites had wrought one another up to look on the ſucceſs of the preſent deſigns as infallible. Every meeting-houſe which the populace demoliſhed, every little drunken riot which happened, ſerved to confirm them in theſe ſanguine expectations: and there was hardly one amongſt them who would loſe the air of contributing by his intrigues to the reſtoration, which he took it for granted would be brought about without him in a very few weeks.

Care and hope ſat on every buſy Iriſh face. Thoſe who could write and read had letters to ſhew, and thoſe who had not arrived to this pitch of erudition had their ſecrets to whiſper. No ſex was excluded from this miniſtry. *Fanny Ogletborp*, whom you muſt have ſeen in England, kept her corner

corner in it, and *Olive Trant* was the great wheel of our machine.

I imagine that this picture, the lines of which are not in the leaſt too ſtrong, would ſerve to repreſent what paſſed on your ſide of the water at the ſame time. The letters which came from thence ſeemed to me to contain rather ſuch things as the writers wiſhed might be true, than ſuch as they knew to be ſo; and the accounts which were ſent from hence were of the ſame kind. The vanity of ſome, and the credulity of others ſupported this ridiculous correſpondence, and I queſtion not but very many perſons, ſome ſuch I have known, did the ſame thing from a principle which they took to be a very wiſe one: they imagined that they helped by theſe means to maintain and to encreaſe the ſpirit of the party in England and France. They acted, like *Thoas*, that turbulent Ætolian, who brought *Antiochus* into Greece: "quibus mendaciis de rege, multiplicando "verbis copias ejus, erexerat multorum in Græcia "animos; iiſdem & regis ſpem inflabat, omnium "votis eum arceſſi." Thus were numbers of people employed under a notion of advancing the buſineſs, or from an affectation of importance, in amuſing and flattering one another, and in ſounding the alarm in the ears of an enemy, whom it was their intereſt to ſurpriſe. The government of England was put on its guard: and the neceſſity of acting, or of laying aſide with ſome diſadvantage all thoughts of acting for the preſent, was precipitated, before any meaſures neceſſary to enable you to act had been prepared or almoſt thought of.

If his majeſty did not, till ſome ſhort time after this, declare the intended invaſion to parliament, it was not for want of information. Before I came to Paris, what was doing had been diſcovered. The little armament made at the Havre which furniſhed the

the only means the *Chevalier* then had for his tranſportation into Britain, which had exhauſted the treaſury of St. Germains, and which contained all the arms and ammunition that could be depended upon for the whole undertaking, though they were hardly ſufficient to begin the work even in Scotland, was talked of publicly. A miniſter leſs alert and leſs capable than the Earl of *Stair* would eaſily have been at the bottom of the ſecret; for ſo it was called, when the particulars of meſſages received and ſent, the names of the perſons from whom they came, and by whom they were carried, were whiſpered about at tea-tables and in coffee-houſes.

In ſhort, what by the indiſcretion of people here, what by the rebound which came often back from London, what by the private intereſts and ambitious views of perſons in the French court, and what by other cauſes unneceſſary to be examined now, the moſt private tranſactions came to light: and they who imagined that they truſted their heads to the keeping of one or two friends, were in reality at the mercy of numbers. Into ſuch company was I fallen, for my ſins: and it is upon the credit of ſuch a mob-miniſtry, that the tories have judged me capable of betraying a truſt, or incapable of diſcharging it.

I had made very little progreſs in the buſineſs which brought me to Paris, when the paper ſo long expected was ſent, in purſuance of former inſtances, from England. The unanimous ſenſe of the principal perſons engaged was contained in it. The whole had been dictated word for word to the gentleman who brought it over by the Earl of *Mar*, and it had been delivered to him by the Duke of *Ormond*. I was driving in the wide ocean without a compaſs, when this dropped unexpectedly into my hands. I received it joyfully, and I ſteered my

courſe exactly by it. Whether the perſons from whom it came purſued the principles, and obſerved the rules which they laid down as the meaſures of their own conduct and of ours, will appear by the ſequel of this relation.

This memorial aſſerted, that there were no hopes of ſucceeding in a preſent undertaking, for many reaſons deduced in it without an immediate and univerſal riſing of the people in all parts of England upon the *Chevalier*'s arrival, and that this inſurrection was in no degree probable unleſs he brought a body of regular troops along with him: that if this attempt miſcarried, his cauſe and his friends, the Engliſh liberty and government, would be utterly ruined: but if by coming without troops he reſolved to riſque theſe and every thing elſe, he muſt ſet out ſo as not to arrive before the end of September, O. S. to juſtify which opinion many arguments were urged. In this caſe twenty thouſand arms, a train of artillery, five hundred officers, with their ſervants, and a conſiderable ſum of money, were demanded: and as ſoon as they ſhould be informed, that the *Chevalier* was in condition to make this proviſion, it was ſaid that notice ſhould be given him of the places to which he might ſend, and of the perſons who were to be truſted. I do not mention ſome inconveniencies which they touched upon ariſing from a delay. Becauſe their opinion was clearly for this delay, and becauſe they could not ſuppoſe that the *Chevalier* would act, or that thoſe about him would adviſe him to act, contrary to the ſenſe of all his friends in England. No time was loſt in making the proper uſe of this paper. As much of it as was fit to be ſhewn to this court was tranſlated into French, and laid before the king of France. I was now able to ſpeak with greater aſſurance, and in ſome ſort to undertake conditionally for the event of things.

The

The propoſal of violating treaties ſo lately and ſo ſolemnly concluded, was a very bold one to be made to people, whatever their inclinations might be, whom the war had reduced to the loweſt ebb of riches and power. They would not hear of a direct and open engagement, ſuch as the ſending a body of troops would have been, neither would they grant the whole of what was aſked in the ſecond plan. But it was impoſſible for them or any one elſe to foreſee how far thoſe ſteps which they were willing to take, well improved, might have encouraged or forced them to go. They granted us ſome ſuccours, and the very ſhip in which the pretender was to tranſport himſelf was fitted out by *Depine d'Anicant* at the king of France's expence. They would have concealed theſe appearances as much as they could; but the heat of the whigs and the reſentment of the court of England might have drawn them in. We ſhould have been glad indirectly to concur in fixing theſe things upon them: and, in a word, if the late king had lived ſix months longer, I verily believe that there had been war again between England and France. This was the only point of time when theſe affairs had, to my apprehenſion, the leaſt reaſonable appearance even of poſſibility: all that preceded was wild and uncertain: all that followed was mad and deſperate. But this favorable aſpect had an extreme ſhort duration. Two events ſoon happened, one of which caſt a damp on all we were doing, and the other rendered vain and fruitleſs all we had done. The firſt was the arrival of the Duke of *Ormond* in France, the other was the death of the king.

We had founded the duke's name high. His reputation and the opinion of his power were great. The French began to believe, that he was able to form and to head a party; that the troops would join him; that the nation would follow the ſignal whenever he drew his ſword; and the voice of the

people, the echo of which was continually in their ears, confirmed them in this belief. But when in the midſt of all theſe bright ideas they ſaw him arrive, almoſt literally alone, when to excuſe his coming, I was obliged to tell them, that he could not ſtay; they ſunk at once from their hopes: and that which generally happens happened in this caſe; becauſe they had had too good an opinion of the cauſe, they began to form too bad an one. Before this time, if they had no friendſhip for the tories, they had at leaſt ſome conſideration and eſteem. After this, I ſaw nothing but compaſſion in the beſt of them, and contempt in the others.

When I arrived at Paris, the king was already gone to Marly, where the indiſpoſition which he had begun to feel at Verſailles increaſed upon him. He was the beſt friend the *Chevalier* had: and when I engaged in this buſineſs, my principal dependence was on his perſonal character. This failed me to a great degree: he was not in a condition to exert the ſame vigor as formerly. The miniſters who ſaw ſo great an event as his death to be propably at hand, a certain minority, an uncertain regency, perhaps confuſion, at beſt a new face of government and a new ſyſtem of affairs, would not, for their own ſakes, as well as for the ſake of the public, venture to engage far in any new meaſures. All I had to negotiate by myſelf firſt, and in conjunction with the Duke of *Ormond* ſoon afterwards, languiſhed with the king. My hopes ſunk as he declined, and died when he expired. The event of things has ſufficiently ſhewn, that all thoſe which were entertained by the duke and the jacobite party under the regency were founded on the groſſeſt deluſions imaginable. Thus was the project become impracticable before the time arrived, which was fixed by thoſe who directed things in England, for putting it in execution.

The

The new government of France appeared to me like a ſtrange country; I was little acquainted with the roads. Moſt of the faces I met with were unknown to me, and I hardly underſtood the language of the people. Of the men who had been in power under the late reign, many were diſcarded, and moſt of the others were too much taken up with the thoughts of ſecuring themſelves under this, to receive applications in favor of the pretender. The two men who had the greateſt appearance of favor and power, were *D'Agueſſeau* and *Noailles*. One was made chancellor, on the death of *Voiſin*, from attorney general; and the other was placed at the head of the treaſury. The firſt paſſes for a man of parts, but he never acted out of the ſphere of the law: I had no acquaintance with him before this time; and when you conſider his circumſtances and mine, you will not think it could be very eaſy for me to get acceſs to him now. The latter I had known extremely well whilſt the late king lived: and from the ſame court principle, as he was glad to be well with me then, he would hardly know me now. The * miniſter who had the principal direction of foreign affairs I lived in friendſhip with, and I muſt own to his honor, that he never encouraged a deſign, which he knew that his court had no intention of ſupporting.

There were other perſons, not to tire you with farther particulars upon this head, of credit and influence, with whom I found indirect and private ways of converſing: but it was in vain to expect any more than civil language from them, in a cafe which they found no diſpoſition in their maſter to countenance, and in favor of which they had no prejudices of their own. The private engagements into which the Duke of *Orleans* had entered with his

* *M. d'Huxelles.*

majeſty,

majeſty, during the life of the late king, will abate of their force as the regent grows into ſtrength, and would ſoon have had no force at all if the pretender had met with ſucceſs: but in theſe beginnings they operated very ſtrongly. The air of this court was to take the counterpart of all which had been thought right under *Lewis* the Fourteenth. "Cela reſemble trop à l'ancien ſyſtème," was an anſwer ſo often given, that it became a jeſt, and almoſt a proverb. But to finiſh this account with a fact which is incredible, but ſtrictly true; the very peace, which had ſaved France from ruin, and the makers of it, were become as unpopular at this court, as at the court of Vienna.

The Duke of *Ormond* flattered himſelf in this ſtate of things, that he had opened a private and ſure channel of arriving at the regent, and of bending him to his purpoſes. His grace and I lived together at this time in an houſe which one of my friends had lent me. I obſerved that he was frequently loſt, and that he made continual excurſions out of town, with all the myſterious precaution imaginable. I doubted at firſt, whether theſe intrigues related to buſineſs or pleaſure, I ſoon diſcovered with whom they were carried on, and had reaſon to believe that both were mingled in them. It is neceſſary that I explain this ſecret to you.

Mrs. Trant, whom I have named above, had been preparing herſelf for the retired abſtemious life of a † carmelite, by taking a ſurfeit of the pleaſures of Paris; when a little before the death of the queen, or about that time, ſhe went into England. What ſhe was entruſted, either by the *Chevalier*, or any other perſon, to negotiate there, I am ignorant of, and it imports not much to know. In that journey

† She uſed to pretend a reſolution of turning nun. She is ſince married to the Duke of *Bouillon*'s brother, who was too much diſhonoured by his former life, to be ſo even by this ſcandalous match.

ſhe

ſhe made or renewed an acquaintance with the Duke of *Ormond*. The ſcandalous chronicle affirms, that ſhe brought with her, when ſhe returned into France, a woman, of whom I have not the leaſt knowledge, but who was probably handſome; ſince without beauty, ſuch a merchandiſe would not have been ſaleable, nor have anſwered the deſign of the importer: and that ſhe made this way her court to the regent. Whatever her merit was ſhe kept a correſpondence with him, and put herſelf upon that foot of familiarity, which he permits all thoſe who contribute to his pleaſures to aſſume. She was placed by him, as ſhe told me herſelf, where I found her ſome time after that which I am ſpeaking of, in the houſe of an antient gentlewoman, who had formerly been maid of honor to Madame, and who had contracted at court a ſpirit of intrigue, which accompanied her in her retreat.

Theſe two had aſſociated to them the Abbè de *Teſieu*, in all the political parts of their buſineſs; for I will not ſuppoſe that ſo reverend an eccleſiaſtic entered into any other ſecret. This abbè is the regent's ſecretary: and it was chiefly through him that the private treaty had been carried on between his maſter and the Earl of *Stair* in the king's reign. Whether the prieſt had ſtooped at the lure of a cardinal's hat, or whether he acted the ſecond part by the ſame orders that he acted the firſt, I know not. This is ſure, and the Britiſh miniſter was not the bubble of it, that whilſt he concerted meaſures on one hand to traverſe the pretender's deſigns, he teſtified on the other all the inclination poſſible to his ſervice. A mad fellow, who had been an intendant in Normandy, and ſeveral other politicians of the loweſt form, were at different times taken into this famous junto.

With theſe worthy people his grace of *Ormond* negotiated, and no care was omitted on his part to keep

keep me out of the ſecret. The reaſon of which, as far as I am able to gueſs at, ſhall be explained to you by and by. I might very juſtly have taken this proceeding ill, and the duke will not be able to find in my whole conduct towards him any thing like it: I proteſt to you very ſincerely I was not in the leaſt moved at it.

He advanced not a ſtep in his buſineſs with theſe ſham miniſters, and yet imagined that he got daily ground. I made no progreſs with the true ones, but I ſaw it. Theſe, however, were not our only difficulties. We lay under another, which came from your ſide, and which embarraſſed us more. The firſt hindered us from working forward to our point of view, but the ſecond took all point of view from us.

A paper was ſent into England juſt before the death of the king of France, which had been drawn by me at Chaville in concert with the Dukes of *Ormond* and *Berwic*, and with Monſieur de *Torcy*. This paper was an anſwer to the memorial received from thence. The ſtate of this country was truly repreſented in it: the difference was fixed between what had been aſked, and what might be expected from France; and upon the whole it was demanded what our friends would do, and what they would have us to do? the reply to this came through the French ſecretary of ſtate to our hands. They declared themſelves unable to ſay any thing, till they ſhould ſee what turn affairs would take on ſo great an event as the death of the king, the report of which had reached them.

Such a declaration ſhut our mouths and tied our hands. I confeſs I knew neither how to ſolicit, nor what to ſolicit; this laſt meſſage ſuſpending the project on which we had acted before, and which I kept as an inſtruction conſtantly before my eyes. It ſeemed to me uncertain, whether you intended to go on, or whether your deſign

ſign was to ſtifle as much as poſſible all paſt tranſactions; to lie perfectly ſtill; to throw upon the court the odium of having given a falſe alarm, and to wait till new accidents at home, and a more favorable conjuncture abroad, might tempt you to reſume the enterpriſe. Perhaps this would have been the wiſeſt game you could have played: but then, you ſhould have concerted it with us who acted for you here. You intended no ſuch thing, as appeared afterwards: and therefore, thoſe who acted for the party at London, whoever they were, muſt be deemed inexcuſable for leaving things on the foot of this meſſage, and giving us no advice fit to be depended upon for many weeks. Whilſt preparations were to be made, and the work was to be ſet a going by aſſiſtance from hence, you might reaſonably expect to hear from us, and to be determined by us: but when all hopes of this kind ſeemed to be gone, it was your part to determine us, and we could take no reſolution here, but that of conforming ourſelves to whatever ſhould come preſcribed from England.

Whilſt we were in this condition, the moſt deſperate that can be imagined, we began to receive verbal meſſages from you, that no more time was to be loſt, and that the *Chevalier* ſhould come away. No man was, I believe, ever ſo embarraſſed as I found myſelf at that time. I could not imagine that you would content yourſelves by looſe verbal meſſages, after all that had happened, to call us over, and I know by experience how little ſuch meſſages are to be depended on. For ſoon after I engaged in theſe affairs, a monk arrived at Bar, diſpatched, as he affirmed, by the Duke of *Ormond*, in whoſe name he inſiſted that the *Chevalier* ſhould haſten into Britain, and that nothing but his preſence was wanting to place the crown on his head. The fellow delivered his errand ſo poſitively, and ſo circumſtantially, that the reſolution was taken at Bar to ſet out, and my rendezvous to join the

the *Chevalier* was appointed me. This method to fetch a king with as little ceremony as one would invite a friend to ſupper, appeared ſomewhat odd to me, who was then very new in theſe affairs. But when I came to talk with the man, for by good luck he had been ſent for from Bar to Paris, I eaſily diſcerned that he had no ſuch commiſſion as he pretended to, and that he acted of his own head. I preſumed to oppoſe the taking any reſolution upon his word, though he was a monk; and ſoon after we knew from the Duke of *Ormond* himſelf, that he had never ſent him.

This example made me cautious; but that which determined my opinion was, that I could never imagine, without ſuppoſing you all run mad, that the ſame men who judged this attempt unripe for execution, unleſs ſupported by regular troops from France, or at leaſt by all the other aſſiſtances which are enumerated above, while the deſign was much more ſecret than at preſent, when the king had no fleet at ſea, nor more than eight thouſand men diſperſed over the whole iſland, when we had the good wiſhes of the French court on our ſide, and were ſure of ſome particular aſſiſtances, and of a general connivance; that the ſame men, I ſay, ſhould preſs for making it now without any other preparation, when we had neither money, arms, ammunition, nor a ſingle company of foot, when the government of England was on its guard, national troops were raiſed, foreign forces ſent for, and France, like all the reſt of the continent, againſt us. I could not conceive ſuch a ſtrange combination of accidents as ſhould make the neceſſity of acting encreaſe gradually upon us, as the means of doing ſo were taken from us.

Upon the whole matter, my opinion was, and I did not obſerve the Duke of *Ormond* to differ from me, that we ſhould wait till we heard from you, in

ſuch

ſuch a manner as might aſſure us of what you intended to do yourſelves and of what you expected fromus, and that in the mean while we ſhould go as far as the little money which we had, and the little favor which was ſhewn us, would allow, in getting ſome embarkations ready on the coaſt.

Sir *George Byng* had come into the road of Havre, and had demanded by name ſeveral ſhips which belonged to us, to be given up to him. The regent did not think fit to let him have the ſhips; but he ordered them to be unloaded, and their cargoes were put into the king's magazines. We were in no condition to repair the loſs; and therefore, when I mention embarkations, you will pleaſe to underſtand nothing more than veſſels to tranſport the pretender's perſon, and the perſons of thoſe who ſhould go over with him. This was all we could do, and this was not neglected.

We were thus employed, when a gentleman arrived from Scotland to repreſent the ſtate of that country, and to require a definitive anſwer from the *Chevalier*, whether he would have the inſurrection to be made immediately, which they apprehended they might not be able to make at all, if they were obliged to defer it much longer. This gentleman was ſent inſtantly back again, and was directed to let the perſons he came from know, that the *Chevalier* was deſirous to have the riſing of his friends in England and Scotland ſo adjuſted, that they might mutually aſſiſt each other, and diſtract the enemy; that he had not received a final anſwer from his friends in England, but that he was in daily expectation of it; that it was very much to be wiſhed, that all attempts in Scotland could be ſuſpended till ſuch time as the Engliſh were ready; but that if the Scots were ſo preſſed that they muſt either ſubmit or riſe immediately, he was of opinion they ſhould riſe, and he would make the beſt of his way to them.

What

What this forwardneſs in the Scots, and this uncertainty and backwardneſs in the Engliſh muſt produce, it was not hard to foreſee; and therefore, that I might neglect nothing in my power to prevent any falſe meaſures, as I was conſcious to myſelf that I had neglected nothing to promote true ones, I diſpatched a gentleman to London, where I ſuppoſed the Earl of *Mar* to be, ſome days before the meſſage I have juſt ſpoken of was ſent to Scotland. I deſired him to make my compliments to Lord *Mar*, and to tell him from me, that I underſtood it to be his ſenſe, as well as the ſenſe of all our friends, that Scotland could do nothing effectually without the concurrence of England, and that England would not ſtir without aſſiſtance from abroad: that he might aſſure himſelf no ſuch aſſiſtance could be depended upon, and that I begged of him to make the inference from theſe propoſitions. The gentleman went, but upon his arrival at London, he found that the Earl of *Mar* was already ſet out to draw the Highlanders into arms. He communicated his meſſage to a perſon * of confidence, who undertook to ſend it after his lordſhip, and this was the utmoſt which either he or I could do in ſuch a conjuncture.

You are now viſibly departed from the very ſcheme which you had ſent us over, and from all the principles which had been ever laid down. I did what I could to keep up my own ſpirit as well as the ſpirits of the *Chevalier* and of all thoſe with whom I was in correſpondence: I endeavoured even to deceive myſelf. I could not remedy the miſchief, and I was reſolved to ſee the concluſion of the perilous adventure. But I own to you, that I thought then, and that I have not changed my opinion ſince, that ſuch meaſures as theſe

* Mr. *Lewis*, who belonged to the Earl of *Oxford*.

would

would not be purſued, by any reaſonable man, in the moſt common affairs of life. It was with the utmoſt aſtoniſhment that I ſaw them purſued, in the conduct of an enterpriſe which had for its object nothing leſs than the diſpoſition of crowns, and for the means of bringing it about nothing leſs than a civil war.

Impatient that we heard nothing from England, when we expected every moment to hear that the war was begun in Scotland, the Duke of *Ormond* and I reſolved to ſend a perſon * of confidence to London. We inſtructed him to repeat to you the former accounts, which we had ſent over, to let you know how deſtitute the *Chevalier* was, either of actual ſupport, or even of reaſonable hopes, and to deſire that you would determine whether he ſhould go to Scotland, or throw himſelf on ſome part of the Engliſh coaſt. This perſon was farther inſtructed to tell you, that the *Chevalier* being ready to take any reſolution at a moment's warning, you might depend on his ſetting out the inſtant he received your anſwer: and therefore, that to ſave time, if your intention was to riſe, you would do well to act immediately, on the aſſurance that the plan you preſcribed, be it what it would, ſhould be exactly complied with. We took this reſolution the rather, becauſe one of the pacquets which had been prepared in cypher, to give you an account of things which had been put above three weeks before into Monſ. de *Torcy*'s hands, and which by conſequence we thought to be in yours, was by this time ſent back to me by this miniſter, I think open, with an excuſe that he durſt not take upon him to forward it.

The perſon diſpatched to London returned very ſoon to us, and the anſwer he brought was †, that

* Mr. *Ezechiel Hamilton*: he got all the papers by heart.

† *Landſdown* gave this anſwer in the name of all the perſons privy to the ſecret.

ſince

ſince affairs grew daily worſe, and could not mend by delay, our friends in England had reſolved to declare immediately, and that they would be ready to join the *Chevalier* on his landing: that his perſon would be as ſafe there as in Scotland, and that in every other reſpect, it was better that he ſhould land in England; that they had uſed their utmoſt endeavors, and that they hoped the weſtern counties were in a good poſture to receive him. To this was added, a general indication of the place he ſhould come to, as near to Plymouth as poſſible.

You muſt agree, that this was not the anſwer of men who knew what they were about. A little more preciſion was neceſſary in dictating a meſſage, which was to have ſuch conſequences: and eſpecially ſince the gentleman could not fail to acquaint the perſons he ſpoke with, that the *Chevalier* was not able to carry men enough to ſecure him from being taken up, even by the firſt conſtable. Notwithſtanding this, the Duke of *Ormond* ſet out from Paris, and the *Chevalier* from Bar. Some perſons were ſent to the north of England, and others to London, to give notice that they were both on their way. Their routs were ſo ordered, that the Duke of *Ormond* was to ſail from the coaſt of Normandy ſome days before the *Chevalier* arrived at St. Malo, to which place the duke was to ſend immediate notice of his landing; and two gentlemen acquainted with the country, and perfectly well known to all our friends in thoſe parts, were diſpatched before, that the people of Devonſhire and Somerſetſhire, who were, we concluded, in arms, might be appriſed of the ſignals which were to be made from the ſhips, and might be ready to receive the duke.

On the coaſt of France, and before his embarkation, the duke heard that ſeveral of our principal friends had been ſeiſed, immediately after the perſon who

who came laſt from them had left London; that the others were all diſperſed, and that the conſternation was univerſal. He embarked notwithſtanding this melancholy news, and ſupported by nothing but the firmneſs of his temper, he went over to the place appointed: he did more than his part, and he found that our friends had done leſs than theirs. One of the gentlemen who had paſſed over before him, and had traverſed part of the country, joined him on the coaſt, and aſſured him that there was not the leaſt room to expect a riſing. In a word, he was refuſed a night's lodging in a country which we had been told was in a good poſture to receive the *Chevalier*, and where the duke expected that multitudes would repair to him.

He returned to the coaſt of Britany after this uncomfortable expedition, where the *Chevalier* arrived about the ſame time from Lorain. What his grace propoſed by the ſecond attempt, which he made as ſoon as the veſſel could be refitted, to land in the ſame part of the iſland, I profeſs myſelf to be ignorant. I writ him my opinion at the time, and I have always thought, that the ſtorm in which he had like to have been caſt away, and which forced him back to the French coaſt, ſaved him from a much greater peril, that of periſhing in an attempt as full of extravagant raſhneſs, and as void of all reaſonable meaning, as any of thoſe adventures which have rendered the hero of La Mancha immortal.

The *Chevalier* had now but one of theſe two things left him to do; one was to return to Bar, the other was to go to Scotland, where there were people in arms for him. He took this laſt reſolution. He left Britany, where he had as many miniſters as there were people about him, and where he was eternally teiſed with noiſy diſputes about what was to be done, in circumſtances

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in which no reaſonable thing could be done. He ſent to have a veſſel got ready for him at Dunkirk, and he croſſed the country as privately as he could.

Whilſt all theſe things paſſed, I remained at Paris, to try, if by any means ſome aſſiſtance might be at laſt procured; without which it is was evident, even to thoſe who flattered themſelves the moſt, that the game was up.

No ſooner was the Duke of *Ormond* gone from Paris, on the deſign which I have mentioned, and Mrs. *Trant*, who had accompanied him part of the way, returned, but I was ſent for to a little houſe at Madrid in the Bois de Boulogne, where ſhe lived with Mademoiſelle de *Chauſſery*, the antient gentlewoman with whom the Duke of *Orleans* had placed her. Theſe two perſons opened to me what had paſſed whilſt the Duke of *Ormond* was there, and the hopes they had of drawing the regent into all the meaſures neceſſary to ſupport the attempts, which were making in favor of the *Chevalier*.

By what they told me at firſt, I ſaw that they had been truſted; and by what paſſed in the courſe of my treating with them, it appeared, that they had the acceſs which they pretended to. All which I had been able to do by proper perſons and in proper methods, ſince the king of France's death, amounting to little or nothing, I reſolved at laſt, to try what was to be done by this indirect way. I put myſelf under the conduct of theſe female managers, and without having the ſame dependence on them as his grace of *Ormond* had, I puſhed their credit and their power as far as they reached, during the time I continued to ſee them. I met with ſmoother language and greater hopes than had been given me hitherto. A note ſigned by the regent, ſuppoſed to be writ to a woman, but which was to be explained to be intended for the Earl of *Mar*,

Mar, was put into my hands to be ſent to Scotland. I took a copy of it, which you may ſee at the end of theſe papers †. When Sir *John Areſkine* came to preſs for ſuccour, the regent was prevailed upon by theſe women to ſee him, but he carried nothing real back with him, except a quantity of gold, part of the money which we had drawn from Spain, and which was loſt with the veſſel in a very odd manner on the Scotch coaſt. The Duke of *Ormond* had been promiſed ſeven or eight thouſand arms, which were drawn out of the magazines, and ſaid to be lodged, I think at Compiegne. I uſed my utmoſt efforts, that theſe arms might be carried forward to the coaſt, and I undertook for their tranſportation: but all was in vain; ſo that the likelihood of bringing any thing to effect in time appeared to me no greater than I had found it before I entered into this intrigue.

I ſoon grew tired of a commerce, which nothing but ſucceſs could render tolerable, and reſolved to be no longer amuſed by the pretences, which were daily repeated to me, that the regent had entertained perſonal prejudices againſt me, and that he was inſenſibly, and by degrees, to be dipped in our meaſures; that both theſe things required time, but that they would certainly be brought about, and that we ſhould then be able to anſwer all the expectations of the Engliſh and the Scotch. The firſt of theſe pretences contained a fact, which I could hardly perſuade myſelf to be true, becauſe I knew very certainly, that I had never given his royal highneſs the leaſt occaſion for ſuch prejudices: the ſecond was a work which might ſpin out into a great and uncertain length. I took my reſolution to drive what related to myſelf to an immediate explanation, and what related to others to an immediate deciſion, not to ſuffer any excuſe for doing

† This note has not been found among the author's papers.

nothing to be founded on my conduct, nor the salvation, if I could hinder it, of so many gallant men as were in arms in Scotland, to rest on the success of such womanish projects. I shall tell you what I did on the first head now, and what I did on the second hereafter in its proper place.

The fact, which it was said the regent laid to my charge, was a correspondence with Lord *Stair*, and having been one night at his house, from whence I did not retire till three in the morning. As soon as I got hold of this, I desired the marshal of *Berwic* to go to him. The marshal told him from me, that I had been extremely concerned, to hear in general, that I lay under his displeasure; that a story, which it was said he believed, had been related to me; that I expected the justice which he could deny to no man of having the accusation proved, in which case I was contented to pass for the last of human kind, or of being justified if it could not be proved. He answered, that such a story had been related to him by such persons as he thought would not have deceived him; that he had been since convinced, that it was false, and that I should be satisfied of his regard for me: but that he must own he was very uneasy to find, that I, who could apply to him through the marshal *d'Huxelles*, could chuse to treat with Mrs. *Trant*, and the rest; for he named all the cabal, except his secretary, whom I had never met at Mademoiselle *Chauffery*'s. He added, that these people teised him, at my instigation, to death, and that they were not fit to be trusted with any business. He applied to some of them the severest epithets. The marshal of *Berwic* replied, that he was sure I should receive the whole of what he had been pleased to say with the greatest satisfaction; that I had treated with these persons much against my will; and finally, that if his royal highness would not employ them, he was sure I would never apply to them. In a conversation which I had

had not long after with him, he ſpoke to me in much the ſame terms as he had done to the marſhal. I went from him very ill edified as to his intentions of doing any thing in favor of the *Chevalier*; but I carried away with me this ſatisfaction, that he had aſſigned me, from his own mouth, the perſon through whom I ſhould make my applications to him, and through whom I ſhould depend on receiving his anſwers; that he had diſavowed all the little politic clubs, and had commanded me to have no more to do with them.

Before I reſume the thread of my narration, give me leave to make ſome reflection upon what I have been laſt ſaying to you. When I met with the Duke of *Ormond* at his return from the coaſt, he thought himſelf obliged to ſay ſomething to excuſe his keeping me out of a ſecret, which during his abſence I had been let into. His excuſe was, that the regent had exacted from him that I ſhould know nothing of the matter. You will obſerve, that the account which I have given you ſeems to contradict this aſſertion of his grace, ſince it is hard to ſuppoſe, that if the regent had exacted that I ſhould be kept out of the ſecret, theſe women would have dared to have let me into it; and ſince it is ſtill harder to ſuppoſe, that the regent would make this expreſs condition with the Duke of *Ormond*, and the moment the duke's back was turned, would ſuffer theſe women to teiſe him from me, and to bring me anſwers from him. I am, however, far from taxing the duke with affirming an untruth. I believe the regent did make ſuch a condition with him, and I will tell you how I underſtand all this little management, which will explain a great deal to you. This prince, with wit and valor, has joined all the irreſolution of temper poſſible, and is, perhaps, the man in the world the leaſt capable of ſaying no to your face. From hence it happened, that theſe women, like multitudes of other people, forced him to ſay

and do enough to give them the air of having credit with him, and of being truſted by him. This drew in the Duke of *Ormond*, who is not, I dare ſay, as yet undeceived. The regent never intended from the firſt, to do any thing, even indirectly, in favor of the jacobite cauſe. His intereſt was plainly on the other ſide, and he ſaw it. But then, the ſame weakneſs in his character carried him, as it would have done his great uncle *Gaſton* in the ſame caſe, to keep meaſures with the *Chevalier*. His double trimming character prevailed on him to talk with the Duke of *Ormond*: but it carried him no farther. I queſtion not but he did on this occaſion, what you muſt have obſerved many men to do. We not only endeavor to impoſe on the world, but even on ourſelves. We diſguiſe our weakneſs, and work up in our minds an opinion that the meaſure which we fall into by the natural or habitual imperfection of our character, is the effect of a principle of prudence, or of ſome other virtue. Thus the regent, who ſaw the Duke of *Ormond*, becauſe he could not reſiſt the importunity of *Olive Trant*, and who gave hopes to the duke, becauſe he can refuſe no body, made himſelf believe, that it was a great ſtrain of policy, to blow up the fire, and to keep Britain embroiled. I am perſuaded that I do not err in judging that he thought in this manner; and here I fix the reaſon of his excluding me out of the commerce which he had with the Duke of *Ormond*, of his affecting a perſonal diſlike of me, and of his avoiding any correſpondence with me upon theſe matters; till I forced myſelf in a manner upon him, and he could not keep me any longer at a diſtance without departing from his firſt principle, that of keeping meaſures with every body. He then threw me, or let me ſlide, if you will, into the hands of theſe women, and when he found that I preſſed him hard that way too, he took me out of their hands and put me back again into

into the proper channel of buſineſs, where I had not been long, as you will ſee by and by, before the ſcene of amuſement was finiſhed. Sir *John Areſkine* told me, when he came from the firſt audience that he had of his royal highneſs, that he put him in mind of the encouragement which he had given the Earl of *Mar* to take arms. I never heard any thing of this kind, but what Sir *John* let drop to me. If the fact be true, you ſee that the Scotch general had been amuſed by him with a witneſs. The Engliſh general was ſo in his turn, and while this was doing, the regent might think it beſt to have him to himſelf. Four eyes comprehend more objects than two, and I was a little better acquainted with the characters of people, and the maſs of the country, than the duke, though this court had been at firſt a ſtrange country to me in compariſon of the former.

An infinity of little circumſtances concurred to make me form this opinion, ſome of which are better felt than explained, and many of which are not preſent to my memory. That which had the greateſt weight with me, and which is, I think, deciſive, I will mention. At the very time when it is pretended, that the regent treated with the Duke of *Ormond*, on the expreſs condition that I ſhould know nothing of the matter; two * perſons of the firſt rank and greateſt credit in this court, when I made the moſt preſſing inſtances to them in favor of the *Chevalier*, threw out in converſation to me, that I ſhould attach myſelf to the Duke of *Orleans*, that in my circumſtances I might want him, and that he might have occaſion for me. Something was intimated of penſions, and eſtabliſhment, and of making my peace at home. I would not underſtand this language, becauſe I would not break with the people

* Marſhal *d'Huxelles*, marſhal *d'Effiat*: twenty-five thouſand pound offered by the laſt.

who

who held it: and when they ſaw that I would not take the hints, they ceaſed to give them.

I fancy that you ſee by this time the motives of the regent's conduct. I am not, I confeſs, able to explain to you thoſe of the Duke of *Ormond*'s: I cannot ſo much as gueſs at them. When he came into France I was careful to ſhew him all the friendſhip and all the reſpect poſſible. My friends were his, my purſe was his, and even my bed was his. I went further, I did all thoſe things which touch moſt ſenſibly people who have been uſed to pomp. I made my court to him, and haunted his levee with aſſiduity. In return to this behavior, which was the pure effect of my good will, and which no duty that I owed his grace, no obligation that I had to him, impoſed upon me; I have great reaſon to ſuſpect, that he went at leaſt half way in all that was ſaid or done againſt me. He threw himſelf blindly into the ſnare which was laid for him, and inſtead of hindering, as he and I, in concert, might have done, thoſe affairs from languiſhing, in the manner they did ſeveral months, he furniſhed this court with an excuſe for not treating with me, till it was too late to play even a ſaving game; and he neither drove the regent to aſſiſt the *Chevalier*, nor to declare that he would not aſſiſt him; though it was fatal to the cauſe in general, and to the Scotch in particular, not to bring one of the two about.

It was Chriſtmas, one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifteen, before the *Chevalier* ſailed for Scotland. The battle of Dunblain had been fought, the buſineſs of Preſton was over: there remained not the leaſt room to expect any commotion in his favor among the Engliſh; and many of the Scotch, who had declared for him, began to grow cool in the cauſe. No proſpect of ſucceſs could engage him in this expedition, but it was become neceſſary for his reputation. The Scotch on one ſide ſpared not

to

to reproach him, I think unjuſtly, for his delay; and the French, on the other, were extremely eager to have him gone. Some of thoſe who knew little of Britiſh affairs imagined, that his preſence would produce miraculous effects. You muſt not be ſurprized at this. As near neighbours as we are, ninety nine in an hundred among the French are as little acquainted with the inſide of our iſland as with that of Japan. Others of them were uneaſy to ſee him ſkulking about in France, and to be told of it every hour by the Earl of *Stair*. Others again imagined, that he might do their buſineſs by going into Scotland, though he ſhould not do his own: that is, they flattered themſelves, that he might keep a war for ſome time alive, which would employ the whole attention of our government; and for the event of which they had very little concern. Unable from their natural temper, as well as their habits, to be true to any principle, they thought and acted in this manner, whilſt they affected the greateſt friendſhip to the king, and whilſt they really did deſire to enter into new and more intimate engagements with him. Whilſt the pretender continued in France they could neither avow him nor favor his cauſe: if he once ſet his foot on Scotch ground, they gave hopes of indirect aſſiſtance: and if he could mantain himſelf in any corner of the iſland, they could look upon him, † it was ſaid, as a king. This was their language to us. To the Britiſh miniſter they denied, they forſwore, they renounced; and yet the ‡ man of the beſt head in all their councils, being aſked by Lord *Stair* what they intended to do, anſwered, before he was aware, that they pretended to be neuters.—

† Diſcourſe of Abbé *d'Eſtrees*, afterwards archbiſhop of Cambray.

‡ Mar. *d'Huxelles*.

I leave

I leave you to judge, how this ſlip was taken up.

As ſoon as I received advice that the *Chevalier* was ſailed from Dunkirk, I renewed, I redoubled all my applications. I neglected no means, I forgot no argument which my underſtanding could ſuggeſt to me. What the Duke of *Ormond* reſted upon, you have ſeen already; and I doubt very much whether Lord *Mar*, if he had been here in my place, would have been able to employ meaſures more effectual than thoſe which I made uſe of. I may, without any imputation of arrogance, compare myſelf on this occaſion with his lordſhip, ſince there was nothing in the management of this affair above my degree of capacity; nothing equal, either in extent or difficulty, to the buſineſs which he was a ſpectator of, and which I carried on, when we were ſecretaries of ſtate together under the late queen.

The king of France, who was not able to furniſh the pretender with money himſelf, had writ ſome time before his death to his grandſon, and had obtained a promiſe of four hundred thouſand crowns from the king of Spain, a ſmall part of this ſum had been received by the queen's treaſurer at St. Germain's, and had been either ſent to Scotland or employed to defray the expences which were daily making on the coaſt. I preſſed the Spaniſh ambaſſador at Paris, I ſolicited, by *Lawleſs*, *Alberoni* at Madrid; and I found † another more private and more promiſing way of applying to him. I took care to have a number of officers picked out of the Iriſh troops, which ſerve in that country; their routs were given them, and I ſent a ſhip to receive and tranſport them. The money came in ſo ſlowly and in ſuch trifling

† Marquiſs *Monti.*

ſums,

ſums, that it turned to little account, and the officers were on their way when the *Chevalier* returned from Scotland.

In the ſummer, endeavors had been uſed to prevail on the King of Sweden to tranſport from Gottenburg, the troops he had in that neighbourhood into Scotland, or into the north of England. He had excuſed himſelf, not becauſe he diſliked the propoſition, which, on the contrary, he thought agreeable to his intereſt; but for reaſons of another kind. Firſt, becauſe the troops at hand for this ſervice conſiſted in horſe, not in foot, which had been aſked, and which were alone proper for ſuch an expedition: ſecondly, becauſe a declaration of this ſort might turn the Proteſtant princes of the empire, from whoſe offices he had ſtill ſome proſpect of aſſiſtance, againſt him: and thirdly, becauſe although he knew that the King of Great Britain was his enemy, yet they were not in war together, nor had the latter acted yet a while openly enough againſt him to juſtify ſuch a rupture. At the time I am ſpeaking of, theſe reaſons were removed by the King of Sweden's being beat out of the empire, by the little conſequence which his management of the Proteſtant princes was to him, and by the declaration of war which the king as elector of Hanover made. I took up this negotiation therefore again. The regent appeared to come into it. He ſpoke fair to the Baron de *Spar*, who preſſed him on his ſide, as I preſſed him on mine, and promiſed, beſides the arrears of the ſubſidy due to the Swedes, an immediate advance of fifty thouſand crowns for the enterpriſe on Britain. He kept the officer who was to be diſpatched I know not how long booted; ſometimes on pretence, that in the low ſtate of his credit he could not find bills of exchange for the ſum, and ſometimes on other pretences, and by theſe delays he evaded his promiſe. The French were very frank

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in declaring, that they could give us no money, and that they would give us no troops. Arms, ammunition and connivance, they made us hope for. The latter in ſome degree we might have had, perhaps; but to what purpoſe was it to connive, when by a multitude of little tricks they avoided furniſhing us with arms and ammunition, and when they knew that we were utterly unable to furniſh ourſelves with them? I had formed the deſign of engaging French privateers in the pretender's ſervice. They were to have carried whatever we ſhould have had to ſend to any part of Britain in their firſt voyage, and after that, to have cruiſed under his commiſſion. I had actually agreed for ſome, and it was in my power to have made the ſame bargains with others. Sweden on one ſide, and Scotland on the other, would have afforded them retreats: and if the war had been kept up in any part of the mountains, I conceive the execution of this deſign would have been of the greateſt advantage to the pretender. It failed, becauſe no other part of the work went on. He was not above ſix weeks in his Scotch expedition, and theſe were the things I endeavored to bring to bear in his abſence. I had no great opinion of my ſucceſs before he went; but when he had made the laſt ſtep which it was in his power to make, I reſolved to ſuffer neither him nor the Scotch to be any longer bubbles of their own credulity, and of the ſcandalous artifice of this court. It would be tedious to enter into a longer narrative of all the uſeleſs pains I took. To conclude therefore; in a converſation which I had with the M. *d'Huxelles*, I took occaſion to declare, that I would not be the inſtrument of amuſing the Scotch; and that ſince I was able to do them no ſervice, I would at leaſt inform them, that they muſt flatter themſelves no longer with hopes of ſuccour from France. I added, that I would ſend them veſſels, which, with thoſe already on the coaſt

coaſt of Scotland, might ſerve to bring off the pretender, the Earl of *Mar*, and as many others as poſſible. The marſhal approved my reſolution, and adviſed me to execute it as the only thing which was left to do. On this occaſion he ſhewed no reſerve, he was very explicit, and yet in this very point of time, the promiſe of an order was obtained, or pretended to be obtained, from the regent, for delivering thoſe ſtores of arms and ammunition which belonged to the *Chevalier*, and which had been put into the French magazines, when Sir *George Byng* came to Havre. *Caſtel Blanco* is a Spaniard who married a daughter of Lord *Melford*, and who under that title ſet up for a medler in Engliſh buſineſs. I cannot juſtly tell whether the honor of obtaining this promiſe was aſcribed to him, to the junto in the bois de Boulogne, or to any one elſe. I ſuppoſe they all aſſumed a ſhare of the merit. The project was, that theſe ſtores ſhould be delivered to *Caſtel Blanco;* that he ſhould enter into a recogniſance to carry them to Spain, and from thence to the Weſt Indies, that I ſhould provide a veſſel for this purpoſe, which he ſhould appear to hire or buy; and that when ſhe was at ſea ſhe ſhould ſail directly for Scotland. You cannot believe that I reckoned much on the effect of this order: but accuſtomed to concur in meaſures, the inutility of which I ſaw evidently enough, I concurred in this likewiſe. The neceſſary care was taken, and in a fortnight's time the ſhip was ready to ſail, and no ſuſpicion of her belonging to the *Chevalier*, or of her deſtination, was gone abroad.

As this event made no alteration in my opinion, it made none in the diſpatches which I prepared and ſent to Scotland. In them I gave an account of what was in negotiation. I explained to him what might be hoped for in time, if he was able to maintain himſelf in the mountains without the ſuccours he demanded from France. But from France I told him

him plainly, that it was in vain to expect the leaſt part of them. In ſhort I concealed nothing from him. This was all I could do to put the *Chevalier* and his council in a condition to judge what meaſures to take; but theſe diſpatches never came to his hands. He was ſailed from Scotland juſt before the gentleman, whom I ſent, arrived on the coaſt. He landed at Graveline about the twenty-ſecond of February, and the firſt orders he gave, were to ſtop all the veſſels which were going on his account to the country from whence he came.

I ſaw him the morning after his arrival at St. Germain's, and he received me with open arms. I had been, as ſoon as we heard of his return, to acquaint the French court with it. They were not a little uneaſy, and the firſt thing which the M. *d'Huxelles* ſaid to me upon it was, that the *Chevalier* ought to proceed to Bar with all the diligence poſſible, and to take poſſeſſion of his former aſylum before the Duke of Lorrain had time to deſire him to look out for a reſidence ſome where elſe: nothing more was meaned by this propoſal, than to get him out of the dominions of France immediately. I was not in my mind averſe to it for other reaſons. Nothing could be more diſadvantageous to him than to be obliged to paſs the Alpes, or to reſide in the papal territories on this ſide of them. Avignon was already named for his retreat in common converſation, and I know not whether from the time he left Scotland, he ever thought of any other. I imagined, that by ſurpriſing the Duke of Lorrain we ſhould furniſh that prince with an excuſe to the king, and to the emperor; that we might draw the matter into length, and gain time to negotiate ſome other retreat than that of Avignon for the *Chevalier*. The duke's good will there was no room to doubt of, and by what the Prince of Vaudemont told me at Paris ſome time afterwards, I am apt to think we ſhould have ſucceeded,

ceeded. In all events it could not be wrong to try every meaſure, and the pretender would have gone to Avignon with much better grace, when he had done, in the ſight of the world, all he could to avoid it.

I found him in no diſpoſition to make ſuch haſte: he had a mind, on the contrary, to ſtay ſome time at St. Germain's, and in the neighbourhood of Paris, and to have a private meeting with the regent. He ſent me back to Paris to ſolicit the meeting. I writ, I ſpoke to the Marſhal *d'Huxelles*, I did beſt to ſerve him in his own way. The marſhal anſwered me by word of mouth, and by letter. He refuſed me by both. I remember he added this circumſtance, that he found the regent in bed, and acquainted him with what the *Chevalier* deſired; that the regent roſe up in a paſſion, ſaid that the things which were aſked were puerilities, and ſwore that he would not ſee him. I returned without having been able to ſucceed in my commiſſion: and I confeſs I thought the want of ſucceſs on this occaſion no great misfortune.

It was two or three o'clock on the Sunday or Monday morning when I parted from the pretender. He acquieſced in the determination of the regent, and declared that he would inſtantly ſet out for Lorain: his trunks were packed, his chaiſe was ordered to be at the door at five, and I ſent to Paris to acquaint the miniſter that he was gone. He aſked me how ſoon I ſhould be able to follow him, gave me commiſſions for ſome things, which he deſired I ſhould bring after him: and in a word, no Italian ever embraced the man he was going to ſtab, with greater ſhew of affection and confidence.

Inſtead of taking poſt for Lorain, he went to the little houſe in the bois de Boulogne, where his female miniſters reſided; and there he continued lurking for ſeveral days, and pleaſing himſelf with the air of myſtery and buſineſs, whilſt the only real buſineſs, which he ſhould have had at that time, lay neglected.

neglected. He ſaw the Spaniſh and Swediſh miniſters in this place. I cannot tell, for I never thought it worth aſking, whether he ſaw the Duke of *Orleans*: poſſibly he might. To have been teiſed into ſuch a ſtep, which ſignified nothing, and which gave the cabal an air of credit and importance, is agreeable enough to the levity of his royal highneſs's character.

The Thurſday following the Duke of *Ormond* came to ſee me, and after the compliment of telling me, that he believed I ſhould be ſurpriſed at the meſſage he brought, he put into my hands a note to himſelf, and a little ſcrip of paper directed to me, and drawn in the ſtyle of a juſtice of peace's warrant. They were both in the *Chevalier*'s hand-writing, and they were dated on the Tueſday, in order to make me believe that they had been writ on the road, and ſent back to the duke: his grace dropped in our converſation, with great dexterity, all the inſinuations proper to confirm me in this opinion. I knew at this time his maſter was not gone, ſo that he gave me two very riſible ſcenes, which are frequently to be met with when ſome people meddle in buſineſs; I mean that of ſeeing a man labor with a great deal of aukward artifice to make a ſecret of nothing, and that of ſeeing yourſelf taken for a bubble, when you know as much of the matter as he who thinks that he impoſes on you.

I cannot recollect preciſely the terms of the two papers. I remember that the kingly laconic ſtyle of one of them, and the expreſſion of having no farther occaſion for my ſervice, made me ſmile. The other was an order to give up the papers in my office; all which might have been contained in a letter-caſe of a moderate ſize. I gave the duke the ſeals, and ſome papers which I could readily come at. Some others, and indeed all ſuch as I had not deſtroyed, I ſent afterwards to the *Chevalier*: and I took care to convey

vey to him, by a ſafe hand, ſeveral of his letters, which it would have been very improper the duke ſhould have ſeen. I am ſurpriſed that he did not reflect on the conſequence of my obeying his order literally. It depended on me to have ſhewn his general what an opinion the *Chevalier* had of his capacity. I ſcorned the trick, and would not appear piqued, when I was far from being angry. As I gave up, without ſcruple, all the papers which remained in my hands, becauſe I was determined never to make uſe of them; ſo I confeſs to you, that I took a ſort of pride in never aſking for thoſe of mine, which were in the pretender's hands: I contented myſelf with making the duke underſtand how little need there was to get rid of a man in this manner, who had made the bargain which I had done at my engagement, and with taking this firſt opportunity to declare, that I would never more have to do with the pretender, or his cauſe.

That I might avoid being queſtioned and quoted in the moſt curious and the moſt babling town in the world, I related what had paſſed to three or four of my friends, and hardly ſtirred abroad during a fortnight, out of a little lodging which very few people knew of. At the end of this term the marſhal of *Berwic* came to ſee me, and aſked me what I meaned, to confine myſelf to my chamber, when my name was trumpeted about in all the companies of Paris, and the moſt infamous ſtories were ſpread concerning me. This was the firſt notice I had, and it was ſoon followed by others. I appeared immediately in the world, and found there was hardly a ſcurrilous tongue which had not been let looſe on my ſubject, and that thoſe perſons whom the Duke of *Ormond* and Earl of *Mar* muſt influence, or might ſilence, were the loudeſt in defaming me.

Parti-

Particular inſtances wherein I had failed were cited; and as it was the faſhion for every jacobite to affect being in the ſecret, you might have found a multitude of vouchers to facts, which, if they had been true, could in the nature of them be known to very few perſons.

This method, of beating down the reputation of a man by noiſe and impudence, impoſed on the world at firſt, convinced people who were not acquainted with me, and ſtaggered even my friends. But it ceaſed in a few days to have any effect againſt me. The malice was too groſs to paſs upon reflection. Theſe ſtories died away almoſt as faſt as they were publiſhed, for this very reaſon, becauſe they were particular.

They gave out, for inſtance, that I had taken to my own uſe, a very great ſum of the *Chevalier's* money, when it was notorious that I had ſpent a great ſum of my own in his ſervice; and never would be obliged to him for a farthing, in which caſe, I believe, I was ſingle. Upon this head it was eaſy to appeal to a very honeſt gentleman, the queen's treaſurer at St. Germain's, through whoſe hands, and not through mine, went the very little money which the *Chevalier* had.

They gave out, that whilſt he was in Scotland, he never heard from me, though it was notorious that I ſent him no leſs than five expreſſes during the ſix weeks which he conſumed in this expedition. It was eaſy on this head, to appeal to the perſons, to whom my diſpatches had been committed.

Theſe lies, and many others of the ſame ſort which were founded on particular facts, were diſproved by particular facts, and had not time, at leaſt at Paris, to make any impreſſion. But the principal crime with which they charged me then, and

and the only one which ſince that time they have inſiſted upon, is of another nature. This part of their accuſation is general, and it cannot be refuted without doing what I have done above, deducing ſeveral facts, comparing theſe facts together, and reaſoning upon them; nay, that which is worſe, is, that it cannot be fully refuted without the mention of ſome facts, which, in my preſent circumſtances, it would not be very prudent, though I ſhould think it very lawful, for me, to divulge. You ſee that I mean the ſtarving the war in Scotland, which it is pretended might have been ſupported, and might have ſucceeded to, if I had procured the ſuccors which were aſked, nay, if I had ſent a little powder. This the jacobites, who affect moderation and candor, ſhrug their ſhoulders at: they are ſorry for it, but Lord *Bolingbroke* can never waſh himſelf clean of this guilt; for theſe ſuccours might have been obtained, and a proof that they might, is, that they were ſo by others. Theſe people leave the cauſe of this management doubtful, between my treachery and my want of capacity. The pretender, with all the falſe charity and real malice of one who ſets up for devotion, attributes all his misfortunes to my negligence.

The letters which were writ by my ſecretary above a year ago into England, the marginal notes which have been made ſince to the letter from Avignon, and what is ſaid above, have ſet this affair in ſo clear a light, that whoever examines, with a fair intention, muſt feel the truth, and be convinced by it. I cannot, however, forbear to make ſome obſervations on the ſame ſubject here. It is even neceſſary that I ſhould do ſo in the deſign of making this diſcourſe the foundation of my juſtification to the tories at preſent, and to the whole world in time.

There is nothing which my enemies apprehend ſo much as my juſtification, and they have reaſon. But they may comfort themſelves with this reflection, that it will be a misfortune, which will accompany me to my grave, that I ſuffered a chain of accidents to draw me into ſuch meaſures and ſuch company; that I have been obliged to defend myſelf againſt ſuch accuſations and ſuch accuſers; that by aſſociating with ſo much folly, and ſo much knavery, I am become the victim of both; that I was diſtreſſed by the former, when the latter would have been leſs grievous to me, ſince it is much better in buſineſs to be yoaked to knaves than fools, and that I put into their hands the means of loading me, like the ſcape-goat, with all the evil conſequences of their folly.

In the firſt letters which I received from the Earl of *Mar*, he writ for arms, for ammunition, for money, for officers, and all things, frankly, as if theſe things had been ready, and I had engaged to ſupply him with them, before he ſet up the ſtandard at the bræ of Mar; whereas our condition could not be unknown to his lordſhip, and you have ſeen that I did all I could to prevent his reckoning on any aſſiſtance from hence. As our hopes at this court decreaſed, his lordſhip roſe in his demands: and at the time when it was viſible that the regent intended nothing leſs than even privately and indirectly to ſupport the Scotch, the pretender and the Earl of *Mar* writ for regular forces and a train of artillery; which was in effect to inſiſt that France ſhould enter into a war for them. I might, in anſwer to the firſt inſtances, have aſked Lord *Mar*, what he did in Scotland? and what he meaned by drawing his countrymen into a war at this time? or at leaſt upon this foot?—He who had dictated not long before a memorial, whereini t was aſſerted, that

to

to have a proſpect of ſucceeding in this enterpriſe, there muſt be an univerſal inſurrection, and that ſuch an inſurrection was in no ſort probable, unleſs a body of troops was brought to ſupport it?—He who thought that the conſequence of failing, when the attempt was once made, muſt be the utter ruin of the cauſe, and the loſs of the Britiſh liberty?—He who concurred in demanding as a pis-aller, and the leaſt which could be inſiſted on, arms, ammunition, artillery, money, and officers? I ſay, I might have aſked what he meant to begin the dance when he had not the leaſt aſſurance of any ſuccor, but, on the contrary, the greateſt reaſon imaginable to believe this affair was become as deſperate abroad by the death of the moſt Chriſtian King, as it was at home by the diſcovery of the deſign, and by the meaſures taken to defeat it?

Inſtead of acting this part, which would have been wiſe, I took that which was plauſible. I reſolved to contribute all I could to ſupport the buſineſs, ſince it was begun. I encouraged his lordſhip as long as I had the leaſt ground for doing ſo, and I confirmed the pretender in his reſolution of going to Scotland, when he had nothing better left him to do. If I have any thing to reproach myſelf with, in the whole progreſs of the war in Scotland, it is having encouraged Lord *Mar* too long. But, on the other hand, if I had given up the cauſe, and had writ deſpondingly to him, before this court had explained itſelf as fully as the Marſhal *d'Huxelles* did in the converſation which is mentioned above, it is eaſy to ſee what turn would have been given to ſuch a conduct.

The true cauſe of all the misfortunes which happened to the Scotch, and to thoſe who took arms in the north of England, lies here; that they roſe without any previous certainty of foreign help, in direct contradiction to the ſcheme which their

leaders themſelves had formed. The excuſe which I have heard made for this, is that the act of parliament for curbing the Highlanders was near to be put in execution; that they would have been diſarmed and entirely diſabled from riſing at any other time, if they had not roſe at this. You can judge better than I of the validity of this excuſe. It ſeems to me, that by management they might have gained time, and that even when they had been reduced to the dilemma ſuppoſed, they ought to have got together, under pretence of reſiſting the infractions of the union without any mention of the pretender, and have treated with the government on this foot. By theſe means they might probably have preſerved themſelves in a condition of avowing their deſign, when they ſhould be ſure of being backed from abroad: at the worſt they might have declared for the *Chevalier* when all other expedients failed them. In a word, I take this excuſe not to be very good, and the true reaſon of this conduct to have been the raſhneſs of the people, and the inconſiſtent meaſures of their head.

But admitting the excuſe to be valid, it remains ſtill an undeniable truth, that this is the original fountain from whence all thoſe waters of bitterneſs flowed, which ſo many unhappy people have drunk of. I have ſaid already, that the neceſſity of acting was precipitated before any meaſures to act with ſucceſs had been taken, and that the neceſſity of doing ſo ſeemed to increaſe as the means of doing ſo were taken away. To whom is this to be aſcribed? Is it to be aſcribed to me, who had no ſhare in theſe affairs, till a few weeks before the Duke of *Ormond* was forced to abandon England, and the diſcovery of the intended invaſion was publiſhed to parliament and to the world? or is it to be aſcribed to thoſe who had from the firſt been at the head of this undertaking?

Unable

Unable to defend this point, the next reſort of the jacobites is to this impudent and abſurd affirmation, that notwithſtanding the diſadvantages under which they took arms, they ſhould have ſucceeded, if the indirect aſſiſtances, which were aſked from France had been obtained: nay, that they ſhould have been able to defend the Highlands, if I had ſent them a little powder. Is it poſſible that a man ſhould be wounded with ſuch blunt weapons? Much more than powder was aſked for from the firſt, and I have already ſaid, that when the *Chevalier* came into Scotland, regular troops, artillery, &c. were demanded. Both he and the Earl of *Mar* judged it impoſſible to ſtand their ground, without ſuch aſſiſtance as theſe. How ſcandalous then muſt it be deemed, that they ſuffered their dependents to ſpread in the world, that for want of a little powder I forced them to abandon Scotland? The Earl of *Mar* knows, that all the powder in France would not have enabled him to ſtay at Perth as long as he did, if he had not had another ſecurity: and when that failed him, he muſt have quitted the party, if the regent had given us all that he made ſome of us expect.

But to finiſh all that I intend to ſay on a ſubject which has tired me, and perhaps you; the jacobites affirm, that the indirect aſſiſtances which they deſired might have been obtained: and I confeſs, that I am inexcuſable if this fact be true. To prove it, they appeal to the little politicians of whom I have ſpoken ſo often. I affirm, on the contrary, that nothing could be obtained here to ſupport the Scotch, or to encourage the Engliſh. To prove the aſſertion, I appeal to the miniſters with whom I negotiated, and to the regent himſelf, who, whatever language he may hold in private with other people, cannot controvert with me the truth of what

what I advance. He excluded me formerly, that he might the more eaſily avoid doing any thing; and perhaps he has blamed me ſince, that he might excuſe his doing nothing. All this may be true, and yet it will remain true, that he would never have been prevailed upon to act directly againſt his intereſt in the only point of view which he has, I mean the crown of France, and againſt the unanimous ſenſe of all his miniſters. Suppoſe that in the time of the late queen, when ſhe had the peace in view, a party in France had implored her aſſiſtance, and had applied to *Margery Fielding*, to *Iſrael*, to my Lady *Oglethorpe*, to Dr. *Battle*, and Lieutenant General *Stewart*; what ſucceſs do you imagine ſuch applications would have had? The queen would have ſpoke them fair; ſhe would ſpeak otherwiſe to no body: but do you imagine ſhe would have made one ſtep in their favor? *Olive Trant*, *Magny*, Mademoiſelle *Chauffery*, a dirty Abbé *Brigault*, and Mr. *Dillon*, are characters very oppoſite to theſe; and what I ſuppoſed to have paſſed in England, is not a whit more ridiculous than what really paſſed here.

I ſay nothing of the ſhips which the jacobites pretend that they ſent into Scotland, three weeks or a month after the pretender was returned. I believe they might have had my Lord *Stair*'s connivance then, as well as the regent's. I ſay nothing of the order which they pretend to have obtained, and which I never ſaw, for the ſtores that were ſeized at Havre to be delivered to *Caſtel Blanco*. I have already ſaid enough on this head, and you cannot have failed to obſerve, that this ſignal favor was never obtained by theſe people, till the Marſhal *d'Huxelles* had owned to me, that nothing was to be expected from France, and that the only thing which I could do was to endeavor to bring the pre-

pretender, the Earl of *Mar*, and the principal perſons who were moſt expoſed, off: neither he nor I imagining that any ſuch would be left behind.

When I began to appear in the world, upon the advertiſements which my friends gave me of the clamor that was raiſed againſt me, you will eaſily think I did not enter into ſo many particulars as I have done with you. I ſaid even leſs, than you have ſeen, in thoſe letters which *Brinſden* writ into England, in March and April was twelve-month; and yet the clamor ſunk immediately. The people of conſideration at this court beat it down, and the court of St. Germain's grew ſo aſhamed of it, that the queen thought fit to purge herſelf of having any ſhare in encouraging the diſcourſes which were held againſt me, or having been ſo much as let into the ſecret of the meaſure which preceded them. The provocation was great, but I reſolved to act without paſſion. I ſaw the advantage the pretender and his council, who diſpoſed of things better for me than I ſhould have done for myſelf, had given me: but I ſaw likewiſe, that I muſt improve this advantage with the utmoſt caution.

As I never imagined that he would treat me in the manner he did, nor that his miniſters could be weak enough to adviſe him to it; I had reſolved, on his return from Scotland, to follow him till his reſidence ſhould be fixed ſomewhere or other: after which, having ſerved the tories in this, which I looked upon as their laſt ſtruggle for power, and having continued to act in the pretender's affairs till the end of the term for which I embarked with him; I ſhould have eſteemed myſelf to be at liberty, and ſhould, in the civileſt manner I was able, have taken my leave of him. Had we parted thus, I ſhould have remained in a very ſtrange ſituation during the reſt

reſt of my life: but I had examined myſelf thoroughly, I was determined, I was prepared.

On one ſide he would have thought that he had a ſort of right, on any future occaſion, to call me out of my retreat; the tories would probably have thought the ſame thing: my reſolution was taken to refuſe them both, and I foreſaw that both would condemn me. On the other ſide, the conſideration of his keeping meaſures with me, joined to that of having once openly declared for him, would have created a point of honor, by which I ſhould have been tied down, not only from ever engaging againſt him, but alſo from making my peace at home. The *Chevalier* cut this gordian knot aſunder at one blow. He broke the links of that chain which former engagements had faſtened on me, and gave me a right to eſteem myſelf as free from all obligations of keeping meaſures with him, as I ſhould have continued if I had never engaged in his intereſt. I took therefore, from that moment, the reſolution of making my peace at home, and of employing all the unfortunate experience I had acquired abroad, to undeceive my friends, and to promote the union and the quiet of my country.

The Earl of *Stair* had received a full power to treat with me, whilſt I was engaged with the pretender, as I have been ſince informed. He had done me the juſtice to believe me incapable to hearken, in ſuch circumſtances, to any propoſals of that kind: and as much friendſhip as he had for me, as much as I had for him, we entertained not the leaſt even indirect correſpondence together during that whole time. Soon afterwards he employed a perſon * to communicate to me the diſpoſition of his majeſty to grant me my pardon, and

* *Saladin* of Geneva, then at Paris.

his

his own deſire to give me, on this occaſion, all the proofs he could of his inclination in my favor. I embraced the offer, as it became me to do, with all poſſible ſenſe of the king's goodneſs, and of his lordſhip's friendſhip *. We met, we talked together, and he wrote to the court on the ſubject. The turn which the miniſters gave to this matter was, to enter into a treaty to reverſe my attainder, and to ſtipulate the conditions on which this act of grace ſhould be granted me.

The notion of a treaty ſhocked me. I reſolved never to be reſtored rather than go that way to work, and I opened myſelf without any reſerve to Lord *Stair*. I told him that I looked on myſelf to be obliged in honor and in conſcience to undeceive my friends in England, both as to the ſtate of foreign affairs, as to the management of the jacobite intereſt abroad, and as to the characters of perſons: in every one of which points I knew them to be moſt groſsly and moſt dangerouſly deluded. That the treatment I had received from the pretender and his adherents would juſtify me to the world in doing this: that if I remained in exile all my life he might be aſſured, that I would never more have to do with the jacobite cauſe; and that if I was reſtored, I ſhould give it an effectual blow, in making that apology which the pretender has put me under a neceſſity of making: that in doing this I flattered myſelf, that I ſhould contribute ſomething to the eſtabliſhment of the king's government, and to the union of his ſubjects; but that this was all the merit which I could promiſe to have: that if the court believed theſe profeſſions to be ſincere, a treaty with me was unneceſſary for them; and that if they did

* There will be added, at the end of this relation, an original letter from the Earl of *Stair* to Mr. *Craggs*, giving a full account of the tranſaction here mentioned.

not

not believe them ſo, a treaty with them was dangerous for me: that I was determined in this whole tranſaction to make no one ſtep which I would not own in the face of the world; that in other circumſtances it might be ſufficient to act honeſtly, but that in a caſe as extraordinary as mine, it was neceſſary to act clearly, and to leave no room for the leaſt doubtful conſtruction.

The Earl of *Stair*, as well as Mr. *Craggs*, who arrived ſoon after in France, came into my ſenſe. I have reaſon to believe, that the king has approved it likewiſe upon their repreſentations, ſince he has been pleaſed to give me the moſt gracious aſſurances of his favor. What the effect of all this may be, in the next, or in any other ſeſſion, I know not: but this is the foot on which I have put myſelf, and on which I ſtand at the moment I write to you. The whigs may continue inveterate, and by conſequence fruſtrate his majeſty's good intentions towards me; the tories may continue to rail at me, on the credit of ſuch enemies as I have deſcribed to you in the courſe of this relation: neither the one nor the other ſhall make me ſwerve out of the path which I have traced to myſelf.

I have now led you through the ſeveral ſtages which I propoſed at firſt, and I ſhould do wrong to your good underſtanding as well as to our mutual friendſhip, if I ſuſpected that you could hold any other language to me than that which *Dolabella* uſes to *Cicero*. "Satisfactum eſt jam a te vel officio vel "familiaritati; ſatisfactum etiam partibus." The king, who pardons me, might complain of me, the whigs might declaim againſt me, my family might reproach me for the little regard which I have ſhewn to my own and to their intereſt; but where is the crime I have been guilty of towards my party and towards my friends? In what part of my conduct will the tories find an excuſe for the treatment which they have given me? As tories, ſuch as they

they were when I left England, I defy them to find any. But here lies the ſore, and tender as it is, I muſt lay it open. Thoſe amongſt them, who rail at me now, are changed from what they were, or from what they profeſſed themſelves to be, when we lived and acted together. They were tories then, they are jacobites now. Their objections to the courſe of my conduct whilſt I was in the pretender's intereſt are the pretence; the true reaſon of their anger is, that I renounce the pretender for my life. When you were firſt driven into this intereſt, I may appeal to you for the notion which the party had. You thought of reſtoring him by the ſtrength of the tories, and of oppoſing a tory king to a whig king. You took him up as the inſtrument of your revenge and of your ambition. You looked on him as your creature, and never once doubted of making what terms you pleaſed with him. This is ſo true, that the ſame language is ſtill held to the catechumens in jacobitiſm. Were the contrary to be avowed even now, the party in England would ſoon diminiſh. I engaged on this principle when your orders ſent me to Commercy, and I never acted on any other. This ought to have been part of my merit towards the tories, and it would have been ſo if they had continued in the ſame diſpoſitions. But they are changed, and this very thing is become my crime. Inſtead of making the pretender their tool, they are his. Inſtead of having in view to reſtore him on their own terms, they are laboring to do it without any terms; that is, to ſpeak properly, they are ready to receive him on his. Be not deceived: there is not a man on this ſide of the water who acts in any other manner. The church of England-jacobite and the Iriſh Papiſt ſeem in every reſpect to have the ſame cauſe. Thoſe on your ſide of the water, who correſpond with theſe, are to be comprehended in the ſame claſs: and from hence it is, that

that the clamor raiſed againſt me has been kept up with ſo much induſtry, and is redoubled on the leaſt appearance of my return home, and of my being in a ſituation to juſtify myſelf.

You have ſeen already what reaſons the pretender, and the ſeveral ſorts of people who compoſe his party here, had to get rid of me, and to cover me to the utmoſt of their power with infamy. Their views were as ſhort in this caſe as they are in all others. They did not ſee at firſt, that this conduct would not only give me a right, but put me under a neceſſity of keeping no farther meaſures with them, and of laying the whole myſtery of their iniquity open. As ſoon as they diſcovered this, they took the only courſe which was left them, that of poiſoning the minds of the tories, and of creating ſuch prejudices againſt me whilſt I remained in a condition of not ſpeaking for myſelf, as will, they hope, prevent the effect of whatever I may ſay when I am in a condition of pleading my own cauſe. The bare apprehenſion, that I ſhall ſhew the world that I have been guilty of no crime, renders me criminal among theſe men: and they hold themſelves ready, being unable to reply either in point of fact or in point of reaſon, to drown my voice in the confuſion of their clamor.

The only crimes I am guilty of, I own. I own the crime of having been for the pretender, in a very different manner from thoſe with whom I acted. I ſerved him as faithfully, I ſerved him as well as they, but I ſerved him on a different principle. I own the crime of having renounced him, and of being reſolved never to have to do with him as long as I live. I own the crime of being determined ſooner or later, as ſoon as I can, to clear myſelf of all the unjuſt aſperſions which have been caſt upon me; to undeceive by my experience as many as I can of thoſe tories who may have been drawn into error, and to contribute, if ever I return home, as far as I

am

am able, to promote the national good of Britain without any other regard. Theſe crimes do not, I hope, by this time appear to you to be of a very black dye. You may come, perhaps, to think them virtues, when you have read and conſidered what remains to be ſaid; for before I conclude, it is neceſſary that I open one matter to you, which I could not weave in ſooner without breaking too much the thread of my narration. In this place, unmingled with any thing elſe, it will have, as it deſerves to have, your whole attention.

Whoever compoſed that curious piece of falſe fact, falſe argument, falſe Engliſh, and falſe eloquence, the letter from Avignon, ſays, that I was not thought the moſt proper perſon to ſpeak about religion. I confeſs I ſhould be of his mind, and ſhould include his patrons in my caſe, if the practice of it was to be recommended: for ſurely it is unpardonable impudence to impoſe by precept what we do not teach by example. I ſhould be of the ſame mind, if the nature of religion was to be explained, if its myſteries were to be fathomed, and if this great truth was to be eſtabliſhed, that the church of England has the advantage over all other churches in purity of doctrine, and in wiſdom of diſcipline. But nothing of this kind was neceſſary. This would have been the taſk of reverend and learned divines. We of the laity had nothing more to do than to lay in our claim, that we could never ſubmit to be governed by a prince who was not of the religion of our country. Such a declaration could hardly have failed of ſome effect towards opening the eyes and diſpoſing the mind even of the pretender. At leaſt, in juſtice to ourſelves, and in juſtice to our party, we who were here ought to have made it, and the influence of it on the pretender ought to have become the rule of our ſubſequent conduct.

In

In thinking in this manner I think no otherwiſe now than I have always thought: and I cannot forget, nor you neither, what paſſed when a little before the death of the queen, letters were conveyed from the *Chevalier* to ſeveral perſons, to myſelf among others. In the letter to me, the article of religion was ſo aukwardly handled, that he made the principal motive of the confidence we ought to have in him to conſiſt in his firm reſolution to adhere to Popery. The effect which this epiſtle had on me was the ſame which it had on thoſe tories to whom I communicated it at that time; it made us reſolve to have nothing to do with him.

Some time after this I was aſſured by ſeveral, and I make no doubt but others have been ſo too, that the *Chevalier* at the bottom was not a bigot. That whilſt he remained abroad and could expect no ſuccor, either preſent or future, from any princes but thoſe of the Roman Catholic communion, it was prudent, whatever he might think, to make no demonſtration of a deſign to change: but that his temper was ſuch, and he was already ſo diſpoſed, that we might depend on his compliance with what ſhould be deſired of him, if ever he came amongſt us, and was taken from under the wing of the queen his mother. To ſtrengthen this opinion of his character, it was ſaid that he had ſent for Mr. *Leſley* over; that he allowed him to celebrate the church of England-ſervice in his family, and that he had promiſed to hear what this divine ſhould repreſent on the ſubject of religion to him. When I came abroad, the ſame things, and much more, were at firſt inſinuated to me, and I began to let them make impreſſion upon me, notwithſtanding what I had ſeen under his hand. I would willingly flatter myſelf, that this impreſſion diſpoſed me to incline to jacobitiſm, rather than allow that the inclination to jacobitiſm diſpoſed me eaſily to believe what, upon

that principle, I had ſo much reaſon to wiſh might be true. Which was the cauſe, and which the effect, I cannot well determine: perhaps they did mutually occaſion each other. Thus much is certain, that I was far from weighing this matter as I ought to have done, when the ſolicitation of my friends, and the perſecution of my enemies, precipitated me into engagements with the pretender.

I was willing to take it for granted, that ſince you were as ready to declare, as I believed you at that time, you muſt have had entire ſatisfaction on the article of religion. I was ſoon undeceived; this ſtring had never been touched. My own obſervation, and the unanimous report of all thoſe who from his infancy have approached the pretender's perſon, ſoon taught me how difficult it is to come to terms with him on this head, and how unſafe to embark without them.

His religion is not founded on the love of virtue and the deteſtation of vice; on a ſenſe of that obedience which is due to the will of the Supreme Being; and a ſenſe of thoſe obligations which creatures formed to live in a mutual dependence on one another lie under. The ſpring of his whole conduct is fear. Fear of the horns of the devil, and of the flames of hell. He has been taught to believe, that nothing but a blind ſubmiſſion to the church of Rome, and a ſtrict adherence to all the terms of that communion, can ſave him from theſe dangers. He has all the ſuperſtition of a capuchin; but I found on him no tincture of the religion of a prince. Do not imagine that I looſe the reins to my imagination, or that I write what my reſentments dictate: I tell you ſimply my opinion. I have heard the ſame deſcription of his character made by thoſe who know him beſt; and I converſed with very few among the Roman Catholics themſelves, who did not think him too much a Papiſt.

Nothing

Nothing gave me from the beginning ſo much uneaſineſs as the conſideration of this part of his character, and of the little care which had been taken to correct it. A true turn had not been given to the firſt ſteps which were made with him. The tories, who engaged afterwards, threw themſelves, as it were, at his head. He had been ſuffered to think that the party in England wanted him as much as he wanted them. There was no room to hope for much compliance on the head of religion, when he was in theſe ſentiments, and when he thought the tories too far advanced to have it in their power to retreat: and little dependence was at any time to be placed on the promiſes of a man capable of thinking his damnation attached to the obſervance, and his ſalvation to the breach, of theſe very promiſes. Something, however, was to be done: and I thought that the leaſt which could be done was, to deal plainly with him, and to ſhew him the impoſſibility of governing our nation by any other expedient, than by complying with that which would be expected from him as to his religion. This was thought too much by the Duke of *Ormond* and Mr. *Leſley;* although the duke could be no more ignorant than the miniſter, how ill the latter had been uſed, how far the *Chevalier* had been from keeping the word which he had given, and on the faith of which Mr. *Leſley* had come over to him. They both knew, that he not only refuſed to hear himſelf, but that he ſheltered the ignorance of his prieſts, or the badneſs of his cauſe, or both, behind his authority, and abſolutely forbid all diſcourſe concerning religion. The duke ſeemed convinced that it would be time enough to talk of religion to him when he ſhould be reſtored, or, at ſooneſt, when he ſhould be landed in England; that the influence under which he had lived being at a diſtance, the reaſonableneſs of what he might propoſe, joined to the apparent neceſſity which would then ſtare him

him in the face, could not fail to produce all the effects which we could desire.

To me this whole reasoning appeared fallacious. Our business was not to make him change appearances on this side of the water, but to prepare him to give those which would be necessary on the other: and there was no room to hope that if we could gain nothing on his prejudices here, we should be able to overcome them in Britain. I would have argued just as the Duke of *Ormond* and *Lesley*, if I had been a Papist; and I saw well enough that some people about him, (for in a great dearth of ability there was cunning to be met with,) affected nothing more than to keep off all discourse of religion. To my apprehension it was exceeding plain that we should find, if we were once in England, the necessity of going forward at any rate with him, much greater than he would find that of complying with us. I thought it an unpardonable fault to have taken a formal engagement with him, when no previous satisfaction had been obtained on a point, at least as essential to our civil as to our religious rights; to the peace of the state, as to the prosperity of the church: and I looked on this fault to be aggravated by every day's delay. Our silence was unfair, both to the *Chevalier* and to our friends in England. He was induced by it to believe, that they would exact far less from him, than we knew they expected: and they were confirmed in an opinion of his docility, which we knew to be void of all foundation. The pretence of removing that influence, under which he had lived, was frivolous, and should never have been urged to me, who saw plainly, that according to the measures pursued by the very persons who urged it, he must be environed in England by the same people that surrounded him here; and that the court of St. James's would be constituted, if ever he was restored, in the same manner as that of St. Germain's was.

When the draught of a declaration, and other papers which were to be diſperſed in Great Britain, came to be ſettled, it appeared that my apprehenſion and diſtruſt were but too well founded. The pretender took exception againſt ſeveral paſſages, and particularly againſt thoſe, wherein a direct promiſe of ſecuring the churches of England and Ireland was made. He was told, he ſaid, that he could not in conſcience make ſuch a promiſe: and, the debate being kept up a little while, he aſked me with ſome warmth, why the tories were ſo deſirous to have him, if they expected thoſe things from him which his religion did not allow? I left theſe draughts by his order with him, that he might conſider and amend them. I cannot ſay that he ſent them to the queen to be corrected by her confeſſor and the reſt of her council; but I firmly believe it. Sure I am, that he took time ſufficient to do this, before he ſent them from Bar where he then was, to Paris whither I was returned. When they were digeſted in ſuch a manner as ſatisfied his caſuiſts, he made them be printed: and my name was put to the declaration, as if the original had been ſigned by me. I had hitherto ſubmitted my opinion to the judgment of others; but on this occaſion I took advice from myſelf. I declared to him, that I would not ſuffer my name to be at the bottom of this paper. All the copies which came to my hands I burnt, and another was printed off, without any counterſigning.

The whole tenor of the amendments was one continued inſtance of the groſſeſt bigotry; and the moſt material paſſages were turned with all the jeſuitical prevarication imaginable. As much as it was his intereſt, at that time, to cultivate the reſpect which many of the tories really had for the memory of the late queen, and which many others affected as a farther mark of their oppoſition to the court, and to the whig party; as much as it was his intereſt to weave

weave the honor of her name into his cauſe, and to render her, even after her death, a party to the diſpute; he could not be prevailed upon to give her that character which her enemies allowed her, nor to make uſe of thoſe expreſſions in ſpeaking of her, which by the general manner of their application, are come to be little more than terms of reſpect and words of form, proper in the ſtile of public acts. For inſtance:

She was called in the original draught "his ſiſter "of glorious and bleſſed memory." In that which he publiſhed, the epithet of "bleſſed" was left out. Her eminent juſtice and her exemplary piety were occaſionally mentioned. In lieu of which, he ſubſtituted a flat, and in this caſe an invidious, expreſſion, "her inclinations to juſtice."

Not content with declaring her neither juſt nor pious in this world, he did little leſs than declare her damned in the other, according to the charitable principles of the church of Rome.

"When it pleaſed Almighty God to take her to "himſelf," was the expreſſion uſed in ſpeaking of the death of the queen. This he eraſed, and inſtead thereof inſerted theſe words: "when it pleaſed Al- "mighty God to put a period to her life."

He graciouſly allowed the univerſities to be nurſeries of loyalty, but did not think that it became him to ſtile them "nurſeries of religion."

Since his father paſſes already for a ſaint, and ſince reports are encouraged of miracles, which they ſuppoſe to be wrought at his tomb, he might have allowed his grandfather to paſs for a martyr: but he ſtruck out of the draught theſe words, "that bleſ- "ſed martyr who died for his people," which were applied to King *Charles* the Firſt, and would ſay nothing more of him than that "he fell a ſacrifice "to rebellion."

In the clauſe which related to the churches of England and Ireland, there was a plain and direct

promiſe inſerted of "effectual proviſion for their "ſecurity; and for their re-eſtabliſhment in all thoſe "rights which belong to them." This clauſe was not ſuffered to ſtand, but another was formed, wherein all mention of the church of Ireland was omitted, and nothing was promiſed to the church of England but the ſecurity, "and re-eſtabliſhment of all "thoſe rights, privileges, immunities, and poſſeſ-"ſions which belong to her," and wherein he had already promiſed by his declaration of the twentieth of July, to ſecure and "protect all her members."

I need make no comment on a proceeding ſo eaſy to be underſtood. The drift of theſe evaſions, and of this affected obſcurity, is obvious enough, at leaſt it will appear ſo by the obſervations which remain to be made.

He was ſo afraid of admitting any words which might be conſtrued into a promiſe of his conſenting to thoſe things, which ſhould be found neceſſary for the preſent or future ſecurity of our conſtitution, that in a paragraph where he was made to ſay, that he thought himſelf obliged to be ſolicitous for the proſperity of the church of England, the word *proſperity* was expunged; and we were left by this mental reſervation to gueſs what he was ſolicitous for? It could not be for her proſperity: that he had expunged. It muſt therefore be for her deſtruction, which in his language would have been ſtiled, her converſion.

Another remarkable proof of the ſame kind is to be found towards the concluſion of the declaration. After having ſpoke of the peace and flouriſhing eſtate of the kingdom, he was made to expreſs his readineſs to concert with the two houſes ſuch further meaſures, as ſhould be thought neceſſary for ſecuring the ſame to future generations. The deſign of this paragraph you ſee. He and his council ſaw it too, and therefore the word "ſecuring" was laid aſide,

aſide, and the word "leaving" was inſerted in lieu of it.

One would imagine, that a declaration corrected in this manner might have been ſuffered to go abroad without any farther precaution. But theſe papers had been penned by Proteſtants, and who could anſwer that there might not be ſtill ground ſufficient, from the tenor of them, to inſiſt on every thing neceſſary for the ſecurity of that religion? The declaration of the twentieth of July had been penned by a prieſt of the Scotch college, and the expreſſions had been meaſured ſo as to ſuit perfectly with the conduct which the chevalier intended to hold, ſo as to leave room to diſtinguiſh him, upon future occaſions, with the help of a little pious ſophiſtry, out of all the engagements which he ſeemed to take in it. This orthodox paper was therefore to accompany the heretical paper into the world, and no promiſe of moment was to ſtand in the latter, unleſs qualified by a reference to the former. Thus the church was to be ſecured in the rights, &c. which belong to her. How? No otherwiſe than according to the declaration of the month of July. And what does that promiſe? Security and protection to the members of this church in the enjoyment of their property. I make no doubt, but *Bellarmine*, if he had been the chevalier's confeſſor, would have paſſed this paragraph thus amended. No engagement whatever taken in favor of the church of Ireland, and a happy diſtinction found between ſecuring that of England, and protecting her members. Many a uſeful project for the deſtruction of heretics, and for accumulating power and riches to the ſee of Rome, has been eſtabliſhed on a more ſlender foundation.

The ſame ſpirit reigns through the whole. Civil and religious rights are no otherwiſe to be confirmed, than in conformity to the declaration of July; nay, the general pardon is reſtrained and limited to the terms preſcribed therein.

This

This is the account which I judged too important to be omitted, and which I choſe to give you altogether. I ſhall ſurely be juſtified at preſent in concluding, that the tories are groſsly deluded in their opinion of this prince's character, or elſe that they ſacrifice all which ought to be eſteemed precious and ſacred among men, to their paſſions. In both theſe caſes I remain ſtill a tory, and am true to the party. In the firſt I endeavor to undeceive you by an experience purchaſed at my expence and for your ſakes: in the ſecond, I endeavor to prevail on you to revert to that principle from which we have deviated. You never intended, whilſt I lived amongſt you, the ruin of your country; and yet every ſtep, which you now make towards the reſtoration you are ſo fond of, is a ſtep towards this ruin. No man of ſenſe, well informed, can ever go into meaſures for it, unleſs he thinks himſelf and his country in ſuch deſperate circumſtances, that nothing is left them but to chuſe of two ruins that which they like beſt.

The exile of the royal family, under *Cromwell*'s uſurpation, was the principal cauſe of all thoſe misfortunes, in which Britain has been involved, as well as of many of thoſe which have happened to the reſt of Europe, during more than half a century.

The two brothers, *Charles* and *James*, became then infected with Popery to ſuch degrees, as their different characters admitted of. *Charles* had parts, and his good underſtanding ſerved as an antidote to repel the poiſon. *James*, the ſimpleſt man of his time, drank off the whole chalice. The poiſon met, in his compoſition, with all the fear, all the credulity, and all the obſtinacy of a temper proper to increaſe its virulence, and to ſtrengthen its effect. The firſt had always a wrong bias upon him; he connived at the eſtabliſhment, and indirectly contributed to the growth of that power, which afterwards

wards diſturbed the peace and threatened the liberty of Europe ſo often: but he went no farther out of the way. The oppoſition of his parliaments, and his own reflections, ſtopped him here. The prince and the people were indeed mutually jealous of one another, from whence much preſent diſorder flowed, and the foundation of future evils was laid: but his good and his bad principles combating ſtill together, he maintained, during a reign of more than twenty years, in ſome tolerable degree, the authority of the crown, and the floriſhing eſtate of the nation. The laſt, drunk with ſuperſtitious and even enthuſiaſtic zeal, ran headlong into his own ruin, whilſt he endeavored to precipitate ours. His parliament and his people did all they could to ſave themſelves by winning him. But all was vain: he had no principle on which they could take hold. Even his good qualities worked againſt them, and his love of his country went halves with his bigotry. How he ſucceeded we have heard from our fathers. The revolution of one thouſand ſix hundred and eighty eight ſaved the nation, and ruined the king.

Now the pretender's education has rendered him infinitely leſs fit than his uncle, and at leaſt as unfit as his father, to be king of Great Britain. Add to this, that there is no reſource in his underſtanding. Men of the beſt ſenſe find it hard to overcome religious prejudices, which are of all the ſtrongeſt; but he is a ſlave to the weakeſt. The rod hangs like the ſword of *Damocles* over his head, and he trembles before his mother and his prieſt. What, in the name of God, can any member of the church of England promiſe himſelf from ſuch a character? Are we by another revolution to return into the ſame ſtate from which we were delivered by the firſt? Let us take example from the Roman Catholics, who act very reaſonably in refuſing to ſubmit to a Proteſtant prince. *Henry* the Fourth had at leaſt as good a title

tle to the crown of France as the pretender has to ours. His religion alone ſtood in his way, and he had never been king if he had not removed that obſtacle. Shall we ſubmit to a Popiſh prince, who will no more imitate *Henry* the Fourth in changing his religion, than he will imitate thoſe ſhining qualities which rendered him the honeſteſt gentleman, the braveſt captain, and the greateſt prince of his age? Allow me to give a looſe to my pen for a moment on this ſubject. General benevolence and univerſal charity ſeem to be eſtabliſhed in the goſpel as the diſtinguiſhing badges of Chriſtianity. How it happens I cannot tell; but ſo it is, that in all ages of the church the profeſſors of Chriſtianity ſeem to have been animated by a quite contrary ſpirit. Whilſt they were thinly ſcattered over the world, tolerated in ſome places, but eſtabliſhed no where, their zeal often conſumed their charity. Paganiſm, at that time the religion by law eſtabliſhed, was inſulted by many of them; the ceremonies were diſturbed, the altars thrown down. As ſoon as, by the favor of *Conſtantine*, their numbers were increaſed, and the reins of government were put into their hands, they began to employ the ſecular arm, not only againſt different religions, but againſt different ſects which aroſe in their own religion. A man may boldly affirm that more blood has been ſhed in the diſputes between Chriſtian and Chriſtian, than has ever been drawn from the whole body of them in the perſecutions of the Heathen emperors, and in the conqueſts of the Mahometan princes. From theſe they have received quarter, but never from one another. The Chriſtian religion is actually tolerated among the Mahometans, and the domes of churches and moſques ariſe in the ſame city. But it will be hard to find an example, where one ſect of Chriſtians has tolerated another which it was in their power to extirpate. They have gone farther in

in theſe later ages; what was practiſed formerly has been taught ſince. Perſecution has been reduced into ſyſtem, and the diſciples of the meek and humble *Jeſus* have avowed a tyranny, which the moſt barbarous conquerors never claimed. The wicked ſubtilty of caſuiſts has eſtabliſhed breach of faith with thoſe who differ from us, as a duty in oppoſition to faith, and murder itſelf has been made one of the means of ſalvation. I know very well that the reformed churches have been far from going thoſe cruel lengths, which are authoriſed by the doctrine as well as example of that of Rome; though *Calvin* put a flaming ſword on the title of a French edition of his Inſtitute, with this motto, "Je ne ſuis point "venu mettre la paix, mais l'epée;" but I know likewiſe, that the difference lies in the means, and not in the aim, of their policy. The church of England, the moſt humane of all of them, would root out every other religion, if it was in her power. She would not hang and burn; her meaſures would be milder, and therefore, perhaps, more effectual.

Since then there is this inveterate rancor among Chriſtians, can any thing be more abſurd, than for thoſe of one perſuaſion to truſt the ſupreme power, or any part of it, to thoſe of another? Particularly, muſt it not be reputed madneſs in thoſe of our religion, to truſt themſelves in the hands of Roman Catholics? Muſt it not be reputed impudence in a Roman Catholic to expect that we ſhould? He who looks upon us as heretics, as men in rebellion againſt a lawful, nay a divine authority, and whom it is therefore meritorious by all ſorts of ways to reduce to obedience. There are many, I know, amongſt them who think more generouſly, and whoſe morals are not corrupted by that which is called religion: but this is the ſpirit of the prieſthood, in whoſe ſcale that ſcrap of a parable, "Compel them to come in," which they apply as they pleaſe, outweighs the whole decalogue.

decalogue. This will be the ſpirit of every man who is bigot enough to be under their direction: and ſo much is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe.

During your laſt ſeſſion of parliament, it was expected that the whigs would attempt to repeal the occaſional bill. The ſame jealouſy continues: there is, perhaps, foundation for it. Give me leave to aſk you, upon what principle we argued for making this law, and upon what principle you muſt argue againſt the repeal of it? I have mentioned the principle in the beginning of this diſcourſe. No man ought to be truſted with any ſhare of power under a government, who muſt, to act conſiſtently with himſelf, endeavor the deſtruction of that very government. Shall this propoſition paſs for true, when it is applied to keep a Preſbyterian from being mayor of a corporation? And ſhall it become falſe, when it is applied to keep a Papiſt from being king? The propoſition is equally true in both caſes, but the argument drawn from it is juſt ſo much ſtronger in the latter, than in the former caſe, as the miſchiefs, which may reſult from the power and influence of a king, are greater than thoſe which can be wrought by a magiſtrate of the loweſt order. This ſeems to my apprehenſion to be *argumentum ad hominem*, and I do not ſee by what happy diſtinction a jacobite tory could elude the force of it.

It may be ſaid, and it has been urged to me, that if the chevalier was reſtored, the knowledge of his character would be our ſecurity; "habet fœnum in "cornu:" there would be no pretence for truſting him, and by conſequence it would be eaſy to put ſuch reſtrictions on the exerciſe of the regal power, as might hinder him from invading or ſapping our religion and liberty. But this I utterly deny. Experience has ſhewn us how ready men are to court power and profit; and who can determine how far either the tories or the whigs would comply, in order to

to ſecure to themſelves the enjoyment of all the places in the kingdom? Suppoſe, however, that a majority of true Iſraelites ſhould be found, whom no temptation could oblige to bow the knee to *Baal*; in order to preſerve the government on one hand, muſt they not deſtroy it on the other? The neceſſary reſtrictions would in this caſe be ſo many, and ſo important, as to leave hardly the ſhadow of a monarchy, if he ſubmitted to them; and if he did not ſubmit to them, theſe patriots would have no reſource left but in rebellion. Thus, therefore, the affair would turn, if the pretender was reſtored. We might, moſt probably, loſe our religion and liberty by the bigotry of the prince, and the corruption of the people. We ſhould have no chance of preſerving them, but by an entire change of the whole frame of our government, or by another revolution. What reaſonable man would voluntarily reduce himſelf to the neceſſity of making an option among ſuch melancholy alternatives?

The beſt which could be hoped for, were the chevalier on the throne, would be, that a thread of favorable accidents, improved by the wiſdom and virtue of parliament, might keep off the evil day during his reign. But ſtill the fatal cauſe would be eſtabliſhed, it would be entailed upon us, and every man would be appriſed, that ſooner or later the fatal effects muſt follow. Conſider a little what a condition we ſhould be in, both with reſpect to our foreign intereſt, and our domeſtic quiet, whilſt the reprieve laſted, whilſt the chevalier or his ſucceſſors made no direct attack upon the conſtitution.

As to the firſt, it is true indeed, that princes and ſtates are friends or foes to one another, according as the motives of ambition drive them. Theſe are the firſt principles of union and diviſion amongſt them. The Proteſtant powers of Europe have joined, in our days, to ſupport and aggrandiſe the houſe of

of Auſtria, as they did, in the days of our forefathers, to defeat her deſigns, and to reduce her power; and the moſt Chriſtian king of France has more than once joined his councils and his arms too, with the councils and arms of the moſt Mahometan Emperor of Conſtantinople. But ſtill there is, and there muſt continue, as long as the influence of the Papal authority ſubſiſts in Europe, another general, permanent, and invariable diviſion of intereſts. The powers of earth, like thoſe of Heaven, have two diſtinct motions. Each of them rolls in his own political orb, but each of them is hurried at the ſame time round the great vortex of his religion. If this general notion be juſt, apply it to the preſent caſe. Whilſt a Roman Catholic holds the rudder, how can we expect to be ſteered in our proper courſe? His political intereſt will certainly incline him to direct our firſt motion right; but his miſtaken religious intereſt will render him incapable of doing it ſteadily.

As to the laſt, our domeſtic quiet; even whilſt the chevalier, and thoſe of his race concealed their game, we ſhould remain in the moſt unhappy ſtate which human nature is ſubject to, a ſtate of doubt and ſuſpence. Our preſervation would depend on making him the object of our eternal jealouſy, who, to render himſelf and his people happy, ought to be that of our intire confidence.

Whilſt the pretender and his ſucceſſors forbore to attack the religion and liberty of the nation, we ſhould remain in the condition of thoſe people who labor under a broken conſtitution, or who carry about them ſome chronical diſtemper. They feel a little pain at every moment; or a certain uneaſineſs, which is ſometimes leſs tolerable than pain, hangs continually on them, and they languiſh in the conſtant expectation of dying perhaps in the ſevereſt torture.

But

But if the fear of hell ſhould diſſipate all other fears in the pretender's mind, and carry him, which is frequently the effect of that paſſion, to the moſt deſperate undertakings; if among his ſucceſſors a man bold enough to make the attempt ſhould ariſe, the condition of the Britiſh nation would be ſtill more deplorable. The attempt ſucceeding, we ſhould fall into tyranny; for a change of religion could never be brought about by conſent; and the ſame force, that would be ſufficient to enſlave our conſciences, would be ſufficient for all the other purpoſes of arbitrary power. The attempt failing, we ſhould fall into anarchy; for there is no medium when diſputes between a prince and his people are arrived at a certain point; he muſt either be ſubmitted to, or depoſed.

I have now laid before you even more than I intended to have ſaid when I took my pen; and I am perſuaded, that if theſe papers ever come to your hands, they will enable you to caſt up the account between party and me. Till the time of the queen's death it ſtands, I believe, even between us. The tories diſtinguiſhed me by their approbation, and by the credit which I had amongſt them; and I endeavored to diſtinguiſh myſelf in their ſervice, under the immediate weight of great diſcouragement, and with the no very diſtant proſpect of great danger. Since that time the account is not ſo even, and I dare appeal to any impartial perſon, whether my ſide in it be that of the debtor. As to the opinion of mankind in general, and the judgment which poſterity will paſs on theſe matters, I am under no great concern. "Suum cuique decus poſteritas rependit."

FROM

FROM THE

EARL OF STAIR,

HIS MAJESTY'S EMBASSADOR AT PARIS,

TO

JAMES CRAGGS, JUNIOR, ESQ.

SECRET LETTER*.

MONSIEUR,

VOUS avés vu par ma depêche l'état de la negotiation. J'ai à preſent à vous parler, en particulier, de *Bolingbroke*.

Je l'ai vu chés moi le jour après l'arrivée de Mr. *Pitt*: et nous avons eu enſemble une converſation d'une heure et demie; dont la ſubſtance eſt, que lui, *Bolingbroke*, rentroit, du meilleur de ſon cœur, dans ſon devoir envers ſon roi et ſa patrie; et que rien au monde étoit capable de le détacher de cette reſolution, quand même ſa majeſté ne trouveroit pas à propos de lui faire grace. Qu'il étoit prêt, de ce moment, à s'employer avec moi dans ce païs-ici pour le ſervice du roi, ſi je croyois qu'il y pouvoit être utile à quelque choſe; et qu'il me communi-

* This letter, which, with ſeveral more private and ſecret letters, had been returned to Lord *Stair* by his correſpondent, was communicated to the editor of theſe papers, ſome time ago, by a relation of his lordſhip: and it is copied here, exactly, from the original in his own hand-writing.

queroit

querbit tout ce qui viendroit à ſa connoiſſance qui me pourroit être de quelque uſage, et qu'il m'aideroit volontiers de toutes les lumieres qu'il pourroit avoir acquiſes par ſes habitudes ici.

Il me dit, que je ſçavois bien, par ſon caractere, qu'il ne faiſoit pas les choſes à demi; qu'en rentrant en ſon devoir il ſe propoſoit de ſervir le roi et ſa patrie avec zèle et avec affection. Que pour cet effet, il ſe croiroit obligé, par toutes les obligations du devoir, de la reconnoiſſance, de l'honneur et de l'interêt même, d'informer le roi de tout ce que ſon experience lui pourroit ſuggérer d'utile pour le ſervice de ſa majeſté, pour l'affermiſſement de la tranquillité publique, et pour prévenir tous les projets qui ſe pourront former en faveur de ſes ennemis. Qu'il feroit tout ce qui dependroit de lui de faire rentrer les toris qui ont embraſſé le parti du prétendant dans leur devoir, en leur faiſant voir quelle eſpece d'homme le prétendant étoit; et qu'ils ſe trompoient s'ils croyoient qu'ils pourroient avoir de la ſeureté avec lui ou pour leur liberté ou pour leur réligion. Que pour pouvoir faire cela, il étoit neceſſaire, même pour le ſervice du roi, que lui, *Bolingbroke*, ne fût pas perdu de reputation, qu'il ne paſsât pas pour délateur.

Il inſiſta beaucoup ſur cet article. "Ce que je "propoſe de faire, me dit-il, eſt digne d'un hon- "nête homme, convaincu de ſon erreur et touché "d'un vrai répentir; c'eſt ce que je ferai hautement "et à la face de l'univers: et permettés-moi d'ajou- "ter, que c'eſt un ſervice réel que je rendrai au roi "et à ma patrie. Mais de conſentir à trahir des "particuliers, ou à révéler ce qui m'a été confié, "ce ſeroit me deſhonnorer à jamais."

Je ne dois pas oublier à vous dire, qu'outre ſon éloignement pour le prétendant, il m'a temoigné beaucoup de dépit contre la France: et je ſuis ſûr qu'il me parloit ſincerement.

Je

Je ſerai bien-aiſe d'être inſtruit au plutôt touchant les intentions du roi à ſon égard; et de ce que je dois lui promettre au nom de ſa majeſté; afin qu'il puiſſe être en état de ſe rétirer de ce païs-ici, où j'appréhende qu'il ne fait pas bon pour lui.

Pour moi; je vous avoue franchement, que je crois qu'il m'a parlé dans la ſincérité de ſon cœur; qu'il eſt reſolu de faire ſon mieux pour abattre le parti du prétendant, et pour le déracinet tout-à-fait ſi cela dependoit de lui: et il me paroit certain, qu'il n'y a perſonne qui puiſſe nuire au prétendant au point qu'il le peut faire.

A' la fin de nôtre converſation, il me ſerra la main, et me dit: "Mi lord, ſi l'on me fait la juſtice de "croire que mes profeſſions ſont ſinceres, plus ils "menagent ma réputation, plus ils ſont le ſervice "du roi. Si au contraire ils me ſoupçonnent de ne "pas marcher droit, ils auront raiſon d'exiger de "moi des conditions que j'aurai en même tems rai- "ſon, comme un honnête homme, de réfuſer. Les "difficultés que je fais de promettre trop, peuvent "ſervir de garans que je tiendrai ce à quoi je m'en- "gage. En tout cas, le tems et ma conduite uni- "forme convaincront tout le monde de la droiture "de mes intentions: et il vaut mieux attendre ce "tems avec patience, quelque long qu'il puiſſe être, "que d'arriver avec precipitation à ſon but en ſor- "tant du grand chemin de l'honneur et de la pro- "bité."

REFLEC-

REFLECTIONS

UPON

EXILE.

M.DCC.XVI.

REFLECTIONS

UPON

EXILE*.

M.DCC.XVI.

DISSIPATION of mind, and length of time, are the remedies to which the greateſt part of mankind truſt in their afflictions. But the firſt of theſe works a temporary, the ſecond a ſlow, effect: and both are unworthy of a wiſe man. Are we to fly from ourſelves that we may fly from our misfortunes, and fondly to imagine that the diſeaſe is cured, becauſe we find means to get ſome moments of reſpite from pain? Or ſhall we expect from time, the phyſician of brutes, a lingering and uncertain deliverance? Shall we wait to be happy till we can forget that we are miſerable, and owe to the weakneſs of our faculties a tranquillity which ought to be the effect of their ſtrength? Far otherwiſe. Let us ſet all our paſt and our preſent afflictions at once before our eyes †. Let us reſolve to overcome them, inſtead of flying from them, or wearing out the

* Several paſſages of this little treatiſe are taken from *Seneca*: and the whole is writ with ſome alluſion to his ſtyle and manner, "quanquam non omnino temere ſit, quod de ſententiis illius "queritur Fabius," &c. *Eras.* De ſen. jud.

† *Sen.* De con. ad Hel.

ſenſe of them by long and ignominious patience. Inſtead of palliating remedies, let us uſe the inciſion-knife and the cauſtic, ſearch the wound to the bottom, and work an immediate and radical cure.

The recalling of former misfortunes ſerves to fortify the mind againſt latter. He muſt bluſh to ſink under the anguiſh of one wound, who ſurveys a body ſeamed over with the ſcars of many, and who has come victorious out of all the conflicts wherein he received them. Let ſighs and tears, and fainting under the lighteſt ſtrokes of adverſe fortune, be the portion of thoſe unhappy people whoſe tender minds a long courſe of felicity has enervated: while ſuch, as have paſſed through years of calamity, bear up, with a noble and immoveable conſtancy, againſt the heavieſt. Uninterrupted miſery has this good effect, as it continually torments, it finally hardens.

Such is the language of philoſophy: and happy is the man who acquires the right of holding it. But this right is not to be acquired by pathetic diſcourſe. Our conduct can alone give it us: and therefore, inſtead of preſuming on our ſtrength, the ſureſt method is to confeſs our weakneſs, and, without loſs of time, to apply ourſelves to the ſtudy of wiſdom. This was the advice which the oracle gave to *Zeno* *, and there is no other way of ſecuring our tranquillity amidſt all the accidents to which human life is expoſed. Philoſophy has, I know, her *Thraſos*, as well as war: and among her ſons many there have been, who, while they aimed at being more than men, became ſomething leſs. The means of preventing this danger are eaſy and ſure. It is a good rule to examine well before we addict ourſelves to any ſect: but I think it is a better rule, to addict ourſelves to none. Let us hear them all, with a perfect indifferency on which ſide the truth

* *Diog. Laert.*

lies:

lies: and, when we come to determine, let nothing appear ſo venerable to us as our own underſtandings. Let us gratefully accept the help of every one who has endeavored to correct the vices, and ſtrengthen the minds of men; but let us chuſe for ourſelves, and yield univerſal aſſent to none. Thus, that I may inſtance the ſect already mentioned, when we have laid aſide the wonderful and ſurpriſing ſentences, and all the paradoxes of the Portique, we ſhall find in that ſchool ſuch doctrines as our unprejudiced reaſons ſubmits to with pleaſure, as nature dictates, and as experience confirms. Without this precaution, we run the riſque of becoming imaginary kings, and real ſlaves. With it we may learn to aſſert our native freedom, and live independent on fortune.

In order to which great end, it is neceſſary that we ſtand watchful, as centinels, to diſcover the ſecret wiles and open attacks of this capricious goddeſs, before they reach us *. Where ſhe falls upon us unexpected, it is hard to reſiſt; but thoſe who wait for her, will repel her with eaſe. The ſudden invaſion of an enemy overthrows ſuch as are not on their guard; but they who foreſee the war, and prepare themſelves for it before it breaks out, ſtand, without difficulty, the firſt and the fierceſt onſet. I learned this important leſſon long ago, and never truſted to fortune even while ſhe ſeemed to be at peace with me. The riches, the honors, the reputation, and all the advantages which her treacherous indulgence poured upon me, I placed ſo, that ſhe might ſnatch them away without giving me any diſturbance. I kept a great interval between me and them. She took them, but ſhe could not tear them from me. No man ſuffers by bad fortune, but he who has been deceived by good. If we grow fond of her gifts, fancy that they belong to us,

* *Sen.* De con. ad Hel.

and

and are perpetually to remain with us, if we lean upon them, and expect to be conſidered for them; we ſhall ſink into all the bitterneſs of grief, as ſoon as theſe falſe and tranſitory benefits paſs away, as ſoon as our vain and childiſh minds, unfraught with ſolid pleaſures, become deſtitute even of thoſe which are imaginary. But, if we do not ſuffer ourſelves to be tranſported by proſperity, neither ſhall we be reduced by adverſity. Our ſouls will be of proof againſt the dangers of both theſe ſtates: and, having explored our ſtrength, we ſhall be ſure of it; for in the midſt of felicity, we ſhall have tried how we can bear misfortune.

It is much harder to examine and judge, than to take up opinions on truſt; and therefore the far greateſt part of the world borrow, from others, thoſe which they entertain concerning all the affairs of life and death *. Hence it proceeds that men are ſo unanimouſly eager in the purſuit of things, which, far from having any inherent real good, are varniſhed over with a ſpecious and deceitful gloſs, and contain nothing anſwerable to their appearances †. Hence it proceeds, on the other hand, that, in thoſe things which are called evils, there is nothing ſo hard and terrible as the general cry of the world threatens. The word *exile* comes indeed harſh to the ear, and ſtrikes us like a melancholy and execrable ſound, through a certain perſuaſion which men have habitually concurred in. Thus the multitude has ordained. But the greateſt part of their ordinances are abrogated by the wiſe.

Rejecting therefore the judgment of thoſe who determine according to popular opinions, or the firſt appearances of things, let us examine what

* Dum unuſquiſque mavult credere, quam judicare, nunquam de vita judicatur, ſemper creditur. *Sen.* De vita beat.

† *Sen.* De con. ad Hel.

exile

exile really is *. It is then, a change of place; and, leſt you ſhould ſay that I diminiſh the object, and conceal the moſt ſhocking parts of it, I add, that this change of place is frequently accompanied by ſome or all of the following inconveniencies; by the loſs of the eſtate which we enjoyed, and the rank which we held; by the loſs of that conſideration and power which we were in poſſeſſion of; by a ſeparation from our family and our friends; by the contempt which we may fall into; by the ignominy with which thoſe who have driven us abroad, will endeavor to ſully the innocence of our characters, and to juſtify the injuſtice of their own conduct.

All theſe ſhall be ſpoke to hereafter. In the mean while, let us conſider what evil there is, in change of place, abſtractedly and by itſelf.

To live deprived of one's country is intolerable †. Is it ſo? How comes it then to paſs that ſuch numbers of men live out of their countries by choice? Obſerve how the ſtreets of London and Paris are crowded. Call over thoſe millions by name, and aſk them, one by one, of what country they are: how many will you find, who, from different parts of the earth, come to inhabit theſe great cities, which afford the largeſt opportunities, and the largeſt encouragement, to virtue and to vice? Some are drawn by ambition, and ſome are ſent by duty; many reſort thither to improve their minds, and many to improve their fortunes; others bring their beauty, and others their eloquence, to market. Remove from hence, and go to the utmoſt extremities of the Eaſt or the Weſt: viſit the barbarous nations of Africa, or the inhoſpitable regions of the North: you will find no climate ſo bad, no coun-

* *Sen.* De con. ad Hel. † Ibid.

try

try ſo ſavage, as not to have ſome people who come from abroad, and inhabit there by choice.

Among numberleſs extravagancies which have paſſed through the minds of men, we may juſtly reckon for one, that notion of a ſecret affection, independent of our reaſon, and ſuperior to our reaſon, which we are ſuppoſed to have for our country; as if there were ſome phyſical virtue in every ſpot of ground, which neceſſarily produced this effect in every one born upon it.

"——Amor patriæ ratione valentior omni *."

As if the heimyei was an univerſal diſtemper, inſeparable from the conſtitution of a human body, and not peculiar to the Swiſs, who ſeem to have been made for their mountains, as their mountains ſeem to have been made for them †. This notion may have contributed to the ſecurity and grandeur of ſtates. It has therefore been not unartfully cultivated, and the prejudice of education has been with care put on its ſide. Men have come in this caſe, as in many, from believing that it ought to be ſo, to perſuade others, and even to believe themſelves that it is ſo. *Procopius* relates that *Abgarus* came to Rome, and gained the eſteem and friendſhip of *Auguſtus* to ſuch a degree, that this emperor could not reſolve to let him return home: that *Abgarus* brought ſeveral beaſts, which he had taken one day in hunting, alive to *Auguſtus*: that he placed in different parts of the Circus ſome of the earth which belonged to the places where each of theſe animals had been caught; that as ſoon as this was done, and they were turned looſe, every one of them ran to that corner where his earth lay: that *Auguſtus*, admiring their ſentiment of love for their country

* Ov. De Ponto, El. iv. † Card. *Benti.* Let.

which

which nature has graved in the hearts of beaſts, and ſtruck by the evidence of the truth, granted the requeſt which *Abgarus* immediately preſſed upon him, and allowed, though with regret, the tetrarch to return to Edeſſa. But this tale deſerves juſt as much credit as that which follows in the ſame place, of the letter of *Abgarus* to *Jeſus Chriſt*, of our Saviour's anſwer, and of the cure of *Abgarus*. There is nothing, ſurely, more groundleſs than the notion here advanced, nothing more abſurd. We love the country in which we are born, becauſe we receive particular benefits from it, and becauſe we have particular obligations to it: which ties we may have to another country as well as that we are born in; to our country by election, as well as to our country by birth. In all other reſpects, a wiſe man looks on himſelf as a citizen of the world: and, when you aſk him where his country lies, points, like *Anaxagoras*, with his finger to the Heavens.

There are other perſons, again, who have imagined that as the whole univerſe ſuffers a continual rotation, and nature ſeems to delight in it, or to preſerve herſelf by it, ſo there is in the minds of men a natural reſtleſſneſs, which inclines them to change of place, and to the ſhifting their habitations *. This opinion has at leaſt an appearance of truth, which the other wants; and is countenanced, as the other is contradicted, by experience. But, whatever the reaſons be, which muſt have varied infinitely in an infinite number of caſes, and an immenſe ſpace of time; true it is in fact, that the families and nations of the world have been in a continual fluctuation, roaming about on the face of the globe, driving and driven out by turns. What a number of colonies has Aſia ſent into Europe! The Phœnicians planted the coaſts of the Mediterranean ſea, and puſhed their

* *Sen.* De con. ad Hel.

ſettle-

ſettlements even into the ocean. The Etrurians were of Aſiatic extraction; and, to mention no more, the Romans, thoſe lords of the world, acknowledged a Trojan exile for the founder of their empire. How many migrations have there been, in return to theſe, from Europe into Aſia? They would be endleſs to enumerate; for, beſide the Aeolic, the Ionic, and others of almoſt equal fame, the Greeks, during ſeveral ages, made continual expeditions, and built cities in ſeveral parts of Aſia. The Gauls penetrated thither too, and eſtabliſhed a kingdom. The European Scythians over-ran theſe vaſt provinces, and carried their arms to the confines of Egypt. *Alexander* ſubdued all from the Helleſpont to India, and built towns, and eſtabliſhed colonies, to ſecure his conqueſts, and to eternize his name. From both theſe parts of the world Africa has received inhabitants and maſters; and what ſhe has received ſhe has given. The Tyrians built the city, and founded the republic of Carthage; and Greek has been the language of Egypt. In the remoteſt antiquity we hear of *Belus* in Chaldæa, and of *Seſoſtris* planting his tawny colonies in Colchos: and Spain has been, in theſe latter ages, under the dominion of the Moors. If we turn to Runic hiſtory, we find our fathers, the Goths, led by *Woden* and by *Thor*, their heroes firſt and their divinities afterwards, from the Aſiatic Tartary into Europe: and who can aſſure us that this was their firſt migration? They came into Aſia, perhaps by the eaſt, from that continent to which their ſons have lately ſailed from Europe by the weſt: and thus, in the proceſs of three or four thouſand years, the ſame race of men have puſhed their conqueſts and their habitations round the globe: at leaſt this may be ſuppoſed, as reaſonably as it is ſuppoſed, I think by *Grotius*, that America was peopled from Scandinavia. The world is a great wilderneſs, wherein mankind have wandered and joſtled

jostled one another about from the creation. Some have removed by necessity, and others by choice. One nation has been fond of seizing what another was tired of possessing: and it will be difficult to point out the country which is to this day in the hands of its first inhabitants.

Thus fate has ordained that nothing shall remain long in the same state; and what are all these transportations of people, but so many public exiles? *Varro*, the most learned of the Romans, thought, since nature * is the same wherever we go, that this single circumstance was sufficient to remove all objections to change of place, taken by itself, and stripped of the other inconveniencies which attend exile. M. *Brutus* thought it enough that those, who go into banishment, cannot be hindered from carrying their virtue along with them. Now, if any one judge that each of these comforts is in itself insufficient, he must however confess that both of them, joined together, are able to remove the terrors of exile. For what trifles must all we leave behind us be esteemed, in comparison of the two most precious things which men can enjoy, and which, we are sure, will follow us wherever we turn our steps, the same nature, and our proper virtue †? Believe me, the providence of God has established such an order in the world, that of all which belongs to us the least valuable parts can alone fall under the will of others. Whatever is best is safest; lies out of the reach of human power; can neither be given nor taken away. Such is this great and beautiful work of nature, the world. Such is the mind of man, which contemplates and admires the world, whereof it makes the noblest part. These are inseparably ours, and as long as we remain in one we shall enjoy the other. Let us march therefore intrepidly wherever we are led by the course of human

* *Sen.* De con. ad Hel. † Ibid.

acci-

accidents. Wherever they lead us, on what coaſt ſoever we are thrown by them, we ſhall not find ourſelves abſolutely ſtrangers. We ſhall meet with men and women, creatures of the ſame figure, endowed with the ſame faculties, and born under the ſame laws of nature. We ſhall ſee the ſame virtues and vices, flowing from the ſame general principles, but varied in a thouſand different and contrary modes, according to that infinite variety of laws and cuſtoms which is eſtabliſhed for the ſame univerſal end, the preſervation of ſociety. We ſhall feel the ſame revolution of ſeaſons, and the ſame ſun and moon * will guide the courſe of our year. The ſame azure vault, beſpangled with ſtars, will be every where ſpread over our heads. There is no part of the world from whence we may not admire thoſe planets which roll, like ours, in different orbits round the ſame central ſun; from whence we may not diſcover an object ſtill more ſtupendous, that army of fixed ſtars hung up in the immenſe ſpace of the univerſe, innumerable ſuns, whoſe beams enlighten and cheriſh the unknown worlds which roll around them: and whilſt I am raviſhed by ſuch contemplations as theſe, whilſt my ſoul is thus raiſed up to heaven, it imports me little what ground I tread upon.

Brutus †, in the book which he writ on virtue, related that he had ſeen *Marcellus* in exile at Mitylene, living in all the happineſs which human nature is capable of, and cultivating, with as much aſſiduity as ever, all kinds of laudable knowledge. He added, that this ſpectacle made him think that it was rather he who went into baniſhment, ſince he was to return without the other, than the other who

* *Plut.* Of baniſhment. He compares thoſe who cannot live out of their own country, to the ſimple people who fancied that the moon of Athens was a finer moon than that of Corinth.

—— labentem cœlo quæ ducitis annum. *Virg.* Georg.

† *Sen.* De con. ad Hel.

remained

remained in it. O *Marcellus*, far more happy when *Brutus* approved thy exile, than when the commonwealth approved thy conſulſhip! How great a man muſt thou have been, to extort admiration from him who appeared an object of admiration even to his own *Cato!* The ſame *Brutus* reported further, that *Cæſar* overſhot Mitylene, becauſe he could not ſtand the ſight of *Marcellus* reduced to a ſtate ſo unworthy of him. His reſtoration was at length obtained by the public interceſſion of the whole ſenate, who were dejected with grief to ſuch a degree, that they ſeemed all upon this occaſion, to have the ſame ſentiments with *Brutus*, and to be ſuppliants for themſelves rather than for *Marcellus* †. This was to return with honor; but ſurely he remained abroad with greater, when *Brutus* could not reſolve to leave him, nor *Cæſar* to ſee him; for both of them bore witneſs of his merit. *Brutus* grieved, and *Cæſar* bluſhed to go to Rome without him.

Q. Metellus Numidicus had undergone the ſame fate ſome years before, while the people, who are always the ſureſt inſtruments of their own ſervitude, were laying, under the conduct of *Marius*, the foundations of that tyranny which was perfected by *Cæſar*. *Metellus* alone, in the midſt of an intimidated ſenate, and outrageous multitude, refuſed to ſwear to the pernicious laws of the tribune *Saturninus*. His conſtancy became his crime, and exile his puniſhment. A wild and lawleſs faction prevailing againſt him, the beſt men of the city armed in his defence, and were ready to lay down their lives, that they might preſerve ſo much virtue to their country. But he, having failed to perſuade, thought

† *Marcellus* was aſſaſſinated at Athens, in his return home, by *Chilo*, an old friend, and fellow-ſoldier of his. The motive of *Chilo* is not explained in hiſtory. *Cæſar* was ſuſpected, but he ſeems to be juſtified by the opinion of *Brutus*.

it

it not lawful to conſtrain. He judged in the phrenſy of the Roman commonwealth, as *Plato* judged in the dotage of the Athenian. *Metellus* knew, that if his fellow-citizens amended, he ſhould be recalled; and if they did not amend, he thought he could be no where worſe than at Rome. He went voluntarily into exile, and wherever he paſſed he carried the ſure ſymptom of a ſickly ſtate, and the certain prognoſtic of an expiring commonwealth. What temper he continued in abroad will beſt appear by a fragment of one of his letters which *Gellius* *, in a pedantic compilation of phraſes uſed by the annaliſt *Q. Claudius*, has preſerved for the ſake of the word fruniſcor. "Illi vero omni "jure atque honeſtate interdicti: ego neque aqua "neque igne careo: et ſumma gloria fruniſcor." Happy *Metellus!* happy in the conſcience of thy own virtue! happy in thy pious ſon, and in that excellent friend who reſembled thee in merit and in fortune!

Rutilius had defended Aſia againſt the extortions of the publicans, according to the ſtrict juſtice of which he made profeſſion, and to the particular duty of his office. The Equeſtrian order were upon this account his enemies, and the Marian faction was ſo of courſe, on account of his probity, as well as out of hatred to *Metellus*. The moſt innocent man of the city was accuſed of corruption. The beſt man was proſecuted by the worſt, by *Apicius;* a name dedicated to infamy †. Thoſe who had ſtirred up the falſe accuſation ſat as judges, and pronounced the unjuſt ſentence againſt him. He hardly deigned to defend his cauſe, but retired into the Eaſt, where that Roman virtue which Rome could not bear, was received with

* Lib. xvii. cap. 2.

† There was another *Apicius*, in the reign of *Tiberius*, famous for his gluttony; and a third in the time of *Trajan*.

honor.

honor *. Shall *Rutilius* now be deemed unhappy, when they who condemned him are, for that action, delivered down as criminals to all future generations? when he quitted his country with greater eaſe than he would ſuffer his exile to finiſh; when he alone durſt refuſe the Dictator *Sylla*, and being recalled home, not only declined to go, but fled farther off?

What do you propoſe, it may be ſaid, by theſe examples, multitudes of which are to be collected from the memorials of former ages? I propoſe to ſhew that as change of place, ſimply conſidered, can render no man unhappy, ſo the other evils which are objected to exile, either cannot happen to wiſe and virtuous men; or, if they do happen to them, cannot render them miſerable. Stones are hard, and cakes of ice are cold: and all who feel them, feel them alike †. But the good or the bad events, which fortune brings upon us, are felt according to what qualities we, not they, have. They are in themſelves indifferent and common accidents, and they acquire ſtrength by nothing but our vice or our weakneſs. Fortune can diſpenſe neither felicity nor infelicity unleſs we co-operate with her. Few men, who are unhappy under the loſs of an eſtate, would be happy in the poſſeſſion of it: and thoſe, who deſerve to enjoy the advantages which exile takes away, will not be unhappy when they are deprived of them.

It grieves me to make an exception to this rule; but *Tully* was one ſo remarkably, that the example can be neither concealed, nor paſſed over. This great man, who had been the ſaviour of his country, who had feared, in the ſupport of that cauſe, neither the inſults of a deſperate party, nor the daggers of aſſaſſins, when he came to ſuffer for the

* *Sen.* L. De prov. cap. 3. † *Plut.* On exile.

ſame

ſame cauſe, ſunk under the weight. He diſhonored that baniſhment which indulgent providence meant to be the means of rendering his glory complete. Uncertain where he ſhould go, or what he ſhould do, fearful as a woman, and froward as a child, he lamented the loſs of his rank, of his riches, and of his ſplendid popularity. His eloquence ſerved only to paint his ignominy in ſtronger colors. He wept over the ruins of his fine houſe which *Clodius* had demoliſhed: and his ſeparation from *Terentia*, whom he repudiated not long afterwards, was perhaps an affliction to him at this time. Every thing becomes intolerable to the man who is once ſubdued by grief *(a)*. He regrets what he took no pleaſure in enjoying, and, overloaded already, he ſhrinks at the weight of a feather. *Cicero*'s behaviour, in ſhort, was ſuch that his friends, as well as his enemies, believed him to have loſt his ſenſes *(b)*. *Cæſar* beheld, with a ſecret ſatisfaction, the man, who had refuſed to be his lieutenant, weeping under the rod of *Clodius*. *Pompey* hoped to find ſome excuſe for his own ingratitude in the contempt which the friend, whom he had abandoned, expoſed himſelf to. Nay, *Atticus* judged him too meanly attached to his former fortune, and reproached him for it. *Atticus*, whoſe great talents were uſury and trimming, who placed his principal merit in being rich, and who would have been noted with infamy at Athens, for keeping well with all ſides, and venturing on none *(c)*: even *Atticus* bluſhed for *Tully*, and the moſt plauſible man alive aſſumed the ſtyle of *Cato*.

(a) Mitto cætera intolerabilia. Etenim fletu impedior. L. iii. Ad Attic. ep. 10.

(b) Tam ſæpe, et tam vehementer objurgas, et animo infirmo eſſe dicis. Ib.

(c) *Plut.* Vit. Solon.

Having

Having dwelt the longer on this inſtance, becauſe, whilſt it takes nothing from the truth which has been eſtabliſhed, it teaches us another of great importance. Wiſe men are certainly ſuperior to all the evils of exile. But in a ſtrict ſenſe he, who has left any one paſſion in his ſoul unſubdued, will not deſerve that appellation. It is not enough that we have ſtudied all the duties of public and private life; that we are perfectly acquainted with them, and that we live up to them in the eye of the world; a paſſion that lies dormant in the heart, and has eſcaped our ſcrutiny, or which we have obſerved and indulged as venial, or which we have perhaps encouraged, as a principle to excite and to aid our virtue, may one time or other deſtroy our tranquillity, and diſgrace our whole character. When virtue has ſteeled the mind on every ſide, we are invulnerable on every ſide: but *Achilles* was wounded in the heel. The leaſt part, overlooked or neglected, may expoſe us to receive a mortal blow. Reaſon cannot obtain the abſolute dominion of our ſouls by one victory. Vice has many reſerves, which muſt be beaten; many ſtrong holds, which muſt be forced; and we may be found of proof in many trials, without being ſo in all. We may reſiſt the ſevereſt, and yield to the weakeſt attacks of fortune. We may have got the better of avarice, the moſt epidemical diſeaſe of the mind, and yet be ſlaves to ambition †. We may

† *Seneca* ſays the contrary of all this, according to the Stoical ſyſtem, which, however, he departs from on many occaſions. "Si contra unam quamlibet partem fortunæ ſatis tibi roboris eſt, "idem adverſus omnes erit.——Si avaritia dimiſit, vehementiſ- "ſima generis humani peſtis, moram tibi ambitio non faciet. "Si ultimum diem," &c. De Con. ad Hel.

Non ſingula vitia ratio, ſed pariter omnia proſternit. In univerſum ſemel vincitur. Ib.

Nec audacem quidem timoris abſolvimus: ne prodigum quidem avaritia liberamus. De Benef. L. iv. c. 27.

Qui autem habet vitium unum, habet omnia. Ib. L. v. c. 15.

have purged our ſouls of the fear of death, and yet ſome other fear may venture to lurk behind. This was the caſe of *Cicero*. Vanity was his cardinal vice *(a.)* It had, I queſtion not, warmed his zeal, quickened his induſtry, animated the love of his country, and ſupported his conſtancy againſt *Catiline*: but it gave to *Clodius* an entire victory over him. He was not afraid to die, and part with eſtate, rank, honor, and every thing which he lamented the loſs of: but he was afraid to live deprived of them. "Ut vivus hæc amitterem *(b.)*" He would probably have met death on this occaſion with the ſame firmneſs with which he ſaid to *Popilius Lænus*, his client and his murderer, "Approach, veteran, and "if at leaſt thou canſt do this well, cut off my head." But he could not bear to ſee himſelf, and to be ſeen by others, ſtripped of thoſe trappings which he was accuſtomed to wear. This made him break out into ſo many ſhameful expreſſions. "Poſſum obliviſci "qui fuerim? non ſentire qui ſim? quo caream "honore? qua gloria?" And ſpeaking of his brother—"Vitavi ne viderem; ne aut illius luctum "ſqualoremque aſpicerem, aut me, quem ille floren-"tiſſimum reliquerat, perditum illi afflictumque of-"ferrem *(c.)*". He had thought of death, and prepared his mind for it. There were occaſions too where his vanity might be flattered by it. But the ſame vanity hindered him in his proſperous eſtate from ſuppoſing ſuch a reverſe as afterwards happened to him. When it came, it found him unprepared, it ſurpriſed him, it ſtunned him; for he was ſtill fond of the pomp and hurry of Rome, "fumum et "opes, ſtrepitumque Romæ," and unweaned from

(a) In animo autem gloriæ cupido, qualis fuit Ciceronis, plurimum poteſt. *Vel. Pat.* L. i.

(b) Ep ad *Attic.* L. iii. ep. 3, 7, 10. et paſſim.

(c) L. iii. ep. 10. ad *Attic.*

all

all thoſe things which habit renders neceſſary, and which nature has left indifferent.

We have enumerated them above, and it is time to deſcend into a more particular examination of them. Change of place then may be borne by every man. It is the delight of many. But who can bear the evils which accompany exile? You who aſk the queſtion can bear them. Every one who conſiders them as they are in themſelves, inſtead of looking at them through the falſe optic which prejudice holds before our eyes. For what? you have loſt your eſtate: reduce your deſires, and you will perceive yourſelf to be as rich as ever, with this conſiderable advantage to boot, that your cares will be diminiſhed. Our natural and real wants † are confined to narrow bounds, whilſt thoſe which fancy and cuſtom create are confined to none. Truth lies within a little and certain compaſs, but error is immenſe. If we ſuffer our deſires therefore to wander beyond theſe bounds, they wander eternally. "Neſcio quid curtæ ſemper abeſt rei." We become neceſſitous in the midſt of plenty, and our poverty encreaſes with our riches. Reduce your deſires, be able to ſay with the apoſtle of Greece, to whom *Eraſmus* was ready to addreſs his prayers, "quam multis ipſe non egeo!" Baniſh out of your exile all imaginary, and you will ſuffer no real wants. The little ſtream which is left will ſuffice to quench the thirſt of nature, and that which cannot be quenched by it, is not your thirſt, but your diſtemper; a diſtemper formed by the vicious

† Naturalia deſideria finita ſunt: ex falſa opinione naſcentia ubi deſinant non habent, nullus enim terminus falſo eſt. *Sen.* Ep. 16.

Excerp. ex Lib. *Sen.* falſely ſo called.

Si ad naturam vives, nunquam eris pauper; ſi ad opinionem, nunquam dives. Exiguum natura deſiderat, opinio immenſum. *Sen.* Ep. 16.

habits of your mind, and not the effect of exile. How great a part of mankind bear poverty with cheerfulneſs, becauſe they have been bred in it, and are accuſtomed to it? ‡ Shall we not be able to acquire, by reaſon and by reflection, what the meaneſt artiſan poſſeſſes by habit? ſhall thoſe who have ſo many advantages over him, be ſlaves to wants and neceſſities of which he is ignorant? The rich, whoſe wanton appetites neither the produce of one country, nor of one part of the world, can ſatisfy, for whom the whole habitual globe is ranſacked, for whom the caravans of the eaſt are continually in march, and the remoteſt ſeas are covered with ſhips; theſe pampered creatures, ſated with ſuperfluity, are often glad to inhabit an humble cot, and to make an homely meal. They run for refuge into the arms of frugality. Madmen that they are, to live always in fear of what they ſometimes wiſh for, and to fly from that life which they find in luxury to imitate! Let us caſt our eyes backwards on thoſe great men who lived in the ages of virtue, of ſimplicity, of frugality, and let us bluſh to think that we enjoy in baniſhment more than they were maſters of in the midſt of their glory, in the utmoſt affluence of their fortune. Let us imagine that we behold a great dictator giving audience to the Samnite ambaſſadors, and preparing on the hearth his mean repaſt with the ſame hand which had ſo often ſubdued the enemies of the commonwealth, and borne the triumphal laurel to the capitol. Let us remember that *Plato* had but § three ſervants, and that *Zeno* had none ‖. *Socrates*,

‡ *Sen.* De con. ad Hel.

§ *Plato*'s will, in *Diog. Laer.* mentions four ſervants, beſides *Diana*, to whom he gave her freedom.

Apuleius makes his eſtate conſiſt in a little garden near the academy, two ſervants, a patten for ſacrifices, and as much gold as would ſerve to make ear-rings for a child.

‖ *Zeno* was owner of a thouſand talents when he came from Cyprus into Greece, and he uſed to lend his money out upon ſhips at

Socrates, the reformer of his country, was maintained, as *Menenius Agrippa*, the arbiter of his country, was buried, by contribution *. While *Attilius Regulus* beat the Carthaginians in Afric, the flight of his ploughman reduced his family to diſtreſs at home, and the tillage of his little farm became the public care. *Scipio* died without leaving enough to marry his daughters, and their portions were paid out of the treaſury of the ſtate; for ſure it was juſt that the people of Rome ſhould once pay tribute to him, who had eſtabliſhed a perpetual tribute on Carthage. After ſuch examples, ſhall we be afraid of poverty? Shall we diſdain to be adopted into a family which has ſo many illuſtrious anceſtors? Shall we complain of baniſhment for taking from us what the greateſt philoſophers, and the greateſt heroes of antiquity, never enjoyed.

You will find fault perhaps, and attribute to artifice, that I conſider ſingly misfortunes which come altogether on the baniſhed man, and overbear him with their united weight. You could ſupport change of place if it was not accompanied with poverty, or poverty if it was not accompanied with the ſeparation from your family and your friends, with the loſs of your rank, conſideration, and power, with contempt and ignominy. Whoever he be who reaſons in this manner, let him take the following anſwer: The leaſt of theſe circumſtances is ſingly ſufficient to render the man miſerable who is not prepared for

at an high intereſt. He kept, in ſhort, a kind of inſurance-office. He loſt this eſtate perhaps when he ſaid, "recte ſane agit "fortuna, quæ nos ad philoſophiam impellit." Afterwards he received many and great preſents from *Antigonus*. So that his great frugality and ſimplicity of life, was the effect of his choice, and not of neceſſity. Vid. *Dio. Laer.*

* *Diog. Laer.* Vit. Soc. quotes *Ariſtoxenus* for affirming that *Socrates* uſed to keep a box, and lived upon the money which was put into it: "Poſita igitur arcula, colligiſſe pecuniam quæ da-"retur; conſumpta autem ea, rurſus poſuiſſe."

it,

it, who has not diveſted himſelf of that paſſion upon which it is directed to work. But he who has got the maſtery of all his paſſions, who has foreſeen all theſe accidents, and prepared his mind to endure them all, will be ſuperior to all of them, and to all of them at once as well as ſingly. He will not bear the loſs of his rank, becauſe he can bear the loſs of his eſtate: but he will bear both, becauſe he is prepared for both; becauſe he is free from pride as much as he is from avarice.

You are ſeparated from your family and your friends. Take the liſt of them, and look it well over. How few of your family will you find who deſerve the name of friends; and how few among theſe who are really ſuch? Erafe the names of ſuch as ought not to ſtand on the roll, and the voluminous catalogue will ſoon dwindle into a narrow compaſs. Regret, if you pleaſe, your ſeparation from this ſmall remnant. Far be it from me, whilſt I declaim againſt a ſhameful and vicious weakneſs of mind, to proſcribe the ſentiments of a virtuous friendſhip. Regret your ſeparation from your friends: but regret it like a man who deſerves to be theirs. This is ſtrength, not weakneſs of mind; it is virtue, not vice.

But the leaſt uneaſineſs under the loſs of the rank which we held is ignominious. There is no valuable rank among men, but that which real merit aſſigns. The princes of the earth may give names, and inſtitute ceremonies, and exact the obſervation of them; their imbecility and their wickedneſs may prompt them to clothe fools and knaves with robes of honor, and emblems of wiſdom and virtue: but no man will be in truth ſuperior to another, without ſuperior merit; and that rank can no more be taken from us, than the merit which eſtabliſhes it. The ſupreme authority gives a fictitious and arbitrary value to coin, which is therefore not current alike

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in all times and in all places; but the real value remains invariable, and the provident man, who gets rid as faſt as he can of the droſſy piece, hoards up the good ſilver. Thus merit will not procure the ſame conſideration univerſally. But what then? the title to this conſideration is the ſame, and will be found alike in every circumſtance by thoſe who are wiſe and virtuous themſelves. If it is not owned by ſuch as are otherwiſe, nothing is however taken from us; we have no reaſon to complain. They conſidered us for a rank which we had; for our denomination, not for our intrinſic value. We have that rank, that denomination no longer, and they conſider us no longer: they admired in us what we admired not in ourſelves. If they learn to neglect us, let us learn to pity them. Their aſſiduity was importunate: let us not complain of the eaſe which this change procures us; let us rather apprehend the return of that rank and that power, which, like a ſunny day, would bring back theſe little inſects, and make them ſwarm once more about us. I know how apt we are, under ſpecious pretences, to diſguiſe our weakneſſes and our vices, and how often we ſucceed not only in deceiving the world, but even in deceiving ourſelves. An inclination to do good is inſeparable from a virtuous mind, and therefore the man, who cannot bear with patience the loſs of that rank and power which he enjoyed, may be willing to attribute his regrets to the impoſſibility which he ſuppoſes himſelf reduced to of ſatisfying this inclination. But let ſuch an one know, that a wiſe man contents himſelf with doing as much good as his ſituation allows him to do; that there is no ſituation wherein we may not do a great deal; and that when we are deprived of a greater power to do more good, we eſcape at the ſame time the temptation of doing ſome evil.

* *Sen.* De con. ad Hel.

The

The inconveniencies, which we have mentioned, carry nothing along with them difficult to be borne by a wife and virtuous man; and thoſe which remain to be mentioned, contempt and ignominy, can never fall to his lot. It is impoſſible that he who reverences himſelf ſhould be deſpiſed by others; and how can ignominy affect the man who collects all his ſtrength within himſelf, who appeals from the judgment of the multitude to another tribunal, and lives independent of mankind and of the accidents of life? *Cato* loſt the election of prætor, and that of conſul; but is any one blind enough to truth to imagine that theſe repulſes reflected any diſgrace on him? The dignity of thoſe two magiſtracies would have been encreaſed by his wearing them. They ſuffered, not *Cato*.

You have fulfilled all the duties of a good citizen, you have been true to your truſt, conſtant in your engagements, and have purſued the intereſt of your country without regard to the enemies you created, and the dangers you run. You ſevered her intereſt, as much as lay in your power, from thoſe of her factions, and from thoſe of her neighbours and allies too, when they became different. She reaps the benefit of theſe ſervices, and you ſuffer for them. You are baniſhed, and purſued with ignominy; and thoſe whom you hindered from triumphing at her expence, revenge themſelves at yours. The perſons, in oppoſition to whom you ſerved, or even ſaved the public, conſpire and accompliſh your private ruin. Theſe are your accuſers, and the giddy ungrateful crowd your judges. Your name is hung up in the tables of proſcription, and art joined to malice endeavours to make your beſt actions paſs for crimes, and to ſtain your character. For this purpoſe the ſacred voice of the ſenate is made to pronounce a lie, and thoſe records, which ought to be the eternal monuments of truth,

truth, become the vouchers of impoſture and calumny. Such circumſtances as theſe you think intolerable, and you would prefer death to ſo ignominious an exile. Deceive not yourſelf. The ignominy remains with them who perſecute unjuſtly, not with him who ſuffers unjuſt perſecution. "Re-"calcitrat undique tutus." Suppoſe that in the act which baniſhes you, it was declared that you have ſome contagious diſtemper, that you are crooked, or otherwiſe deformed. This would render the legiſlators ridiculous †. The other renders them infamous. But neither one nor the other can affect the man, who in an healthful well-proportioned body enjoys a conſcience void of all the offences aſcribed to him. Inſtead of ſuch an exile, would you compound, that you might live at home in eaſe and plenty, to be the inſtrument of blending theſe contrary intereſts once more together, and of giving but the third place to that of your country? Would you proſtitute her power to the ambition of others, under the pretence of ſecuring her from imaginary dangers, and drain her riches into the pockets of the meaneſt and vileſt of her citizens, under the pretence of paying her debts? If you could ſubmit to ſo infamous a compoſition, you are not the man to whom I addreſs my diſcourſe, or with whom I will have any commerce: and if you have virtue enough to diſdain it, why ſhould you repine at the other alternative? Baniſhment from ſuch a country, and with ſuch circumſtances, is like being delivered from priſon. *Diogenes* was driven out of the kingdom of Pontus for counterfeiting the coin, and *Stratonicus* thought that forgery might be committed in order to get baniſhed from Scriphos. But you have obtained your liberty by doing your duty.

† The dialogue between *Cicero* and *Philiſcus*. *Dion. Caſſ.* L. xxxviii.

Baniſhment,

Baniſhment, with all its train of evils, is ſo far from being the cauſe of contempt, that he who bears up with an undaunted ſpirit againſt them, while ſo many are dejected by them, erects on his very miſfortunes a trophy to his honor: for ſuch is the frame and temper of our minds, that nothing ſtrikes us with greater admiration than a man intrepid in the midſt of misfortunes. Of all ignominies an ignominious death muſt be allowed to be the greateſt; and yet where is the blaſphemer who will preſume to defame the death of *Socrates (a)?* This ſaint entered the priſon with the ſame countenance with which he reduced thirty tyrants, and he took off ignominy from the place: for how could it be deemed a priſon when *Socrates* was there? *Phocion* was led to execution in the ſame city. All thoſe who met the ſad proceſſion, caſt their eyes to the ground, and with throbbing hearts bewailed, not the innocent man, but Juſtice herſelf, who was in him condemned. Yet there was a wretch found, for monſters are ſometimes produced in contradiction to the ordinary rules of nature, who ſpit in his face as he paſſed along. *Phocion* wiped his cheek, ſmiled, turned to the magiſtrate, and ſaid, "Admoniſh this "man not to be ſo naſty for the future."

Ignominy then can take no hold on virtue *(b)*; for virtue is in every condition the ſame, and challenges the ſame reſpect. We applaud the world when ſhe proſpers; and when ſhe falls into adverſity we applaud her. Like the temples of the gods, ſhe is venerable even in her ruins. After this muſt it not appear a degree of madneſs to defer one moment acquiring the only arms capable of defending us againſt attacks which at every moment we are expoſed to? Our being miſerable, or not miſerable, when we fall into misfortunes, depends on the

(a) Sen. De con. ad Hel. *(b)* Ib.

manner

manner in which we have enjoyed proſperty. If we have applied ourſelves betimes to the ſtudy of wiſdom, and to the practice of virtue, theſe evils become indifferent; but if we have neglected to do ſo, they become neceſſary. In one caſe they are evils, in the other they are remedies for greater evils than themſelves. *Zeno (c)* rejoiced that a ſhipwreck had thrown him on the Athenian coaſt: and he owed to the loſs of his fortune the acquiſition which he made of virtue, of wiſdom, of immortality. There are good and bad airs for the mind, as well as for the body. Proſperity often irritates our chronical diſtempers, and leaves no hopes of finding any ſpecific but in adverſity. In ſuch caſes baniſhment is like change of air, and the evils we ſuffer are like rough medicines applied to inveterate diſeaſes. What † *Anacharſis* ſaid of the vine, may aptly enough be ſaid of proſperity. She bears the three grapes of drunkenneſs, of pleaſure, and of ſorrow: and happy it is if the laſt can cure the miſchief which the former work. When afflictions fail to have their due effect, the caſe is deſperate. They are the laſt remedy which indulgent Providence uſes: and if they fail, we muſt languiſh and die in miſery and contempt. Vain men! how ſeldom do we know what to wiſh or to pray for? When we pray againſt misfortunes, and when we fear them moſt, we want them moſt. It was for this reaſon that *Pythagoras* forbid his diſciples to aſk any thing in particular of God. The ſhorteſt and the beſt prayer which we can addreſs to him, who knows our wants, and our ignorance in aſking, is this: "Thy will be done."

Tully ſays, in ſome part of his works, that as happineſs is the object of all philoſophy, ſo the diſputes among philoſophers ariſe from their different notions of the ſovereign good. Reconcile them in that

(c) *Diog. Laert.* † *Sen.*

point,

point, you reconcile them in the reſt. The ſchool of *Zeno* placed this ſovereign good in naked virtue, and wound the principle up to an extreme beyond the pitch of nature and truth. A ſpirit of oppoſition to another doctrine, which grew into great vogue while *Zeno* flouriſhed, might occaſion this exceſs. *Epicurus* placed the ſovereign good in pleaſure. His terms were wilfully, or accidentally miſtaken. His ſcholars might help to pervert his doctrine, but rivalſhip enflamed the diſpute; for in truth there is not ſo much difference between ſtoiciſm reduced to reaſonable intelligible terms, and genuine orthodox epicuriſm, as is imagined. The *felicis animi immota tranquillitas*, and the *voluptas* of the latter, are near enough a-kin: and I much doubt whether the firmeſt hero of the Portique would have borne a fit of the ſtone, on the principles of *Zeno*, with greater magnanimity and patience than *Epicurus* did on thoſe of his own philoſophy †. However, *Ariſtotle* took a middle way, or explained himſelf better, and placed happineſs in the joint advantages of the mind, of the body, and of fortune. They are reaſonably joined; but certain it is, that they muſt not be placed on an equal foot. We can much better bear the privation of the laſt, than of the others; and poverty itſelf, which mankind is ſo afraid of, "per mare pauperiem fugiens, per ſaxa, "per ignes," is ſurely preferable to madneſs, or the ſtone, though ‡ *Chryſippus* thought it better to live mad, than not to live! If baniſhment therefore, by taking from us the advantages of fortune, cannot take from us the more valuable advantages of the

† Compare the repreſentations made ſo frequently of the doctrine of volupty taught by *Epicurus*, with the account which he himſelf gives in his letter to *Menœceus*, of the ſenſe wherein he underſtood this word. Vid. *Diog. Laer.*

‡ In his third book of Nature, cited by *Plutarch*, in the Treatiſe on the Contradictions of the Stoics.

mind

mind and the body, when we have them; and if the ſame accident is able to reſtore them to us, when we have loſt them, baniſhment is a very ſlight misfortune to thoſe who are already under the dominion of reaſon, and a very great bleſſing to thoſe who are ſtill plunged in vices which ruin the health both of body and mind. It is to be wiſhed for, in favor of ſuch as theſe, and to be feared by none. If we are in this caſe, let us ſecond the deſigns of Providence in our favor, and make ſome amends for neglecting former opportunities by not letting ſlip the laſt. "Si nolis ſanus, curres hydropicus." We may ſhorten the evils which we might have prevented, and as we get the better of our diſorderly paſſions, and vicious habits, we ſhall feel our anxiety diminiſh in proportion. All the approaches to virtue are comfortable. With how much joy will the man, who improves his misfortunes in this manner, diſcover that thoſe evils, which he attributed to his exile, ſprung from his vanity and folly, and vaniſh with them! He will ſee that, in his former temper of mind, he reſembled the effeminate prince who could drink no † water but that of the river Choaſpes; or the ſimple queen, in one of the tragedies of *Euripides*, who complained bitterly, that ſhe had not lighted the nuptial torch, and that the river Iſmenus had not furniſhed the water at her ſon's wedding. Seeing his former ſtate in this ridiculous light, he will labor on with pleaſure towards another as contrary as poſſible to it; and when he arrives there, he will be convinced by the ſtrongeſt of all proofs, his own experience, that he was unfortunate becauſe he was vicious, not becauſe he was baniſhed.

If I was not afraid of being thought to refine too much, I would venture to put ſome advantages of

† *Plut.* On Baniſhment.

fortune,

fortune, which are due to exile, into the ſcale againſt thoſe which we loſe by exile. One there is which has been neglected even by great and wiſe men. *Demetrius Phalereus*, after his expulſion from Athens, became firſt miniſter to the king of *Egypt*; and *Themiſtocles* found ſuch a reception at the court of Perſia, that he uſed to ſay his fortune had been loſt if he had not been ruined. But *Demetrius* expoſed himſelf, by his favor under the firſt *Ptolemy*, to a new diſgrace under the ſecond; and *Themiſtocles*, who had been the captain of a free people, became the vaſſal of the prince he had conquered. How much better is it to take hold of the proper advantage of exile, and to live for ourſelves, when we are under no obligation of living for others? *Similis*, a captain of great reputation under *Trajan* and *Adrian*, having obtained leave to retire, paſſed ſeven years in his retreat, and then dying, ordered this inſcription to be put on his tomb: That he had been many years on earth, but that he had lived only ſeven †. If you are wiſe, your leiſure will be worthily employed, and your retreat will add new luſtre to your character. Imitate *Thucydides* in Thracia, or *Xenophon* in his little farm at Scillus. In ſuch a retreat you may ſit down, like one of the inhabitants of Elis, who judged of the Olympic games, without taking any part in them. Far from the hurry of the world, and almoſt an unconcerned ſpectator of what paſſes in it, having paid in a public life what you owed to the preſent age, pay in a private life what you owe to poſterity. Write as you live, without paſſion; and build your reputation, as you build your happineſs, on the foundations of truth. If you want the talents, the inclination, or the neceſſary materials for ſuch a work, fall not however into ſloth. Endeavor to copy after the ex-

† *Xiphil.*

ample

ample of *Scipio* at Linternum. Be able to ſay to yourſelf,

" Innocuas amo delicias doctamque quietem."

Rural amuſements, and philoſophical meditations, will make your hours gilde ſmoothly on; and if the indulgence of Heaven has given you a friend like *Lælius*, nothing is wanting to make you completely happy.

Theſe are ſome of thoſe reflections which may ſerve to fortify the mind under baniſhment, and under the other misfortunes of life, which it is every man's intereſt to prepare for, becauſe they are common to all men †: I ſay, they are common to all men; becauſe even they who eſcape them are equally expoſed to them. The darts of adverſe fortune are always levelled at our heads. Some reach us, ſome graze againſt us, and fly to wound our neighbours. Let us therefore impoſe an equal temper on our minds, and pay without murmuring the tribute which we owe to humanity. The winter brings cold, and we muſt freeze. The ſummer returns with heat, and we muſt melt. The inclemency of the air diſorders our health, and we muſt be ſick. Here we are expoſed to wild beaſts, and there to men more ſavage than the beaſts: and if we eſcape the inconveniencies and dangers of the air and the earth, there are perils by water and perils by fire. This eſtabliſhed courſe of things it is not in our power to change; but it is in our power to aſſume ſuch a greatneſs of mind as becomes wiſe and virtuous men; as may enable us to encounter the accidents of life with fortitude, and to conform ourſelves to the order of nature, who governs her great kingdom, the world, by continual mutations. Let

† *Sen.* Ep. 107.

us

us ſubmit to this order, let us be perſuaded that whatever does happen ought to happen, and never be ſo fooliſh as to expoſtulate with nature. The beſt reſolution we can take is to ſuffer what we cannot alter, and to purſue, without repining, the road which Providence, who directs every thing, has marked out to us: for it is not enough to follow; and he is but a bad ſoldier who ſighs, and marches on with reluctancy. We muſt receive the orders with ſpirit and cheerfulneſs, and not endeavor to ſlink out of the poſt which is aſſigned us in this beautiful diſpoſition of things, whereof even our ſufferings make a neceſſary part. Let us addreſs ourſelves to GOD, who governs all, as *Cleanthes* did in thoſe admirable verſes, which are going to loſe part of their grace and energy in my tranſlation of them.

> Parent of nature! maſter of the world!
> Where'er thy Providence directs, behold
> My ſteps with cheerful reſignation turn.
> Fate leads the willing, drags the backward on.
> Why ſhould I grieve, when grieving I muſt bear?
> Or take with guilt, what guiltleſs I might ſhare?

Thus let us ſpeak, and thus let us act. Reſignation to the will of GOD is true magnanimity. But the ſure mark of a puſillanimous and baſe ſpirit, is to ſtruggle againſt, to cenſure the order of Providence, and, inſtead of mending our own conduct, to ſet up for correcting that of our Maker.

THE

OCCASIONAL WRITER.

Fidens animi atque in utrumque paratus.

VIRG.

THE

OCCASIONAL WRITER.

NUMBER I.

INSCRIBED TO THE PERSON, TO WHOM ALONE IT CAN BELONG.

MOST NOBLE SIR,

I AM one, whoſe ambition it hath been, ever ſince I came into the world, to diſtinguiſh myſelf as a writer; in which, I fairly confeſs, I had not only the view of raiſing my reputation, but that of eſtabliſhing my fortune. A proſpect, which ſeemed very reaſonable in a time of general peace and univerſal affluence; in an age ſo particularly polite, that it is even the faſhion to appear knowing in all the elegant arts and ſciences; and that to whatever branch of them a genius ſhall think fit to turn himſelf, he is ſure it will be to one that is in vogue.

The firſt eſſays of my pen made a good deal of noiſe in the world: they filled foreign journals, and were tranſlated into ſeveral languages. The Sorbonne, and both our mother Univerſities, returned me thanks for having reconciled ſeveral diſputes, and

ſolved ſeveral difficulties in chronology and hiſtory, which had perplexed the learned world, from the impartial *Euſebius*, down to the circumſtantial *Prideaux;* my Philoſophical Poems were received with the greateſt applauſe; and it is well known, that if the gay part of the world read my *Anti-Lucretius* for amuſement, the graveſt divines have no tdiſdained to borrow arguments from it in their diſputes with the materialiſts.

Animated by ſuch ſucceſs, in one part of my aim, I proceeded with indefatigable labor, till continual diſappointments, in the other, rendered me at length more indifferent to that imaginary good, applauſe, and leſs patient of that real evil, want. I began then to compare my condition with that of ſeveral great authors, both antient and modern; and finding upon the compariſon that they had not been better treated than myſelf, I was ſoon led by my reflections to diſcover the true reaſon of our ill fortune in the world; I was ſoon convinced that they and I had been on a wrong purſuit; that miniſters of ſtate pay no reſpect to the brighteſt talents, when they are miſapplied, and eſteem all talents to be ſo, which are not wholly employed about the preſent time, and principally dedicated to the ſervice of their adminiſtration; neither can I ſay this proceeding is unjuſt, how much ſoever I ſuffer by it.

If we write for poſterity, we muſt not complain that the care of rewarding our merit is left to poſterity; and if we neglect to ſerve the ſtate, thoſe, who are appointed to preſide over it, break no rule of equity when they neglect us. *Spencer* has been amply recompenced by poſterity for his Fairy Queen; but the wiſe treaſurer *Burleigh* declined the payment of an hundred pounds, which Queen *Elizabeth* ordered him, and left this admirable poet

to

to ſtarve. Had *Spencer* applied himſelf to more ſerious ſtudies, had he excelled in phyſics, in metaphyſics, or even in the firſt philoſophy, or in theology, inſtead of excelling in wit and poetry, the "amabiles inſaniæ" of Horace, his uſage would have been the ſame no doubt. Even the greateſt productions of theſe ſtudies are but trifles in the account of a conſummate ſtateſman, and may properly enough be diſtinguiſhed from the others in ſenſe, by the title of "inſaniæ ſeveriores."

Our Engliſh miniſters, to their honor be it ſpoken, have at all times proceeded upon this admirable principle; the moſt excellent ſermons, the moſt elaborate treatiſes, have not been ſufficient to procure the advancement of ſome divines, whilſt a ſorry pamplet or a ſpiritual libel has raiſed others to the higheſt dignities of the church. As it has fared with mere divinity, ſo has it fared with mere eloquence: as one never cauſed the divine, ſo the other never cauſed the lawyer, to be diſtinguiſhed. But we know that if either of them be employed in a court cauſe, he never fails of making his fortune. The ſame fate has attended writers of another kind; the celebrated Tatlers, and Spectators, had no reward except from bookſellers and fame. But when thoſe authors made the diſcovery I have made, and applied their talents better, in writing the Engliſhman and the Freeholder, one was ſoon created a knight, and the other became ſecretary of ſtate. In ſhort, without enumerating any more inſtances, I may confidently affirm, that this has been the caſe from the days of *Burleigh* to this time; how much ſooner it began to be ſo, I hope, Sir, you will not give me the leiſure to enquire.

From the moment I reſolved to become a ſtate writer, I mentally devoted myſelf to your ſervice: and

and I do it now in this public and moſt ſolemn manner. Employ me, Sir, as you pleaſe; I abandon myſelf intirely to you; my pen is at your diſpoſition, and my conſcience in your keeping. Like a lawyer, I am ready to ſupport the cauſe, in which, give me leave to ſuppoſe that, I ſhall be ſoon retained, with ardor; and, if occaſion be, with ſubtilty and acrimony. Like a Swiſs, I will behave myſelf with equal boldneſs and fidelity; my pen is my fortune, and I think it as honorable to offer it, as offer my ſword, without enquiring in a general battle, or in private ſkirmiſhes, at what relation or friend I ſtrike. I cancel at once all former obligations and friendſhip, and will moſt implicitly follow your inſtructions in panegyric on yourſelf and friends, in ſatyr on your adverſaries, in writing for or againſt any ſubject; nay, in writing for or againſt the ſame ſubject, juſt as your intereſt, or even your paſſions, may render it expedient.

I am not ignorant that when *Carneades* offered to argue for virtue, and then againſt it, *Cato* propoſed to drive that great philoſopher and orater out of Rome. But *Cato* was a man of narrow principles and of too confined an underſtanding. He conſidered virtue abſtractedly, without any regard to time, to place, and to that vaſt variety of conjunctures, which happens in the courſe of human affairs. In common life, morality is no doubt neceſſary, and therefore legiſlators have been careful to enforce the practice of it; but whenever morality claſhes with the intereſt of the ſtate, it muſt be, and it always has been, laid aſide. Theſe are my opinions; and it is a great comfort to my conſcience to find them confirmed by the practice of ſome reverend perſons, whoſe examples ought to be of greater weight with me, than that of a wretched pagan. I ſhall therefore ſhew myſelf neither ſqueamiſh nor whimſical in purſuing the enterprize to which I offer my ſervices, but

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ſhall remain firmly perſuaded, that all the moral vices, I may be occaſionally guilty of in ſo good a courſe, will be exalted into political virtues.

After this plain and honeſt account, which I have given of myſelf, it may be allowed me to ſay, that you cannot find a perſon better qualified for your ſervice, or more worthy to be liſted, among thoſe who draw their pens in your cauſe, and of whom I am willing to hope that you have a greater and an abler body in reſerve, than you have hitherto judged proper to bring into the field.

It is evident that a miniſter, in every circumſtance of life, ſtands in as much need of us public writers, as we of him. In his proſperity he can no more ſubſiſt without daily praiſe, than we without daily bread, and the farther he extends his views the more neceſſary are we to his ſupport. Let him ſpeak as contemptuouſly of us as he pleaſes, for that is frequently the manner of thoſe who employ us moſt, and pay us beſt; yet will it fare with his ambition as with a lofty tree, which cannot ſhoot its branches into the clouds, unleſs its root work into the dirt, from which it roſe, on which it ſtands, and by which it is nouriſhed.

If a miniſter falls into adverſity, ſhall he take up the pen in his own defence? would not the caſe be as deplorable for him to be left to write, as for a prince to be left to fight in his own quarrel? Believe me, Sir, whenever fortune abandons you, and who knows how ſoon that may happen, you will find yourſelf in a very forlorn ſtate. At the name of your ſucceſſor, thoſe crowds, that attend your levee, will vaniſh like ſpirits at the dawn of day. None will remain about you, but ſuch as no other adminiſtration will condeſcend to employ: and we may therefore very probably behold you, which would be a pitiful ſight indeed, endeavoring to ſecure a ſafe retreat with H***** on one ſide of you, and

L******

L****** on the other, two groteſque perſonages, exactly paired and nearly allied, but ſurely as little fit to ſupport a miniſter in his decline, as to adorn his triumph. In ſuch a turn as this, you may depend on my utmoſt efforts to keep up a ſpirit for you: and I can make no doubt of being ſeconded by ſeveral of my fellow-writers, ſince I am certain you will not ſcruple to ſhare ſome part of that fortune, which your induſtry and parſimony have raiſed, with thoſe who unite to ſave the whole; and ſince we ſhall be reaſonable enough not to expect above ſixpence in the pound out of it, which cannot well amount to more than fifteen or twenty thouſand pounds. A trifling ſum for ſo great a ſervice and ſo weighty a purſe!

You may perhaps, after all I have ſaid, be ſtill apt to think that theſe are wild diſcourſes, which have no other foundation but my deſire to render myſelf neceſſary. You may refine too much in your reflections on my conduct, and too little in thoſe you make on your preſent ſituation; or if you judge rightly of this, it is not impoſſible but you may depend too much on your own vigilance and dexterity. Should any of thoſe flatterers, who often betray their patrons into a fatal ſecurity, ſpeak to you much in the ſame manner, as ſleep addreſſes himſelf to Palinurus in the fifth book of the Æneis.

——Palinure, ferunt ipſa æquora claſſem,
Æquatæ ſpirant auræ, datur hora quieti;
Pone caput, feſſoſque oculos furare labori.

You would anſwer, I am perſuaded, as this Pilot did:

Mene ſalis placidi vultum, fluctuſque quietos
Ignorare jubes? mene huic confidere monſtro?

But *Palinurus* ſlept, and you know the conſequence.

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Be not therefore diſpleaſed if a ſincere and zealous ſervant rouſes you, admoniſhes you not to truſt too much to appearances, and ſhews you danger when perhaps you leaſt expect it. You have ſailed long in a ſmooth ſea with gentle and favorable gales. We believe your courage and your abilities extremely great, but we believe it implicitly; for you have not had foul weather enough to give any conſiderable proofs of either. Theſe circumſtances, which might be abuſed to inſpire ſecurity, I urge as reaſons why you ſhould be alarmed; for the element you have to deal with is by the laws of nature inconſtant: and therefore the longer you have been without a ſtorm, the more reaſon you have to expect one. There is no ſurer preſage of an hurricane than juſt ſuch a dead calm as I have obſerved for ſome time.

To ſpeak without a figure: I would not have you flatter yourſelf, that the undiſturbed quiet you have ſo long enjoyed is merely owing to your own integrity and political merit, or to the uncommon proſecution of hawkers and pamphleteers, which has been carried on by the direction of one of your principal inſtruments, and indeed a moſt vigorous ſtateſman. This quiet, Sir, is owing to deep and inveterate deſigns, which it becomes me to lay before you, without any regard to the cenſure I may incur, of revealing private converſation, and of breach of truſt. Know then, that from the time you came into a fulneſs of power, many were ſhocked at the manner in which you ſeized it, and at the uſe you made of it. They ſaid, that both were hurtful, indecent, and even ſhameleſs. They went ſtill farther, and affirmed, that your conduct was fooliſh with regard to your own intereſt, ſince it was fooliſh for a man to truſt to one ſingle expedient of government, who had ſeveral in his power; and eſpecially to ſuch an expedient as that of money, which would equally

equally ſerve to ſupport him or to hang him. Theſe perſons however, notwithſtanding their diſcontent, reſolved to lie quiet, till your mal-adminiſtration ſhould become ſo glaring as to juſtify their oppoſition, even in his majeſty's ſight: they ſaid they would not follow your example; and upon that occaſion they remembered, with ſome ſharpneſs, how you did your utmoſt to diſtreſs the king's affairs, upon the firſt diſguſt you received; nay, they were malicious enough to call to mind ſome perſonal reflections †, which the heat of your imagination, and your familiarity with majeſty, betrayed you into, and for which they ſaucily wiſhed what I dare not name. Theſe ſeditious ſpirits flattered themſelves that you would do your own buſineſs when you had the full ſwing of your power. They were acquainted, they ſaid, with the preſumption and diſtruſt, with the boldneſs and puſillanimity, with the indiſcretion and cunning, and with fifty other contradictions, which made up your character: and upon theſe they depended for puting a ſpeedy end to your adminiſtration. This end they imagine to be now at hand; for thus they reaſon:—A miniſter, who is attacked on his management of the public revenue, and has all the advantages of money and authority on his ſide, may eſcape though he is guilty; but if he is innocent, the proceedings againſt him in ſuch a caſe muſt neceſſarily confirm his power, and eſtabliſh his reputation: nothing more deſirable than ſuch an attack can happen to him. But our preſent miniſter, ſay theſe malignants, directly ſtops all enquiry: in public he evades giving ſuch accounts as the repreſentatives of the people have a right to demand; in private he is

† See a pamphlet called, An Anſwer to an infamous Libel, intitled, Sedition and Defamation diſplayed. Printed for *R. Francklin.*

modeſt and diſcreet enough to laugh at thoſe who think him ſuch a fool as to furniſh proofs againſt himſelf. Can a miniſter keep his ground long, who has no other defence than an implied confeſſion of his guilt? Will ſuch a behaviour be endured in a nation hitherto free, and where there remain at leaſt ſome ſparks of honor and of love of the country?

Theſe and many other reflections, which, for brevity ſake, I omit, upon your particular conduct, and upon our domeſtic affairs, are frequently thrown out. But, Sir, I confeſs to you, that I tremble when I hear the ſame perſons diſcourſe concerning the ſtate of the nation, with regard to her foreign intereſts. They affirm, and they offer to demonſtrate, that the affairs of Europe never were in greater confuſion, and that the part we take upon ourſelves is ſuch an one, as no nation ever acted which was not betrayed, or whoſe miniſters were not infatuated. That you are ſo, they ſay, is paſt diſpute, whether you have conducted theſe affairs yourſelf, or have left them to thoſe men of eminent talents, who are concerned in this part of your adminiſtration: they inſiſt that nothing could have happened to us, if you had entirely neglected our foreign intereſts, worſe than what you have brought upon us, by running into the other extreme. For they aſk, what is the fruit of your continual negotiations, ſupported by a vaſt expence, and carried on as buſily as if the welfare of Great Britain had been at ſtake in every diſpute which has happened on the Continent? They anſwer for you, and they defy you to contradict them, that we have made the quarrels of other people our own; and that we find ourſelves engaged as principals, in ſome caſes where we have but a very remote concern, and in others where we have no concern at all. That our commerce ſuffers, and runs the riſque of being loſt, not for a time, but for ever, in ſeveral branches, much more

more beneficial to us than the Oſtend trade; and that our right to keep thoſe important poſſeſſions, which were yielded to us in the moſt ſolemn and authentic manner, is come, by dint of negotiation, from being indiſputable, to be called in queſtion. In a word, that to reſtore the public tranquillity, and to ſettle our own intereſts, we muſt engage in a new war and conclude a new peace: that you have contrived to make it impoſſible for us to do one, without fighting againſt the very principle for which we have fought ever ſince the revolution, or to attempt the other without lying under the particular circumſtance, that our principal allies will be as much in earneſt as our enemies to wreſt out of our hands the chief advantages which we obtained by the treaty of Utrecht. At the time when theſe treaties were made, continue they, your great miniſter cried aloud and ſpared not. He complained, as much as any man, that the exorbitant power of France was not ſufficiently reduced; and that the barriers of our allies, on the Rhine and in the Netherlands, were left too weak: and is it under his adminiſtration that we are to ſee a pretence given to the French, and an opportunity thrown into their hands, of ſtrengthening their power, and of extending their barriers? When I tell theſe objectors that your brother anſwers for the court of France, they laugh in my face, and reply, "Well he may, and ſo might any of thoſe, who were in the French intereſt, have done at the time when the triple alliance was broken, and France was encouraged by England to fall upon the Dutch." The miniſters, who are anſwered for, would be as weak as he, who anſwers for them, if they did not ſee the advantage in the preſent juncture, and did not take a ſecret malicious pleaſure in making us, who contributed ſo much to reduce their power, become the inſtruments of raiſing it again. In the caſe of a war then,

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we have, according to this reaſoning, which really, Sir, has an air of truth, nothing ſo much to fear as the aſſiſtance of our chief ally; and in the caſe of a treaty, not only France, but Holland likewiſe, muſt be againſt us in that important article of Gibraltar and Port-Mahon, and in all particular advantages of commerce, which we have enjoyed, and may find it reaſonable to pretend to. The late Duke of Orleans, as dear a friend as he was to us, inſiſted ſtrenuouſly, that we ſhould give up the places before-mentioned; pretended a promiſe to this effect, and himſelf obliged in honor to ſee this promiſe kept. Every one, who knows any thing of the tranſactions of thoſe times, knows with how envious an eye the Dutch beheld the ſeparate privileges in trade, and the ſole poſſeſſion of Gibraltar, and of the iſland of Minorca, which we obtained at the laſt peace; and what lengths they would have gone to facilitate the negotiations, which at that time they oppoſed, if they might have been admitted to a ſhare in theſe advantages.

The danger of an immediate invaſion, and the engagements entered into by the emperor and the king of Spain to inſult us with their fleets, and to conquer Great Britain and Ireland for the pretender, have been very induſtriouſly propagated by thoſe who are already in your pay, and by me, who ſtand a candidate for this honor, but am hitherto a volunteer in your ſervice. I am ſorry to tell you, Sir, but Heaven forbid that I ſhould conceal ſo material a circumſtance from your knowledge, we do not ſucceed. We raiſe a ſpirit, but this ſpirit turns againſt you. There are more people than ever againſt the pretender; and zeal for ſupporting the preſent eſtabliſhment never ran higher. But this zeal is not any longer without knowledge: it is directed to its proper object, and there is no poſſibility of leading it hoodwinked to ſerve any other purpoſes.

poſes. Some incredulous wretches there are, who ſmile when we talk to them of invaſions and the pretender, and who content themſelves to reply, that the machine is very ſeaſonably introduced, and according to the rules of art. The greater number take fire, and lay this new diſtreſs, which we threaten them with, at your door; for, they ſay, that we diſobliged Spain ſome years ago, to tie the emperor the more firmly to us, and that we have ſince that time diſobliged the emperor, by affecting a cloſer correſpondence, and greater union of councils with France than ever was known between the two nations. They ſend us to that excellent treatiſe, "The Barrier Treaty vindicated," to learn our true and laſting intereſt in foreign alliances, and there they pretend that we ſhall find the condemnation of all your meaſures: they lament the miſerable ſcene, which they apprehend may ſoon be opened, his majeſty's foreign dominions expoſed to all the calamities of war, and perhaps in danger of being loſt; we ourſelves ſtruggling againſt domeſtic enemies, and defending our coaſts againſt invaſions: theſe miſchiefs brought upon us by a conjunction of the emperor, our ally, old with the king of Spain his rival; a conjunction ſo unnatural, that nothing but the higheſt reſentment at our behavior to them both could have brought it about: in ſhort, to finiſh up the picture, Great Britain reduced in this diſtreſs to lean ſolely upon France, and the faith of that court to become our chief ſecurity.

Upon the whole matter, your enemies, Sir, the ſubſtance of whoſe private converſation I have now honeſtly reported to you, conclude very inſolently, that you have filled up the meaſure of your iniquity and your folly, and that you muſt ſink, or the nation muſt ſink, under the weight of that calamity which you have brought and ſuffered to be brought upon her.

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As ſhocking as this account muſt be to your ears, I promiſe myſelf that the ſincerity and plainneſs with which I have given it, will be agreeable to you; and that you will receive into your boſom a man whoſe affection for your perſon and zeal for your ſervice, muſt be above all ſuſpicion, after giving you intelligence of ſo high a nature, without any ſtipulation for the diſcovery.

I expect to hear from you in eight days from the date hereof; if I do not, you ſhall hear again from him, who is,

Moſt noble Sir,

Your honor's

moſt devoted ſervant,

From my Garret,
Jan. 1726-7.

THE OCCASIONAL WRITER.

THE

THE

OCCASIONAL WRITER.

NUMBER II.

TO THE SAME.

MOST NOBLE SIR,

I THINK myſelf obliged in honor to let the world know, that you have treated all my propoſals to write in your ſervice, with a contempt unuſual from one in your ſtation; for I have ſeen the times when every little paultry proſtitute of his pen found countenance and encouragement. Theſe wretches are ſure of both, whenever there are any bad meaſures to be juſtified, or any bold ſtrokes to be given; and the croaking of theſe ravens has always, in my imagination, boded ſome miſchief or other to the commonwealth.

For this reaſon, I took upon me the character of a moſt infamous libeller, in my firſt addreſs to you, that I might be able to make a ſurer judgment of our preſent condition, and know better what expectations to entertain; ſo that I own I am moſt agreeably diſappointed in not receiving any letter or meſſage

meſſage from you. I own, that inſtead of biting you, I am fairly bit myſelf.

Some malicious refiners may pretend, perhaps, that an addreſs of ſuch a nature, made in ſo public a manner, could meet with no other treatment, even from a miniſter who was willing to accept the propoſal. Malice, I ſay, may refine thus, and endeavor to depreciate a virtuous action, which cannot be denied, by ſuppoſing ſuch motives to it as cannot be proved. The practice is too common, and eſpecially where men are divided into parties, where public diſputes create and nouriſh private animoſities, and where perpetual feuds irritate the natural malignity of the heart. But far be it from me to judge with ſo little charity; I am willing to believe, Sir, that you declined the offers made you, not on account of the public addreſs, by which they were conveyed, but becauſe you diſdained to ſupport a virtuous adminiſtration by a venal pen.

When I meet a man with loaded piſtols in his pocket, or a dagger under his cloak, I ſuſpect that he is going upon no very honorable deſigns. Houſebreakers and coiners have been detected, by having their tools found about them. Informers, ſpies, and hireling ſcribblers are the tools of an evil ſtateſman; and when I ſee all ſuch diſcouraged, and none of them about a miniſter, I think myſelf obliged to ſuppoſe that his deſigns are honorable, and his meaſures directed to the public good.

I take this opportunity therefore of begging your pardon for the trial I preſumed to make. The liberty indeed was great; but ſince it has turned ſo vaſtly to your honor, I hope to be the more eaſily forgiven. Shall I own it, Sir? My hopes go ſtill farther; you diſdained me under the feigned character which I aſſumed; from the ſame principle of honor, from the ſame conſciouſneſs of merit, you

will, nay, you muſt, afford me ſome ſhare of your eſteem, when I appear, as I intend to do for the future, under my own. Theſe papers ſhall breathe nothing but zeal to promote the honor of his majeſty, the ſecurity of our preſent happy eſtabliſhment, and, in one word, the good of our country. The ſame ſpirit which animates you and me, ſhall animate them: and I cannot doubt of your approbation, when I co-operate with you to theſe purpoſes, which were certainly the ſole inducements you had to enter into buſineſs; as it is manifeſt that you continue at the head of affairs for no other reaſons.

The truth is, however, (for I think it becoming a friendſhip, which is likely to grow as intimate as ours, that I ſhould diſguiſe nothing from you) two things have lately happened, which gave ſome little ſhock to my good opinion of you. The firſt is an unwillingneſs you manifeſted, that the true ſtate of the national debts ſhould be known by the nation; and the ſevere cenſure you paſſed on ſuch perſons, as were deſirous to give their countrymen a fair account of their condition in a part ſo eſſential, that our being a nation, or not a nation, depends almoſt entirely, in this criſis, on our running or not running farther into debt. The other is the publication of a pamphlet ſuppoſed to be written by your direction, which is evidently deſigned to keep us no leſs in the dark as to all our affairs abroad.

As to the firſt, that matter has been taken up already; and will, I doubt not, in all places, and in all manners, be ſo thoroughly ſifted, that we ſhall no longer be at a loſs, either as to the revenue, and the real charges upon it, or as to the whole management of it. In which examination, Sir, let me adviſe you, as a friend, to act an ingenuous part, that ſuſpicions may not increaſe, and that

that I may not be obliged to write to you in a ſtile, to which I ſhall turn my pen with reluctance.

As to the latter, I hope, it will be likewiſe examined; and if I was able to take ſuch a taſk on myſelf, I ſhould, I am perſuaded, in doing ſo, but make a ſecond trial of you to your glory, and knit the bands of our friendſhip the cloſer, by anſwering a pamphlet of ſo pernicious conſequence, and writ with ſo ill a deſign. But I know my own unfitneſs to inform, to inſtruct, and to rouſe our countrymen, ſome from their lethargy, and ſome from their golden dreams. I may toll the alarm-bell, but perſons of greater ſtrength and ſkill muſt be called upon to raiſe it, and to ring it out in the ears of the nation.

We are grown more eaſy, nay, more willing, than ever, to be impoſed upon; and we do more than half the work of thoſe who find their account in deluding us. Almoſt every man conſiders himſelf as a ſingle perſon; thoſe few, who extend their conſiderations farther, ſeldom or never carry them beyond the narrow ſyſtem of a family, or a party. And thus it happens, that private intereſt is become the criterion, by which judgments are formed upon public affairs. The man, whoever he be, who is at any time in faſhion, has nothing to do but to hold out that purſe, which the more he empties it, the ſurer he is to fill. After which let him declaim imperiouſly, and aſſert boldly, without regarding proof, or condeſcending to argue; let one of his tools write a pamphlet in much the ſame ſtrain, and the work is done, the opinion of mankind is ſettled, the crowd repeats what the orator has ſaid, and the author writ; the clamor is echoed back on all ſides, and theſe echoes, the reverſe of all others, ſtrengthen by repetition. Thus the corrupt lead the blind, and the blind lead one

another; the ſtill voice of reaſon is drowned in popular clamor, and truth is overwhelmed by prejudice.

This is a true account of what happens frequently; it is ſo far from being a deſcription drawn from imagination, that I could give ſeveral inſtances, and perhaps ſhall have occaſion to quote ſome, of ſuch groſs impoſitions on the common ſenſe of mankind, offered in this manner, and offered with ſucceſs, as no one would be bold enough to attempt putting on the weakeſt man in Britain in private converſation.

There are therefore, GOD knows, but too many reaſons for him to deſpond, who entertains a thought of prevailing on the generality of people, to lay aſide their prejudices, to check their paſſions, and to conſider the ſtate of the nation in a due extent, and in a true light; and yet ſuch is our condition, ſuch a criſis are we in, that if we do not take and execute this reſolution now, it may very probably be out of our power to do it hereafter to any good purpoſe.

In our ſenate we hear of great dangers, which we have to apprehend from abroad; and if we believe what is ſaid in a foreign * ſtate, we are expoſed to very great ones at home. I am willing to hope, that both one and the other are magnified; but they may grow to be ſuch in reality as they are repreſented to be, if we do not take more than ordinary care; firſt, to weigh in a juſt balance each of the many evils which threaten the nation; and, ſecondly, if we do not penetrate into every one of the cauſes, which have combined to bring them upon us. Should we fail in the firſt point, we may increaſe our dangers from abroad; by over-rating thoſe at home, and by applying ourſelves ſolely to

* Vide Letter from Stockholm.

prevent

prevent the latter. But I believe no one thinks us diſpoſed to run into this extreme; we are much more likely to run into the other, and to increaſe our dangers at home, by over-rating thoſe which we apprehend from abroad. Should we fail in the ſecond point, and neglect to penetrate into all the cauſes which combine to bring our preſent diſtreſs upon us, palliative remedies alone will be applied, in the uſe of which we may very probably expire after a tedious languor, but from which we cannot expect a radical cure.

Convinced therefore, that if we neglect the preſent moment, if every man does not think and write, and ſpeak and act for his country at this time, according to his beſt talents, and according to the opportunities which he has of exerting them, we ſhall ſoon be in every ſenſe a ruined nation.

I confeſs, that I am impatient, however low my hopes of ſucceſs run, till ſome abler pen accepts the invitation, which "the Enquirer into the reaſons of the conduct of Great Britain" gives to every member of this community, till an enquiry is made, according to the right which he is pleaſed to allow, into our preſent ſtate, and into the meaſures, which have led to it. But then this enquiry muſt be made upon better principles, and with an honeſter view than he has, who made this, which lies before me; the perſon, who accepts his invitation, ſhould be one who would bluſh to follow his example; for he acts the part of an apologiſt, where he profeſſes to act that of an impartial enquirer: he ſeems very zealous for the ſucceſs of the cauſe which he pleads, and very indifferent what means he employs to procure this ſucceſs; many things are diſguiſed, many are concealed, and hardly any are repreſented in their natural and proper light. Fallacy, ſophiſm, and a puerile declamation, ſwell the

the elaborate treatiſe; but there was a deſign perhaps, as well as habit, in ſuch a manner of writing upon this occaſion, ſince a bad cauſe muſt be defended by ſuch means; and, therefore, by ſuch pens as would diſgrace and weaken a good one; ſince it may poſſibly appear, upon a fair examination, that the cauſe he is retained in is none of the beſt.

If this ſhould appear, I am apt to believe, that thoſe, who ſet him at work, will not be much concerned; they could not look on this pamphlet as any thing better than a momentary expedient to miſlead and inflame. If it has that effect, if it ſerves to keep up the deluſion till all the jobs, which are to be done, are done; the ends, which they propoſed to themſelves, are perhaps anſwered. But if this nation ſhould awaken to a ſenſe of their true intereſt, and if the Britiſh ſpirit ſhould once more revive amongſt us, it might very well happen that theſe perſons would have made a faulty reckoning; for ſurely, after having exerciſed the juſtice of the nation, by cenſuring in one parliament a treaty of peace, which has been approved in another, it will not be thought ſtrange, if we puniſh, at one time or another, thoſe who have negotiated us out of peace and tranquillity, into war and confuſion, although the wiſdom of the nation ſhould think fit to ſupport, for the preſent, the meaſures of theſe miniſters.

The Enquirer ſuppoſes the whole face of affairs in Europe to have received the great alteration which he is ſo much ſurpriſed at, within the ſpace of the laſt year; but I cannot agree with him, that the turn has been ſo ſudden as he repreſents it. "The "calm hardly to be paralleled by any paſt proſpect," as this great maſter of ſtile expreſſes himſelf by a figure of Hibernian rhetoric, was accompanied, as calms

calms frequently are, by many ſigns of an approaching ſtorm; which ſigns did not eſcape the obſervation of the ſailors, and even paſſengers in our veſſel, though they eſcaped that of our able pilots, who were, it ſeems, all that while in a moſt ſerene ſecurity. The particular evils, which we apprehend at preſent, were known to our miniſters above a year ago, if it be true, as the Enquirer affirms, that the treaty of Hanover, and negotiations in conſequence of it, are "the ſteps, which the "court of Great Britain thought fit to take as "ſoon as poſſible, after the danger we were in ap-"peared evident beyond all contradiction." But before the particular danger appeared, the general danger was evident enough. When the treaty of Vienna was made, our ſhip ſtruck; but we had been ſailing among rocks and ſhoals long before, ever ſince we quitted our port, and launched out to ſea, on the wiſe arrand of convoying other people ſafe to theirs.

He therefore, who is deſirous to make the enquiry propoſed, in ſuch a manner as may be of real uſe to the public, muſt take up things much higher than this partial writer was inſtructed to do. Many things happened during the congreſs of Cambray, which deſerve to be explained; and there are treaties, both previous and ſubſequent to the quadruple alliance, which deſerve to be commented upon.

Nay, there ſeems to be a neceſſity of going farther back than this reign, or even than this century, if we deſign to be thoroughly acquainted with the original of our preſent diſtreſs. When we have taken a general ſurvey of the conduct of Britain, with relation to the affairs of Europe, for about two hundred years, we ſhall come much better prepared to diſcover our true point of intereſt; and by obſerving how we have departed from it, we ſhall learn how to return to it.

This

This part I will venture to undertake; and what I ſhall ſay upon it, may ſerve at leaſt as an introduction to that work, which, I hope, will be performed by ſome abler hand.

The foundations of the grandeur of France, and thoſe of the grandeur of the houſe of Auſtria, were laid very near at the ſame period. *Ferdinand* and *Iſabella* began the latter; and in *Charles* the Fifth their grandſon, and almoſt immediate ſucceſſor, it was carried up to that exorbitant height, which made Europe tremble under his reign, under that of his ſon, and upon ſome occaſions even later. The progreſs which France made was not ſo rapid, but was perhaps as ſure; ſhe ſhared with her rival the ſpoils of the houſe of Burgundy, by the addreſs and vigor of *Lewis* the Eleventh, who not only extended the bounds, and ſtrengthened the frontier of that cloſe compact body, whoſe very figure is an addition to the force of it, but aſſured its inward tranquillity better, and rendered that monarchy more formidable than it had been in the time of his predeceſſors, when the authority of the prince was leſs.

The forming of two ſuch powers, in Europe, made it the intereſt of all other princes and ſtates, to keep as much as poſſible a balance between them. And here began that principle of Engliſh policy to be eſtabliſhed, which, however true and wiſe in itſelf, has hardly ever been truly and wiſely purſued.

We ſhould take things rather too high, if we went up to the reign of King *Henry* the Seventh, though even there ſome obſervations are to be made, which have relation to our preſent ſubject.

Frequent

Frequent and important occaſions of acting on this principle preſented themſelves in the time of *Henry* the Eighth. Some he took, ſome he neglected, and ſome he managed ill; for, to ſay the truth, the whole conduct of this prince was a continued courſe of extravagance, violence, and levity: his vices glared through the beſt actions of his life. He exerciſed the tyranny, and practiſed the bloody precepts, of the church of Rome, even while he was delivering us from the papal yoke. His deliberations for peace or war ſeemed often to have a mixture of humor in them; and his own paſſions, as well as *Wolſey*'s, made him hold the balance of Europe, if he did hold it, with an uneven hand.

The reformation, which began in his time in Germany, and which was completed by *Edward* the Sixth, and by Queen *Elizabeth*, in England, gave occaſion to a new diviſion of intereſts; and made it of the utmoſt importance to the welfare of this nation, not only to preſerve a balance between the two great powers of Europe, but to ſupport the Proteſtant cauſe againſt them both. The firſt of theſe was to be done by throwing as much as the occaſion might require of our weight, ſometimes into one, and ſometimes into the other of theſe ſcales; but the latter could be effected by nothing leſs than a conſtant adherence to that ſide which was for a long time the weakeſt, and which, I doubt, is ſo ſtill.

Both theſe principles were purſued by Queen *Elizabeth*, with the greateſt wiſdom, and with the greateſt ſucceſs. To illuſtrate this fully, it would be neceſſary to run through the annals of her glorious reign. But a few general obſervations will ſuffice for our preſent purpoſe. When ſhe came to the crown, the nation was divided between two powerful parties, exaſperated by religious zeal: Ireland

land was Papiſt, Scotland was under the immediate influence of France, and the queen of that kingdom, married to the Dauphin of France, diſputed her title to the crown of England. In ſhort, the ſureſt ſupport ſhe had amidſt all theſe difficulties, beſides the firmneſs of her mind, and the penetration of her underſtanding, was in *Philip* the Second, whom ſhe diſobliged by refuſing to make him her huſband; and who could not fail of being, on many accounts, as he proved to be, her moſt implacable and dangerous enemy. She kept meaſures for a while with him, nay, perhaps, with the court of Rome, and ſoon ſettled her government, and eſtabliſhed her power; her own kingdom was the firſt and principal object of her care; and ſhe judged very wiſely, that, in order to be conſiderable abroad, ſhe muſt begin by making herſelf ſo at home. Her revenue was adminiſtered with the utmoſt frugality, induſtry was encouraged, manufactures improved, and commerce extended: ſhe was far from neglecting foreign alliances, but her negotiations were conducted with great art and little expence, and the engagements ſhe took were always neceſſary, ſeldom chargeable. She ſupported the Proteſtant cauſe in France, with good offices, with loans of money; and upon ſome preſſing occaſions with troops. But ſhe never depended on the gratitude of *Henry* the Fourth, and was neither ſurpriſed nor unprepared when he made returns very unworthy of the obligations he had to her. The Dutch could not have ſuſtained their revolt from Spain, nor have formed their commonwealth, without her aſſiſtance. She helped them powerfully, but ſhe exacted cautionary towns from them, as a ſecurity for her reimburſement, whenever they ſhould be in a condition to pay; and in the mean time as a check, to keep them under the influence and direction of England. By ſuch methods as theſe, her own country grew rich and flouriſhing,

riſhing, while ſhe not only preſerved a balance of power abroad, but contributed extremely to reduce Spain from being the terror of Europe, to that low ſtate, into which it fell under the ſucceſſors of King Philip the Second.

The reign of King *James* the Firſt is not to be read without a mixture of indignation and contempt. He came to the crown with great advantages; but a bad head, and a worſe heart, hindered him from improving any of them. He loſt the opportunity of uniting the two kingdoms; he ſuffered his revenue to be ill adminiſtered; his miniſters were notoriouſly corrupt, and he himſelf very profuſe.

Inſtead of aſſwaging, he fomented diſputes by his pedantry; eſtabliſhed ſuch principles of government, and raiſed ſuch a ſpirit in the clergy, as could hardly fail to produce the terrible effects which followed in the reign of his ſon.

Such a management of domeſtic affairs would have put it out of his power, if it had been his inclination to act a wiſer part in foreign affairs: but he had no ſuch inclination. Twelve years he ſuffered himſelf to be amuſed with the Spaniſh match; he countenanced at leaſt the Popiſh, and he abſolutely neglected the Proteſtant intereſt, both in France and Germany. Inſtead of helping the diſpoſitions, which appeared, to take the imperial crown out of the houſe of Auſtria, he favored the cauſe of that family, and abandoned his own children to the reſentment of the emperor and the Popiſh league. When the thirty years war began in 1618, the liberty of Germany, and the whole Proteſtant intereſt, were in the utmoſt peril. The ſole meaſures, which he took for the ſupport of either, conſiſted in ſimple embaſſies, ridiculous letters, and languid negotiations. Queen *Elizabeth* defeated the ambitious deſigns of the Spaniſh branch of the Auſtrian

trian family; King *James* favored thoſe of the German branch of the ſame family.

Over the ſucceeding reign, and all that followed, to the reſtoration of King *Charles* the Second, let us draw a veil.

During this time the decay of the Spaniſh monarchy increaſed apace, the liberties of Germany were aſſerted, and the power of the emperor bounded by the treaties of Weſtphalia; but another power, that of France, began to riſe very faſt on the foundations laid long ago. *Richelieu* and *Mazarine* had given that crown a great ſuperiority in the affairs of Europe, and the prince who wore it, reſolved to maintain and augment this ſuperiority, at the expence of all his neighbours.

The attack which *Lewis* the Fourteenth made upon the Low Countries in 1667, ſhewed, both in the manner of it, and in the pretence taken for it, what Europe had to expect from this prince. On this occaſion the triple alliance was made; and happy had it been, if the ſame principles of policy had continued to prevail. But the king who ſat on our throne, with better ſenſe and more courage than his grandfather, was at leaſt as unfit as he to defend the liberties of Europe, and perhaps more unfit to defend the Proteſtant intereſt.

King *Charles* the Second joined his councils and his arms to thoſe of France; and when he could not openly aſſiſt, he privately abetted, the uſurpations of that crown. He might, by conforming to the deſires of his people, who were in his and their true intereſt, have had the immortal honor of preſerving a balance of power in Europe; but he choſe the eternal infamy of helping to deſtroy this balance; and not content to be the ally of a prince, whoſe enemy he ought to have been, he condeſcended to be his inſtrument, and even his penſioner. This conduct, which took ſo much ſtrength from that ſide,

ſide, which was already too weak, and which added ſo much to that which was already too ſtrong, eſtabliſhed the abſolute ſuperiority of France, and left Spain, Germany, Italy, and the Seventeen Provinces, nay, and Britain too, in conſequence, at her mercy.

This terrible face of things did not mend on the acceſſion of King *James* the Second to the throne. Whatever his politics were, religion would have got the better of them. Bigotry muſt have cemented a cloſe union between him and the King of France, who was alone able and willing to aſſiſt him in the work he had undertaken at home. But the greatneſs of our danger, as it ſometimes happens, ſaved us; and in ſaving us, ſaved all Europe. The revolution in our government cauſed a total change in our conduct. A prince, who had been long at the head of a weak but reſolute oppoſition to France, mounted our throne; and the principles of maintaining a balance between the great powers of Europe, and of ſupporting the Proteſtant intereſt, came once more into faſhion in this kingdom, after having been for near a century, either neglected, or acted againſt.

The body of the nation reſumed theſe principles with warmth, and has ſupported them ever ſince with unparalleled ſpirit and vigor. But let it be ſaid without offence, ſince it may be ſaid with truth, and ſince it is neceſſary that it ſhould be ſaid upon this occaſion, we have not purſued them with as much wiſdom as zeal. If we have erred in our politics ſince the revolution, it is ſure we have erred on the right ſide. But errors on the right ſide are errors ſtill, and may, in time, prove as fatal as errors on the other; and are, in one reſpect at leaſt, more dangerous, as they are leſs attended to at firſt, or guarded againſt.

Between

Between all extremes there is a certain middle point, which men of genius perceive, and to which men of honor adhere in private and in public life.

Thus avarice and prodigality are at an immenſe diſtance; but there is a ſpace marked out by virtue between them, where frugality and generoſity reſide together. Thus again, to abandon thoſe, whom it is our intereſt to ſupport, is an exceſs of folly; and to ſupport the intereſts of other people, to the ruin of our own, is an exceſs of folly likewiſe. But there are lines deſcribed by prudence, between theſe two exceſſes, within which our common intereſts meet, and may proceed together.

It would be an invidious as well as tedious taſk, to go through all the inſtances, which might be produced; wherein we have, under pretence of preſerving a balance of power in Europe, gratified the paſſions of particular men, and ſerved the turns of private intereſt, till we have rendered that principle, in a reaſonable purſuit of which our ſafety and our glory conſiſt, the occaſion of real danger to the intereſt, and of reproach to the wiſdom of our nation. A few of theſe inſtances will ſuffice to deduce the progreſs of our miſtaken policy, to evince the truth of what has been advanced in general, and to fix the application of the whole to the preſent conjuncture; wherein I apprehend, that we are about to pay the price not only of late errors, but a long ſeries of errors.

The war, which began in 1688, was no doubt a very neceſſary war. It was neceſſary to extinguiſh the rebellion in Scotland; it was neceſſary to reduce Ireland; it was neceſſary to aſſert the new eſtabliſhment of our government. Theſe were our immediate intereſts; but we had remote intereſts likewiſe concerned, which were of themſelves ſufficient

ficient to engage us to enter, at leaſt as allies and friends, into the war. The empire was in danger by the taking of Philipſburg, and other enterpriſes of the French; and Holland lay once more open to their invaſions, by the ſeizing of Bonne. In the courſe of this war, Ireland was reduced; all the efforts againſt the government in England and Scotland were defeated; and, by the peace, France acknowledged King *William*.

As unfortunate as we had been on the Rhine and in Flanders, every thing, which the French had taken in the courſe of the war from our allies, was reſtored at Ryſwic; and Luxembourg, which France had uſurped before the war, was likewiſe given up. Thus far all was well. The points, which England contended for, were carried; and our allies recovered by treaty more than they had loſt by war.

If a common guaranty of this treaty had been entered into as ſoon as thoſe powers acceded who refuſed to ſign when England and Holland did, the tranquillity of Europe would have been better ſecured than it was at this time, or at the peace of Nimeghen; at leaſt England would have engaged, as far as it became her to do, even upon the principle of maintaining the balance of power, and no farther.

But, inſtead of taking this ſtep, we took another, which proved fatal in its conſequences. The death of *Charles* the Second, king of Spain, without children, was then in proſpect. The pretenſions of France were known, and its power had been lately felt. Whenever the caſe ſhould happen, a war ſeemed to be unavoidable. But this war muſt have been made by France alone, for the conqueſt of the Spaniſh monarchy; which, as powerful as we then thought her, and as inſolent as ſhe really was, ſhe would

would not have engaged in lightly. Neither could ſhe have ſupported it, if ſhe had, ſince even with Spain on her ſide, ſhe could not have ſupported the laſt, if the mines of Peru had not been unaccountably left open to her.

On the apprehenſion, however, of ſuch a war, and on the ſpecious pretence of preſerving a balance of power in Europe, the partition treaties were made; that is, without the knowledge of the King of Spain, we diſpoſed of his inheritance; without the conſent of the emperor, and in concert with his adverſe party, we ſettled the rights conteſted between the houſe of Auſtria and Bourbon; and we engaged to make this partition good by arms.

I do not enter into the reaſons for and againſt this treaty, which may be drawn from the particular ſtipulations contained in it, but content myſelf to obſerve, in general, what impolitic meaſures we were at this period betrayed into, by an over-weening deſire to preſerve the balance of power; and how much reaſon we have to be always on our guard againſt errors of this kind, ſince a prince, whom genius and experience had rendered the greateſt man of his age, was not exempt from them, but drew both England and Holland fatally into them.

Whenever this balance is in real danger by the exorbitant growth of one power, or by the union of more, other princes and ſtates will be alarmed of courſe. All of them ought, and moſt of them will, take meaſures for their common ſecurity. But the wiſe councils amongſt them will, upon every ſuch occaſion, proportion their meaſures, and the engagements they enter into, not according to the nature of the danger conſidered generally, but according to the immediate or remote relation which it has to each of them; and according to the ſtrength, ſituation,

ſituation, or any other circumſtance, which may be peculiar to each of them.

To do otherwiſe, would be to loſe ſight of our own particular intereſt in the purſuit of a common intereſt. It would be nothing better than ſetting up for the *Don Quixotes* of the world, and engage to fight the battles of all mankind. The ſtate, which keeps its own particular intereſt conſtantly in view, has no invariable rule to go by; and this rule will direct and limit all its proceedings in foreign affairs; ſo that ſuch a ſtate will frequently take no ſhare, and frequently a ſmall ſhare in the diſputes of its neighbours, and will never exert its whole ſtrength, but when its whole is at ſtake. But a ſtate, who neglects to do this, has no rule at all to go by, and muſt fight to negotiate, and negotiate to fight again, as long as it is a ſtate; becauſe, as long as it is a ſtate, there will be diſputes among its neighbours, and ſome of theſe will prevail at one time, and ſome at another, in the perpetual flux and reflux of human affairs.

If the kings of France and Spain, and the emperor, had made an agreement amongſt themſelves, about the ſucceſſion to the dominions of Spain, conſiſtent with the common intereſt of Europe, and conſidering the partiality which the court of Spain had, at that time, for the houſe of Auſtria, there was little room to fear, that ſuch an agreement would have been too favorable to the houſe of Bourbon. If any ſuch partition had been made, I ſay, no objection would have remained, either as to the right or manner of making it, and we might have eſcaped a war. If theſe princes had done nothing of this kind, we might have been engaged upon the King of Spain's death, as I ſaid before, in a defenſive war, for preſerving the dominions of our old allies, and the liberties of

Europe, againſt the uſurpations of our antient enemy. But inſtead of waiting to be auxiliaries in a defenſive war, we put ourſelves under a neceſſity of being principals in an offenſive one; and by affecting to ſecure the balance of power, when we had neither call nor right to meddle, we reduced our affairs to this abſurd alternative, that we muſt either make an offenſive war as principals, againſt the emperor and Spain, in order to conquer for France, which was equally impolitic and unjuſt, or againſt France and Spain, in order to conquer for the emperor, under the greateſt diſadvantages poſſible; which happened to be the caſe.

The partition treaties forced the King of Spain to make a will in favor of the houſe of Bourbon; and the Spaniards threw themſelves into the arms of France, to prevent the diſmemberment of their monarchy.

Thus was the balance of power loſt by our meddling where we had nothing to do, even before it could have been in danger, if we had not meddled at all. We loſt it, and the emperor knew that we muſt reſtore it for our own ſakes, which could be done no otherwiſe than by conquering for him; and this he left us to do the beſt we could. While we fought his battles, he lent us the Auſtrian title, the perſon of his ſon, the preſent emperor, and little elſe. We neglected every thing, and ſacrificed every thing in the proſecution of this quarrel. But the imperial councils were ſo far from neglecting any thing, or ſacrificing any thing to it, that they ſeemed wholly taken up for ſome years in ſettling the affairs of Hungary to their ſatisfaction; and they ſacrificed to an idle refinement in politics the greateſt opportunity which we ever had, or muſt ever hope to have; I mean that of deſtroying the naval force of France, by the taking

of

of Toulon. This they deliberately and almoſt avowedly hindered.

If ever people were called upon to think of their own immediate intereſts, we were ſo at this time. Whether we could then have put an end to the expenſive war we were engaged in for the houſe of Auſtria, in a manner conſiſtent with the public intereſt of Europe, I am not able to determine. Certain it is in fact, that far from entertaining any ſuch thoughts, we redoubled our ſpirit and our efforts in the proſecution of the war. As we acquired new allies, we enlarged our engagements; and as we obtained new victories, we extended our views. The grand alliance formed by King *William*, for reſtoring a balance of power in Europe, propoſed no other objects than ſufficient barriers, ſecurity to trade, and reaſonable ſatisfaction to the houſe of Auſtria †. Theſe were thought, by that great prince, all the points neceſſary to be contended for. But, inſtead of confining ourſelves to ſo narrow a plan, we judged that the balance of power could not be effectually reſtored, unleſs we wreſted the whole Spaniſh monarchy from the houſe of Bourbon, to give it to the houſe of Auſtria. For this prize we fought, and fought with as little regard to all other intereſts, as if we had defended our own altars, and our own houſes.

Muſt we not acknowledge, upon this occaſion, Sir, the ſhortneſs of human foreſight? The very meaſure, which we purſued at ſo great expence of blood and treaſure (becauſe nothing leſs could ſecure the balance of power in Europe, and even the trade of this kingdom, and the Proteſtant ſucceſſion, againſt the invaſions of France and the pretender) that very meaſure would, it ſeems, have put all theſe into the utmoſt peril.

† Vide G. Al. Art. 8.

If we had ſucceeded in our attempts to ſet the crown of Spain on the head of the preſent emperor, and his brother the Emperor *Joſeph* had lived, would our danger from the union of theſe two brothers not have been at leaſt as great as that which is apprehended from the union of the preſent emperor, and of the preſent King of Spain, rivals almoſt from their cradles, and by a long courſe of oppoſition, ſuch inveterate enemies, that they could hardly be kept, as the Enquirer aſſures us, "within "the bounds of common decency towards one "another, by all the addreſs of two powerful "mediators in a public treaty?" Might not the ſame addreſs that threw theſe enemies into one another's arms, (for it will appear they did not run thither ſo unaccountably) and united them in deſigns deſtructive to the commerce and rights of other nations, have ſucceeded equally well between the two brothers, eſpecially ſince, in this caſe, there would have been but half the work to do? The union would have been formed to our hands, and our addreſs could only have been ſhewn, in giving ſuch proper provocations, as might have inſpired the deſigns.

Would *Charles* have been leſs favorable to the trade of his brother's ſubjects, at any place in the Auſtrian dominions, than *Philip* ſhews himſelf to the trade of the ſubjects of *Charles?* Would *Joſeph* not have concurred to aſſiſt his brother to regain Gibraltar, and the iſland of Minorca, at leaſt, as zealouſly as we can ſuppoſe that *Charles* concurs to aſſiſt *Philip*, either by good offices, or, if you pleaſe, to have it ſo, by force of arms? Would not a league between the two brothers have been as much a popiſh league as that which we are ſo much alarmed at, between the ſurviving brother and the preſent King of Spain? Would not the firſt have

made uſe of the pretender, as the latter is ſaid to do, and as every prince or ſtate, with whom we happen to be at variance, may be provoked to do? In ſhort, I may ſafely challenge the author of the enquiry, as great a caſuiſt as he is, to ſhew any difference between the two caſes which I have compared together, except this, that we might have been expoſed to great dangers from that ſettlement of Europe, which we fought to bring about, than we are, or can probably be expoſed to, from that which we were ſolicitous to prevent. But the caſe is ſtill ſtronger than I have put it. For even after the death of the Emperor *Joſeph*, his preſent imperial majeſty continued his claim to the whole Spaniſh monarchy; and you, and I, and many of us, continued to ſupport his claim, and oppoſed with all our force the negotiations of peace, which were begun upon a different principle. Happily we failed of ſucceſs. The many, who remonſtrated, "That "we were haſtening apace to make him a power "too great and too formidable; and that we ſhould "find in him, at laſt, the enemy we then dreaded "only in another," prevailed. Had they not, in what a condition ſhould we have been at this time? Would the emperor have been more grateful, or leſs powerful, with the crown of Spain and the Indies, added to ſo many others? If the union between him and the King of Spain is ſo formidable to us, how much more reaſon ſhould we have had to apprehend the conſequences to our trade, and in the end to our liberties and our religion themſelves if theſe divided powers had been united in the ſame ungrateful perſon, as it is the mode at preſent to call the emperor?

If Don *Carlos* ſhould marry the eldeſt archduchеſs, if the emperor ſhould die without iſſue male, if the King of France ſhould die without iſſue

iſſue male, if the Prince of Auſtrias ſhould die without iſſue male, and the princes of the blood in France and Spain ſhould not ſupport the validity of the renunciations, all which is within the bounds of poſſibility, "Don *Carlos* may be at once empe-" ror, king of France, and king of Spain, and have " the vaſt ſtrength and riches of all theſe pow-" ers united and centered in him." This terrible object ſtares our ſpeculative enquirer in the face, and diſturbs his head. It diſturbs, very probably, thoſe excellent heads, who ſet him a ſcribbling, who can ſee ſo far into futurity at preſent; and who, not very long ago, were unable to diſcern the neareſt and moſt probable events. Let us conſider now, what conſequence of this kind might have happened, if, for ſecuring a balance of power in Europe, the preſent emperor had been likewiſe King of Spain. If then the King of France, inſtead of marrying the daughter of *Staniſlaus*, had married the eldeſt daughter of the emperor, which ſurely had been within the bounds of poſſibility, there would remain but one chance at this time, viz. the emperor having a ſon, to ſave us from the combination of ſuch a power, as would in reality form what we commonly, though improperly, call univerſal monarchy; ſince there would be nothing elſe, which could hinder *Lewis* the Fifteenth from being King of France, of Spain, and of the Weſt-Indies, maſter of all the Auſtrian dominions, and, by conſequence, emperor. The truth I would inculcate by what I have ſaid is this, that as the partition treaty threw too much weight into the ſcale of Bourbon, to the deſtruction of the balance of power in Europe; ſo the neceſſary conſequence of the war we made to reſtore this balance muſt have been, if we had ſucceeded according to our deſires, to deſtroy it again, by throwing too much

much weight into the ſcale of Auſtria. This has been proved by the event, and the Enquirer demonſtrates, or he demonſtrates nothing.

As far, therefore, as we have brought this deduction, that is, to the end of the laſt war, it is manifeſt that the notion of preſerving a balance of power in Europe has, for the reaſons touched upon above, and which every man will extend in his own thoughts, proved to us like an *ignis fatuus*; in the purſuit of which we have been led from difficulty to difficulty, and from danger to danger.

If we enquire, whether the treaties of Utrecht and Baden did afford us an opportunity of correcting our errors, and of profiting by our experience, it will be found that they did; ſince all the points, which had been in conteſt were then ſettled, and this ſettlement acquieſced in by all the parties to the war, except the emperor, who kept up ſtill his claim againſt *Philip* the Fifth.

But the keeping up this claim could not have endangered the public tranquillity. He was unable to attack Spain for want of a maritime force, or even Sicily, which was covered beſides by the guaranty of the neutrality of Italy; and this neutrality ſerved likewiſe to hinder Spain from attacking him. There might have been a war of the pen, and there could have been no other between them.

At the worſt, if the King of Spain had invaded any part of Italy, the guarantees of the neutrality might eaſily have prevented ſuch an attempt; and in ſo doing they would have obſerved the treaties, and kept the peace, far from breaking either one or the other.

In ſuch a ſtate of foreign affairs, we had certainly an opportunity of looking carefully after our own. The King of Spain had no pretence to aſk for any alteration in the ſettlement ſo lately eſtabliſhed with his

his own conſent; and the emperor could not have complained of his majeſty for obſerving treaties, which he would not have made, but which he found made; nor for refuſing to enter into a new war on this account.

Whether we improved this opportunity, or not, what our preſent condition is, and by what ſteps we have been reduced to it, I leave to the enquiry of ſome perſon more capable than myſelf. Let it ſuffice, that I have endeavored to remove ſome deluſions, which have affected even men of the beſt underſtandings, and the beſt intentions; and to prepare the minds of my countrymen to conſider, at this critical point of time, what our national intereſt really is, without being biaſſed in their judgments by what they may have thought of it on any former occaſions.

I am,

Moſt noble Sir,

Your Honor's

moſt devoted Servant,

February 3, 1726-7.

THE OCCASIONAL WRITER.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

JUST after I had ſent theſe ſheets to the preſs, a paper, intitled, "A Letter to the Occaſional Writer," was brought to me. I have read this ſtiff pedantic piece with more attention than it deſerves, though I read it curſorily; and notwithſtanding the pains which the author takes to paſs for you, I am ready to acquit you of the ſcandal. You would certainly have writ better, and your pen at leaſt would not have appeared ſo near a-kin to that of the Craftſman Extraordinary.

Who this author ſuppoſes the Occaſional Writer to be, I cannot gueſs. Such a wretch as he deſcribes is, I believe, to be found no where, nor even ſuch an image of guilt and miſery any where, except in the horrors of his own mind. I ſhall therefore, with a decent contempt for this ſcurrilous ſcribbler, and without any concern about his imaginary correſpondent, continue theſe inoffenſive letters, in great tranquillity and ſedateneſs, as often as occaſion invites me, or as I find myſelf in the humor.

THE

OCCASIONAL WRITER.

NUMBER III.

TO THE SAME.

——Quis te, juvenum confidentiſſime, noſtras
Juſſit adire domos? Quidve hinc petis? inquit. At ille,
Scis Proteu, ſcis ipſe; neque eſt te fallere cuiquam.

VIRG.

MOST NOBLE SIR,

WHEN I writ the poſtſcript to my laſt letter, I believed firmly that the Anſwer to the Occaſional Writer was neither writ by you, nor publiſhed by your order. Many conſiderations determined me to this opinion. For inſtance: I could not think, that in order to vent yourſelf in a fit of railing, you would draw a picture out of your own imagination, which cannot paſs for that of the perſon who writ to you, even in the low and vile character he aſſumed, and which you will hardly venture to own that you meant to be the reſemblance of any man in Britain. I could not perſuade myſelf that you would give occaſion, as I apprehend very much that you have done, to the drawing of another picture

picture after the life, which no one will miſtake, and which you will not be curious to place in your collection of paintings. I have, with the reſt of mankind, a great regard for ſome of your friends; but I have, with the reſt of mankind likewiſe, a great regard for your particular enemies, among whom it ſeemed impoſſible to me that you, who knew them ſo well, ſhould preſume to find either ſlaves or criminals, or inſolvent debtors. I dare affirm, that there is not one of them, who ever "mortgaged "his eſtate for more than its value, or reduced "himſelf near the neceſſity of living by contri-"bution."

Theſe are ſome of the motives which induced me to acquit you of the ſcandal, as I then thought it, of writing this paper. But, upon better information, and farther reflection, I have changed my opinion; and I ſee nothing inconſiſtent with my reſpect for you, in believing that you did write it.

As great an advantage as it is in all the affairs of life for a man to keep his temper, it is often excuſable, and perhaps ſometimes even praiſe-worthy, to loſe it. When a miniſter is contradicted in matters relating to his adminiſtration, and when buſy people ſhall preſume to aſk his reaſons, inſtead of ſubmitting to his authority, can we wonder if his paſſion tranſports him into rhodomontades, and if he behaves himſelf a little wildly? But when the virtue of a miniſter like you, whoſe whole life has been one bright example of public and private virtue, ſhall be ſuſpected, ſo far as to be tempted to paſſion; who can refuſe him even applauſe, if his generous ſoul, tranſported with a juſt indignation, breathes forth ſuch expreſſions, as might, upon a leſs occaſion, paſs for indecent ribaldry?

This was your caſe, moſt noble Sir, in the trial which I preſumed lately to make, with too much boldneſs

boldneſs perhaps, but ſurely with a very good deſign. A man writes to you from his garret, deſcribes himſelf as a proſtitute ſcribbler, and offers you the ſervice of his pen: this, and this alone, appears to you; upon which a noble indignation ſeizes you, and you ſtrike boldly, though you ſtrike in the dark. There is really ſomewhat fine in this ſally of reſentment, and it confirms, in the higheſt degree, the ſentiments I have long entertained of your integrity, of your ability, and of a certain grace which accompanies and gives a luſtre to every part of your conduct.

The ſhare I have had in this adventure affords me great ſatisfaction. Your anger fell on a feigned character, and hurts me not; but the honor of having drawn an anſwer from a firſt miniſter, and an anſwer in print, accrues to me, and is ſuch a one, as the greateſt of our weekly authors could never boaſt.

Give me leave, therefore, to be tranſported in my turn, but to be tranſported with joy, and to inſert an abſtract of your anſwer in this paper, as *Balzac* placed at the head of his works, a letter from the Cardinal de *Richlieu*. I conſult my own honor, it muſt be confeſſed, in doing this; but I conſider ſtill more that juſt applauſe and admiration which I, with the reſt of the world, am obliged on this occaſion to give you.

To thoſe parts of the Occaſional Writer's letter, which ſhew that you are at this juncture in want of ſuch ſervices as the ſcoundrel he perſonated might be fit to do, you make no reply. The want you ſeem to admit, but the offer of ſervice you reject: let the public hear in what manner.

ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT

OF THE

M-------R'S ANSWER

TO THE

OCCASIONAL WRITER.

Page 1. " THOUGH you have not ſigned " your name, I know you. Becauſe a man who " is without all principles of honeſty, who in no " one thing can be relied upon, a betrayer of " his friend, a traitor to his prince, an enemy to " his country, a perjured, ungrateful, unfaithful " raſcal, muſt be you; one who is a compoſition " of all theſe, can be only you.

Page 2. " You are an infamous fellow, who " make a reputation of doing miſchief; and *He-* " *roſtratus* and *Nero* were not greater villains than " you.

" You are of ſo profligate a character, that in " your proſperity no body envied you, and in your " diſgrace no body pities you.

" You were in the intereſt of France, and of the " pope, as hath appeared by your writings, and " you went out of the way to ſave yourſelf from " the gallows.

Page 3. " You are a fellow who have no con- " ſcience at all, or a damnable complying one: and " if you would lend it to me, it would be of no " uſe to me.

" You

" You have no abilities; you are an emancipated " ſlave, a proſcribed criminal, and an inſolvent " debtor: and I am not in ſuch a deſperate for- " lorn condition, to employ a fellow who hath no " talents.

Page 4. " You have been a traitor, and ſhould " be uſed like one. And I love my maſter ſo well, " that I will never adviſe him to uſe you, leſt you " ſhould joſtle me out of my employment.

" The majority are of my opinion. One ſide " rails at you, the other diſlikes you; and that " *Palinurus* would deſerve to be drowned indeed, " who let you have the rudder, if he could help " it.

Page 5. " I do not value what you or your " company ſay of me; neither am I to be frighted " with a parliamentary ſcrutiny. You rail at me, " becauſe you envy me; and I deſpiſe all that a " man in the impotence of diſgrace can do againſt " me, who could never terrify me in the zenith of " his power.

Then follow theſe admirable arguments.

Page 6, 7, 8. " I. You may talk what you will " of France, Spain, and the emperor; power is " fluctuating, and perhaps I know who is Britain's " enemy as well as another. II. Though we did " lend the emperor a helping hand, we are not to " let him do what he pleaſes; and when we ſet him " up, it was good politics, and now it is equally " good to take him down. III. I do not queſtion " but we ſhall humble him. IV. I muſt tell you " plainly, you and I, as to foreign affairs, dif- " fer widely in opinion. V. When our neighbours " grow ſaucy and encroaching, it is high time to " look about us, and not to be taken napping. " VI. I know you are like the emperor, becauſe

" he

" he is like yourſelf in ingratitude; and you hate " our friend France, becauſe you were well received " there.

" If any body ſays any thing of me, pray, tell " them ALL THESE THINGS. But for all that, " I will not give you an employment.

" I know you to be ſo hot-headed, that when " you have read this, you will vent all your malice " againſt me. But I do not value it; for I would " rather have you my enemy than my friend.

" Change your names, and be as abuſive and " ſcurrilous as you pleaſe, I ſhall find you out. I " am *Ariſtæus;* you are *Proteus.* You may change " to a flame, a lion, a bull, or a bear, I ſhall know " you, baffle you, conquer you, and contemn you. " All your oppoſition will redound to my honor " and glory. And ſo, Sir, I ſcorn your proffered " ſervices.

" Sir, your moſt, &c."

How great! how free! how bold! how generous! Well may thoſe who have the honor of a near approach to you, extol the noble openneſs of your nature, which diſplays itſelf in this uncommon manner; and think that temper in a ſtateſman truly admirable, which loſes itſelf ſo glorioufly. Did ever miniſter ſpeak ſo plainly, or lay himſelf ſo open to any man, and eſpecially to ſuch a man as you ſuppoſed yourſelf writing to at that time? Far from diſcovering hatred and contempt of ſuch wretches, perſons in your ſituation have generally encouraged, and even feared them. Nay, they have ſometimes aſpired to be themſelves of that claſs; and *Seneca's* Apocolocynthoſis upon *Claudius*, is not the ſole inſtance of miniſters, who have dipped their pens in ſatyr, to rail at the memory of a dead prince.

But

But now, after this honorable declaration which you have made, after this great example which you have given, let every mercenary ſcribbler, every tool of ſecret ſervice, tremble and deſpair. Long may you live, moſt noble Sir, the juſt model of a miniſter, who ſcorns the aſſiſtance of flattery, falſehood, artifice, or corruption.

I have devoted myſelf to your ſervice, and ſhall certainly attend you through every ſtage of your fortune: as long as we both draw vital air, you ſhall feel the effects of my zeal in your cauſe, and I promiſe you very ſolemnly, that from henceforward I will live for no other purporſe; ſo that I am perſuaded you will hear with pleaſure the three engagements which I think it proper to take with the public and with you.

The firſt is, that my pen ſhall conſtantly preſerve decency and good manners, and ſhall never be ſtained with any abuſe of particular perſons. I will chaſtiſe vice, I will expoſe folly, and I will combat error, wherever I find them. But I will never touch upon any unalterable defects in figure, in family, in birth, in any kind whatſoever; much leſs will I allow myſelf to hint at any particular ſcandal, or even to mention any real misfortune, which may equally befal the beſt and the worſt of men; unleſs I am forced by my ſubject to it, and unleſs I can ſoften the evil by the very manner of recalling it to memory. To attack a vice, a folly or an error, is correction. To attack the perſon is defamation. He who writes an invective, does a ſilly thing, becauſe he loſes his end; and the wiſeſt of men has ſaid, "He that uttereth ſlander is a fool." Even truth loſes its force in an invective, as it does in a panegyric; in one, it is thrown into the lump with malice, in the other, with flattery; and he who is guilty of the firſt, that is, he who writes againſt the man, not againſt his crimes,

his

his follies, or his errors, seldom proves any thing more than his own envy, and the other's superiority. To conclude this head, he, who writes an invective, does a base and wicked thing; because his design is to disturb the quiet, and destroy the peace of another man, but not to reform him, or to serve the public. The pen of such a writer, like one of those scourges, of which the profound *Melbomius* has writ so learnedly, while it chastises the person, serves only to provoke the vice.

The second obligation, which I lay myself under, and which equally becomes a man who writes in the cause of truth, is that of intire disinterestedness.

I know the generosity of your nature, I know what places and pensions have been the rewards of some very mean performances in verse and prose; and that R. R. state-writer, of whom we are obliged to ask blessing, is most certainly not at the head of our profession. These examples, and a due consideration of the importance of my services, teach me sufficiently what expectations I might entertain, without any risque of a disappointment. But I have neither ambition of this kind, nor avarice. My fortune is above wanting the necessaries, and my philosophy above wanting the superfluities of life. I therefore discharge you from all obligation of rewarding my services; and I wish, for the sake of your ease, your honor, and your safety, my example was likely to be followed.

When we behold a great man among a crowd of disinterested friends, we know that they follow his virtues, and his merit; when we hear an orator bring over the majority of an unprejudiced audience to his opinion, we must impute it to the force of his eloquence. But surely it is as rare for a minister to have disinterested friends, as an unprejudiced audience; so that a number of followers can

be no proof of his perſonal virtues, or a majority of his eloquence.

The ancients placed great happineſs in their *inemptæ dapes;* I would rather you ſhould place yours in the *inempti amici.* But alas! Sir, as amiable as you are, this happineſs will hardly fall to your lot, in our degenerate age; and I know not whether to maintain your power, you may not be forced to tarniſh the luſtre of your glorious adminiſtration. The king has indeed the hearts of the people; his ſervice will always be ſupported by a national concurrence, becauſe his views are always directed to the national good. This part is eaſy and ſecure, but when once men come to diſtinguiſh between the king's ſervice and yours, there will ariſe another part not ſo eaſy nor ſecure. You have blended them pretty artfully together hitherto, but I doubt the diſcrimination is at hand. When that comes, you will be reduced to a melancholy alternative; which I beg you to think of, and to prepare for. To quit your power and your pretenſions, and to quit them before you have eſtabliſhed in your room that dear brother of yours, who does you ſo much ſervice at home, by tiring the ****, and the nation ſo much honor abroad by diverting the C*** of F***, would indeed be hard. But on the other hand, be pleaſed to conſider that this nation has gone very far into corruption already; that there is a point of corruption, to which no nation can arrive and recover their liberties, if they are loſt; or even preſerve them, if they are not loſt, according to *Machiavel*'s obſervation; and that whoever is the inſtrument of plunging his country irretrievably into this abyſs, I uſe a word you ſeem fond of, will fall into a terrible abyſs himſelf, and have no ſuperiority any where, but where the briber ſtands before the bribed, as the devil ſtands before the ſinner.

You

You ſee, Sir, how my zeal tranſports me, and carries me upon the leaſt hint, which may be improved to your honor or ſervice, even out of my ſubject. I return to it, and the third engagement which I take, is to obſerve a ſtrict impartiality.

To do otherwiſe, would be to act contrary to my nature, and to the dictates of my reaſon. I have a natural abhorrence of injuſtice; and I conſidered, when I firſt drew my pen, in how particular a manner it behoves us political writers to be on our guard, againſt falling into any partiality. The judge is circumſcribed by forms, to the obſervance of which he is bound; he has the law open before him; the parties, on whom he ſits in judgment are generally indifferent to him, and far from having any of his paſſions awakened, the whole man is ſometimes prone to ſleep. When there is room to ſuſpect a judge of partiality in a particular caſe, it is agreeable to the practice of ſome countries that he ſhould decline preſiding at the trial, or be obliged to withdraw at the requiſition of the party. With all theſe, and many other precautions which wiſe conſtitutions have eſtabliſhed, it is neither eaſy nor ſafe for the venerable ſages of the law to exerciſe partiality. But we political writers are not under the ſame reſtraints, and are expoſed to ſtrong temptations. No forms are preſcribed to regulate our proceedings; no particular laws adapted to the particular caſes which may occur, lie open before us. The general law of reaſon is the only rule we have to follow; the application of this rule requires the moſt nice exactneſs, and we are obliged to make this application often, in pronouncing judgment on men and things, when we are the moſt warmly engaged in thoſe civil conteſts, which the duty of our profeſſion expoſes us to, and even when our tempers are ruffled by oppoſition. From which conſideration, the difficul-

ty of preſerving a ſtrict impartiality may evidently appear: Give me leave, however, to illuſtrate this matter a little farther.

In the Athenian commonwealth, the citizen who took no ſide was deemed indifferent to the public good, and was branded for his infamous neutrality. Now, if ſuch an obligation as this lay upon every private citizen in that democratical government, it is certain, that we public perſons, at leaſt, ought to think ourſelves under the ſame obligation, even in this limited monarchy of ours. Indifference muſt be a crime in us, to be ranked but one degree below treachery; for deſerting the commonwealth is next to betraying it. Our duty muſt oblige us in all public diſputes to take the beſt ſide, and to eſpouſe it with warmth: this warmth will beget warmth; for you know, Sir, that the worſt ſide is not always the worſt defended. Provocations will multiply daily, and we may be attacked in the moſt ſenſible parts. You, Sir, yourſelf, may for aught I know, be inſulted, and your ſpotleſs character may be defiled by ſome ſaucy ſcribbler: in this licentious age, nothing is held ſacred; under the ſpecious pretence of free-thinking, the providence and the very being of GOD, have been openly called in queſtion, and reflections on your adminiſtration may poſſibly ſteal into the world.

Suppoſe, for a moment, that any thing ſo monſtrous as this ſhould happen, that you ſhould be directly inveighed againſt, or which perhaps is more poignant, ironically commended; and then conſider how difficult it would be for a profeſſed admirer of you, heated in the conteſt, to keep his temper, and to preſerve his impartiality: you muſt agree with me, the taſk would be extremely difficult.

But I am ſure you will agree likewiſe, that as difficult as it would be, a conſcientious man ought to impoſe it upon himſelf.

The

The ill effects of partiality in us political writers, when it carries us to give unjuſt and falſe repreſentations of men and things, will not be thought of little moment by you, who labor for fame, and expect a great part of your reward from poſterity, as poſterity is to receive a great part of the advantages which your wiſe and virtuous adminiſtration procures, in "reviving, ſupporting, and extending "credit, in opening ſo comfortable a proſpect of "the payment of our debts, in ſtrengthening us "abroad by ſo many beneficial alliances, and above "all, in amending our morals, by the total diſ-"couragement of every kind of artifice and cor-"ruption."

The civil magiſtrate may give away a man's eſtate, or take away his life; but we can do, and often have done more; we ſet the general characters and particular actions of men in what light we pleaſe, and deliver them down, ſometimes very unjuſtly, under the moſt amiable or the moſt hateful colors to future ages: for the raſh ſentence we pronounce is eagerly received, and as eagerly tranſmitted by thoſe who are animated with the ſame paſſion.

In this manner are unjuſt, and even falſe repreſentations eſtabliſhed. They become the general opinion of mankind, and then, although our works ſhould grow out of date as faſt as a Gazette, which it muſt be confeſſed happens very frequently; yet ſtill the miſchief is done, the hiſtorian perpetuates the ſlander which the politician broached, and triumphs in the cotemporary authority, upon which he writes to ſerve the preſent turn, or to ſatisfy reſentment of party; ſuch perſons as have no other crime but that of differing in opinion from us, and ſuch events as have no other demerit but our diſlike of the perſons who bring them about, are loaded with infamy. Poſterity is impoſed upon as well as the

THE

FIRST VISION

OF

CAMILICK.

IN HOC SIGNO VINCES.

HAVING as yet given the reader little beſides grave diſcourſes on public matters, and foreſeeing that, during the ſeſſion of parliament, I ſhall be obliged to continue daily in the ſame track, I am willing to take this one opportunity of preſenting him with ſomething, which has no relation at all to public affairs, but is of a nature purely amuſing, and entirely void of reflection upon any perſon whatſoever.

My friend *Alvarez* (a man not unknown to many here, by his frequent journies to England) did ſome time ſince make me a preſent of a Perſian manuſcript, which he met with while he followed the fortunes of *Meriweis*. An exact tranſlation of the firſt chapter has been made, at my requeſt, by the learned Mr. *Solomon Negri*, and is as follows:

CAMILICK's

CAMILICK's VISION.

IN the name of God, ever merciful, and of *Haly* his prophet. I ſlept in the plains of Bagdad, and I dreamed a dream. I lifted my eyes, and I ſaw a vaſt field, pitched with the tents of the mighty, and the ſtrong ones of the earth in array of battle. I obſerved the arms and enſigns of either hoſt. In the banners of the one were pictured a crown and ſceptre; and upon the ſhields of the ſoldiers were engraven ſcourges, chains, iron maces, axes, and all kinds of inſtruments of violence. The ſtandards of the other bore the crown and ſceptre alſo; but the devices on the ſhields were the balance, the olive wreath, the plough-ſhare, and other emblematical figures of juſtice, peace, law, and liberty. Between theſe two armies I ſaw a king come forth, and ſign a large roll of parchment; at which loud ſhouts of acclamation were heard from every quarter. The roll itſelf flew up into the air, and appeared over their heads, encompaſſed with rays of glory. I obſerved that wherever the ſecond army moved, this glorious apparition attended them; or rather the army ſeemed only to move, as that guided or directed. Soon after, I ſaw both theſe hoſts engaged, and the whole face of the land overſpread with blood. I ſaw the king who had ſigned and broken that ſacred charter, drink out of a golden cup, fall into convulſions, gaſp and die.

I then ſaw another king take his place; who, in the moſt ſolemn manner, engaged to make the words contained in the roll the guide of his actions; but notwithſtanding this, I ſaw both armies again encounter. I ſaw the king a priſoner. I ſaw his ſon relieve him, and I ſaw the chiefs of the other army

army put to death. Yet that victorious ſon himſelf bowed his head to the parchment; which now appeared with fuller luſtre than before. Several other battles enſued, with vaſt ſlaughter on both ſides; during which the celeſtial volume was ſometimes clouded over; but ſtill again exerted its rays, and after every cloud appeared the brighter. I obſerved thoſe heroes, who fought beneath it, though ever ſo unfortunate, not once to abate their courage, while they had the leaſt glimpſe of that heavenly apparition in their view; and even thoſe, whom I ſaw overthrown, pierced with ghaſtly wounds, and panting in death, reſigned their lives in ſmiles, and with eyes caſt up to that glorious object. At laſt the long contention ceaſed. I beheld both armies unite and move together under the ſame influence. I ſaw one king twelve times bow down before the bright phænomenon, which from thence forward ſpread a light over the whole land; and, deſcending nearer to the earth, the beams of it grew ſo warm as it approached, that the hearts of the inhabitants leaped for joy. The face of war was no more. The ſame fields, which had ſo long been the ſcene of death and deſolation, were now covered with golden harveſts. The hills were cloathed with ſheep. The woods ſung with gladneſs. Plenty laughed in the valleys. Induſtry, commerce, and liberty danced hand in hand through the cities.

While I was delighting myſelf with this amiable proſpect, the ſcene entirely changed. The fields and armies vaniſhed; and I ſaw a large and magnificent hall, reſembling the great divan or council of the nation. At the upper end of it, under a canopy, I beheld the ſacred covenant, ſhining as the ſun. The nobles of the land were there aſſembled. They proſtrated themſelves before it, and they ſung an hymn. "Let the heart of the king be glad;

"for

" for his people are happy! May the light of the " covenant be a lanthorn to the feet of the judges; " for by this ſhall they ſeparate truth from falſe- " hood. O innocence, rejoice! for by this light " ſhalt thou walk in ſafety; nor ſhall the oppreſſor " take hold on thee. O juſtice, be exceeding glad! " for by this light all thy judgments ſhall be decreed " with wiſdom; nor ſhall any man ſay thou haſt " erred. Let the hearts of all the people be glad! " for this have their grandfathers died; in this have " their fathers rejoiced; and in this may their poſ- " terity rejoice evermore!"

Then all the rulers took a ſolemn oath to preſerve it inviolate and unchanged, and to ſacrifice their lives and their fortunes, rather than ſuffer themſelves or their children to be deprived of ſo invaluable a bleſſing.

After this, I ſaw another and larger aſſembly come forward into the hall, and join the firſt. Theſe paid the ſame adorations to the covenant; took the ſame oath; they ſung the ſame hymn; and added a ſolemn form of imprecation to this effect. " Let " the words of the roll be for ever in our eyes, and " graven on our hearts; and accurſed be he who " layeth hands on the ſame. Accurſed be he who " ſhall remove this writing from the people; or " who ſhall hide the law thereof from the king. " Let that man be cut off from the earth. Let his " riches be ſcattered as the duſt. Let his wife be " the wife of the people. Let not his firſt-born be " ranked among the nobles. Let his palaces be de- " ſtroyed. Let his gardens be as a deſert, having " no water. Let his horſes and his horſemen be " overthrown; and let his dog devour their car- " caſes."—In the midſt of theſe execrations entered a man, dreſſed in a plain habit, with a purſe of gold in his hand. He threw himſelf forward into the room, in a bluff, ruffianly manner. A ſmile, or ra-

ther

ther a ſneer, ſat on his countenance. His face was bronzed over with a glare of confidence. An arch malignity leered in his eye. Nothing was ſo extraordinary as the effect of this perſon's appearance. They no ſooner ſaw him, but they all turned their faces from the canopy, and fell proſtrate before him. He trod over their backs, without any ceremony, and marched directly up to the throne. He opened his purſe of gold, which he took out in handfuls, and ſcattered amongſt the aſſembly. While the greater part were engaged in ſcrambling for theſe pieces, he ſeized, to my inexpreſſible ſurprize, without the leaſt fear, upon the ſacred parchment itſelf. He rumpled it rudely up, and crammed it into his pocket. Some of the people began to murmur. He threw more gold, and they were pacified. No ſooner was the parchment taken away, but in an inſtant I ſaw half the auguſt aſſembly in chains. Nothing was heard through the whole divan, but the noiſe of fetters, and clank of irons. I ſaw pontiffs in their eccleſiaſtical habits, and ſenators clad in ermine, linked together like the moſt ignominious ſlaves. Terror and amazement were impreſſed on every countenance, except on that of ſome few to whom the man continued diſperſing his gold. This he did till his purſe became empty. Then he dropt it; but then too, in the very ſame moment, he himſelf dropt with it to the ground. That, and the date of his power, at once expired. He ſunk, and ſunk for ever. The radiant volume again aroſe: again ſhone out, and re-aſſumed its place above the throne; the throne, which had been darkened all this time, was now filled with the effulgence of the glory which darted from it. Every chain dropped off in an inſtant. Every face regained its former cheerfulneſs. Heaven and earth reſounded with liberty! liberty! and the HEART OF THE KING WAS GLAD WITHIN HIM.

AN

ANSWER

TO THE

*LONDON JOURNAL**

OF SATURDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1728.

THE family of the *Publicolæ* are ſurely very numerous. I pretend to no acquaintance with them, and I deſire none. Far be it from me therefore to aſſign to any one of the fraternity his particular lucubration. I do not preſume to ſay, for inſtance, that ſuch a piece was writ by *Ben*, or ſuch a one by *Robin;* but I can plainly diſtinguiſh, in their productions, a difference of ſtile and character. In ſome, I feel myſelf lulled by a regular, mild, and frequently languid harangue; ſuch as often deſcends upon us from the pulpit. In others, I obſerve a crude, incoherent, rough, inaccurate, but ſometimes ſprightly, declamation; well enough fitted for popular aſſemblies, where the majority is already convinced.

The *Publicolæ* of the ſeventh of December quite jaded me. I handled the numb fiſh till I fancied a torpor ſeized my imagination; and perhaps you may think, that I am hardly yet recovered from the conſequences of that accident. However, I ſhall venture to play a little with the *Publicolæ* of this day;

* This paper was ſuppoſed to be then under the direction of *Benjamin* Lord Biſhop of *****.

for

for I think I can go through an anſwer to this paper. He returns the ball at leaſt, and keeps up the game.

Before I come to this, give me leave to premiſe a word or two more.

As different as the *Publicolæ* are in other things, in one they are all alike. They are ſcurrilous and impatient. They call names, and grow angry at a ſneer. *Raleigh* laid down his pen, rather than continue ſuch a bear-garden conteſt. I took it up and anſwered them for once in their own ſtile; but they muſt not expect ſo much complaiſance from me any more. The matters we enter upon are ſerious, and by me they ſhall be treated ſeriouſly and calmly. I ſhall conſider the dignity of the cauſe I plead for; the cauſe of truth; the cauſe of my country; and I ſhall look down with contempt on the invectives and menaces, which they may throw out; and by which they will ſuit their ſtile with great propriety to their ſubject.—But let us come to the point.

The *Publicolæ* of this day ſets out with ſtating, in an half light, a queſtion which hath been much debated in the world. No man that I know of, no reaſonable man I am ſure, did ever find fault that we avoided a war. Our national circumſtances are ſo well known, they are ſo ſeverely felt, that miniſters who maintained peace, and procured to their country the bleſſings of peace, quiet, improvement of trade, diminution of taxes, decreaſe of debts, would be almoſt the objects of public adoration. But the exception taken to our conduct hath been this; that we provoked a war firſt, and ſhewed a fear of it afterwards. People recal the paſſages of three years paſt. They wiſh we had practiſed greater caution at that time; but then the ſame people very conſiſtently wiſh that we had exerted greater vigor ſince. If the honor and intereſt of his late majeſty, and of the Britiſh nation, ſay they,

were

were ſo ſeverely wounded by the public or private treaties of Vienna, that it was fit to keep no longer any meaſures, even ſuch as have been thought of decency, with the emperor and the king of Spain; why this fear of diſobliging them? Why this long forbearance under all the inſults offered to us by the Spaniards? If we were in a condition, by our own ſtrength, and by our alliance with France, to enter with a proſpect of ſucceſs into an immediate war, why again have we choſen to defer it, under ſo many provocations to begin it? Why have we endured ſome of the worſt conſequences of a war, without taking thoſe advantages which acting offenſively would undeniably have procured to us? But if all this was quite otherwiſe, continue the ſame political reaſoners; if the honor and intereſt of his late majeſty, and of the Britiſh nation, were not ſo ſeverely wounded; if we were neither, by our own ſtrength, nor by the alliance of France, in a condition to riſque a war; nay, more, if things were ſo unfortunately jumbled, that perhaps "this war "would have been more to our own detriment than "to that of our enemies," as the *Publicolæ* have more than once inſinuated in their papers, what could we mean three years ago, when matters were carried to greater and harſher extremities than it is poſſible to find any example of among civilized nations, ſince the quarrels of *Charles* the Fifth, and *Francis* the Firſt? If our "principal ally would "have been dangerous to our intereſts in the ope-"rations of a war, and is indifferent to them in "the negotiations of peace," for this hath been inſinuated too from the ſame quarter, what a treaty was that which procured us this ally? What aſſurances were thoſe which made us depend upon him? The difficulty of theſe dilemmas cannot, I think, be ſolved; and thoſe who attempt it deceive themſelves, whilſt they mean to deceive the people.

But

But we are told that we went into a war, as far as the reaſon of things would give us leave. It ſeems then that the reaſon of things would neither give us leave to protect our trade, nor to make reprizals, when our merchants were plundered. If theſe words are to paſs for any thing more than empty ſound, it will follow either that *Publicolæ* is capable of affirming the groſſeſt untruth in a paper, addreſſed to the people of England; or that our ſituation is worſe than the leaſt ſanguine of our friends ever thought it, or the moſt malicious of our enemies ever repreſented it. Very bad indeed muſt it be, if the reaſon of things obliged us to bear from the Spaniards, at this low ebb of their maritime power, what would not have been borne when their proud armada covered the ſeas; what would hardly have been borne, even in the reign of King *James* the Firſt.

But, GOD be praiſed! this is not our caſe; and therefore *Publicolæ* muſt be content to lie under the imputation which he hath drawn on himſelf by the boldneſs of his aſſertions.

He is frequently guilty of this fault; and the words which immediately follow thoſe I have quoted, afford a ſtrong inſtance of it. "We did not, "ſays he, take the galleons and bring them home; "but we blocked them up; which as completely "anſwered the true end and deſign of ſending that "fleet, as the actual taking of them. The deſign "was to keep the money out of their hands (the "Spaniards) and ſo diſable them to carry on the "project of the treaty of Vienna." Very well. This matter is brought to a ſhort iſſue. The blockade of the galleons is over. Our fleet is come back from the Weſt-Indies. The galleons are either come or coming. The Spaniards therefore are, according to *Publicolæ*, no longer diſabled from carrying on the project

ject of the Vienna treaty. I aſk then, have they abandoned, have they renounced theſe projects? If our fleet blocked up the galleons till this was done, he is in the right. This anſwered the deſign of ſending it. If they ſhould, after this, break their faith, and renounce the moſt ſacred obligations, none but they are to be complained of.

Publicolæ would have us believe, indeed, that they have renounced theſe projects; that they have granted us the main things in diſpute; and that the congreſs is only to ſettle other affairs of leſs importance. But this I deny; and he ſhall be obliged to confeſs either that he advances, here again, a bold untruth; or that he reckons our keeping Gibraltar not amongſt the main things in diſpute, but amongſt thoſe of leſs importance. Let him ſhew me, if he can, in the preliminaries, a particular and expreſs confirmation of our right to this place, made by the Spaniards. I will undertake to ſhew him the general words, by which the Spaniards will pretend in the congreſs, as it is notorious they do every where and on all occaſions, that they have ſtill a right to demand the reſtitution of Gibraltar, and that this right is to be diſcuſſed in the congreſs.

I know it hath been ſaid more than once, in a very public place, and in a very ſolemn manner, that Gibraltar ſhould not be even mentioned at the congreſs; but it would be impertinent to lay any ſtreſs on the aſſurances of a perſon, who hath preſumed to give ſo many groundleſs ones already; and who either hath been bantered moſt egregiouſly himſelf, or hath made no ſcruple of bantering his country.

Here then is one main point of our intereſts, to mention no more, ſtill unſettled; not becauſe the Spaniards have flown off from any agreement they had come to with us about it; but becauſe it

was never ſettled; and yet the galleons are left at liberty to come home.

If aſſerting our right to Gibraltar, and ſome other things, which were founded ſo high by an acquaintance of yours, Mr. *Publicola* (the author of the Enquiry) had no ſhare in the ends which were propoſed by ſending our fleet to the Weſt-Indies, ſuch ſtrange incomprehenſible ends may, for ought I know, have been completely anſwered: but if theſe points, ſo eſſential to Great Britain, were any of the main things in diſpute; if they were any of the ends propoſed by what is called diſtreſſing the Spaniards; then is it falſe to aſſert that theſe ends have been completely anſwered.

When we conſider what numbers of able and uſeful ſubjects his majeſty hath loſt in the expedition to the Weſt-Indies; and that we are, at leaſt, as far off from a ſettlement of intereſts with Spain now, as we were before that expedition was undertaken, it is impoſſible not to feel great and unaffected concern.

If it be aſked, what was to be done? I ſhall anſwer that, perhaps, it little becomes a private man to determine ſuch great queſtions; but I will proceed to ſhew, that all which *Publicola* advances againſt taking the galleons, is trifling.

Firſt then, if blocking up the galleons in the Spaniſh ports was of ſuch conſequence, taking them would have been a more effectual meaſure to all the ſame purpoſes.

Secondly, if we had taken them, as it is certain that Mr. *Hoſier* could have done with eaſe, and with all their treaſure on board, immediately on his firſt arrival, we ſhould have had a chance the more for taking the flota too, which ſtole away to Europe, whilſt our ſquadron lay rotting before Porto-Bello.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, if we had taken this treaſure, we ſhould have had in our hands a ſufficient ſecurity for endemnifying our merchants, who have been the only ſufferers, by the depredations of the Spaniards, whilſt the French and Dutch have ſailed ſecurely; and to one body of whom, I mean the South-Sea Company, the king of Spain owes, for former ſeizures unjuſtly made, as much perhaps as his proportion in the treaſure of the galleons amounts to.

Fourthly, to have taken the galleons would not have been liable to the ſame inconveniencies, as we have ſeverely felt by purſuing an other meaſure. The expedition would have been ſoon over. The expence of lives and treaſure would have been infinitely leſs. It would have coſt little or nothing to have kept the Spaniards out of their money by a ſeizure, as long as the true reaſon of things ſhould have required it; whereas it hath coſt us more than all that money is worth, to keep them out of it by a blockade only for a time; and for a time, which hath not been ſufficient to ſecure us againſt their deſigns, or to make them lay aſide their pretenſions. "But if we had taken them, ſays *Publicolæ*, "we ſhould have taken the money of other people, "as well as of the Spaniards. We ſhould have "been pirates." Let us ſee how this hangs together. If we had reſtored immediately to the proprietors their reſpective ſhares, as he ſuppoſes we muſt have done, the brand of piracy would not have ſtuck upon us. But ſuppoſe we had thought fit not to reſtore their ſhares to the Spaniards, till our differences with the court of Madrid had been ſettled; ſhould we have been pirates in that caſe? He will be laughed at who affirms it. Would the king of Spain's ſhare in this treaſure have been no loſs to him? would he not have miſſed the extra-

vagant indulto, which he is now going to receive on this immenſe treaſure? Should we have been pirates for puniſhing, in this manner, a prince, who actually beſieged one of our fortreſſes, who actually detained the ſhips and ſeized the eſtates of our merchants, and whoſe ſubjects every day killed, robbed and plundered the ſubjects of Great Britain?

But I go a ſtep farther; for if we ſtop with *Publicola*, it will be always ſhort of the mark, and we ſhall never exhauſt the ſubject, as I deſire to do, becauſe I deſire to find the truth, and to be ſure that I find it. What hath been ſaid hitherto, hath been ſaid on the ſuppoſition of a ſeizure only; and I hope the ſcruples of *Publicolæ*'s timorous conſcience are appeaſed. I hope he hath found out, by this time, that ſuch a ſeizure might have been carried on without piracy. But ſuppoſe it had been a capture, not a ſeizure; ſuch a capture as can never be made but in time of open war; ſuch a capture as intitles the captors, by our laws, to the whole profit of the prize. Why then we had commenced a war againſt Spain by this action, as Spain had done long before againſt us by a thouſand hoſtilities. Why then Vice-admiral *Hoſier*, and the officers and ſeamen of his ſquadron, had been in the ſame caſe as Sir *Charles Wager*, and the officers and ſeamen of his ſquadron were in the laſt war; and I do not remember that theſe gallant men were ever proſecuted as pirates at home, or reputed ſuch abroad, or obliged to refund any part of the treaſure they had taken.

Upon the whole matter, *Publicolæ*'s argument proves nothing in the preſent caſe; or it proves that even when we are at war with Spain, we muſt not preſume to attack theſe ſacred galleons. Other nations are always intereſted in them, as well as the Spaniards.

Spaniards. It will therefore be always unlawful, according to this excellent caſuiſt, to make prize of them: and he is defied to diſtinguiſh himſelf out of this abſurdity.

Having now gone through what Mr. *Publicolæ* calls, I know not why, the ſubject in general, we will examine the ſecond part of his epiſtle. I paſs over all the Billingſgate with which he uſhers in this part; though I could make myſelf and you too very merry, if I would apply his criticiſms on what *Raleigh* ſays, concerning one promiſe, to the interpretation which was given to another promiſe; by which we might have learned, amongſt many other curious diſtinctions, the difference between a direct promiſe, and a promiſe miniſterially worded: but I ſhall leave him to his phrenzy, and proceed ſoberly to ſhew you that he ſays nothing, or that which is worſe than nothing, in every line of this performance; in which he ſeems to triumph with ſuch vaſt complacency.

The point he labors is to ſhew that the promiſe made by the Lord *Stanhope* to reſtore Gibraltar, which hath not been complied with, and the deſtruction of the Spaniſh fleet on the coaſt of "Sicily, threw "the court of Madrid into the arms of the em-"peror, and were the true root and real cauſe of "all that thorough hatred and deep malice ſhewn "in the treaty of Vienna;" and by conſequence that all our preſent difficulties with Spain proceed from hence; from cauſes laid many years ago, and when the preſent miniſters were not in power. My buſineſs ſhall not be to blame or to excuſe any miniſters; but to make a true deduction of facts, and to reaſon clearly and juſtly upon them; and I charitably hope, that I may bring *Publicolæ* to do ſo in time; if for no other reaſon, at leaſt by obliging him to take ſhame to himſelf ſo often; for though

I am

I am not ſo bloody-minded as *Publicolæ*, who talks as if he had heads in his power, yet I aſſure him, that I will not let him alone whilſt, amongſt other enormities, he makes it his buſineſs to bury truth and common ſenſe under ſuch weekly heaps of rubbiſh.

I ſhall ſhew immediately that, in whatever terms or manner we ſuppoſe Lord *Stanhope* to have made a promiſe of reſtoring Gibraltar to the Spaniards, it will be of no avail to *Publicola*'s purpoſe. But ſince he hath told us what he hath heard, and *Raleigh* hath told us what he hath heard, for neither of them can pretend to ſpeak on their own knowledge concerning this affair, I will likewiſe take leave to ſtate what I have been informed of, upon better authority than what my adverſary hath often writ upon in his affirmative ſtyle.

I have been informed then, that Lord *Stanhope* had been induced, or ſeduced, call it which you pleaſe, by the late regent of France, to make an overture of this kind at the court of Madrid. Lord *Stanhope*, ſays our author, might think that Gibraltar was to be "honeſtly given up for valuable conſiderations." He might ſo; and he was ſo honeſt a man, ſo ſincere a lover of his country, that if he had thought in another manner, no conſideration of private intereſt, no regard to the ſervice of a miniſtry, could have prevailed on him to make, nor even to entertain the motion. But have a care of your inſinuations, Mr. *Publicolæ;* and learn to make them with a little more delicacy. The caſe is vaſtly different now. The ſenſe of our auguſt monarch is known. The ſenſe of the whole nation hath been loudly proclaimed; and I believe no miniſter, how preſuming ſoever, will venture, at this time, to ſay that Gibraltar may be honorably or advantageouſly given up; and therefore no virtuous miniſter

niſter will think he can honeſtly give it up, or conſpire in meaſures which may create the appearance of a neceſſity ſo to do.——But to return to my narration.

If ſuch an overture was made by Lord *Stanhope*, it was made to prevail on the court of Spain to deſiſt from the enterprize they had then in hand; an enterprize, which we ſhould have been obliged to prevent, if the treaty of quadruple alliance had never been made, by virtue of our guaranty to the neutrality of Italy. That this overture was not received is evident; ſince the Spaniards went on with their expedition, which ended in the deſtruction of their fleet. Now call this an overture, as I do; or call it a promiſe, as *Publicola* will affect to do; it was vacated to all intents and purpoſes by the Spaniards, who refuſed to comply with the condition on which it was and only could be grounded.

It hath been ſaid by ſome, that this promiſe was renewed afterwards, to pacify the Spaniards for the loſs of their ſhips, and for their defeat in Sicily: but this deſerves explanation; and will not ſtand in the light which thoſe who urge it deſire it ſhould.

It is, I believe, true, that the French, who firſt induced us to make this overture, would, on the pretences juſt now mentioned, and on the pretence of the hopes which the regent had continued to give the Spaniards, have obliged us to acknowledge this vacated promiſe as a ſubſiſting obligation; but I have been informed, that this was refuſed flatly to the miniſter ſent over hither upon that occaſion, and to the regent himſelf by our miniſter abroad. The promiſe then continued vacated; and we were as much diſentangled from the ſnares which our good allies laid for us, as if no ſuch promiſe or overture had been ever made.

But

But farther. If a promiſe of this kind had been made on our part, even after the expedition to Sicily, which there is no color to affirm, yet that promiſe muſt likewiſe have been void, ſince it was made ſo, to all intents and purpoſes; by the king of Spain's acceſſion to the * quadruple alliance.

That all poſſeſſions are mutually confirmed by that treaty, except ſuch as are ſpecified in it, cannot be denied. The poſſeſſion of Gibraltar was therefore again confirmed to us by the king of Spain, when he acceded to that treaty; unleſs he can ſhew that our poſſeſſion of it was excepted, or can produce any private article or declaration, which made a reſervation of his right to this place, notwithſtanding the ceſſion of it made at Utrecht. But nothing of this can be ſhewn; and it hath been ſaid, I believe truly, that a contrary declaration was made ſolemnly and publicly by the Britiſh miniſter in Holland, at the very time when the acceſſion was ſigned.

Thus far then the way is clear before us. When we came mediators to the congreſs of Cambray (for ſuch we were at that place, though we have the misfortune to find ourſelves principally and almoſt ſolely concerned in the diſputes to be ſettled at Soiſſons) the king of Spain had no right, nor pretence of right, to demand of Great Britain the reſtitution of Gibraltar. Indeed, if he had then ſuch a pretence; if a promiſe, on our part, to reſtore this place to him, which promiſe we refuſed to execute, had then ſubſiſted, how could he have accepted of our mediation?

Ay, but (ſays this poor hunted author, who doubles and ſhifts the works, and tries, at any rate, to ſave himſelf) Lord *Stanhope*, according to *Raleigh*'s

* Vide the treaty.

own

own confeſſion, was firſt in this affair, and laid the foundation of this expectation in the Spaniards.—It is plain the Spaniards had ſuch aſſurances. It is allowed you, at leaſt for argument ſake, that Lord *Stanhope* was firſt in this affair. The Spaniards had ſuch aſſurances. Make your moſt of it. Theſe aſſurances were diſcharged; theſe promiſes were releaſed; and whatever Lord *Stanhope* can be ſuppoſed to have ſaid or done about Gibraltar, hath no more relation to the preſent diſpute, than what was done or ſaid about Gibraltar in the time of King *Rodrigue* and the Count *Julian:* ſo that our author is building up a right for the Spaniards upon foundations which were demoliſhed as ſoon as laid. He is building up a right, or he is building up nothing; for to talk, as he does, of expectations, in caſes of this nature, without eſtabliſhing a right, real or plauſible, is too frivolous to deſerve an anſwer.

Let me illuſtrate this by a familiar inſtance; for things cannot be made too plain to him. I will ſuppoſe him a clergyman. I will ſuppoſe that by merit, of ſome kind or other, he gets a promiſe of a biſhopric. After this he does ſomething inconſiſtent with ſuch a promotion. He forfeits all title. He renounces all pretenſions to it. Shall his advocate be admitted to inſiſt that, notwithſtanding all this, he expects to be a biſhop ſtill; and, inſtead of grounding his expectations on his right, ground his right on his expectations? No certainly; ſuch an advocate would be hiſſed out of court, and would deſerve at leaſt to have his gown pulled over his ears.

But the Spaniards are not ſo chimerical. They ground their expectations, and what they call their right, on a new engagement taken by us, as they ſay, ſince all the tranſactions, mentioned above, were over; on a private article, in a treaty made with them in 1721, ſtipulating the contents of a letter

letter to be written by the late king; and on the letter written in purſuance of this article, the original of which they offer to produce; and which they pretend to be a poſitive engagement to reſtore Gibraltar to them.

With what front now could *Publicolæ* affirm, that what *Raleigh* ſays about the letter is nothing to his purpoſe; unleſs this myſterious letter had been wrote before this ſame kind of a verbal promiſe was made?—If this myſterious or miniſterial letter had been writ before *Lord Stanhope*'s promiſe was made, it would have been nothing to *Raleigh*'s purpoſe; becauſe his purpoſe was to ſhew, that the demand which the Spaniards now make of Gibraltar, cannot be made on any thing which paſſed in Lord *Stanhope*'s time; but it was extremely to his purpoſe to ſhew that this letter was writ after Lord *Stanhope*'s death. Had *Publicolæ* taken upon him to ridicule the plaineſt and eaſieſt demonſtration in *Euclid*, he could not have rendered himſelf more ridiculous than he does upon this occaſion.

I am at a loſs what words to uſe. I have debarred myſelf from uſing hard ones; and none but the hardeſt are equal to what this writer deſerves. Let him paſs then without any animadverſion from me. Let the reader pronounce ſentence upon him.

To ſum up the whole on this head. *Publicolæ* was to prove that my Lord *Stanhope*'s promiſe to reſtore Gibraltar, is one of the reaſons of the preſent obſtinacy of the Spaniards, and by conſequence of our preſent difficulties. Now it is notorious that in fact the Spaniards ground their demand on ſomething which paſſed whilſt he was alive. *Publicolæ* ſays, it never appeared that the preſent miniſtry came into ſuch aſſurances. If he means the aſſurances given by my Lord *Stanhope*, and long ago made null, he is moſt certainly in the right,

right, for a very obvious reaſon. But if he means the aſſurances ſtill inſiſted upon, I have nothing to ſay but this:—Theſe aſſurances, or what the Spaniards call by that name, were given in the year of our Lord 1721.

The ſecond reaſon aſſigned, by this profound politician, for the obſtinacy of the Spaniards, is the reſentment which hath lain at their hearts, ever ſince we deſtroyed their fleet. Here are no proofs offered; nor can there be any, which are direct; becauſe the aſſertion relates to what paſſes, and hath paſſed theſe many years, in the hearts of the king, queen and miniſters of Spain. It is a fact, which we are to take on the bare word of this author, or to reject. I make no ſcruple of rejecting it, becauſe the probable reaſons againſt it ſeem to me of much greater weight than his ſingle authority in any caſe, and eſpecially in a caſe of this nature. The Spaniards were certainly not very well pleaſed with us for deſtroying their fleet. But doth it follow from hence, that the reſentment which they conceived upon this occaſion, operates thus ſtrongly ſtill? How often were the French beaten by us in the laſt war? Were not whole ſquadrons of their ſhips deſtroyed? How many of their armies were defeated? How many of their towns were taken? Notwithſtanding which, we ſee with pleaſure, the moſt perfect harmony, the moſt intimate friendſhip, ſubſiſt between their court and ours; even from the time, when their diſgraces were recent, and when their reſentments againſt us muſt have run the higheſt, if it was true that reſentment, and not the Ragione di Stato, as the Italians call it, governed the conduct of princes. But the Spaniards are more vindicative than the French. This may be ſaid perhaps by people, who are apt to ſupport one affirmation by another, and

to

to call that proof. But then how came it to paſs, that the Spaniards were ſo ſoon reconciled to the French, and entered into ſuch cloſe alliances with them immediately after the campaign of 1718? If the Britiſh arms beat the Spaniſh fleet, the French arms took the Spaniſh towns at the ſame time. The near relation, and the antient friendſhip between the two courts of France and Spain, it may be ſaid again, rendered their reconciliation eaſy. But this would be to ſuppoſe what is quite contrary to the natural courſe of human paſſions. According to that the court of Spain muſt have been infinitely more piqued againſt their own family, for joining in oppoſition to them with the emperor, who had been ſo long their common enemy, than againſt the court of Britain, who had not the ſame ties to them, and who acted for an old ally. This is natural and probable. Nay, when we conſider how many marks of the utmoſt reſentment were ſhewn at that time by the Spaniſh to the French court; how many intrigues the former carried on to ſubvert the government, and to raiſe a rebellion in France; I think we may juſtify affirming that this is true in fact. And yet how ſoon was all this forgot at Madrid? How ſoon was the reunion of the two courts brought about in the cloſeſt manner, and cemented by marriages?

The king and queen of Spain might look on the proceedings of the French, in this affair, as a political quarrel, and a national wrong; but they looked on an affair, which happened a few years afterwarsd, as a perſonal injury and affront. I mean the ſending back the infanta in ſo abrupt, ſo unprepared a manner, without any ſoftening, and with ſo many aggravating circumſtances. Never reſentment run higher, nor was expreſſed in terms of greater paſſion, than that of the court of Madrid upon this occaſion; and yet one or two ſacrifices, a little addreſs,

dreſs, and a little management pacified all; united the two courts again; and reſtored to the French, in a ſhort time, ſuch an influence in Spain, that it is marvellous we, who depend ſo much upon it, ſhould not yet have found the leaſt effect from it in our favor.

I have dwelt on theſe obſervations, in order to ſhew to what poor expedients thoſe writers are reduced, who attribute the preſent obſtinacy of the Spaniards to the beating their fleet above nine years ago. Surely it is ſtrange that the Cardinal *De Fleury* ſhould have been able, in ſeven or eight months time, to re-eſtabliſh a good correſpondence and friendſhip between the two courts of France and Spain, after ſo great and ſo ſenſible an affront as *Philip* and his queen thought was put upon them by his predeceſſor in the miniſtry; and that our miniſters ſhould not be able, in the courſe of as many years, to atone for what their predeceſſors did; nor to pacify the reſentment of the Spaniards, for their loſs of the fleet in an action, which they might have avoided; and which they rendered, in ſome ſort, unavoidable to us. It is impoſſible to believe, that ſuch an incident ſhould produce theſe effects; which ſeem to ſtrengthen, rather than to grow weaker, the farther they are removed from this ſuppoſed cauſe of them. There muſt be ſomething more recent than this anger, at a loſs long ſince ſuſtained and repaired too, as I believe. Perhaps we may begin to make ſome diſcovery of this kind, when we examine the next article; to which I ſhall proceed as ſoon as I have made a few reflections more on this head, which *Publicolæ* moſt prudently ſuggeſts to me, and which will be of wonderful ſervice to his cauſe.

" Nor does the quadruple alliance" (ſays he; but he muſt mean the king of Spain's acceſſion to this

this alliance) " being after the promiſe" (that is, Lord *Stanhope*'s promiſe or overture, concerning Gibraltar) " prove the Spaniards had given up " their expectations founded on that promiſe; but " only that they were not, at that time, in proper " circumſtances to inſiſt upon it." I have ſhewn how ſilly it is to talk of expectations, without any right to expect; and how the right of the Spaniards to Gibraltar, acquired by Lord *Stanhope*'s promiſe, or overture, either real or ſuppoſed, was extinguiſhed before the year 1721. But I agree, that if they had then had even a real right, they muſt have ſubmitted to give it up, as they did at that time, becauſe of the circumſtances into which they were fallen. Let me aſk Mr. *Publicolæ* what reduced them to theſe circumſtances? He muſt anſwer, it was beating their fleet. They had been as obſtinate before that time as it is poſſible for them to be now. *Alberoni* talked at leaſt as high as the Marquis *de la Paz*. But they grew complying as ſoon as this hoſtility was committed. Might not the taking their galleons have had the ſame effect lately? Would not our incomparable miniſters, who run up and down the world negotiating and making treaties, with ſo much credit to themſelves, and ſo much honor and advantage to the nation, have done better (I ſpeak it with due ſubmiſſion to their approved wiſdom) to imitate than to blame the conduct of their predeceſſors? From 1721 to 1725, we heard of nothing but the happy and floriſhing ſtate of our affairs. This muſt have been owing, according to *Publicolæ*, to the circumſtances the Spaniards were in; and therefore this muſt have been owing to the defeat which they received in the Mediterranean. How came we to hear from the very ſame perſons, that all our difficulties and the diſtreſſes we are in at preſent, ought to be dated before

fore the year 1721? Surely, to be in a floriſhing ſtate, a nation muſt be in a ſecure ſtate; and how could that be true, if, during the four years I have mentioned, a powerful neighbour meditated revenge, and only waited an opportunity of ſtriking home? How could it be declared, even from the throne, that * nothing more than the forms of a congreſs were wanting to eſtabliſh the public tranquillity, if the grand quarrel between us and Spain did, in effect, ſubſiſt at that time?

There are people ſo very regardleſs of truth, and ſo very indifferent to the ſhame of being convicted of falſehood, that they never conſider, when they affirm a fact, any thing more than the preſent expediency. Strange, almoſt incredible inſtances of this might be quoted. I paſs them over in ſilence for many reaſons; and, amongſt others, for this reaſon, that ſome of them are too recent to be forgot. I ſtick to the point before me; and ſhall conclude it by obſerving that when *Publicolæ* aſſigns all the difficulties which we have labored under ſince the year 1725, to what paſſed before the year 1721, he is confuted not only by the reaſons I have urged, which ſeem to me unanſwerable, but likewiſe by an authority which every man will allow to be deciſive.

The next article to be conſidered is this. *Raleigh*, who was not ſatisfied with *Publicolæ*'s way of accounting for our preſent difficulties, and for the cloſe alliance between the Emperor and Spain, had aſcribed both to our refuſal of the ſole mediation at Cambray. He is accuſed of malicioufly concealing the truth, and of imputing that to ill management, extraordinary refinement and great tenderneſs, which was the reſult of true reaſon. Now I think I can

* Vide the king's ſpeech at the opening of the ſeſſion, 1721.

demonſtrate

demonſtrate that *Publicolæ* is ignorant of the truth; or that he conceals it, I will not ſay corruptly, but unfairly.

That the treaty of Vienna was actually and in form ſigned, before it could be ſo much as known at Vienna that we had refuſed the ſole mediation, I might grant in one ſenſe, and for the ſake of argument, though I do not believe that the fact is juſt as he ſtates it; and yet I might ſafely deny the ſame thing in the only ſenſe in which this fact can be of the leaſt uſe to our author. I can grant that this treaty might be ſigned in form at Vienna, before it could be known there, in form, that we had refuſed the ſole mediation; before the couriers from Cambray to London, from London to Paris, from Paris to Madrid, from Madrid to Vienna, could perform their journies, and the ſeveral courts could hold their councils and make their diſpatches. But the certain knowledge of our refuſing this mediation might very well arrive at Vienna before the treaty was ſigned; nay, the treaty might be ſigned upon this knowledge, by virtue of inſtructions given with this contingency ſpecified in them. I ſay, this might be the caſe; and therefore to affirm this fact, in the terms *Publicolæ* affirms it, is nothing to the purpoſe. What *Raleigh* advanced may ſtill be true.

That full powers were given by Spain to carry on the treaty of Vienna four months before this offer of the mediation, is moſt certainly true: and therefore there is as much reaſon to be aſtoniſhed that early meaſures were not taken to prevent it, as there is that other meaſures than what we have ſeen purſued, were not taken to prevent the effects of ſuch a treaty. Could it be an abſolute ſecret to our miniſters, who ought to be well informed; ſince they have had ſuch immenſe ſums for ſecret

ſervice

ſervice, as were never heard of before their time, that Spain was negotiating at Vienna, during theſe four months? Could it be a ſecret to them that, from the death of the Duke of *Orleans*, and about a year, at leaſt, before this treaty was concluded, the Spaniſh miniſters were full of fears and jealouſies about the completing the Infanta's marriage with the King of France? If theſe things, which were not quite unknown to moſt private perſons, who obſerved the courſe of public events, and who ſought information about them, did not eſcape the intelligence of our miniſters, how could a conſideration of the circumſtances, which the court of Spain was in at that period, eſcape their ſagacity?

From the time of the acceſſion of the King of Spain to the quadruple alliance, the whole management of the court of Madrid had been left to the Duke of *Orleans* and his cardinal *Du Bois*; and if we were drawn into the treaty made at Madrid in 1721, by this prince and his miniſter, as I verily believe we were, it is eaſy to ſee who was thanked for this by the Spaniards, and how watchful France hath conſtantly been to ſeize and improve every occaſion of rendering our title to Gibraltar diſputable, and of wreſting this important place out of our hands. We came then into the congreſs of Cambray joint mediators with the French, between the Emperor and the King of Spain, but not with equal advantage; not with an equal ſhare in the confidence of one of the parties; and with our ſhare in the confidence of the other, perhaps, a little diminiſhed: for it is not unlikely that the private treaty, made at Madrid with the King of Spain, whilſt we were mediators at Cambray between him and the Emperor, might give umbrage at leaſt to the latter. I know not whether this ſtep did not even occaſion ſome complaint, though not in form perhaps, from the imperial miniſters.

In this ſtate of things, and in this diſpoſition of all parties, what could it be imagined that the Spaniards ſhould turn themſelves to, on the foreſight of a rupture of all intimacy, and even correſpondence with France? Could they reſolve to leave themſelves without any ally with ſo many enemies, and with their intereſts ſtill unadjuſted? Could they reſolve to run the riſque, in this condition, of falling back into a ſtate of war, when they were about to purchaſe peace at a price which they thought ſo dear? Could they reſolve to abandon themſelves intirely to Great Britain, who had hitherto ſhewn ſo much partiality to the Emperor, ſtill their enemy, and whoſe principal intercourſe with them had been managed hitherto by France, to whom they expected ſoon to become enemies? Certainly they could not reſolve upon this, even as I have ſtated the caſe; much leſs could they do ſo, if they had ſuch an inveterate rancor at heart, as *Publicolæ* repreſents. What then could our miniſters imagine the Spaniards ſhould do upon a foreſight of the Infanta's being ſent back, and by conſequence of breaking with France? I will venture to ſay, for it is plain and evident, that if they thought any thing on this affair, they muſt think the very thing which the Spaniards did. The Spaniards began to treat at Vienna, that they might prepare for the worſt; and they delayed concluding their treaty, till what they feared happened. Give me leave to add, that it was eaſy to ſee that, whenever the miniſters of *Philip* and the Imperialiſts ſhould come to examine their maſter's intereſt together, they would ſoon find theſe intereſts not ſo hard to reconcile, nor their want of mediators ſo great, as they had imagined, whilſt rivalſhip and pique kept them at a diſtance; and that there were men of great weight in the Emperor's court, whoſe private intereſt muſt render them particularly zealous to promote this union.

union. All this happened; and it affords a pregnant inſtance of what I ſaid above, that reaſon of ſtate will determine the conduct of princes, not old ſtale reſentments.

From what hath been thus ſtated I deſire to make ſome inferences, and to recommend them to *Publicolæ*'s conſideration.

Firſt then, It appears more ridiculous than ever to talk of the promiſe of Gibraltar, and the loſs of their fleet as lying at the hearts of the Spaniards, and breaking out upon this occaſion. Neither muſt it be ſaid abſolutely, that our refuſing the ſole mediation at Cambray threw Spain into the arms of the Emperor. In what reſpect this ſtep might contribute to it, will be ſaid preſently. But the principal and determining cauſe of Spain's uniting ſo cloſely with the Emperor, was the ſending back the Infanta.

Secondly, However ſudden the immediate reſolution for the departure of this princeſs from France might be; yet this deſign had been long in agitation; ſo long, that the ſuſpicion of it had been entertained by the Spaniards, and was even publicly owned by their miniſters very many months before they ſent their full powers for carrying on a treaty at Vienna.

Thirdly, There was ſurely, in the whole progreſs of this affair, notice enough to alarm any reaſonable men, and time enough to prepare for the conſequences of a breach between France and Spain. During the life of the Duke of *Orleans*, he had, and it could not well be otherwiſe, the chief credit at Madrid. But it was obvious enough that, by ſending back the Infanta, his ſucceſſor would furniſh us with a fair opportunity of attempting at leaſt to get between France and Spain, as France had ſtood between Spain and us, and of maintaining ourſelves in that poſt. This indeed was an object of the utmoſt importance, which deſerved more

than all our negotiations have coſt us, and which it is not impoſſible might have been accompliſhed for leſs. Whenever it ſhall appear that we took all the meaſures in our power, in a proper manner and at a proper time, for this great end, infinite honor will accrue to our miniſters without diſpute.

Fourthly, If we had been as much prepared as one would think we might in ſo many months have been, we ſhould have had ſome great advantages, which, if we were unprepared for theſe events, and even ſurpriſed at them, it was impoſſible we ſhould reap.

The ſole mediation could not indeed have been ſooner offered than it was; becauſe it could not be offered till Spain had broke with France, and then it was offered to us. Nay, if it had been offered ſooner, I agree that we could not have accepted it ſooner, for reaſons of policy and even of decency. But if we had been prepared for theſe events, we might have ſtruck a great ſtroke, as the generality of the world thought, and continue to think, by accepting the mediation in form, as ſoon as it was offered. In the caſe ſuppoſed of preparatory meaſures taken by us, on a foreſight of ſuch a conjuncture, it is probable that Spain would not have been extravagant enough to precipitate ſo bad a bargain as ſhe made for herſelf in the Vienna treaty. Having no mediator nor even ally, ſhe was under a neceſſity of granting almoſt any terms to the Emperor, provided ſhe ſecured the main points which ſhe had in view. But, ſure of our ſupport, and ſhe might have had aſſurances ſufficient for her to depend upon, it is impoſſible to think ſhe would have carried her conceſſions farther than ſhe needed to have done. In this caſe none of thoſe engagements, which were talked of, but which have never yet appeared ſo injurious to Britain, could have been taken; and we might have had perhaps the ſatisfaction of ſeeing the

the peace of Europe conſummated by the reconciliation of two princes, the adjuſtment of whoſe intereſts had been ſo long our care, and whoſe union is, without doubt, in general, and unleſs ſome particular circumſtances of a very extraordinary nature hinder it, the common advantage of all thoſe who deſire to ſee a balance of power preſerved in the weſtern world. But I go farther. I will ſuppoſe that we had not been able to ſoften Spain; or that we had not attempted it, which perhaps was the caſe; that Spain looked on us with a jealous, and even a revengeful eye; and in ſhort, that the mediation was offered to us, without any deſign that we ſhould concern ourſelves in it, and purely for form ſake; yet ſurely, even in this caſe, ſome advantage might have been taken by our immediate acceptance of it. Our conduct, at leaſt, would have been free from any objection, and Spain and the Emperor would have been left without any color of excuſe. Might not ſuch a ſtep have retarded the concluſion of this famous treaty? Might not time have been gained; and would not the leaſt time, in this caſe, have been of the greateſt moment to us?

Fifthly, When the mediation was offered us, we could not know how ſoon the treaty would be ſigned. It cannot be pretended that we did. Our refuſal of it therefore muſt have been grounded purely on theſe two conſiderations, ſo often urged in defence of this meaſure, that the Spaniards were our inveterate enemies, and that we were in alliance with the French. What is meant by being in alliance with the French, and making this a diſtinction between our relation to them and our relation to the Spaniards, I am at a loſs to find. We were ſurely in alliance with one nation, as well as the other, from the moment the King of Spain acceded to the quadruple alliance, and the matters ſtill unſettled at Cambray were ſolely relative to him and

to

to the emperor. If it be meant that we thought the French our friends, and knew that the Spaniards waited only for a pretended occaſion to break out into enmity with us, I think this reaſon will prove the very contrary of what it is advanced to prove. Did we ſuſpect that ſomething contrary to our intereſt, ſomething dangerous to us, was working up in the negotiation of Vienna; and did we for this very reaſon decline an opportunity of coming at ſome knowledge of what was in agitation there? Did we, for this very reaſon, refuſe the beſt means we could have hoped for, of keeping our antient friendſhip with the imperial court, and of being in a condition to check the court of Spain? Such arguments as theſe will not paſs; and whoever produces them hath too mean an opinion of the reſt of mankind, and too preſumptuous an opinion of his own ſufficiency. On the part of France, no objection could have been made to us, if we had accepted this mediation: for either the points to be mediated upon were pure trifles; ſuch as the titles, and other matters of as little weight, referred to the congreſs of Cambray; in which caſe our accepting the ſole mediation muſt have been quite indifferent to the French: or theſe points were of moment to the general intereſt; and in this caſe, the French ought to have deſired that we ſhould continue in the mediation, for the ſame reaſons which ought to have determined us to do ſo. If the friendſhip and confidence between us and the French was not ſo ſtrict as it hath been repreſented, they did not deſerve the compliment we made them. If this friendſhip and confidence were ſo ſtrict, they might and they would have truſted us with pleaſure. Every one knows how concerned and alarmed the French were at the reſentment which the King of Spain ſhewed on this occaſion. Their firſt care was to try all poſſible means of pacifying him. If we could have

have been one of theſe means, their obligations to, and their confidence in us muſt have increaſed. We might have treated for them, when they could not treat for themſelves. Inſtead of this, by dint of management, we ſo diſpoſed affairs, that the French in a ſhort time treated for us with the Emperor and the King of Spain, with whom we could not treat for ourſelves.

The laſt inference I ſhall make, from all that hath been ſaid, is this. As ſending back the Infanta was the certain and immediate cauſe of throwing Spain into the arms of the Emperor; ſo our refuſal of the ſole mediation may juſtly be deemed an acceſſory cauſe of it. This refuſal might give occaſion to carry the engagements of theſe two princes farther than it was for our intereſt that they ſhould go. At leaſt, our acceptance of it was the ſole, probable meaſure, in that inſtant, of preventing ſuch engagements; for this union of the Emperor and the King of Spain is not, in itſelf, ſo terrible. Spain might be as well, nay, better for us and for all Europe, in the arms of the Emperor than of France; and if this union is become formidable to us, we may thank for it our own management, through a long ſeries of buſineſs, and through divers revolutions of affairs; our too much neglect of Spain; our too much dependence on France; our being, upon all occaſions, indefatigably buſy about the intereſts of other people, and leaving to other people the conduct of our own; of which ſurely a more ſtrange example cannot be imagined than that which is before our eyes. We would not attempt, nay, we would not conſent, to be mediators, when we ſtood in that character, and could ſtand in no other, notwithſtanding all the reaſons for it in that nice conjuncture. Such was our delicacy. But we have admitted and (may I be allowed to ſay ſo?) we have courted France to act as mediator,

mediator, where ſhe is a party; for France is a party to the treaty of Hanover; and the treaty of Hanover, with the treaty of Vienna, give occaſion jointly to the congreſs of Soiſſons, and all the preſent negotiations.

That France is a party in our quarrel, we have been often told; and that ſhe would act as ſuch, we have been often aſſured. She was to make beſieging Gibraltar a *Caſus Fœderis*. She was to march an army into Rouſillon. What was ſhe not to do?—But we have ſeen her act hitherto no part but that of a mediator; a common friend; but unconcerned in the quarrel. No good effect hath yet appeared, even from her offices as mediator. If, by theſe offices, ſhe hath kept us from acting for ourſelves, and made us prefer a precarious dependence to a vigorous war, I am ſure the effect of her acting in this character hath been a bad one for Britain.

Nothing can be more plain than that chain of cauſes and effects, which hath dragged us into our preſent difficulties; and as theſe difficulties increaſed, the obſtinacy of Spain muſt of courſe increaſe likewiſe. If that court had never thought of getting Gibraltar out of our hands, the ſtate we brought ourſelves into was ſufficient to ſuggeſt the deſign to them. When once Spain had purchaſed the emperor's alliance (I may uſe this expreſſion, the treaty of Vienna will juſtify it) ſhe might flatter herſelf that he would adhere to her, even in unreaſonable expectations, ſince he had no more to expect from us, and had ſo much to receive from her. As ſoon as we had ſagely declined having to do with her, or for her, unleſs in concert with France, with whom ſhe would have nothing to do at that time, France employed all poſſible means to be reconciled to her. Intrigues of every ſort, eccleſiaſtical and ſecular, were ſet on foot. They ſucceeded; and Spain ſaw

ſhe

ſhe had nothing to apprehend. What ſhe had to hope, I determine not, from this party to the Hanover treaty. The other princes and ſtates, who acceded to this treaty, acceded in ſuch a manner, as it is eaſy to prove, if *Publicolæ* ſhould think fit to deny it, that we could have little to hope, and Spain little to apprehend, from their engagements, in her diſputes with us about our immediate intereſts.

All other powers ſoftened towards each other by degrees; and by degrees we got deeper into the quarrel. Spain, from having no ally, came to have many; ſome more, ſome leſs to be depended on; none to be feared. From having a multitude of diſputes, ſhe came to have none, except with us. We, on the other hand, from having none of our intereſts in diſpute, are come to ſee hardly any others in controverſy. From feeling ourſelves backed by ſeveral allies, we are come, at leaſt in the points of direct relation to us, to have in effect no ally but one; and with that one we own that we are diſſatisfied; nay, we own that we are afraid of him. The writer, I am anſwering, inſinuates both; nay, he does it almoſt in expreſs words. He complains of the indifference of France in ſupport of our intereſts; and of the danger of engaging in a war, in concert with France. Who would have thought it, Mr. *D'Anvers*? Here is the London Journal contradicting the Enquiry; and I am able to point out to you many groſs inſtances of his doing the ſame thing. Here is *Publicolæ* accounting for our preſent difficulties, now they are come upon us, by the very arguments which were urged againſt the Hanover treaty, and which proved that the natural conſequence of that treaty was juſt what the event hath ſhewn it to be. Thoſe who wrote againſt the Enquiry foretold what would happen. *Publicolæ* juſtifies the miniſtry, by complaining that it hath happened!

I will

I will mention but one inſtance more of this kind; and that ſhall be with relation to the Oſtend company. "The grand quarrel, ſays *Publicolæ*, was "between us and Spain. The Oſtend trade, about "which ſuch a noiſe hath been made, was more "the concern of our neighbors, both by treaty and "intereſt, than our own."—Now I will leave the world to decide by whom all this noiſe about the Oſtend trade hath been made. Did not you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, and ſeveral other writers, maintain that this company was of but little concern to us; in oppoſition to the whole party on the contrary ſide, who took all poſſible pains, both within doors and without, to prove that the Oſtend trade was a point of the utmoſt concern to Britain, and even equal to Gibraltar itſelf? Nay, the author of the Enquiry, who hath now the mortification to ſee himſelf given up, in every material article, by both parties; even by thoſe who ſet him to work, goes ſo far, p. 57 of that memorable performance, as to aſſert, that Gibraltar would be of no importance to us, if the Oſtend company ſhould be ſuffered to ſubſiſt; and having labored that point, with all his ſtrength, for no leſs than twenty pages together, concludes it thus: "That not only our own Eaſt and Weſt India "trade, and that of the Dutch, will be ruined by "the Oſtend company, which will be the immediate effect of it, or rather is ſo already in ſome "degree, but alſo that the contagion will ſpread "to many other branches of the Britiſh and Dutch "trade; and convey along with it the riches, the "ſtrength and the naval power to the ſame Spaniſh "Netherlands.

"But were it ſo that Holland alone would be "the ſufferer by the Oſtend trade, which is far "from being the caſe, yet the ruin of Holland muſt "carry along with it, in the end, the ruin of Britain."

Such

Such abſurdities as theſe would provoke merriment in a caſe of leſs conſequence; but they provoke indignation in a caſe where the honor and intereſt of our king and country are ſo deeply concerned.

Into this ſtate were our foreign affairs brought, when his preſent majeſty came to the crown. I mention this the rather, becauſe they, who now think it for their intereſt to date the riſe of all this miſchief ſo much backwarder than it can conſiſtently with truth be dated, may poſſibly find it for their intereſt hereafter, if new and almoſt unavoidable difficulties ſhould come upon us, in conſequence of what they have done in a former reign, to date the riſe of them as much too forward. Let it then be remembered that all which hath happened in this reign, is no more than a prolongation of the ſame ſcene. The great ſcenes of the world are not to be ſhifted at our pleaſure. They muſt be continued ſometimes, when we are convinced the moſt that they are weakly framed. Opportunities muſt be waited for, and we truſt they will happen. We are ſure they will be improved by the capacity, the vigor, the experience and valor of our auguſt monarch. A ſeaſonable and powerful effort hath often broke through the moſt complicated evils. A word hath often effected what the moſt tedious negotiations, ſuch as we have been accuſtomed to, could never have brought about.

I have now done with Mr. *Publicolæ* for this time; and I hope for good and all. If my letter is grown into a greater length than I deſigned, this hath been owing principally to an earneſt deſire of ſetting theſe matters (ſo often and ſo groſsly miſrepreſented) in a juſt and clear light. I have advanced no facts but ſuch as are of public notoriety, ſuch as I know to be true, and ſuch as I do verily believe to be ſo, upon ſuch grounds as reaſonable men have always thought

thought ſufficient to conſtitute, in caſes of this nature, the higheſt probability. I have endeavored to puſh no conſequence, nor to ſtrain any argument farther than I judged it would evidently bear; for whatever *Publicolæ* may think, which concerns me little, I aſſure you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, that I would not have given myſelf this trouble, ſmall as it is, of anſwering him for any other reaſon but this; that, in order to get well out of our preſent difficulties and dangers, it is neceſſary to know truly how we came into them; and that he, therefore, who contributes to diſpel from before the eyes of mankind thoſe miſts of error which are ſo induſtriouſly raiſed at this time, does ſome ſervice to his king and his country.

I am, Sir, &c.

JOHN TROT.

AN

ANSWER

TO THE

DEFENCE

OF THE

ENQUIRY INTO THE REASONS OF THE CONDUCT OF GREAT BRITAIN, &c.

IN A LETTER TO

CALEB D'ANVERS, ESQ.

AN

ANSWER

TO THE

DEFENCE

OF THE

ENQUIRY INTO THE REASONS OF THE CONDUCT OF GREAT BRITAIN, &c.

SIR,

AS ſoon as I heard that the author of the * Enquiry had condeſcended to take notice of a Letter which you thought fit to publiſh in your Journal of the fourth of January laſt, I reſolved to make my acknowledgments to him for ſo great an honor, and to deſire you to convey them into the world. This

* The following was the motto to this Anſwer to the Defence, &c. viz. "Nor can we conceive a more abject ſervility "of conduct, than for people, ſo long famed for commerce and "bravery, to ſee their darling good, and their peculiar glory, "the pledge of their liberty, and life of all their property, juſt "going to be forcibly and unrighteouſly torn from them; and "tamely to look on without one ſtruggle for ſo great a bleſſing, "or one hearty effort againſt the invaders of it. What can we "become, if we give our conſent to ſuch ruin by our own ſu-"pine indolence and inſenſibility, and ſuffer ourſelves to be "ſtript of our boaſted ſtrength and ornament at once, but a "nation, the moſt deſpicable of all nations under heaven; ex-"poſed to the contempt and inſults of the world about us here "below, and rendered utterly unworthy, by our own conduct, "of the care of Providence above us?"

Enquiry, p. 86.

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duty ſhould have been diſcharged immediately, if I had not been diverted from it by avocations of a very different nature; and if I had not obſerved, on a review of the preſent diſpoſitions, that there was no reaſon in force to make a very ſpeedy reply neceſſary. What I am going to ſay now will, I think, juſtify me for what I have ſaid already, in the opinion of mankind; and at leaſt in the ſecret thoughts even of the author and defender of the Enquiry: and as this effect of the little additional trouble I am about to give myſelf is the principal, nay, the ſole good one which I dare expect, we are in time for that; and by conſequence I ſhall not loſe my labor by my delay.

This author hath thrown ſeveral matters in my way, to which it is proper I ſhould ſay ſomething before I enter into that which is ſtrictly the ſubject of our preſent diſpute.

He declares upon this occaſion, with all poſſible ſerioufneſs, that "he hath not writ, or dictated, or "advanced, or, directly or indirectly, had the leaſt "part in the writing or publiſhing any paper, which "hath appeared in the world, in any form, from "the time of writing the Enquiry, and from ſome "time before that, to the twentieth of January, "1728-9." He makes this declaration, "and for "that ſpace of time, particularly with a view to "papers printed in the London Journal; in all "which he hath been utterly unconcerned either "directly or indirectly."

Far be it from me to queſtion the truth of ſo ſolemn a declaration. I give entire credit to it; and I freely own that he hath reaſon to complain of me for inſinuating, at leaſt, that he had a hand in the London Journals. The little ſhare I have had in the paper war hath not given me many opportunities of knowing the combatants; and the productions on one ſide gave me little curioſity to enquire

enquire after the authors of them. But I found it univerſally affirmed, and no where contradicted, that this gentleman had a hand in the weekly papers juſt mentioned. The perſons who recommended theſe papers, countenanced the opinion; and were glad, perhaps, that ſo conſiderable a name ſhould give them an authority which might ſupply whatever elſe they wanted. Nay, I found amongſt thoſe, who were acquainted with this author, and who profeſs a particular regard for him, ſome who were angry at him on this very account; ſome who were ſorry for him; but none who doubted the truth of the fact. What may have given occaſion to ſo general a concurrence, he can beſt tell. I urge theſe circumſtances only to ſhew, how I was led into an error. It was indeed error, not malice. But ſtill I think myſelf obliged to take this occaſion of aſking his pardon; and I do it with all poſſible ſerioufneſs, as he made his declaration, and from the bottom of my heart; becauſe I am as much convinced, that he neither abetted, encouraged, nor paid the authors of theſe papers, as I am that he was not himſelf the author of them.

It cannot be imputed to me, that I have any thing to anſwer for, on account of the perſonal ſeverities which this author, in a very pathetic manner, complains of. We muſt acknowledge, and we ought to lament, that our public papers have abounded in ſcurrility. One would be tempted to imagine, that the Saturnalia were held all the year round in Britain, for thoſe who can do nothing but rail, have had their encouragements to write; and I am perſuaded that this gentleman's candor will oblige him to confeſs, that nothing but a thorough contempt hinders complaints from being made againſt the writers of his own ſide, much better grounded and ſupported by much ſtronger inſtances than he can produce againſt the writers of the oppoſite ſide, in

his own, or in any other caſe. For my part, I ſhould be extremely ſorry to have it ſaid of me, with truth, that I had railed at any author, inſtead of anſwering, or even in anſwering his book; and leſs than any would I be guilty of this crime, for ſuch it is, towards one who defends, with ſo much uniformity of conduct, the liberty of the preſs, that corner-ſtone of public liberty. He who will ſupport what hurts himſelf, becauſe he thinks it the ſupport of the whole liberty we enjoy, ſhall meet with nothing from me but that which he deſerves from all mankind, the utmoſt reſpect, whenever he leaves me the power of ſhewing it, conſiſtently with the regard I owe to truth, and to my own neceſſary defence.

He will not, I hope, think it inconſiſtent with this reſpect for his perſon, or with that which I have for ſome of his writings, if I cannot bring myſelf up to have the ſame for his "Enquiry into the Reaſons of the Conduct of Great Britain;" or for his "Defence of this Enquiry." He appears to have a paternal fondneſs for the firſt of theſe treatiſes, which amounts even to a partiality; the more ſurpriſing, becauſe it is found in one who can boaſt ſo numerous and ſo fair an offspring. I ſhould not have attempted to draw him out of an error, which he ſeems to indulge with ſo great a ſatisfaction, if he had not made it neceſſary for me. Since he hath done ſo, I will offer ſome obſervations on the Enquiry itſelf, before I come to the Defence.

The circumſtance upon which he ſeems to triumph a little, (that the Enquiry was not anſwered) he will permit me to ſay is often a very equivocal proof of the merit of a book. The ſame mouths, it ſeems, which pronounced the Enquiry to be a mean and deſpicable performance, "have more than "once expreſſed in print their earneſt deſire that "ſome

"ſome able hand would anſwer it." From what mouths he took this, I know not. But ſurely the teſtimony of thoſe who deſired ſome able hand would anſwer what they judged to be mean and deſpicable, is an odd teſtimony for him to quote; ſince it could proceed from nothing but a deſign to ridicule him.

Though the Enquiry was not anſwered in form, yet I believe that ſeveral, perhaps all, the points on which his ſyſtem leaned, were occaſionally examined, and ſufficiently refuted by you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, and by others. If no more was done I take the reaſon to have been plainly this. The miniſterial air of authority and information aſſumed in it, made even thoſe, on whom this air did not impoſe, judge that it was prudent to wait till time and events ſhould open the ſcene a little more; and as the ſcene opened, they perceived that the Enquiry was daily anſwered, in the moſt effectual manner, to their hands; ſo that the author might have waited all his life, perhaps, for ſomething more of this ſort, if he had not thought fit to ſeize an opportunity of defending it, not more worthy his notice, than ſeveral others before given him; and if my reſpect for him, and my deſire to ſtand fair in his opinion had not determined me to make him a reply.

As to the effect of the Enquiry, which he thinks ſo conſiderable, that it "awakened multitudes out "of a dull and languid ſtate into life and vi-"gor; and that it was not found to procure ſlum-"bers either to thoſe who liked it, or to thoſe who "diſliked it;" I, who was moſt certainly one of thoſe who either liked or diſliked it, can affirm, with the greateſt truth, that if it did not procure me ſlumbers, it did not keep me awake. Some of the facts advanced in it were ſtrange and ſurpriſing; but then they were deſtitute of any proof, except the ſtrong affirmations of the author, and collecti-

ons of circumſtances ſo extremely trivial, that they became burleſque as ſoon as they were ſeriouſly applied. A bare expoſition of any real danger from the pretender would have waked multitudes into life and vigor, though the Enquiry had never been written. But I apprehend that ſo many pages ſpent on *Wharton*'s Rambles, *Kipperda*'s chit-chat, hearſays of what one great man writ concerning what another great man ſaid, three Muſcovite ſhips coming to Spain, embarkations which were never made, and armies which were never aſſembled, could have no other effect than to compoſe multitudes into perfect tranquillity, and to confirm the opinion of their ſecurity on this head. Any ſurmiſes of an engagement, on the Emperor's part, to aſſiſt Spain in the recovery of Gibraltar by force, could provoke no indignation, whatever elſe it might provoke, nor cauſe any alarm. We knew Gibraltar to be impregnable to the Spaniards, before *Ripperda* declared it to be ſo; and what aſſiſtance the Emperor could give them towards reducing this place, unleſs he had in his ſervice ſome of Mr. *Waller*'s winged troops and Pegaſean horſe, we were not able to diſcover. As to the Emperor's real engagement in this article towards Spain, and as to the engagements of Spain towards the Emperor, on the article of trading to the Weſt-Indies, we ſoon knew what they were; and with this knowledge our alarm ceaſed. What was ſaid in the long diſſertations, about the Oſtend company, cauſed likewiſe little or no emotion in us. Our intereſt was plainly not that of principals, till the Dutch had the addreſs to make us ſo, by their acceſſion to the treaty of Hanover; and the conduct of our own court, who beheld, with ſo much indifference, the riſe and progreſs of this company, had taught us to be indifferent about it. Theſe conſiderations, and many others which I omit, hindered the Enquiry from having the effect,

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which this gentleman's paternal fondneſs makes him believe it had. The part, if I may have leave to ſay ſo, was over-acted. But ſtill I ſee no reaſon that he has to be concerned, becauſe one way or other the end of writing it was anſwered. The Enquiry was the book of a day, like ſome little animals on the banks of the river Hypanis, which came to life in the morning, fulfilled all the ends of their creation, and died before night.

There is a point, on which the author and defender of the Enquiry values himſelf and his book very much; I mean the ſtrict regard to truth which he aſſures us he obſerved in writing. Now, though I am ready to agree that this author has always a great regard to truth, yet I affirm that I could write a book as big as the Enquiry, filled with nothing but demonſtrations of his errors in matters of fact. Too much confidence in the informations he received, too much haſte in compoſing, and, above all, that fire which is apt to over-heat the imagination of polemical writers, muſt have cauſed theſe errors. It is impoſſible to account any other way, how a gentleman of nice honor, remarkable ſincerity, and even exemplary piety, inſtead of making his propoſitions conſtantly the reſult of the evidence he found, upon a thorough examination, true, ſhould, through a whole book, have conſtantly ſuited his evidence to a certain ſet of propoſitions; and how facts and dates, as ſtubborn things as they are in the hands of other men, ſhould grow ſoft as wax under his touch.

But it is not my deſign to enter into a diſquiſition of this ſort. It would ſhew ill-nature, which I hope I have not; and it would be now of no uſe whatever. I muſt however defend myſelf, as unwilling as I am to offend him; and therefore ſince he contradicts what I ſaid, viz. that "he had been given up in "every material article of the Enquiry;" I think myſelf

myſelf obliged to prove it. "How eaſy are ſuch "words as theſe," ſays our author, "but how hard "to ſupport them?" Now I do aſſure him that theſe words, as far as they may be thought harſh or impolite, will at no time fall eaſily from my tongue or pen; but he will find that it is eaſy for me, upon this occaſion, to ſupport them. I will confine myſelf to the four great points of danger, ariſing from the Vienna treaties, and mentioned already. Let us ſee whether he has been given up in them or not.

According to the Enquiry, we were in danger of loſing, not only our Eaſt and Weſt-India trade, but many other branches of the Britiſh trade, by the privileges ſuppoſed to be granted to the Emperor's ſubjects, and from the enjoyment of which privileges we are debarred. Nay, it was very ſtrongly inſinuated that even the ruin of Britain was involved in this point. If this had been the caſe, and if the treaty of Vienna had thus ſettled the matter, there would have been occaſion for all the outcries which we meet with in the Enquiry, and for ſtill more. But our moſt knowing merchants gave up this point, as ſoon as they read and conſidered the ſeveral clauſes; and it is notorious, that the contracting powers declared, as ſoon as they heard of the objection, that their meaning was not to give theſe privileges to the Imperial ſubjects above other nations; and that they would explain the text accordingly, if any ambiguity made it neceſſary. But in truth there was little or no ambiguity in the matter, except what the repreſentations of it occaſioned; for without entering any deeper into it, let us obſerve that the anſwers which this author gives to the objection, which he was forced, from the notoriety of the thing, to make to himſelf, are evaſive and fallacious; for ſince the ſame liberty of entering the Spaniſh ports in the Weſt-Indies, in caſe of diſtreſs

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by bad weather, or for refreſhment, is granted to us by the treaty of 1670, as is granted to the Imperial ſubjects by the treaty of Vienna, does it follow that more is granted to them than to us, becauſe the liberty granted to us hath ceaſed for many years? If we have not made uſe of the liberty, the fact affirmed is nothing to the purpoſe. If we have been denied it, ſuch denial is an infraction of the treaty of 1670, and proves that we have had injuſtice done us by the practice of the Spaniards; but doth not help to prove that we have had any done us by their conceſſions to the Emperor, with whom they may keep this article, perhaps, as little as they have done with us, and who is not likely to have the ſame means of obliging them to it as we have in our power, whenever we pleaſe to employ them.

How the eighth article of the treaty of Utrecht came to be quoted, on this occaſion, is to me marvellous. That article is made general to all nations; but was particularly directed againſt the French, who, even at that time, continued to obtain licences to ſend ſhips to trade in the South Sea, as they had done all the war. But the treaty of Utrecht confirms the treaty of 1670; and the ſtipulation, that "no licence, or any permiſſion at all, "ſhall at any time be given to the French, or any "other nation whatſoever——to ſail, traffic, &c. "to the dominions ſubject to the crown of Spain "in America," cannot ſurely be conſtrued to deprive us of the right of going into thoſe parts, in the caſes allowed by the treaty of 1670. This ſeems ſo clear, that I may pronounce the gentleman given up, on this head, by the moſt knowing merchants, and by every man who can read and underſtand what he reads.

But I may go farther; for it appears even from the fifth article of the proviſional treaty itſelf, which is ſaid to ſecure us from the dangerous en-

gagements contained in the treaties of Vienna, with relation to trade, that the king of Spain "never "underſtood to grant, by the ſaid treaty, any pri- "vileges contrary to the treaties confirmed above; "nor to give to his Imperial majeſty any greater "advantages than thoſe enjoyed by other nations "in their commerce; his Imperial majeſty adopt- "ing for his ſubjects the above-mentioned declara- "tion, made in the name of his Catholic majeſty." And it is very obſervable that this article ſeems to be inſerted in the treaty, merely upon the ſurmiſes of the miniſters of France, Great-Britain and Holland, who have pretended, as it is ſaid in the introduction to it, "that in the treaty of commerce, "concluded at Vienna on the firſt of May, 1725— "there were divers clauſes, which claſhed with ar- "ticles of ſeveral treaties of commerce, anterior to "the year 1725," &c.

If therefore the natural ſenſe of the Vienna treaty itſelf, as well as the declaration of their Imperial and Catholic majeſties, as ſoon as the objection was firſt ſtarted, and their offer to remove any ſuppoſed ambiguity in this article of the Vienna treaty, were not ſufficient to ſatisfy us; what farther ſatisfaction ſhall we receive by the proviſional treaty, in caſe it ſhould be accepted, which contains only the very ſame declaration?—But this hath been ſufficiently explained already by your correſpondent *Raleigh*.

As to the Oſtend trade, he thinks that I myſelf cannot be againſt him, unleſs in the degree of the importance of it. Now this is the very point upon which he muſt be given up, in this caſe, if he is given up at all. I never heard that any man was wild enough to affirm, that the trade carried on from Oſtend, was of no conſequence whatever to us. But the queſtion is, whether that trade be of that degree of importance to us, which he repreſents. He aſks, "who of thoſe I oppoſe hath de-

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"clared againſt him in this?" I anſwer, The very perſon I quoted in the paſſage he had before his eyes, when he aſked this queſtion. He ſays, in the Enquiry, "that our Eaſt and Weſt-India trade will be "ruined by the Oſtend company; that they are ſo "already, in ſome degree; that the contagion will "ſpread to other branches; in ſhort, that this "trade will carry riches, ſtrength, and naval power "from us to the Spaniſh Netherlands." What ſays *Publicolæ?* "The Oſtend trade, about which "ſuch a noiſe hath been made," (he muſt mean by the Enquirer, ſince the Enquirer made more noiſe about it than all the other writers put together) "was more the concern of our neighbors, both "by treaty and intereſt, than our own." I appeal now, in my turn; and I appeal to the Enquirer himſelf. Is not one of theſe repreſentations directly contrary to the other? Does not *Publicolæ* diminiſh the conſequences of the Oſtend trade to us, and treat it even lightly? Does not he magnify it, in the ſtrongeſt terms, and make our all depend upon the obſtruction of it? Does not *Publicolæ*, an author whom I oppoſe, give him up?

We are now come to the danger, much inſiſted upon in the Enquiry *, "of having Gibraltar "wreſted out of our hands by force, if it be poſ-"ſible, unleſs we will baſely yield it up;" and this danger is grounded on a ſuppoſed † mutual engagement between the Emperor and King of Spain, contained in a ſecret offenſive treaty. The writer of the Enquiry confeſſes, "that the Imperial reſident "read to ſome of our miniſters the words, which "he ſaid were the contents of the article which his "maſter had entered into, relating to Gibraltar; "the which implied, that his maſter had engaged "to uſe his good offices for the reſtitution of Gi-"braltar." Now from hence, becauſe this reſident

* Page 57. † Page 34, 35.

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read all that related to this point, and did not ſhew the whole treaty to us, any more than we thought ourſelves obliged to ſhew to the Imperial miniſters the treaties of 1721, which we made at Madrid with one of the parties between whom we were at that time mediators, in the congreſs at Cambray; from hence, I ſay, the writer I am anſwering concludes that the truth of what he imputes to the Emperor ſtands confirmed: but this offenſive alliance hath appeared hitherto no where, except in his writings; and the article relating to Gibraltar, in the defenſive alliance between the Emperor and King of Spain, is ſurely as contrary as poſſible to all that he hath advanced. By that article it appears, that the Spaniards affirmed a promiſe on our part to reſtore Gibraltar. In conſideration of this promiſe, the emperor declares he will not oppoſe this reſtitution, if it be made amicably; that if it be neceſſary, he will employ his good offices, and even his mediation, if the parties deſire it. Till therefore the Enquirer can ſhew an other article between the contracting powers in the Vienna treaties, about Gibraltar, this muſt be reputed the ſole article of that kind, and by conſequence a flat contradiction to all that he hath ſaid on this occaſion; ſo that if his own ſide do not give him up in this caſe, both they and he will be given up, I fear, in the opinion of every other man in Europe; to which I ſhall add, ſince the obſervation lies fairly in my way, that every man, who knows any thing of the intereſt of Europe, knows it as much the intereſt of the emperor, that Britain ſhould keep Gibraltar, as it is the intereſt of one of our allies, that we ſhould loſe the poſſeſſion of this place; and yet we have been taught, by ſome profound ſtateſmen, to apprehend the Emperor's efforts to take it from us, and to rely on the aſſiſtance of France to preſerve it to us.

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I have reſerved to the laſt the greateſt of all thoſe dangers, which are repreſented in the Enquiry; and that is the danger of the pretender.

It is there affirmed, * "that one expreſs article of "the alliance between the emperor and Spain, con- "tained an obligation in favor of the pretender, and "a ſtipulation to make the attempt for him in Eng- "land, before opening the war in any other parts." Nay, this author was ſo well informed of all theſe proceedings, that he gives us the particular engage- ments which the pretender, in return, took towards the Emperor and Spain. All theſe things are aſſert- ed in the ſtrongeſt manner, as founded on "poſi- "tive intelligence; on intelligence from more than "one perſon; on undoubted intelligence, and ſuch "as could be entirely depended on." Now I ſuſ- pect that the enquirer would think me very impert- nent, if I ſhould ſeem to queſtion the authority of his intelligence; and yet I verily believe, that I have better reaſons to do ſo than he had to depend upon it, when he writ the words I have quoted. But we will wave ſaying any thing more on a point on which it is proper for neither of us to ſpeak plain. His good opinion of the intelligence communicated to him will not give it the ſtamp of infallibility; nor will my bad opinion deſtroy its credit. The world will therefore judge, or rather has judged, of the validity of what he does not explain, by the force or weakneſs of the other circumſtances which he enlarges upon; and by obſerving whether the courſe of events hath juſtified this boaſted intelli- gence or not. I have juſt mentioned above the chief of theſe circumſtances; and notwithſtanding the great reſpect I have for this author, nothing ſhall oblige me to treat them more ſeriouſly. I will ſhew him, however, that the courſe of events hath deſtroy-

* Page 52.

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ed all the uſe he pretended to make of theſe circumſtances, and that it has contradicted, inſtead of confirming his intelligence. He ſays, † "that the vi-"gorous reſolutions taken, and the preparations "and diſpoſitions made by Great Britain, ſuſpend-"ed the execution of this deſign. The Spaniards "found themſelves obliged to ſend part of their "ſhips from Cadiz and St. Andero to the Weſt-"Indies, and the Muſcovite ſhips returned home." —Very well! The event does not yet juſtify the intelligence; but that is accounted for. The execution of the deſign was ſuſpended for the preſent. The deſign went on then; and the preparations for an invaſion by conſequence. It muſt have been ſo; for we find in the Enquiry, ‡ that the deſign thus ſuſpended was afterwards prevented by the appearance of a Britiſh fleet on the Spaniſh coaſt. Now let me deſire you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, to take the trouble of turning to Sir *John Jennings'* letter, dated Auguſt 10, 1726, and made public here; in which you will find the Spaniards ſo little prepared to invade us, that when he came on their coaſt, they ſeemed to be in the greateſt conſternation, that all the troops they could aſſemble did not exceed three thouſand men, and that theſe were in very bad condition.

I aſk now, is the intelligence of the enquirer, upon this head, ſupported by any thing but his own affirmation? Is it not contradicted by the whole courſe of events? Does there appear the leaſt reaſon to believe that he had a ſure foundation to build upon, when he made ſuch bold aſſertions, and of ſuch a nature? The ſecret offenſive treaty, which he talks ſo much of, has never appeared, nor any footſteps of it; and many people are apt to believe that it never exiſted any where but in ſome people's luxuriant fancy.

† Page 51. ‡ Page 97.

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The ſeveral treaties made at Vienna in 1725, between the Emperor and Spain, have been long public; and when it was obſerved, ſome where or other, that nothing was contained in them like what the enquirer had aſſerted, the enquirer was given up. He was ſaid to be miſtaken. The article, in favor of the pretender, was ſaid to be in ſome other treaty; and afterwards in no formal treaty. It was not a treaty. It was an engagement. This may be called, by ſome ill-bred people, ſhuffling: but ſure I am that it muſt paſs for a direct giving up of this author; who will find, perhaps, if he pleaſes to enquire into the particulars of what paſſed on this occaſion, that the perſon who gave him thus up, had ſome ſhare in ſetting him to work.

After this, it is hardly worth notice, that the author of the "Obſervations on the Conduct of "Great Britain," has given him up likewiſe; for the utmoſt which this writer ventures to ſay, when he comes to ſpeak of this engagement, aſſerted by the enquirer to be contained in an article of a treaty, is this: "our apprehenſions were that there might "be engagements in favor of the pretender." Let the enquirer conſider again, whether I was in the wrong to advance, that he had been given up, even by his own ſide.

Having juſtified what I preſumed to advance concerning the Enquiry, I come now to the Defence of it.

The gentleman begins this Defence by ſtating the caſe, ſo he calls it, as he did in the Enquiry; and then he proceeds to take notice of what hath followed ſince the date of that book; that is to ſay, he repreſents the matter in diſpute, juſt as it ſuits his purpoſe; leaving out many things neceſſary to ſet the whole in a true light; aſſerting ſome things, which have been never proved; and others, which I think never can be proved; making what inſinuations,

nuations, drawing what concluſions he thinks fit; and, in a word, begging the queſtion in almoſt every line. It is hard to conceive for what purpoſe this is done. The reaſon given, I am ſure, is not a good one; ſince the principal facts and reaſonings upon which the ſtrength of all that can be ſaid muſt be founded, are ſo far from ſeeming to be forgot, that they ſeem to be the only things remembered, or thought of at this time, and are the common topics of almoſt every converſation. There muſt therefore be ſome other reaſon for this method of proceeding; and I can gueſs but one. This method may perhaps be thought proper to catch unwary readers, and to give a particular biaſs to their minds, with which they are to read and to judge of all that follows. I could make uſe of the ſame art; and, without being at much pains, draw up a ſtate of the caſe very contrary to that which he hath drawn, and at leaſt as plauſible. But I think the proceeding too unfair to copy after it. I have indeed no reaſon to do ſo; ſince, very indifferent to all other conſiderations, I ſeek nothing in this diſpute but the diſcovery of the truth: and therefore, as I will receive nothing but what is ſupported by the evidence of fact, and the force of argument, ſo I will not preſume to attempt impoſing any thing, void of both, upon others. Beſides, this gentleman undertakes to "conſider what I "have advanced, either againſt any thing, in which "he can be ſuppoſed to be concerned; or upon "any ſubject of debate, (of this debate he means) "which appears to him to be of importance:" ſo that if I am able to refute all that he objects to me, in the Defence of this Enquiry, I refute all objections, of any importance, to what I have ſaid in my former letter to you; and then I imagine that his ſtate of the caſe will do him no great honor, and his cauſe little good.

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The firſt point on which I am attacked by the defender of the Enquiry is, on the turn, ſo he calls it, which I have given to the very beginning of this whole ſcene. He means the Vienna alliance.

Let us ſee therefore whether it is he or I, for one of us may, perhaps, have done ſo, who hath endeavored, in treating this ſubject, to turn every thing to the ſervice of ſome other cauſe than that of truth.

In the Enquiry, he repreſented the Vienna alliance, as to the manner, and as to the matter of it, to be one of the moſt aſtoniſhing phænomena which ever appeared in the political world. What ſurprize to ſee two princes, rivals almoſt from their infancy, "two powers, that could hardly be kept "within the bounds of common decency towards "one another, privately running into one another's "arms," as he expreſſes himſelf? What a ſurprize to ſee the Emperor abandon the mediation of Great Britain and France; to the firſt of whom he and his family owed ſo many obligations; and to the laſt of whom, in conjunction with the firſt, he owed the acquiſition of Sicily, and the other advantages of the quadruple alliance? What a ſurprize to ſee Spain abandon this mediation, juſt in the moment, as my adverſary has extremely well obſerved, when the intereſts of the Duke of *Parma* were in agitation; intereſts which Spain had extremely at heart; and in the ſupporting which, ſhe had reaſon to think herſelf ſure of ſucceſs againſt the Emperor; becauſe the mediators had taken ſecret engagements with her to favor theſe intereſts, by one of the treaties made at Madrid in 1721? What a ſurprize to ſee Spain do this, and in doing it, not only forego the advantages which the mediators had procured, and were to procure for her, in many reſpects; particularly, in that favorite point, the ſucceſſion of Don *Carlos*; but make ſo bad a bargain for herſelf

ſelf at Vienna, that the Emperor, according to this author, and indeed I think according to the truth, "gained every thing, and particularly the guaranty "of his own ſucceſſion?"

All this, it muſt be confeſſed, appeared wonderful, and excited a ſtrong curioſity to know what were the ſprings of ſo great, and, according to theſe repreſentations, ſo ſudden a revolution of councils and intereſts. But here we were dropped. The enquirer ſpent much time, and took much pains to ſhew what did not occaſion it; but I have not obſerved, that he pretended to ſhew what did; unleſs he meant, that we ſhould take, for cauſes of it, thoſe terrible deſigns which he imputes to the Emperor and the King of Spain. Our miniſters, who ſeem to have foreſeen ſo little that France and Spain might break, and that the negotiations then on foot might be thrown into confuſion, or take ſome new courſe, by this rupture, grew, it ſeems, prodigiouſly alert and ſagacious afterwards. They did not foreſee what happened; but they diſcovered ſtrange myſteries of iniquity concealed under this tranſaction, when it had happened; and theſe myſteries we find pompouſly unfolded in the Enquiry, with all the improvements and embelliſhments which the author's luxuriant fancy could beſtow upon them. Now, ſuppoſing theſe diſcoveries to have been real, the things ſo diſcovered can be looked upon no otherwiſe than as circumſtances of the general meaſure; the meaſure, which the Emperor and Spain took, of treating by themſelves and for themſelves; and therefore they wanted to be accounted for as much as the meaſure itſelf: but upon this head, I ſay, the enquirer gave us no ſatisfaction. Far from explaining to us what might induce Spain to take ſuch a reſolution, at that particular point of time, rather than at any other, he did not afford us the leaſt hint to gueſs, why we

ſhould

ſhould take it at all; and yet ſo ſtrange an effect muſt have had ſome very conſiderable cauſe; too conſiderable certainly to be abſolutely a ſecret, and even beyond the reach of conjecture.

This remarkable defect was, I believe, felt by every perſon who read the Enquiry; and therefore in the progreſs of the diſpute, the writers of the ſame ſide thought it incumbent upon them to aſſign ſome cauſe, which might appear proportionable to ſuch extraordinary effects; and which, at the ſame time, might not be inconſiſtent with what their great maſter, the enquirer, had advanced. The taſk was not eaſy; and indeed they have ſucceeded accordingly. Some laid the cauſe of all in that inveterate rancor, which they ſuppoſed the court of Spain to have conceived againſt us, on two accounts; the promiſe made by Lord *Stanhope* about Gibraltar, and the defeat of the Spaniſh fleet in the Mediterranean. When this was exploded, and I think it was ſo as ſoon as examined, they had recourſe to another ſyſtem; a very ſtrange one indeed: for it declares that the Emperor, France, and Great Britain the three contracting powers with Spain in the quadruple alliance, acted the moſt perfidious part imaginable in that whole proceeding; ſuch a part as *Ferdinand* the Catholic or *Lewis* the Eleventh would have ſtartled at. The ſucceſſion of Don *Carlos*, was, it ſeems, * a point, which all the powers of Europe ſtrenuouſly oppoſed; which the Emperor, who had already obtained his deſires in the affair of Sicily, could not be for; to which the French were averſe; which Great Britain had reaſon to oppoſe and prevent; and which it was plain that the Spaniards could never carry in a congreſs, where every party was an enemy to their in-

* Britiſh Journal, Jan. 4.

tentions. Surely nothing ſo extravagant, nothing ſo inſolent as this was ever yet advanced! If you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, had preſumed even to inſinuate any thing like it, I believe you would have been proſecuted with all the ſeverity poſſible; and I am ſure you would have been given up by all your friends. Neither can I conceive how the enquirer, who is ſo zealous an aſſertor of our honor in the obſervation of treaties, could paſs by ſuch an imputation as this, without darting his thunder at the impious head who deviſed the ſlander; unleſs he thinks it an irremiſſible ſin to account for any thing in contradiction to himſelf; and a venial fault to accuſe Great Britain and France, as well as the Emperor, of ſomething worſe than a violation of treaties; even of making them with a deſign to break them; and of obliging a prince, by long negotiations, and by a war, to accept conditions, which they never intended ſhould be made good to him.

Amongſt others, I preſumed, at laſt, to account for this great event upon principles which I believed to be true, notwithſtanding all that I read in the Enquiry; and which I ſtill believe to be true, notwithſtanding all that is ſaid againſt them, in the Defence of the Enquiry.

The defender begins with quoting two or three paſſages, which relate to the ſending back the infanta, and the point of the ſole mediation, out of my letter to you; and then, without diſproving the facts, or ſo much as mentioning the argument grounded upon them, he pretends that the whole is hypothetical; and thinks it would be a full and ſufficient reply to me, to "frame a ſcheme on the other "ſide, and to oppoſe ſuppoſition to ſuppoſition, and "one arbitrary interpretation of appearances to ano-"ther." After which he proceeds to frame ſuch a ſcheme, partly on facts, which he would have us believe true, and partly, as he ſays himſelf, from his

his own invention; and this he thinks proper to oppoſe, in a ludicrous manner, to the account I have given.

Now if it ſhall appear, on examination, that I have built upon undeniable facts, and have reaſoned juſtly, inſtead of building on ſuppoſitions, and giving arbitrary interpretations to appearances, this author's ſmartneſs will turn upon himſelf, and, inſtead of ſhewing that I deſerved no anſwer, he will only have ſhewn that he was unable to give me a good one.

Let us enter into this examination.

I affirmed, and I do ſtill affirm, that from the death of the Duke of *Orleans*, the Spaniſh miniſters were full of fears and jealouſies about the completing the infanta's marriage with the King of France. Neither do I find any thing urged in the Defence of the Enquiry, to deſtroy the credibility of this fact. Indeed, if it was proper to deſcend into particulars of ſo delicate a nature, it would not be at all difficult to demonſtrate, from a conſideration of the change which was made in the French miniſtry, and of the difference of perſonal ſituations, intereſts and views, that although there never could have been room for ſuch fears and jealouſies as theſe, while the Duke of *Orleans* had lived, yet there was great room for entertaining them, under the adminiſtration of his ſucceſſor. But this is not all. Theſe fears and jealouſies increaſed and ſtrengthened daily in the minds of the Spaniſh miniſters; and if this author pleaſes to enquire, I believe he will find, or elſe his prompters deal very unfairly by him, that the delay and excuſes of the court of France, about performing the ceremony of the Fiancialles, which Spain expected ſhould have been performed ſoon after the time at which the Duke of *Orleans* died, confirmed, in the higheſt degree, the ſuſpicions already taken. The ceremony of the Fiancialles would have ſecured the

marriage. What other effect then could excuſes and delays in this affair produce, but that which I have mentioned?

The Enquiry * ſays, "that the reſolution of the "court of France, relating to the infanta, did not "come, no not in ſuſpicion to Madrid, till March "8th, N. S. 1724-5." If he means the particular reſolution of ſending her back at ſuch a determinate time, that is nothing to the purpoſe, how much ſoever the affirmation might impoſe, when it was made uſe of at firſt, and before this matter had been ſufficiently canvaſſed. But if the reſolution of ſending the infanta back, at ſome time or other; in plain terms, the reſolution of not completing her marriage with the King of France be meant: then, I ſay, that I might very juſtly have ſet this aſſertion down in the liſt of thoſe which are made in the book without a ſtrict regard to truth; for it is undeniably true, that the Spaniſh miniſters in foreign courts, entertained this ſuſpicion above a year before that time. It is equally true, that ſeveral months before that time they ſpoke of this meaſure, as a thing they expected; and I add, that ſeveral private perſons, at leaſt, writ from Madrid in the ſame ſtile, to their correſpondents in other countries. Of all this I am as ſure, as I am ſure I now hold a pen in my hand; or that a pamphlet, called "A "Defence of the Enquiry," is now lying before me; and therefore neither the authority of the Enquiry, nor any better authority can perſuade me, that the ſuſpicion of a deſign to ſend the infanta back from France, did not come to Madrid till March 1724-5; becauſe it would be abſurd to believe, that the miniſters of that court were leſs informed or leſs jealous about an affair of this importance, than private perſons; or that the repeated

* Page 15.

advices,

advices, which must have come from the Spanish ministers abroad, made no impression upon those at home.

This fact is, I think, pretty well established; and the others I am to mention will occasion no dispute. They are these. The Spaniards * first took the resolution of throwing off the mediation, and of treating at Vienna in November 1724; and *Ripperda's* full powers were signed, according to the Enquiry, on the 2d of that month; that is, about a year after the death of the Duke of *Orleans*. Soon after this, the negociation was begun; but the treaties, in which it terminated, were not signed till the last of April and the first of May, 1725.

These, I presume, are facts, and not suppositions. Let it now be considered how I argue upon them, and whether my reasoning be nothing more than an arbitrary interpretation of appearances, as the author of the Defence hath rashly pronounced, but not ventured to attempt to prove. The sum of my argument is this. Since the Spaniards expected that the infanta would be, a little sooner or a little later, sent back from France, they expected to find themselves, a little sooner, or a little later, obliged in honor to shew a due resentment of this affront, to send back the princesses of the house of Bourbon from Spain, and to break off that correspondence which had subsisted between the two courts, from Spain's accession to the quadruple alliance, and which had been so intimate, during the life of the Duke of *Orleans*. They could not foresee how long this rupture might last, because they could not foresee how soon a change would be made in the French ministry, and satisfaction be given them for this affront; but they could not fail to foresee, that if this event should happen during the

* Enquiry, page 15.

congress

congreſs of Cambray, ſomething worſe than the affront would follow, and they muſt remain in the moſt abandoned condition imaginable; broke with one mediator; not ſure of the other; the Emperor in poſſeſſion of Sicily; and the reciprocal condition, in favor of Don *Carlos*, not effectually ſecured to them. Theſe things are ſo intimately and neceſſarily tied together, that I can as little diſcover how it is poſſible to allow the firſt fact which regards the ſuſpicions and expectations of the Spaniards, and deny the conſequences which follow, as I can ſee how it is poſſible to contradict, with the leaſt appearance of reaſon, a fact ſo publicly known, ſupported by ſo many circumſtances, and juſtified by ſo many conſequences as the firſt is. The probable arguments employed in the Defence, and which, it may be pretended, will ſerve to prove that though the fact were true, and the ſuſpicion I have inſiſted on was entertained by the court of Madrid, yet that it did not produce the effects of throwing Spain into the engagement ſhe took at Vienna, will be conſidered preſently.

Thus far then, as we have a deduction of facts, not of ſuppoſitions; ſo we have a thread of conſequential arguments, not a rhapſody of arbitrary interpretations of appearances. The caſe is fairly ſtated, and no imaginary ſcheme is offered to be impoſed for truth. The probability, which reſults from this ſtate, is confirmed, and I think turned into certainty by the event. By the ſtate abovementioned, it was probable that Spain would take meaſures, in time, againſt the diſtreſs to which ſhe muſt foreſee that ſhe ſtood expoſed. Accordingly, the Spaniards began to treat at Vienna before the infanta was ſent from France, which is a fact allowed on all hands, that they might prepare for the worſt; and when I add, that they delayed concluding their treaty, or that the concluſion of their treaty

was

was delayed till what they feared happened, what do I affirm more than what my adverſary allows? He had ſaid at firſt, that the "treaty of peace was "ſigned at Vienna, before what Spain feared from "France was known there." He has corrected that aſſertion, and has ſaid, "that as the treaty of "peace was agreed to at Vienna before what Spain "feared from France was known at Vienna to have "happened; ſo it was ſigned before the refuſal of "Britain could be known there;" that is, the refuſal of the ſole mediation. The firſt point then is yielded to me. The Spaniards did not actually ſign at Vienna, till the news came thither, of the infanta's being actually ſent from France; though they had ſettled and agreed their terms with the imperialiſts, on the knowledge that ſhe would be ſent away. On the ſecond point, all that I urged, as fact or argument, ſtands in the ſame force it did before; for I deſire this author may not be indulged in a liberty I ſhall never take with him nor any one elſe, the liberty of carrying my affirmations, by ſtrained conſtructions, farther than the plain and natural import of the terms I employ.

In oppoſition to *Publicola*, I ſhewed that the manner in which he affirmed the treaty of Vienna to have been ſigned before the refuſal of the mediation was known there, did not refute *Raleigh*, on account of ſome poſſible circumſtances there mentioned. Now this author has been forced to leave the proof, drawn from thoſe poſſible circumſtances, juſt as he found it. "There is no proof," ſays he, "but the bare poſſibility here inſiſted on." I ſay no more. The argument is as ſtrong againſt him, as againſt *Publicola*; for even after the advantages taken over *Publicola*, for not expreſſing himſelf clearly, this author has, for reaſons eaſy to be gueſſed, expreſſed himſelf in a manner liable to the ſame objection. "The peace was ſigned," he ſays, "before

" before the refuſal of Britain could be known." What! before it could be known by certain and direct intelligence, or before it could be known in form, after the tedious round which this reſolution was to take? That is not explained; and yet that was the ſingle point on which any thing could be ſaid to the purpoſe. In ſhort, we purſued, with great ſteadineſs, our wiſe maxims of neglecting Spain, and of adhering cloſely to France; inſomuch that thoſe who wiſhed us no good, were perhaps heard, when they inſinuated that, far from contributing to ward off a blow ſo much apprehended by Spain, we privately abetted France, in her deſign of breaking the match, and imagined by that meaſure, to eſtabliſh an irreconcilable quarrel between the two courts. The Spaniards as well as the imperialiſts, had reaſon to believe, from our whole conduct, that we ſhould not accept the ſole mediation, which had been offered to us; and was it then ſtrange that the former, neglected by us, provoked by France, ſhould preſs the ſigning this treaty, without waiting long for our anſwer; or that the Emperor, who got ſo much by the bargain, ſhould conſent to it?

Having been thus led to the affair of the ſole mediation, which I had hitherto omitted to ſpeak of, in order to avoid confuſion, I ſhall conſider it here, as far as this author has made it neceſſary for me. In my letter to you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, I dwelt a good deal upon it. I placed it in every light, and debated all the merits of the cauſe, as well as I was able. Now, if what I urged was abſurd and nothing to the purpoſe, this author ſhould have ſhewn, in general, that it did not deſerve a more particular anſwer. If what I urged was clear and ſtrong, as ſome people imagine it was, this author, who declares himſelf, in every point, of a contrary opinion, ſhould have had the goodneſs to examine and refute

refute my arguments. How it happens I know not; but this great maſter of polemical writing hath, in every inſtance, upon this occaſion, avoided to enter into the argument. He hath dwelt on the outſide of things, and hath generally cavilled at circumſtances.

I have juſt now given a ſtrong inſtance of this; and I lay hold of the opportunity to tell this gentleman, that I am no apologiſt for Spain, though he endeavours to fix that character upon me by an innuendo, ſo very fine, that I was for ſome time at a loſs to find out his meaning. I neither ſounded to arms againſt the Spaniards, two years ago; nor am, at preſent, an advocate for bearing their delays and their inſults. I neither aggravated, two years ago, the depredations and hoſtilities committed in the Weſt-Indies by the Spaniards; * " and " thoſe violences by which the whole commerce " of Jamaica hath been well nigh deſtroyed, and " the trade of that iſland reduced to a miſerable " condition;" nor do I now ſoften in their favor, and call theſe outrages and loſſes by the gentle name of † " inconveniencies attending a ſtate of " uncertainty."

But to return. Having given an inſtance of this author's cavilling at circumſtances not material in the diſpute, I ſhall now give ſome inſtances of his affirming over again, by way of anſwer, what had been refuted before; and when I have done this, I ſhall have taken notice of all that he ſays upon the ſubject of the ſole mediation.

Firſt then, he ſays, that the knowledge of the negotiations going on at Vienna was a juſt reaſon to decline this offer, which he ſuppoſes to have been a mere piece of mockery. But he does not ſo much as pretend to ſay a word, in anſwer to what I inſiſted upon, as an advantage in accepting this me-

* Enquiry, page 60. † Defence, page 13.

diation,

diation, even ſuppoſing it offered to us without any deſign that we ſhould concern ourſelves in it. He does not pretend ſo much as to controvert what I urged to prove that the worſe opinion we had of the deſigns carried on at Vienna, the more reaſon there was to catch at this offer of the mediation.

Secondly, he inſiſts, that we could not accept this mediation, with a due regard to our alliance with France; and he ſuppoſes, that this reaſon will be thought juſt by "all thoſe who do not "think the breach of faith, and the violation of "treaties, matters of no concern." Here again is another charitable innuendo. But let it paſs. It would be eaſy to ſtrengthen all that was ſaid on this ſubject, in my letter to you, by ſhewing the difference between ſuch a ſtipulation as this of a joint mediation, and the covenants which princes and ſtates enter into with one another, about their mutual intereſts. But there is no need of it, ſince this author, who thinks fit to inſiſt on this point, hath not thought fit to anſwer any one of the arguments urged by me to prove that France could not have complained of us, if we had accepted this mediation; and yet there were ſome dilemmas laid down, which ſeemed to deſerve a ſolution.

Laſtly, he pretends that I affirmed, againſt the moſt public facts, and the plaineſt appearances, what I ſaid to ſhew that our acceptance of the mediation muſt have been agreeable to France: and yet what I ſaid was founded on public facts, and the plaineſt appearances; which he has not touched, becauſe he durſt not deny them. It is really very ſtrange, that ſo conſiderable an author ſhould continue to write when he can neither find out new arguments, nor anſwer the objections made to old ones.

Having

Having now diſpatched the point of the ſole mediation, it remains that I ſay ſomething to thoſe probable arguments, if they deſerve that name, which I have civilly given them, by which this gentleman pretends to deſtroy what is, I think, eſtabliſhed on the ſolid foundation of fact and reaſon, concerning the meaſure taken in France after the death of the late Duke of *Orleans*, to break the match with the infanta, and the conſequence of that meaſure, the throwing Spain into the hands of the Emperor.

Now the firſt of theſe arguments is, that the court of Spain did not mention this affront from France, as any inducement to the tranſaction at Vienna; and that any ſuch mention would have been inconſiſtent with other declarations made to Mr. *Stanhope* at Madrid. Very well. It is then an eſtabliſhed rule, that we are not to believe a court has motives for their conduct, which motives they do not own although we have the ſtrongeſt reaſons imaginable to believe ſuch motives true. Another rule, which this author would do well to eſtabliſh at the ſame time, and which is founded on as much reaſon as the former, is this; that we are to believe all the motives which a court thinks fit to give out, to account for their conduct, although we have the plaineſt proofs imaginable that theſe motives are falſe. Such logic as this was never introduced into politics, I believe, before; and I am perſuaded that you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, will excuſe me if I ſpend no time in anſwering it. Let me deſire you however, before I leave this argument, to turn to the thirteenth and fourteenth pages of the Enquiry, where you will find that the enquirer ſays, the imperial miniſters at Cambray, at London and at Paris, talked the very language, which the defender of the Enquiry ſays the Spaniards were always aſhamed to make uſe of *. Nay, the en-

* Page 19.

quirer

quirer adds, that " upon the firſt public news of the " Vienna treaty at Madrid, the diſcourſes of many " were taught to run that way, and to dwell upon " that ſame popular topic."

The ſecond of theſe arguments is this:—If the news of ſending back the infanta from France, and of Great Britain's refuſing the ſole mediation, had both come to Madrid before *Ripperda* was ſent from thence; even this " could not have really been, and " would not have been pretended to have been the " motive of what was afterwards done at Vien- " na." And why, pray? Becauſe when the news of our refuſing the ſole mediation did come, the court of Spain acknowledged it to be a reaſonable proceeding. This, you ſee, is built on the principles laid down in the laſt article, and deſerves no farther notice. But on the news coming to Madrid, that the infanta was ſent home, he confeſſes that the " court of Spain might, by ſuch circum- " ſtances, be induced to try what honorable terms " the Emperor would come to." This conceſſion goes farther than he is aware of; for I deſire to know if it is reaſonable to believe that Spain would have treated with the Emperor, when the caſe had happened, why it is unreaſonable to believe that Spain did begin to treat with him on almoſt a certain proſpect that the caſe would happen; which is the great point we have been contending about? Ay, but Spain would not have treated with the Emperor to hurt Holland and Britain, becauſe Spain had been hurt by France; nor would the Emperor have entered into a treaty to hurt them, who had no part in the affront to Spain and never injured the Emperor. Again; much leſs would the King of Spain ſend a miniſter to Vienna to enter into and finiſh treaties, which ſhould hurt other nations, upon a ſuſpicion that France would hereafter affront him. I could make ſeveral reflections on ſome of the

the expreſſions in this place; and on the turn, which the author takes, of putting ſome very odd arguments into my mouth, and, what is ſtill more, into the mouths of the Emperor and the King of Spain. But I forbear; and content myſelf with ſaying two things, which will effectually blunt the point of all the wit employed in this paragraph, and fully anſwer the whole of what is ſaid farther upon this ſubject, in the Defence of the Enquiry.

Firſt then; as far as I am from being, or pretending to be, a maſter in politics, which degree this writer ſeems to have taken long ago, I never imagined that the affront, conſidered merely as an affront, precipitated Spain into all the engagements ſhe took with the Emperor; though, by the way, he miſtakes very much, if he thinks, as he ſays, that he may deny new freſh reſentments to determine the conduct of princes, exactly upon the ſame grounds, as I have denied that old ſtale reſentments have this effect. What I imagined, what I ſaid, and what I proved, was, that this affront, conſidered as a neceſſary breach with France, at leaſt for a time, would throw Spain into ſuch circumſtances of diſtreſs, as ſhe was to prevent by all poſſible means; and that therefore reaſon of ſtate determined in this caſe; though no doubt the affront, at the ſame time, provoked the Spaniards. Thus I am conſiſtent with myſelf; and the author might have ſpared himſelf the trouble of writing this elaborate paragraph, if he had adverted to my ſenſe, inſtead of playing with my words.

Secondly; as to the emperor, our author is guilty of begging the queſtion; for the emperor will inſiſt, as he has inſiſted, that his engagements were not engagements to injure any body; that he entered into no offenſive alliance; and that, when he exacted from Spain the guaranty of the Oſtend trade, and of his ſucceſſion, he exacted the guaranty of nothing

thing but of that, which he judges he has an independent right to eſtabliſh and ſecure. As to Spain, it will be likewiſe ſaid, that when his catholic majeſty treated with the Emperor, he never meant to hurt other nations, but to ſecure his own intereſts; that if his guaranty of the Oſtend trade hurts the Dutch or us, he is ſorry for it; but could no more avoid that engagement than he could ſeveral others extremely diſadvantageous to himſelf, and into which he was however obliged to enter, becauſe he was obliged to purchaſe the Emperor's alliance at any rate; that therefore we muſt not blame him, who oppoſed the eſtabliſhment of the Oſtend company, whilſt he could do it, without any ſupport from us; who never gave his guaranty to it, till he was forced to do ſo, by the neceſſity of his affairs; into which neceſſity he was falling for above a year together, without ſeeing the hand of Britain once ſtretched forth to hinder it. Such anſwers as theſe would certainly be given; and, in the mouths of the imperialiſts and the Spaniards, they would be juſt.

If, after all that has been ſaid, this gentleman is unable, upon my notions, to account for the King of Spain's reſolute flying from the mediatorſhip of France, I am ſure it is not my fault. A few ſacrifices did indeed help to pacify Spain, and to reconcile her to France; and a few ſacrifices might, for aught I know, have reconciled our quarrels; or, which is better, have prevented them. But as no one can foreſee now when ſuch ſacrifices will be made here; ſo neither could Spain, at the time when ſhe ſent to Vienna, foreſee when ſuch ſacrifices would be made in France.

Upon the whole matter, and to conclude this tedious article; if the way in which I have endeavored to account for the reſolution taken by Spain

to abandon the mediation of Cambray, and to treat at Vienna, be not right, I ſhould be glad to know what the right way is. No other, which this gentleman, or any reaſonable man will venture to ſupport, has been yet pointed out. But I apprehend the account I have given to be a juſt one; becauſe it is built on fact and reaſon; becauſe the event hath, in every reſpect, confirmed it; and becauſe it ſhews not only why Spain broke with France, and applied to the Emperor; but why Spain entered into theſe new meaſures after the death of the Duke of *Orleans*, which it cannot be pretended ſhe ever thought of doing, while that prince was alive. If now this account be a juſt one, many melancholy but uſeful truths reſult from it.

But I need not point out theſe things. The world will diſcover them, without any help of mine, and will judge how well the Enquiry hath been vindicated, by the author and defender of it upon this head.

The next point, upon which my reaſonings and imputations are to be tried at his tribunal, is that of Gibraltar; and here he ſets out, by accuſing me, not in terms indeed, but in a manner almoſt as plain, of lying, of direct, premeditated lying. I will keep my temper, though a field large enough is opened to me, and though the provocation is not a little aggravated by the ſolemn air with which this accuſation is brought, by the pretences to patience and meekneſs and candor, and by all the appeals to God with which my accuſer hath, in ſeveral parts of his treatiſe, endeavored to captivate the good opinion of mankind, and to eſtabliſh his own reputation, that he might make ſure of ruining that of others. He calls to my mind the character of *Mopſus* in *Taſſo*'s Aminta.

—di

—di quel *Mopſo*
Ch' a ne la lingua melate parole,
E ne le labra un' amichevol ghigno,
- - - - - - - - e il raſoio
Tien ſotto il manto.

I will have the decency not to tranſlate the verſes into Engliſh.

It is not neceſſary that I ſhould ſay much about the jealouſies which this author ſeems to complain aroſe at one time, leſt Gibraltar would be given up or artfully betrayed into the Spaniards hands; nor about the vigorous defence of it, which was made afterwards. Thus much however I will ſay, that when Sir *John Jennings* was called home, with all the troops embarked on board his ſquadron, juſt before the ſiege, and even from the neighborhood of Gibraltar; when the Spaniards were ſuffered, under Sir *Charles Wager*'s eyes, to tranſport by ſea many things neceſſary for the attack of the place; and when it was known that the town wanted almoſt every thing neceſſary for the defence of it, people ſtood a-gaze, and not without reaſon. The cries of the nation precipitated at laſt the ſupplies, and the vigor of the garriſon made a glorious uſe of them.

I come now to the accuſation brought againſt me by this writer. I ſaid, in my letter to you, that the Spaniards ground their preſent claim to the reſtitution of Gibraltar, on a "private "article in a treaty made with them in 1721, "ſtipulating the contents of a letter to be writen "by the late king, and on the letter written in "purſuance of this article." This is the fact. The accuſation is, that there is no ſuch article in the treaty;

treaty; and many words are employed to cut off all pretences of excuſe, and to pin the lie upon me. Now I deſire it may be obſerved, in the firſt place, how very exact and knowing a critic this gentleman is; who, after pronouncing with ſo much emphaſis, "that he hath read the treaty himſelf, and "finds no one article belonging to it, which hath "the leaſt relation to this ſubject," proceeds to mention the treaty, and quotes a wrong one. No man would have imagined that ſuch a ſtipulation could have been ſuppoſed to be in the defenſive alliance between Great Britain, France and Spain, of the thirteenth of June, 1721, who had known that there was a diſtinct private treaty, of the ſame date, between Great Britain and Spain. But this, it ſeems, was a ſecret to my accuſer; though the treaty had appeared printed in the fourth volume of *Rouſſet's* Collection, when he committed this miſtake. It was of this treaty I meant to ſpeak; and the reaſon why I expreſſed myſelf in that manner was this:—I have had ſome years by me an extract of this very treaty, which was long kept a great ſecret, and for the keeping of which ſecret there is an expreſs proviſion in the ſixth article of it. When the treaty became public, I found that my extract of the ſeveral articles was exact; and therefore I gave the more credit to the ſeparate article, mentioned in the ſame extract, as belonging to this treaty, and ſtipulating the contents of a letter to be written by the late king. The letter I never ſaw; but the account I have had of it by thoſe who have read it, agrees with my extract. All this induced me to think, that there was ſuch a ſeparate and more private article, belonging to this private treaty; nor was I at all ſurpriſed to ſee the treaty come abroad without this article; knowing full well that treaties often appear, when the ſecret articles belonging to them do not—This is a true ſtate of the caſe; and

will, I believe, ſufficiently juſtify me for what I writ. But I have not yet done with my accuſer. Let it be, that no ſuch private article, as I was led to ſuppoſe, does exiſt, or was ever executed. Will he venture to ſay that no ſuch article was drawn up, as he expreſſes himſelf, about the treaty of pacification? Will he venture to deny that if our miniſters were afraid to ſign ſuch an article, and therefore did not ſign it, the reaſon on which the Spaniards were induced to recede from this point, was that ſomething equivalent ſhould be done; and that this ſomething was his late majeſty's letter to the King of Spain? I appeal, in my turn, to the loweſt obſerver, as well as the higheſt, who hath gone about to deceive mankind, this author or I; this author, who conceals from the world what he knows, or might know, with all the means of information which he has in his power, and what ſets the matter in quite another light than he hath repreſented it: or I, who, having not the ſame means of information, fell into an undeſigned miſtake; which does not alter the ſtate of the caſe in favor of my argument, ſince, if the Spaniards accepted this letter, which was writ in lieu of the article which was not ſigned, their pretenſions, and nothing but their pretenſions, are under conſideration here, will be ſtill the ſame.

As to the letter itſelf, what I affirm about it is, that the Spaniards pretend it is a poſitive engagement to reſtore Gibraltar to them. That this ſhould be allowed them, I am as far from agreeing as this author can poſſibly be; but that the letter is ſufficient to keep up their pretenſions, I affirm: and that in fact they do keep up their pretenſions on this foundation, is notorious. Was this gentleman to diſpute the point with the Spaniards, he might comment as much, and diſtinguiſh as ſubtily as he pleaſed, on the terms of the letter; the others would inſiſt, that it was given them as an engagement;

ment; that if they had not received it as ſuch, they would not have departed from the article; and I doubt they would be apt to inſinuate, that we could not have found a more proper caſuiſt than himſelf, to diſtinguiſh us out of our obligations, amongſt their own ſchoolmen, or amongſt all the ſons of *Loyola*.

To ſpeak ſeriouſly; it were to be wiſhed extremely, that the Spaniards had not had this color for perſiſting in their demand of Gibraltar, or that it had been by an expreſs and clear ſtipulation taken from them; ſince it is certain, that the right and poſſeſſion of Gibraltar is nothing leſs than aſcertained to Great Britain by the preliminaries, as they ſtand; "and conſequently, that all claim of "Spain to it again is not extinguiſhed."

I contradict him in his own words, though none of the propereſt; and I will prove, in what I am going to ſay, either that he does not at all underſtand the matter he talks ſo magiſterially about, or that he attempts, in this inſtance, to deceive the world, by giving wrong interpretations to ſome things, and by concealing others.

If then, although the letter of the late king hath given the Spaniards a pretence to claim Gibraltar, this claim is effectually barred, and even extinguiſhed by the firſt general words of the ſecond article of the preliminaries; how comes it to paſs that Gibraltar was not ſpecifically mentioned, in order to prevent any future chicane? It will be ſaid, I know, that as the King of Spain's acceſſion to the quadruple alliance vacated any promiſe which my Lord *Stanhope* might have made; ſo the King of Spain, by conſenting to theſe preliminaries, has vacated any engagement of this kind, which the letter may be ſuppoſed to contain; and I, perhaps, ſhall be quoted again as "one, who muſt neceſ-"ſarily ſee the force of this argument." But this

author muſt not judge of my eye-ſight by his own; for I ſee a manifeſt difference between the two caſes. My Lord *Stanhope*'s promiſe is ſaid to have been conditional; all allow that it was verbal; and I think it is allowed likewiſe, that the late king never confirmed it. The ſimple acceſſion of the King of Spain to the quadruple alliance, might therefore be thought very juſtly ſufficient to put the matter, at that time, out of all diſpute, for the reaſons given by me, and quoted by this author. But when the preliminaries were to be ſettled, the King of Spain's claim to the reſtitution of Gibraltar reſted on an engagement, or what he took for an engagement, entered into by the late king, and under his majeſty's own hand. Beſides, this engagement, or promiſe, whether valid or not valid, had been inſiſted upon as valid, in a formal treaty, and had been made the foundation of the ſecond article in the defenſive alliance between the emperor and the King of Spain, which relates to Gibraltar. It required therefore ſomething more to put an end to a claim founded in this manner, than to a claim founded on any promiſe that my Lord *Stanhope* could make. Theſe conſiderations could never eſcape the penetration of that moſt able miniſter, who negotiated the preliminaries; and therefore I conclude, firſt, that the Spaniards would not conſent that Gibraltar ſhould be mentioned ſpecifically in the ſecond article; and, in the next place, that they could refuſe to conſent to it on no reaſon whatever, but this one, that their pretenſions to Gibraltar would be kept alive, if it was not mentioned ſpecifically, notwithſtanding the general words ſo much inſiſted upon by this writer. He has not therefore anſwered my demand; nor ſhewn "in the preliminaries an article, "which is indeed as expreſs and effectual a con-"firmation of our right to Gibraltar, as if the word "Gibraltar had been put into it." But he goes on, and

and obſerves, " that the latter part of this ſecond " article greatly ſtrengthens the former; becauſe it is " there ſtipulated, that if any thing ſhall have been " altered with reſpect to rights and poſſeſſions, or " not have been put in execution, the alteration " made, or the thing not executed, is to be diſ- " cuſſed in the congreſs, and decided according to " the tenor of the ſaid treaties and conventions;" that is, in his ſenſe, according to the tenor of the treaty of Utrecht, and of the quadruple alliance; for he mentions no other, except that of Baden, which hath nothing to do here. Now, ſays he, "nothing either as to the right of Great " Britain to Gibraltar, or to the poſſeſſion of it, " hath been at all altered; nor hath there been any " non-execution, &c." From whence he infers, that our right to Gibraltar is not included in this deſcription of points left to be diſcuſſed in the congreſs. But how could he avoid ſeeing that he aſſumes for granted the very thing diſputed? No alteration hath been made in " our right to Gibral- " tar (ſays he); therefore this right cannot be diſ- " cuſſed." An alteration hath been made in this right, ſay the Spaniards, by a private engagement taken with us in 1721; therefore this alteration is to be diſcuſſed at the congreſs. Who doth not ſee, that whether this right ſhall be found to have been altered, and what the alteration imports, are by this preliminary to be diſcuſſed and decided at the congreſs?

I think, I have now ſhewn what I undertook, and what this gentleman challenges me to ſhew; that is, I have ſhewn thoſe general words in the preliminaries, upon which the Spaniards may found a pretence for reviving their demand of Gibraltar; or, to ſpeak more properly, ſince they have never ceaſed to make it, for continuing this demand. But I have undertaken ſomething more; and therefore

fore will proceed to ſhew what this gentleman was ignorant of, or what he concealed very unfairly, becauſe it is deciſive againſt him.

I think he could hardly be ignorant that the ſecond article of the preliminaries, not only recalls the treaties of Utrecht and Baden, and the quadruple alliance, as he quotes the article, but likewiſe all treaties and conventions which preceded the year 1725; which latter words he does not quote. Perhaps, he judged them unneceſſary. If he did ſo, he was much miſtaken; for by the fifth article of the treaty of 1721, between Great Britain and Spain, it it declared, "that all the pretenſions of "both ſides, touching affairs not expoſed in the "preſent treaty, and which pretenſions are not "comprehended in the ſecond article of it," ſhall be treated of in the future congreſs; which was at that time the congreſs at Cambray. Now let it be obſerved, that the affair of Gibraltar is not one of the affairs expoſed in this treaty. Let it be obſerved alſo, that the pretenſion of the Spaniards to Gibraltar, is not one of the pretenſions comprehended in the ſecond article of it; and then let any man deny, if he can, that, in the intention of Spain, theſe words were relative to the pretenſion, which ſhe acquired by the private engagement taken in the letter ſo often quoted. If the letter gave her a right, as ſhe inſiſts, it gave her a pretenſion certainly to claim that right, and this pretenſion is carefully preſerved by the treaty of 1721. I do not ſay among other pretenſions; for I think I may venture to ſay, that all other pretenſions are ſpecified in the treaty; even that relating to the free exerciſe of the Roman Catholic religion in Minorca: and therefore theſe words ſeem to have been ſingly applied to the pretenſions of Spain on Gibraltar. Will not the Spaniards now inſiſt, upon theſe foundations, that they enjoyed, in 1721, a right to demand the reſtitution

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of Gibraltar, by virtue of conventions then made; and that the ſecond article of the preliminaries preſerves entire, to all the contracting parties, whatever rights, as well as poſſeſſions, they had by virtue of any treaty or conventions, antecedent to the year 1725; and that therefore the firſt general words of the ſecond preliminary preſerve to them the right of demanding the reſtitution of Gibraltar, as a right acquired by conventions made before the year 1725; whilſt the laſt general words of the ſame preliminary article preſerve this right as an alteration made in the treaty of Utrecht, and in the quadruple alliance?

How little weight ſoever the defender of the Enquiry may allow to theſe obſervations, which would I doubt have ſome in a congreſs, yet he muſt allow that they ought not to have eſcaped him, or to have been concealed by him; ſince they do certainly affect the merits of the cauſe on which he has ſo poſitively pronounced judgment, without any regard to them. But I am almoſt ready to aſk your pardon, Mr. *D'Anvers*, for ſaying ſo much on this point, when there is another more clear and more deciſive ſtill behind. Is it poſſible our author ſhould never have heard of a certain public inſtrument, containing a declaration explanatory of the preliminaries made by the French miniſter at the Pardo, on the fourth of March, 1728, and accepted and confirmed by himſelf, and by the Imperial, Britiſh, Spaniſh, and Dutch miniſters on the ſixth of the ſame month? If this inſtrument hath ever fallen into his hands, and it is in every body's elſe, did he never read theſe words in it—"that all pretenſions, "on all ſides, ſhall be produced, debated, and de-"cided in the ſame congreſs?" The diſputes about contrabands, and other complaints made by the Spaniards concerning the ſhip Prince *Frederic*, and the diſputes about the reſtitution of prizes, which articles

articles are taken notice of in the introduction to this inſtrument, are, by particular clauſes in it, referred to the diſcuſſion and deciſion of the congreſs. To what purpoſe then were theſe general words inſerted? To what purpoſe was it ſtipulated that all pretenſions whatſoever (among which the pretenſion of the Spaniards to the reſtitution of Gibraltar muſt neceſſarily be included; ſince, whether ill or well founded, it is ſtill a pretenſion on their ſide) ſhall likewiſe be referred to the congreſs; and that his "Britannic majeſty ſhall be obliged to ſtand to "what ſhall be decided upon the whole?" But I forbear to preſs this matter any farther upon the gentleman; ſince it would be, in ſome ſort, like ſtabbing him on the ground.

I proceed to the article of blocking up the galleons; which is the laſt upon which I am attacked in the Defence of the Enquiry. And here I muſt obſerve again, that he is very far from entering into a refutation of the arguments advanced by me to prove, that ſeizing the galleons was a meaſure liable to no objection, and in every reſpect preferable to that of blocking them up. He obſerves indeed, upon Mr *Hoſier*'s letter, that the treaſure had been taken from on board the galleons, when our ſquadron arrived before Porto Bello. Now, without making any reflections on the intelligence brought from on ſhore to the admiral, and taking it for granted, that all this treaſure was in time removed out of his reach, it will ſtill be true, that this circumſtance proves nothing in defence of the meaſure taken to block up the galleons, and not to ſeize them; ſince whether they would have the riches on board them or not, when Mr. *Hoſier* ſhould arrive, could not be known when his inſtructions were drawn. If all theſe riches had been actually at Porto Bello, when he came thither, he would have had, in effect, nothing more to ſay to the Spaniards, than what the orders they had received

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ten days before from old Spain imported; which was, that they ſhould ſecure the money in the country.

The ſingle point, inſiſted upon to juſtify this meaſure, and which the writer pronounces to be ſufficient, is that the contrary meaſure, that of ſeizing the galleons in port, with all their treaſure on board, if it had been practicable, would "have put Europe into a flame, by putting all the proprietors of "thoſe riches, whether French, Dutch or Spaniſh, "into the greateſt uneaſineſs." At the ſame time, he allows that taking theſe ſhips, if they "had attempted, by force or ſtealth, to come out, had "been reaſonable." Sure I am it is enough to ſay in reply to this, that as to the uneaſineſs which ſuch a ſeizure might have given the Spaniſh proprietors, it deſerved no conſideration; that the French and Dutch proprietors would have believed, or ought to have believed, their effects as ſecure in our hands, as in the hands of Spain; eſpecially in a point of time, when they were, by treaty at leaſt, engaged on our ſide in oppoſition to Spain; and, laſtly, that the diſtinction between ſeizing the galleons at ſea, or blocking them up in port, as if one was, and the other was not an hoſtility, is very manifeſtly a diſtinction without a difference; to prove which, I dare appeal to every man in Britain, whether he would not eſteem the hoſtility as great, and the inſult greater, if a Spaniſh ſquadron ſhould block up Portſmouth, than if it ſhould cruiſe in the channel, and take our ſhips at ſea. The gentleman cuts the diſpute ſhort, by referring us to the obſervations on the conduct of Great Britain; and I ſhall readily join iſſue with him, by referring, on my ſide, to the Craftſman Extraordinary, in which theſe obſervations are fully anſwered, and treated as they deſerved to be.

Having mentioned the galleons, our author could not avoid taking ſome notice of a queſtion I aſked, in

in anſwering *Publicola*, and which he allows to be very material. His anſwers to it deſerve a ſhort reflection or two. " Since the galleons are coming " home, hath Spain renounced thoſe deſigns, " which our fleet was ſent to the Weſt-Indies to " prevent?" Thus he ſtates the queſtion; and his anſwer is, " Truly I can't tell; nor can any one " in the world, who is not in the ſecrets of the court " of Spain." A little afterwards he aſks the ſame queſtion? " Has the King of Spain renounced his " projects?" that is, thoſe deſigns which our fleet was ſent to the Weſt-Indies to prevent? His anſwer is, " Yes undoubtedly, as far as articles ratified by " him can bind; and as far as any contracting powers " can be bound by treaty to one another." Let us ſee what is urged between the firſt and the ſecond aſking of the ſame queſtion, to produce ſuch a wide difference in the anſwers. The King of Spain hath ratified the preliminaries, in conſequence of which the ſiege of Gibraltar is raiſed. Orders are ſent to reſtore the South-ſea ſhip; and he has promiſed, that the effects of the galleons ſhall be delivered. He hath therefore renounced his projects by treaty; but whether he hath renounced them in his heart; " whether he will go on to act an open and honeſt " part," that is more than our author can tell. It is more likewiſe than any one will deſire, that he or thoſe, for whom he is an apologiſt, ſhould pretend to tell, or be anſwerable for. But let us ſee what they are anſwerable for; what has been really done by treaty; what we have obtained to make us ſome amends for the rotting of our ſhips; for the loſs of ſo many thouſand lives, and for the depredations and hoſtilities which this author founded ſo high formerly; and which were carried on with redoubled vigor, during the pacific blockade of the galleons. —The effects of the galleons are to be delivered. I congratulate

congratulate the Dutch and the French upon it; but eſpecially the latter, who have ſuch immenſe wealth on board them. Our ſhare is, I fear, a ſmall one; too ſmall to bear any proportion to the expence we have been at, or the loſſes we have ſuſtained.—Orders are ſent to reſtore the South-ſea ſhip; but the claims of the Spaniards either on that ſhip, or on any account, are preſerved to them and referred to congreſs, by whoſe deciſion we muſt abide; and nothing is ſtipulated, which may ſecure to our merchants a juſt recompence for the numberleſs ſeizures and captures of their effects and ſhips.—The ſiege of Gibraltar is raiſed; but the right to the poſſeſſion of that place hath not been effectually put beyond diſpute. The obſtinacy and the chicane of the Spaniards have prevailed ſo far, that they preſerve, even by the preliminaries, a pretence for bringing this right to be decided by the congreſs; and I ſhall be glad to hear what ally we have there, on whoſe good offices we can depend for ſecuring to us the right of poſſeſſing, and the poſſeſſion of this important place. —Upon the whole, I am extremely ſorry to find, that I was ſo much in the right, when I advanced that no man could ſay, with truth, that the main things in diſpute between us and Spain were yielded to us before the return of the galleons; unleſs he reckoned our keeping Gibraltar, and I might have added the procuring ſatisfaction to our merchants, not among the main things in diſpute, but among thoſe of leſs importance.—I ſay very ſincerely, that I had much rather have been refuted.

It appears, I think, from what hath been ſaid, that the author and defender of the Enquiry, has not only been given up by his own ſide, but even by himſelf, in ſeveral particulars; and ſeveral other points, which were inſiſted upon in the Enquiry, and have been diſputed in other writings, are either

either not mentioned at all in the defence, or in ſuch a ſlight manner as plainly ſhews the author's conſciouſneſs that he cannot ſupport them, though he is very unwilling to give them entirely up: ſo that the author gave a very partial title to his laſt production, which can be juſtly called, at beſt, a Defence only of ſome points in the Enquiry, and is, more properly ſpeaking, a "recantation of it, with a few "particular exceptions."

But now, Mr. *D'Anvers*, what ſhall I ſay to you in excuſe for ſo many and ſuch long letters? The beſt thing I can ſay, is to aſſure you, and I do it very ſolemnly, that I will trouble you with no more of them. The gentleman, to whom I have now replied, may enquire and defend, as much as he pleaſes, without any farther moleſtation from me. When I began to write on this ſubject, I meant nothing leſs than the ſilly ambition of having the laſt word in a diſpute. I ſaw, like every other man, the public diſtreſs. I thought I diſcerned the true and original cauſe of it. The affectation, which I obſerved to turn us off from this ſcent, fortified me in my opinions, and determined me to examine what was alledged againſt them. I have done ſo; and if in doing it, I have contributed in any degree to open the eyes of my countrymen, on their true, and on their miſtaken intereſts, I have obtained the ſole end which I have propoſed to myſelf. I love and I hate; I eſteem and I deſpiſe; but in a caſe of this moment, I ſhould abhor myſelf, if any regard to perſons, any conſideration, except that of truth, had guided my hand in writing.

I began by aſking pardon of this author for an injuſtice which I have done him through error, not malice; and I ſhall conclude with aſſuring him, that upon whatever principle he may have treated me, as I think I did not deſerve, I lay down my reſentment

reſentment with my pen, and remain in Chriſtian charity with him.

I return to the buſineſs of my low profeſſion in life; and if I was worthy to adviſe him, I would adviſe him to return to that of his high calling; to feed the flock committed to his charge. That I may the more effectually perſuade him to take a reſolution ſo much for his own honor, and for the advantage of the church, I will exhort him to it, in the words of the apoſtolical conſtitutions, with ſome very little variation, in order to render the paſſage more applicable.

Sit autem epiſcopus turpis lucri non quæſitor, præſertim de Gentilibus; malitque detrimentum capere, quam inferre. Non ſit avarus; non maledicus, non falſus teſtis, non iracundus, non contentioſus, non negotiis, litibuſque ſecularibus implicitus; non pro alio ſponſor, aut in cauſis pecuniariis advocatus. Non ambitioſus, non duplicis ſententiæ, non bilinguis; calumniæ & maledicentiæ non cupidus auditor; non hypocrita, fallaciis vanis non utens. Quia hæc omnia

"Let a biſhop then not "be fond of making his "court for gain, and eſpe- "cially to the Gentiles. "Let him rather receive "than do an injury. Let "him not be given to evil "ſpeaking, nor to bear "falſe witneſs. Let him "not be wrathful nor "contentious. Let him "not be engaged in the "buſineſs and diſputes of "the world. Let him not "be ready to anſwer for "others. Let him not be "the advocate of private "intereſt in public cauſes. "Let him not be am- "bitious, nor double- "minded, nor double- "tongued. Let him uſe "neither ſimulation nor "diſſimulation in his "con-

REMARKS

ON THE

HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

LETTER I.*

SIR,

SINCE the buſy ſcene of the year is over at home, and we may perhaps wait ſeveral months before the ſucceſsful negotiations of France furniſh us with new hopes of a general pacification, and give you occaſion to carry your ſpeculations forward, it may be proper enough for you to caſt your eyes backwards, to reflect on your own conduct, and to call yourſelf to account before your own tribunal.

I am ſo much perſuaded of the integrity of your intentions, that I do not in the leaſt ſuſpect you will think my advice impertinent; and therefore I ſhall attempt to lead your thoughts on this ſubject, by giving you an account of ſome parts of a con-

* As the dedication and preface, that ſtood at the head of theſe remarks, were written by another and a very inferior hand, they are therefore omitted here.

verſation, at which I happened to be preſent very lately.

Several of your papers and ſeveral of thoſe which have been written againſt you, lay before a company, which often meets, rather to live than to drink together; according to that diſtinction which *Tully* makes to the advantage of his own nation over the Greeks. They diſpute without ſtrife, and examine as diſpaſſionately the events and the characters of the preſent age, as they reaſon about thoſe which are found in hiſtory. When I came in, a gentleman was ſaying, that your victories had been cheaply bought; and that he had not ſeen one champion, able to break a launce, enter the liſts againſt you; upon which ſome were ready to obſerve the inconſiſtencies of human nature, and how hard it often proves to hire men to avow and defend even that which they are hired to act. Others were willing to hope that corruption had not ſpread very wide, nor taken root very deep amongſt us. All agreed, that if your papers could be ſuſpected to be written in oppoſition to the preſent miniſters, the feeble and low oppoſition you have met with, would deſerve to be looked upon as a very melancholy ſymptom for them; ſince it would denote that their cauſe was deemed univerſally bad; or that their perſons were grown univerſally odious among men of ſenſe, ingenuity and knowledge. It would denote their guilt, or their misfortune, perhaps both.

Here one of the company interpoſed, by obſerving very prudently, 'that any thing ſo void of probability, as not to fall even under ſuſpicion, was unworthy of farther conſideration. But, ſaid he, whatever particular views Mr. *D'Anvers* may have had, one general effect, which I cannot approve, has followed from his writings. We muſt remember that when he began to publiſh his weekly lucubrations, univerſal quiet prevailed, if not univerſal ſatisfaction; for in what place, or at

what

'what time was the laſt ever found? Few people 'enquired; fewer grumbled; none clamored; all 'acquieſced. Now the humor of the nation is al-'tered. Every man enquires with eagerneſs, and 'examines with freedom. All orders of men are 'more intent than I ever obſerved them to be on 'the courſe of public affairs, and deliver their judg-'ments with leſs reſerve upon the moſt important. 'From this alteration, for which the Craftſman is 'chiefly anſwerable, no good conſequence can, I 'think, proceed; and it is viſible that ſeveral in-'conveniencies may.'

To this many of us could by no means aſſent. We apprehended that in a country, circumſtanced like ours, and under a government conſtituted like ours, the people had a right to be informed and to reaſon about public affairs; that when wiſe and honeſt meaſures are purſued, and the nation reaps the advantage of them, the exerciſe of this right will always be agreeable to the men in power; that, indeed, if weak and wicked meaſures are purſued, the men in power might find the exerciſe of this right diſagreeable, inconvenient, and ſometimes dangerous to them; but that, even in this caſe, there would be no pretence for attempting to deprive the people of this right, or for diſcouraging the exerciſe of it: and that to forbid men to complain, when they ſuffer, would be an inſtance of tyranny but one degree below that which the triumvirs gave, during the ſlaughter and terror of the proſcriptions, when by edict they commanded all men to be merry upon pain of death.

The perſon from whom we differed, brought us back to the particular caſe of your writings, Mr. *D'Anvers*. He endeavored to ſupport what he had ſaid againſt them in this manner:

'There was no good reaſon for raiſing this ſpirit, 'which I diſlike, in the nation, when the Craftſman 'began to write, or there was ſuch a reaſon. If 'there was none, why has he given ſo much alarm?

'If there was one, how has it come to paſs that ſo 'great an alarm has produced ſo little effect? Will 'you ſay that he had very good reaſon to rouze 'this ſpirit, but that it has hitherto had no oppor-'tunity of exerting itſelf? Or will you ſay that his 'reaſons were good and the opportunity fair, but 'that the minds of men, which have been con-'vinced by the former, have not yet been determined 'to improve the latter? I obſerve on all theſe alter-'natives, that if there was no good and even preſ-'ſing reaſon to raiſe ſuch a ſpirit in the nation as I 'diſlike, (becauſe I expect no national benefit, and 'I fear much inconveniency from it) Mr. *D'An-'vers* has acted a very wicked part, and is little 'better than a ſower of ſedition.—If there was ſuch 'a reaſon, but no ſuch opportunity, he has acted a 'very weak part, and is but a ſhallow politician. '—If there was ſuch a reaſon and ſuch an op-'portunity, but no diſpoſition in the minds of 'men to follow their conviction, you may excuſe 'your favourite author, perhaps, by alledging that 'the minds of men are in the power of God 'alone; but you will repreſent our national con-'dition to be more deſperate than I ever thought 'it, or am yet willing to believe it.——Upon this 'ſuppoſition I affirm that Mr. *D'Anvers* is not to 'be excuſed, if he continues to write; for if he 'cannot raiſe this diſpoſition by perſuaſion, what 'does he aim at farther? I hope that he and you, 'who defend him, admire as much as I profeſs to 'do that divine ſaying of *Plato*: "We may en-"deavor to perſuade our fellow citizens; but it is "not lawful to force them even to that which is "beſt for them."

Whilſt all this paſſed, I took notice that an antient venerable gentleman ſhewed more emotion, and greater impatience than I remembered to have ſeen him ever expreſs before. As ſoon as the other had

had concluded, he broke ſilence in the following manner:

'You have endeavoured to prove, Sir, that the 'Craftſman ſhould not have begun to write; or at 'leaſt that he is inexcuſable for continuing. Now 'I not only differ from you, but I differ from you 'upon the very foundation on which you have 'eſtabliſhed that whole argument.

'The face of things was, I agree, as calm as 'you repreſent it to have been, when my honeſt 'contemporary *Caleb* took up his pen. They were 'halcyon days truly. We were not only quiet, but 'we ſeemed implicit, and dull uniformity of eternal 'aſſent prevailed in every place. I agree that, ſince 'that time, things are very much altered. A fer- 'ment, or ſpirit, call it which you pleaſe, is raiſed; 'but, I bleſs God, it is not the blind and furious 'ſpirit of party. It is a ſpirit, which ſprings from 'information and conviction, that has diffuſed it- 'ſelf not only to all orders of men, as you obſerved, 'but to men of all denominations. Even they 'who act againſt it, encourage it. You cannot 'call it toryiſm, when ſuch numbers of indepen- 'dent whigs avow it. To call it whigiſm would 'be improprer likewiſe, when ſo many tories con- 'cur in it. He, who ſhould call it jacobitiſm, 'would be too abſurd to deſerve an anſwer. What 'is it then? It is, I think, a revival of the true 'old Engliſh ſpirit, which prevailed in the days of 'our fathers, and which muſt always be national, 'ſince it has no direction but to the national in- 'tereſt; "eſt jam una vox omnium;" and I hope 'we ſhall never have occaſion to add, "magis odio 'firmata quam præſidio."

'This ſpirit the Craftſman has contributed to 'raiſe; and I affirm, in my turn, that ſuppoſing 'him to have no other reaſon for raiſing and ſupport- 'ing it, than a general obſervation of the contrary

'temper

'temper into which the nation had fallen, he de-
'ſerves the acknowledgments of every honeſt man
'in Britain, for the part he has acted. The diſ-
'pute between us is thus reduced to one ſingle propo-
'ſition; and if I prove this, all your reaſoning,
'Sir, falls of courſe to the ground.

The other aſſented; the ſtate of the diſpute was fixed; and the old gentleman proceeded in his argument to this effect:

'Give me leave to borrow, upon this occaſion,
'an image which my Lord *Bacon* employs, in one
'of his Eſſays, upon another. A people who will
'maintain their liberties, muſt pray for the bleſſing
'of *Judah*, to avoid the fate of *Iſſachar*, the greateſt
'curſe which can befal them. Far from jogging
'on ſilently and tamely, like the aſs between two
'burthens, ſuch a people muſt preſerve ſome of
'the fierceneſs of the lion, and even make their
'roar to be heard like his, whenever they are in-
'jured, or ſo much as threatened.

'I do not mean to recommend your ſeditious,
'rebellious ſpirit, which will create a perpetual
'ſcene of tumult and diſorder, and expoſe every
'ſtate to frequent and dangerous convulſions.
'Neither would I be thought to approve even that
'popular peeviſhneſs of temper, which ſometimes
'prevails, ſo as to diſcompoſe the harmony of the
'ſeveral orders of government. But this I aſſert,
'that liberty cannot be long ſecure, in any country,
'unleſs a perpetual jealouſy watches over it, and a
'conſtant determined reſolution protects it in the
'whole body of the nation. The principle muſt
'be permanent and equal. The exerciſe of it
'ought to be proportioned to the occaſions. The
'hundred eyes of *Argus* were not always kept
'open; but they were never all cloſed. The whole
'body of a nation may be as jealous of their liber-
'ties, as a private man of his honor. They may

be,

'be, at all times, animated by a generous reſolu-
'tion of defending theſe liberties at any riſque;
'as he may, at all times, feel in his heart the cou-
'rage of venturing his life to maintain his honor.
'But as there is no neceſſary conſequence from this
'private character to that of a quarrelſome bully;
'ſo neither is there any neceſſary conſequence from
'the public character I have recommended to that
'of a factious, rebellious people.

'Liberty is a tender plant, which will not flou-
'riſh unleſs the genius of the ſoil be proper for it;
'nor will any ſoil continue to be ſo long, which is
'not cultivated with inceſſant care. "Variæ illu-
"dunt peſtes; miſchiefs of various kinds abound;"
'and there is no ſeaſon, in the revolution of the
'great political year of government, when we can
'ſay, with truth, that liberty is entirely free from
'immediate or remote danger.

'In every kind of government ſome powers muſt
'be lodged in particular men, or particular bodies
'of men, for the good order and preſervation
'of the whole community. The lines which cir-
'cumſcribe theſe powers, are the bounds of ſepa-
'ration between the prerogatives of the prince, or
'other magiſtrate, and the privileges of the people.
'Every ſtep, which the prince, or magiſtrate, makes
'beyond theſe bounds, is an encroachment on li-
'berty, and every attempt towards making ſuch a
'ſtep, is a danger to liberty.

'Thus we ſee how great a truſt is repoſed in
'thoſe to whom ſuch powers are committed; and
'if we look into the heart of man, we ſhall ſoon
'diſcover how great, though unavoidable a temp-
'tation is laid in their way. The love of power is
'natural; it is inſatiable; almoſt conſtantly whetted;
'and never cloyed by poſſeſſion. If therefore all
'men will endeavor to encreaſe their power, or at
'leaſt to prolong and ſecure the enjoyment of it,

'according

'according to the uncertain meaſure of their own 'paſſions, and not according to the ſtated propor- 'tion of reaſon and of law; and if neither one 'nor the other of theſe can be attempted without 'a danger to liberty; it follows undeniably that, 'in the nature of things, the notion of a perpe- 'tual danger to liberty is inſeparable from the very 'notion of government.

'That theſe principles are true, will appear evi- 'dent from practice and experience, as well as from 'ſpeculation. All forms of government ſuppoſe 'them to be ſo; and in ſuch as are not abſolute 'monarchies we find the utmoſt precautions, which 'their ſeveral inſtitutions admit, taken againſt this 'evil; from hence that rotation of employments 'in commonwealths; the annual or other more 'frequent elections of magiſtrates; and all thoſe 'checks and controls, which the wiſdom of legiſ- 'lators, prompted by experience, has invented.

'In perfect democracies theſe precautions have 'been taken in the higheſt degree; and yet even 'there they have not been always effectual. They 'were carried ſo far in the Athenian form of go- 'vernment, that this people ſeemed more in dan- 'ger of falling into anarchy than tyranny; and yet 'one of their magiſtrates found means to become 'their tyrant, and to tranſmit this power to his 'ſucceſſors.

'In mixed governments, the danger muſt ſtill 'be greater. Such a one we may juſtly reckon 'that of Rome, as well during the regal as repub- 'lican ſtate; and ſurely no hiſtory can be more 'fruitful in examples of the danger to which liberty 'ſtands expoſed from the natural, and therefore 'conſtant deſire of amplifying and maintaining 'power, than the Roman hiſtory is, from the laſt 'of the kings to the firſt of the emperors.

'A monarchy, limited like ours, may be placed, 'for aught I know, as it has often been repreſented,

'juſt

'juſt in the middle point; from whence a deviation 'leads on one hand to tyranny, and on the other 'to anarchy; but ſure I am that if we are ſituated 'juſt in the middle point, the leaſt deviation is the 'more cautionally to be guarded againſt. Liberty 'would be ſafer, perhaps, if we inclined a little 'more than we do to the popular ſide.

'It may be ſaid, and I would anticipate the ob-'jection, that if we are thus placed, our care 'ought to be exerted equally againſt deviations on 'either ſide; and that I am the more in the wrong 'to appear ſo apprehenſive of thoſe on one ſide, 'and ſo little apprehenſive of thoſe on the other; 'becauſe even our own hiſtory might have ſhewn 'us, that deviations to the popular ſide have coſt us 'at leaſt as dear as ever thoſe to the other ſide can 'be pretended to have done. But let it be con-'ſidered,

'Firſt, that as far as theſe national calamities, 'hinted at in the objection, have been the un-'avoidable conſequences of methods neceſſary to 'ſecure or retrieve liberty, it is infamous to repine 'at them, whatever they have coſt.

'Secondly, that the caſes compared together, 'and ſuppoſed in this objection to be equal, are 'not ſo. I may ſafely appeal to every impartial 'reader of our hiſtory, whether any truth he col-'lected from it ever ſtruck him more ſtrongly than 'this; that when the diſputes between the king 'and the people have been carried to ſuch extremes, 'as to draw national calamities after them, it has 'not being owing primarily to the obſtinacy and 'weak management of the court, and is therefore 'unjuſtly charged on the juſt ſpirit of liberty. In 'truth a ſpirit of liberty will never deſtroy a free 'conſtitution; a ſpirit of faction may. But I ap-'peal again, whether thoſe of our princes, who 'have had ſenſe and virtue enough to encourage the 'one, have had any thing to fear from the other.

'Now

'Now if experience ſhews, as I am perſuaded it 'does, that the prerogative and power of a prince 'will never be in any real danger when he invades, 'neither openly nor inſidiouſly, the liberties of his 'people; the ſame experience will ſhew that the 'liberties of a people may be in very real danger, 'when, far from invading the prerogative and 'power of the prince, they ſubmit to one, and are 'even ſo good as to encreaſe the other. The rea-'ſon of this difference is plain. A ſpirit of fac-'tion alone will be always too weak to cope with 'the legal power and authority of the crown; and 'the ſpirit of liberty, in the whole body of the 'people, which contradiſtinguiſhes this caſe from 'the other, may be raiſed by the fear of loſing; 'but cannot be ſo raiſed by the hopes of acquiring. 'The fear is common to all; the hope can only be 'particular to a few. The fear therefore may be-'come a general principle of union; the hope 'cannot.

'But if a national ſpirit cannot be any other 'than a defenſive, and therefore unprovoked, an 'harmleſs, inoffenſive ſpirit; that of a prince can-'not, without due coercion, be kept within the 'ſame bounds; for here the tables are turned; and 'the hope of acquiring, which can never be a com-'mon principle among the multitude, to unite and 'carry them into action, becomes an almoſt irre-'ſiſtible motive to the prince; who, by yielding 'to it, indulges the moſt powerful paſſions of the 'ſoul; who finds many to ſhare the difficulties and 'dangers of the enterprize with him; and who 'ſhares the prize with none.

'Generally and abſtractedly ſpeaking, therefore, 'as public liberty is more expoſed under mixed go-'vernments, than under perfect democracies; ſo 'is it more expoſed under limited monarchies than 'under any other form of mixed government.

'What

'What encreaſes the danger to liberty in this caſe 'is, that the opportunity of invading it, which lies 'open to a ſovereign prince, ſuits almoſt any cha- 'racter. The powers intruſted to other magiſtrates, 'as in a commonwealth, are ſubject to immediate 'controuls, the exerciſe of them is ſubject to fu- 'ture reviſions, and is limited to a ſhort time; ſo 'that if ſuch magiſtrates invade liberty, with any 'proſpect of ſucceſs, it can only happen, when 'they are able to compenſate for the diſadvantages 'of their political circumſtances, by the greatneſs 'of their perſonal qualifications, by ſuperior under- 'ſtanding and ſuperior courage, by a great if not a 'good character, and by the appearance of virtue 'at leaſt. Few men therefore are fit for ſuch an 'undertaking.

'But the ſovereign prince, who rules in a limited 'monarchy, has an opporunity opened to him for 'life; and ſuch an opportunity as requires no extraor- 'dinary perſonal qualifications. He may poſſeſs every 'vice or weakneſs, which is oppoſed to the virtues 'or appearances of virtue, requiſite in the other 'caſe, and yet may deſtroy the liberty of the brav- 'eſt people upon earth. The pretences for conceal- 'ing his deſigns, and the helps for carrying them on, 'which his ſituation affords above that of any ma- 'giſtrate in a commonwealth, will abundantly com- 'penſate for the diſadvantages ariſing from his per- 'ſonal character, and will ſecure his ſucceſs, if the 'people are brought, by artifice or accident, to 'grow remiſs in watching over their liberties. 'Every man is therefore fit for ſuch an undertaking. 'If theſe general reflections evince that liberty muſt 'always be in ſome degree of danger under every 'government; and that this danger muſt encreaſe in 'proportion as the chief powers of the ſtate are en- 'truſted in fewer hands and for longer terms; then 'liberty is always in ſome degree of danger; and

'that

'that not the leaſt, even under our excellent conſti-
'tution; then the neceſſity of keeping this jealous
'ſpirit, the true guardian of public liberty, always
'alive and active in this nation, is manifeſt; then
'the obſervation of our being fallen into the con-
'trary temper is alone a ſufficient reaſon to juſtify
'Mr. *D'Anvers* for joining his endeavors to awaken
'us from our political lethargy; then, ſir, my pro-
'poſition is proved, and your reaſoning falls to the
'ground.'

This diſcourſe furniſhed matter of much reflection to the company; ſome objections were made; ſome doubts were propoſed; and ſome explanations aſked for. I ſhall not trouble you with all theſe particulars, but ſhall conclude my letter, by relating to you in what manner the old gentleman replied, and by his reply wound up the converſation of the evening.

'I believe, gentlemen, ſaid he, that we do not
'differ ſo much as ſome of you ſeem to imagine:
'for, firſt, though I deſire the veſſel of the com-
'monwealth may ſail ſafely, yet I deſire it may ſail
'ſmoothly too; and though I muſt think, till I hear
'better reaſons to the contrary, that public liberty
'cannot be ſo eaſily attacked, and may be more eaſily
'defended, in a perfect democracy, or in a mixed
'republic, than in a limited monarchy; yet will it
'not follow neceſſarily from hence, as has been
'ſuppoſed, that I prefer the two firſt to the laſt of
'theſe forms of government. On either ſide there
'are compenſations; and if liberty may be better
'defended in the former, yet ſtill it may be defend-
'ed, and domeſtic quiet is perhaps better preſerved
'in the latter.

'Secondly, if I agree with the gentlemen who
'have inſiſted ſo much on the little reaſon which
'there was in the late reign, or is in the preſent,
'to apprehend any encroachments from the crown

'on

'on the Britiſh liberties; theſe gentlemen muſt, 'I think, agree with me likewiſe, that this will not 'alter the caſe; ſubvert what I have endeavoured 'to eſtabliſh; or derive any blame on thoſe who 'have endeavored to revive that public ſpirit of 'watchfulneſs over all national intereſts, which is 'the proper and true guardian of liberty, in an age 'when that public ſpirit has more than begun to 'ſink and die away. I hope there will be always 'men found to preach this doctrine in ſeaſon 'and out of ſeaſon, as the apoſtles preached the 'goſpel; becauſe if this ſpirit is not kept at all 'times in vigor, it may fail us at ſome particular 'time, when we ſhall want to exert it moſt. In 'great and immediate danger, the moſt ſluggiſh 'centinel is alert; but ſurely they who, in times of 'apparent ſecurity, excite us to be upon our guard, 'do as real ſervice as they who animate us to our 'defence when we are actually attacked; and the 'firſt is, in my opinion, that kind of ſervice of 'which we ſtand the moſt in need. I confeſs freely, 'that I ſhould not apprehend ſo much danger to li-'berty in times of ſuſpicion, if I ſaw that neither 'power could ſubdue, nor artifice divert, nor puſil-'lanimity oblige men to abandon this ſpirit; as I 'ſhould apprehend in times of apparent ſecurity, if 'I obſerved it to be loſt. In a word, no laws, no or-'ders of government, can effectually ſecure liberty 'any longer than this ſpirit prevails, and gives 'them vigor; and therefore you might argue as 'reaſonably for repealing any law, or aboliſhing 'any cuſtom, the moſt advantageous to liberty, and 'which you cannot be ſure of reſtoring at your 'pleaſure, becauſe you feel no immediate want of 'it; as you have argued for letting this ſpirit die 'away, which you cannot be ſure of reviving at 'your pleaſure, becauſe you perceive no immediate 'occaſion for the exerciſe of it.

'I hope

'I hope that I have ſaid enough to give me a 'right to conclude in this manner; and if I was to 'deſcend into particular applications of the general 'truths which I have advanced, I think that no 'doubt whatever could remain in any of your 'minds upon this ſubject.'—After this, our company broke up. If the ſame ſubject is reſumed when they meet again, or on any other, which I judge proper to be communicated to you, it is highly probable that you will hear again from

Your admirer,

friend and ſervant, &c.

LETTER

LETTER II.

SIR,

THE ſame company hath met, and the ſame ſubject hath been reſumed; ſo that I think myſelf under an obligation of writing to you again.

The perſon who gave occaſion to all that was ſaid in your defence the other day, ſeemed very deſirous that the converſation ſhould be purſued at our laſt meeting; and therefore as ſoon as we ſate down, he addreſſed himſelf thus to the old gentleman who had fought your battle.

'Sir, ſaid he, I own myſelf a good deal reconciled to the Craftſman by the diſcourſe you held, when we were laſt together. That ſome inconveniences muſt follow from keeping this ſpirit of jealouſy and watchfulneſs always alive, ſeems to me very evident; but I begin to think that this evil may be neceſſary, in order to ſecure us againſt greater. Every ſyſtem of human invention muſt be liable to ſome objections; and it would be chimerical in us to expect a form of government liable to none. Even theocracy was attended by ſome real inconveniencies, according to the Jewiſh hiſtories; and neither the divine preſence in the tabernacle, nor the ambulent oracle, which the prieſt carried about with him, could preſerve entire purity in religion, or good order in the ſtate. We muſt be content therefore to

'bear

'bear the diſorder I apprehend from that ferment, 'which a perpetual jealouſy of the governors in the 'governed will keep up, rather than abandon that 'ſpirit, the life of which is the life of liberty. 'When the jealouſy happens to be ill-placed, we 'may hope it will not riſe to any great and danger- 'ous height. When it happens to be well-grounded, 'it may have the good effect of deſtroying a wicked 'miniſter, of checking a bad, or of reclaiming a 'miſguided prince.

'You ſee, ſir, that my converſion is pretty far 'advanced; and if you will pleaſe to deſcend into 'particular applications of the general doctrines you 'delivered, as you gave us reaſon to hope that you 'would, it is very probable that the few doubts 'I have ſtill may be removed.'

The reſt of the company ſeconded the requeſt. The good old gentleman yielded to our common deſires, and ſpoke to the following effect:

'The general truth I am to prove by particular 'examples is this;—that liberty cannot be preſerved 'long by any people, who do not preſerve that 'watchful and jealous ſpirit of liberty, on the ne- 'ceſſity of which I have inſiſted. If you are once 'convinced of this truth, you will know what opi- 'nion to entertain of thoſe who endeavor to extin- 'guiſh this ſpirit, and of thoſe who do all they can 'to keep it alive.

'There are two other general truths relative to 'this, which I ſhall eſtabliſh likewiſe by particular 'examples, as I go along.

'One is this: that the ſpirit of liberty, far from 'inſpiring that raſhneſs and undiſtinguiſhing fury 'which are peculiar to the ſpirit of faction, is ſlow 'to act even againſt the worſt princes, and exerts 'itſelf in favor of the beſt with more effect than any 'other ſpirit whatever.

'The ſecond is this: that how ſlowly ſoever the 'ſpirit of liberty may act in ſuſpicious times and 'againſt incroaching governors; yet if it be kept 'alive, it will act effectually ſooner or later, though 'under the greateſt diſadvantages, and againſt the 'moſt powerful oppoſition; in a word, in the 'moſt deſperate caſes.

'The firſt of theſe truths will recommend this 'ſpirit to every good prince and honeſt miniſter. 'The other will encourage every man who is a 'friend to liberty, never to abandon the cauſe 'through deſpondency of ſucceſs, as long as he 'ſees this ſpirit prevail, or even ſubſiſt.

'Having fixed theſe principal points of view, 'let us proceed: and though I would not adviſe 'you to admit the works of *Machiavel* into your 'canon of political writings; yet ſince in them, 'as in other apocryphal books, many excellent 'things are interſperſed, let us begin by improving 'an hint taken from the diſcourſes of the Italian 'ſecretary on the firſt decade of *Livy*.

'He obſerves that, of all governments, thoſe 'are the beſt, which by the natural effect of their 'original conſtitutions are frequently renewed or 'drawn back, as he explains his meaning, to 'their firſt principles; and that no government 'can be of a long duration, where this does not 'happen from time to time, either from the 'cauſe juſt mentioned, or from ſome accidental 'cauſe.

'The reaſon is obvious. There muſt be ſome 'good in the firſt principles of every government, 'or it could not ſubſiſt at all; much leſs could 'it make any progreſs. But this good degene-'rates, according to the natural courſe of things; 'and governments, like other mixed bodies, tend 'to diſſolution by the changes which are wrought

'in the ſeveral parts, and by the unaptneſs and 'diſproportion, which reſult from hence through-'out the whole compoſition.

'The moſt effectual, and indeed the ſole me-'thod of maintaining their health and prolonging 'their life, muſt therefore be to bring them back 'as near and as frequently as poſſible to thoſe prin-'ciples, on which their proſperity, ſtrength and 'duration were originally founded.

'This change, or renewal of the ſtate, hath 'been ſometimes wrought by external cauſes, as 'it happened at Rome, upon the invaſion of the 'Gauls. The Romans had departed from their 'antient obſervances. The ceremonies of reli-'gion and the laws of juſtice were neglected by 'them. An enemy, whom they deſpiſed and pro-'voked, conquered them. The impreſſions made 'by this dreadful calamity brought them back to 'their firſt inſtitutions and to their primitive ſpirit. 'They ſprung up from this ſecond original, as '*Livy* calls it, with new vigor, and roſe to greater 'fame, power and dignity than ever.

'But not to dwell on ſuch examples, as point 'out to us rather the puniſhment of vice, than 'the means of reformation, let us obſerve that 'this change, or renewal of the ſtate, is oftener 'and better wrought by internal cauſes.

'Many excellent inſtitutions were contrived in 'framing the Roman government, which ſerved to 'maintain in force the firſt principles of that political 'ſyſtem. Such were the regulations about elec-'tions; the laws againſt bribery; and many other 'written laws, or confirmed cuſtoms. Such again 'was the conſtitution of the ſenate, in whom the 'majeſty of the commonwealth reſided, and whoſe 'authority controled the licentiouſneſs of the peo-'ple. Such was the erection of that ſacred, tri-

'bunitial

'bunitial power, whoſe prerogatives ſerved to 'check the uſurpations of the magiſtrates, and 'who could arreſt with one word, even the pro-'ceedings of the ſenate. Such was the office of the 'cenſors, whoſe inquiſitions and luſtrations cor-'rected abuſes, reformed manners, and purged 'the ſenate itſelf of corrupt and unworthy mem-'bers.

'Theſe laws, theſe cuſtoms, theſe different or-'ders, controling one another, and promoting the 'general good of the commonwealth, had great 'effect during ſome centuries. But this effect 'could never have followed them at all, if the 'ſpirit of liberty, which had enacted theſe laws, 'eſtabliſhed theſe cuſtoms, and formed theſe or-'ders, had not continued. The very beſt laws 'are a dead letter, nay, often a grievance, unleſs 'they are ſtrenuouſly and honeſtly executed. They 'never can be ſo executed, unleſs the ſpirit of them 'poſſeſs thoſe to whom the execution of them is 'committed; and it would be ridiculous to ex-'pect to find this ſpirit in the magiſtrates, and 'the ſeveral orders of the ſtate, unleſs it appeared 'in the body of the people, out of whom theſe 'magiſtrates are choſen, and theſe orders com-'poſed.

'The examples which *Machiavel* cites to ſhew, 'that the virtue of particular men among the Ro-'mans, did frequently draw that government back 'to its original principles, are ſo many proofs that 'the duration of liberty depends on keeping the 'ſpirit of it alive and warm. Such examples were 'frequent in Rome, whilſt this ſpirit flouriſhed. 'As it decayed, theſe examples became more rare 'and failed at laſt entirely. The old laws and cuſ-'toms were, for the moſt part, ſtill in being. 'The forms of electing magiſtrates, and of pro-'mulgating laws were in the main obſerved. There

'was ſtill a ſenate. There were ſtill cenſors and 'tribunes. But the ſpirit of liberty being ſtifled 'by that of faction and cabal, and the ſeveral or-'ders of the government being tainted by the ge-'neral corruption, theſe good laws and cuſtoms 'remained without force, or were ſuſpended, or 'were abrogated, or were perverted to ſerve the 'purpoſes of private ambition and avarice.

'The time-ſerving flatterers of princes and mi-'niſters have no point, amongſt all the nauſeous 'drudgery impoſed on them, which they are 'obliged more to labor than that of repreſenting 'all the effects of a ſpirit of liberty as ſo many ef-'fects of a ſpirit of faction. Examples might be 'found, even without ſearching long or looking 'far after them, when this hath been done againſt 'the public ſenſe of a whole nation, and ſome-'times in favor of a cabal, neither numerous nor 'conſiderable enough to be called a party. But 'ſtill it will remain eternally true, that the ſpirit 'of liberty and the ſpirit of faction are not only 'different, but repugnant and incompatible: ſo 'that the life of either is the death of the other.

'We muſt not imagine that the freedom of the 'Romans was loſt, becauſe one party fought for 'the maintenance of liberty; another for the 'eſtabliſhment of tyranny; and that the latter pre-'vailed. No. The ſpirit of liberty was dead, and 'the ſpirit of faction had taken its place on both ſides. 'As long as the former prevailed, a Roman ſacri-'ficed his own, and therefore no doubt every other 'perſonal intereſt, to the intereſt of the common-'wealth. When the latter ſucceeded, the intereſt 'of the commonwealth was conſidered no other-'wiſe than in ſubordination to that particular in-'tereſt which each perſon had eſpouſed. The prin-'pal men, inſtead of making their grandeur and 'glory conſiſt, as they formerly had done, in that

'which

'which the grandeur and glory of the common-
'wealth reflected on them, conſidered themſelves
'now as individuals, not as citizens, and each
'would ſhine with his own light. To this purpoſe
'alone they employed the commands they had of
'armies, the governments of provinces, and the
'influence they acquired over the tribes at Rome,
'and over the allies and ſubjects of the republic.
'Upon principles of the ſame kind, inferior per-
'ſons attached themſelves to theſe; and that zeal
'and induſtry, nay, that courage and magnanimity,
'which had been exerted formerly in the ſervice of
'the commonwealth, were exerted by the ſpirit of
'faction, for *Marius*, or *Sylla*; for *Cæſar*, or *Pom-*
'*pey*.

'It is plain that the liberty of Rome would not
'have been irretrievably loſt, though *Cæſar* had
'finiſhed the civil war with abſolute ſucceſs, and
'was ſettled in power, if the ſpirit of liberty had
'not been then loſt in the whole body of the peo-
'ple; if the Romans had not been as ripe for ſla-
'very, as the Cappadocians were fond of it; for
'I think the Cappadocians were the people who de-
'ſired that a prince might be ſet over them, and
'refuſed to be a free people.

'I cannot believe that thoſe who murdered *Cæſar*,
'took ſuch puerile meaſures as *Cicero*, who was
'not let into the ſecret, pretended that they had
'taken, when he ſaw the conſequences of their
'action. But in this they erred. They killed
'their benefactor; at leaſt he was ſuch to the
'greateſt part of them; and renewed the civil war,
'in order to reſtore liberty to a people, who had
'loſt the ſpirit of liberty, and who would not take
'it when it was offered to them. Even in the ſenate,
'*Octavius* had a party; *Anthony* had a party; but
'the commonwealth had none. In ſhort, the freeſt
'people upon earth, by ſuffering the ſpirit of liberty

'to

'to decay, and that of faction to grow up, became 'ſlaves to ſuch a ſucceſſion of monſters, continued 'with very few exceptions from the reign of *Au-* 'guſtus to the deſtruction of the empire, as God 'never ſent in his wrath to execute vengeance on 'any other nation.

'Thus I have endeavored to illuſtrate and con- 'firm the firſt general propoſition laid down, by a 'ſummary application of it to the Roman ſtory. I 'have not explained by what degrees, and by what 'means one of theſe ſpirits gradually decayed, and 'the other grew up. The ſubject is fine, and the 'taſk would be pleaſant; but it is unneceſſary to 'our preſent purpoſe. We ſee enough at this time, 'if we ſee that in the greateſt revolution of the 'greateſt government of the world, loſing the ſpirit 'of liberty was the cauſe, and loſing liberty was 'the effect.

'If now we bring theſe conſiderations home, we 'ſhall find not only the firſt general propoſition, but 'the others relative to it, illuſtrated and confirmed 'through the whole courſe of our annals. I ſhall 'make a deduction of ſome of theſe particulars. 'To deduce them all would exceed my ſtrength 'and your patience.

Here one of our company interrupted the old gentleman's diſcourſe, by ſaying that ſince we were come to a kind of pauſe, he deſired leave to make an obſervation, which he thought pertinent and material, on what had been ſaid, before we went into any new matter.—'The difference and oppoſition 'between a ſpirit of liberty and a ſpirit of faction, '(continued he,) hath been juſtly ſtated. A ſpirit 'of liberty will be always and wholly concerned 'about national intereſts, and very indifferent about 'perſonal and private intereſts. On the contrary, 'a ſpirit of faction will be always and wholly con- 'cerned about theſe, and very indifferent about the 'others. When they appear therefore in their pro-

'per

'per characters, they are diſtinguiſhed as eaſily as 'light and darkneſs; and the danger I apprehend 'is over.

'But faction puts on the maſk of liberty; and 'under this falſe appearance, diſputes her being 'even with liberty herſelf. Now here, methinks, 'a great many dangers ariſe; the danger of miſ-'taking when it is ſo hard to diſtinguiſh; the dan-'ger of being bubbles and tools of faction, whilſt 'we fancy ourſelves aſſertors of public liberty; the 'danger of continuing under this deluſion, till it 'is too late to prevent ſuch miſchiefs as we never 'intended to bring on our country. The ſpirit of 'faction may take, and, I doubt not, hath often 'taken poſſeſſion of numbers, who meant to enter-'tain no other ſpirit than that of liberty; for num-'bers have not the diſcernment of ſpirits. This 'poſſeſſion may continue, and, in fact, I believe it 'hath continued very often, till faction hath ac-'compliſhed or ſecured the accompliſhment of her 'ends. I made this obſervation, which reſults na-'turally from what hath been ſaid, and inſiſt upon 'it, becauſe if faction could not lie latent under the 'moſt ſpecious and popular pretences imaginable, 'there would be no great need of putting us on 'our guard againſt it; and becauſe if it can lie 'thus latent and concealed, we may be expoſed to 'the dangers I have mentioned, which ſide ſoever 'of the queſtion we take in political diſputes. At 'this time, to ſpeak as I think, the caſe is ſo clear 'on one ſide, that no man who adheres to it, hath 'the leaſt pretence left him to ſay that he purſues 'the public intereſt, or is directed in his conduct 'by the generous, diſintereſted ſpirit of liberty.

'I could ſupport my aſſertion by many proofs, 'if it was neceſſary in this company. One I will 'mention for its ſingularity; and it is this.

'We have ſeen and heard, in a nation hitherto 'free, ſuch maxims avowed and pleaded for, as are

'inconſiſtent with all the notions of liberty. Cor-
'ruption hath been defended, nay, recommended,
'as a proper, a neceſſary, and therefore a reaſon-
'able expedient of government; than which there
'is not, perhaps, any one propoſition more repug-
'nant to the common ſenſe of mankind and to uni-
'verſal experience. Both of theſe demonſtrate
'corruption to be the laſt deadly ſymptom of ago-
'nizing liberty. Both of them declare that a peo-
'ple abandoned to it, are abandoned to a reprobate
'ſenſe, and are loſt to all hopes of political ſalva-
'tion.

'The dependence of the legiſlative on the ex-
'ecutive power hath been contended for by the
'ſame perſons, under the ſame direction; and yet
'nothing ſurely can be more evident than this;
'that in a conſtitution like ours, the ſafety of the
'whole depends on the balance of the parts, and
'the balance of the parts on their mutual indepen-
'dency on one another: agreeably to which *Thua-*
'*nus* makes *Ferdinand* ſay, in anſwer to the Caſti-
'lians, who preſſed him to take away the indepen-
'dency of the ſtates of Arragon; "Æquilibrio
"potentiæ regni regiſque ſalutem publicam conti-
"neri; & ſi contingeret aliquando alterum alteri
"præponderare, proculdubio alterius aut utriuſ-
"que ruinam ex eo ſecuturam; that the public
"ſafety depends on the equal balance of the
"power of the king, and of the power of the
"kingdom; and that if ever it ſhould happen that
"one outweighed the other, the ruin of one, or
"of both, muſt undoubtedly follow."

'On one ſide then the maſk is pulled off. The
'weak may be ſeduced to concur; the ſtrongeſt
'may be forced to ſubmit; but no man can be any
'longer deceived.

'On the other it muſt be acknowledged that the
'appearances are extremely fair. True notions of
'liberty and good government are profeſſed and
'purſued.

'purſued. Our grievances are complained of; our 'dangers are foretold, not only thoſe which all 'men feel or ſee, but thoſe which are more remote 'from obſervation. In ſhort, the ſpirit of liberty, 'ſuch as it hath been deſcribed, ſeems to breathe 'from this quarter, and to diffuſe its influences over 'the nation.

'As I am a lover of my country and of liberty, 'I have rejoiced in this. I rejoice in it ſtill; and 'yet I confeſs freely, that I took ſome umbrage at 'a paper, which came out not long ago. The 'deſign and tendency of it ſeemed to me to favor 'the cauſe of a faction; and of a faction, how-'ever contemptible in its preſent ſtate, always to 'be guarded againſt. The paper I mean is *Fog's* 'Journal of the ſixth of June: where you have 'ſeen a ridiculous ſpeech, ſuppoſed to be made by 'General *Monk*, and tranſlated, as the author ſays, 'from *Leti's* hiſtory of *Oliver Cromwell.*

'If this wretched production had appeared in '*Miſt's* Journal, I ſhould have felt neither ſur-'prize nor concern. That writer never wore ſo 'much as the maſk of liberty; and ſhewed his game 'ſo plainly, that whatever he got by faction, fac-'tion could get nothing by him. But *Fog*, who 'writes incomparably better, hath appeared to write 'with a much better deſign. Thoſe who are warmeſt 'in the national intereſt, without regard to perſons, 'and independently of all factions, have made this 'judgment of him; and therefore I was ſurpriſed 'and concerned to find that he expoſed himſelf even 'once, or in any degree, to the ſame reproach that 'was frequently and juſtly made to his predeceſſor.'

The gentleman's obſervation gave occaſion to much diſcourſe. Our old ſage deſired it might be remembered that he had not undertaken the defence of every weekly writer, though he had undertaken yours, Mr. *D'Anvers*. 'The paper (continued he)

'which

'which hath been ſo much mentioned, is a very ſilly 'paper, to whatever purpoſe it was deſigned.

'If it was deſigned to inſpire an horror of thoſe 'miſeries from which the reſtoration delivered the 'nation, it was a very ſuperfluous work at this 'time, when there is no real or pretended diffe-'rence of opinion upon that head amongſt us. 'Thoſe who do not go to church upon the twenty-'ninth of May, nor on any other day, will agree 'with thoſe who do, in this point, upon better au-'thority than that of *Leti*, and for better reaſons 'than thoſe which are contained in the fooliſh de-'clamation attributed to *Monk*.

'If it was deſigned to make us commemorate the 'reſtoration of the two brothers, *Charles* and '*James*, as a national bleſſing in itſelf, and inde-'pendently of the other conſideration, the project 'was equally ridiculous. The flattery beſtowed up-'on theſe princes, whilſt they were in exile, might 'paſs, and many things concurred to make it paſs. 'But to talk in the ſame ſtile to mankind at this 'time, when they have both ſat on our throne, 'when ſo many of us remember both what they 'did, and what they would have done, is contemp-'tible to the laſt degree.

'If it was deſigned for more modern application, 'and to raiſe a ſpirit amongſt us in favor of the 'pretender, the project was too fooliſh to have 'been hatched at home. It muſt have been im-'ported from abroad. What jacobite can be ſan-'guine enough to hope that his cauſe ſhould re-'vive, when he beholds the heroical king and 'queen, who fill our throne, auſpicious parents of 'a numerous progeny of young heroes and heroines, 'riſing up to emulate their virtues, and to gladden, 'like them, the Britiſh nation.

'This ſingle conſideration might be ſufficient to 'damp the hopes of any jacobite who lives at home, 'and is a witneſs of all this glory. But however

'I ſhall

'I ſhall mention another, which ought to have its 'weight likewiſe, and which will have more per- 'haps amongſt ſome people. The ſpirit of jaco- 'bitiſm is not only gone, but it will appear to be 'gone in ſuch a manner as to leave no room to ap- 'prehend its return, if we reflect that it hath died 'away, whilſt all that could be done to keep it alive 'was doing by thoſe who profeſſed it, and by thoſe 'who valued and recommended themſelves on their 'oppoſition to all the effects of it; if we conſider 'the numbers of people who have abandoned this 'intereſt, notwithſtanding the utmoſt provocations 'to the contrary.

'In ſhort, I perſuade myſelf that if the preten- 'der had no rival in the throne, inſtead of having 'there one ſo formidable as our moſt auguſt mo- 'narch, yet his way to the throne would not be 'more open to him. The whole bulk of the peo- 'ple hath been brought by the revolution, and by 'the preſent ſettlement of the crown, to entertain 'principles which very few of us defended in my 'younger days. The ſafety and welfare of the 'nation are now the firſt and principal objects of 'regard. The regard to perſons and to families 'hath been reduced to the ſecond place; and it 'holds even that but under the direction of the for- 'mer. Can any man believe that a people brave 'enough to diſpoſe of their crown for the greateſt 'national advantage, even when the throne was 'full, will ever diſpoſe of it as long as the ſpirit of 'liberty remains amongſt them, for the greateſt 'national miſchief, if the throne ſhould be empty?

'There is but one deſign more, which I can 'conceive to have given occaſion to this ſilly paper; 'but one quarter more, from which it could poſſi- 'bly come: and theſe gueſſes, perhaps, will not 'appear the leaſt probable. Might it not be de- 'ſigned to inſtil a jealouſy of jacobitiſm, and to preju-

'dice

'dice mankind againſt all writings which thoſe who 'are offended at them cannot anſwer? Might it not be 'deſigned to furniſh the ſpruce, pert orator, who 'ſtrewed ſome of his flowers in the Daily Courant 'of the eleventh of June, with an hint, which he hath 'moſt happily and modeſtly improved? "*Fog*, ſays "he, avows jacobitiſm; the Craftſman concurs in "the ſame deſign; nay, every jacobite in England "ſinks his maſter's divine right in the popular topics "of debts, taxes and "corruption." So that jaco-'bitiſm may now be imputed upon this authority, to 'ninety-nine in an hundred of the whole nation; 'for ninety-nine in an hundred do complain of 'debts, taxes and corruption. I am ſure there is 'arrogance and impertinence both in ſuch an inſi-'nuation too groſs to be denied; whereas the 'Craftſman may deſtroy the whole proof brought 'againſt him of arrogance, by anſwering three ſilly 'queſtions in the negative.

'If this was the deſign, I will be bold, for bold 'it may juſtly ſeem, to ſay that this expedient is, at 'leaſt as bungling and likely to prove as ineffectual, 'as any that have been produced by the ſame great 'genius who contrived it; for if we were in-'clined to believe that the Craftſman, *Fog*, or any 'other perſon, carries on the meaſures of faction 'under the maſk of liberty; ſhould we believe it 'on the credit of thoſe who oppoſe them, and who 'are notoriouſly influenced to write, though under 'ſpecious pretences of promoting loyalty to the 'king, and an acquieſcence in his majeſty's mea-'ſures, yet, in reality, for no other ſervice than 'that of a ſmall number of men; nay, ſtrictly 'ſpeaking, of a ſingle man? With what face can 'ſuch writers impute faction to any one living 'or dead?

'Let them be aſſured that we can examine and 'judge for ourſelves; and that neither the Craftſman

'nor

'nor *Fog*, would be able, if they went about it,
'to impoſe upon us any more than they themſelves
'have been able to do.

'The pretty author, I juſt now mentioned, be-
'gins his eſſay with airs of wit, and ends it with
'airs of wiſdom. What pity is it that he ſhould
'ſucceed in neither? In his firſt paragraph he re-
'preſents the Craftſman, with curious impropriety,
'as a magician who conjures up ſpirits; as a dog
'who barks at a diſtance; as a little inſect who nib-
'bles at a character: and my friend *Caleb* was
'all theſe things, it ſeems, at the ſame inſtant.
'After this ſpecimen of writing, we may expect to ſee
'him compared in ſome other production of the ſame
'author to a bird, and made to fly different ways
'and in different places at once.

'But let us leave the wit, and come to the wiſ-
'dom; which will bring us back to our ſubject.

'In the laſt paragraph of this elaborate piece,
'the author ſets the example of my Lord *Falkland*
'and others before our eyes; who ſtrengthened, as
'he ſays, the republican party ſo long, "that when
"they found out their deſigns and forſook them, it
"was too late to prevent them." After this, he
'calls moſt charitably on ſeveral well-meaning per-
'ſons to take warning; for ſome, whom he allows
'to be ſuch, he thinks in danger of being drawn
'in to favor the purpoſes of thoſe whom he calls
'oppoſers of our government.

'Behold this little *Gamaliel* in cathedra! Obſerve
'the ſcholars he places at his feet for inſtruction!
"Riſum teneatis amici?" Can the graveſt of you
'forbear laughter?

'When we come to apply the general propoſi-
'tions laid down ſtill more particularly to the Eng-
'liſh than we have done to the Roman hiſtory, I

'ſhall

'ſhall ſhew you perhaps that this author, like moſt 'other fine men, treaſures up in his memory the ob-'ſervations he meets with in hiſtory, inſtead of 'making his own upon the examination and com-'pariſon of the facts and characters he finds there; 'and that the example he hath choſen will come out 'againſt the very purpoſe he hath applied it to. 'In the mean time, let us obſerve that the alarm, 'which hath been taken by ſome of this company, 'and I ſuppoſe by others, at the publication of that 'ſtupid paper in *Fog*'s Journal, ſhews how little 'reaſon there is to apprehend that thoſe who are 'actuated by the ſpirit of liberty, and purſue the 'national intereſt, ſhould be impoſed upon by the 'ſpirit of any faction.

'The ſpirit of liberty is a jealous ſpirit; and fac-'tion is equally the object of its jealouſy, whether 'the views of faction be directed in favor of the 'crown, or againſt it. I make this diſtinction here, 'though I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more fully 'upon it hereafter, becauſe I perceive that we are 'apt to confine our idea of faction to ſuch men and 'ſuch meaſures as are in oppoſition to the men in pow-'er, and to the meaſures they take; whereas in truth 'a number of men in power, who exerciſe it ſolely 'for their own private advantage and ſecurity, and 'who treat the nation as their farm, or rather as a 'country under contribution to them, let them ſhel-'ter themſelves under what authority they pleaſe, 'are as much a faction as any number of men, who 'under popular pretences endeavor to ruin, or at 'leaſt to diſturb, the government, that they may 'raiſe themſelves.

'If the ſpirit of liberty were extinguiſhed, as it is 'diſcouraged, the ſpirit of ſome faction or other 'would no doubt prevail; but this would not

'ſucceed

'ſucceed under the maſk of liberty. There would 'be, in ſuch a caſe, no need of wearing this diſ-'guiſe. Men would avow faction. They would chuſe 'that which ſuited their intereſt beſt; and indeed it 'would be of no great moment which they choſe.

'But if the ſpirit of liberty, which begins to re-'vive in this country, becomes prevalent, there 'will remain nothing to fear from any faction what-'ever, whether maſked or unmaſked. Whilſt it is 'maſked, and the inſtruments or members of it pur-'ſue the national intereſt, though they intend ano-'ther, the bad principle is however ſo far productive 'of good, and the cauſe of virtue is ſo far promoted 'by vice itſelf. When it comes to be unmaſked, 'and the inſtruments or members of it are hurried 'by indiſcretion, or forced by the courſe of events, 'as they muſt be, to ſhew their game, faction is 'that moment diſarmed. The diſtinction marked, 'the ſeparation follows of courſe; and thoſe who 'eſpouſe the cauſe of the nation will find themſelves 'doubly ſtrengthened by the aſſiſtance which fac-'tion gave them at one time, and by the oppoſition 'ſhe makes to them at another. In ſhort, gentle-'men, the ſpirit of jacobitiſm may crawl about and 'ſkulk in corners. The ſpirit of the other faction 'may roll in gilded ſpires, and with erected creſts 'in every public place, and hiſs and threaten and 'caſt its venom around; but the ſpirit of li-'berty, like the divine rod of *Aaron*, will devour 'all the ſerpents of the magicians.

'I ſee therefore no cauſe to fear that we may 'be drawn in to ſerve the purpoſes of faction, whilſt 'we purſue the cauſe of liberty; and if we ſuffered 'ourſelves to be drawn off from this purſuit by the 'jealouſy which one faction endeavors to give us 'of another, we ſhould be arrant bubbles in-'deed. *Fog* is not to be defended for publiſhing a

'paper

'paper liable every way to blame, and capable of 'no excuſe; but if he hath hurt any body by it, he 'hath hurt himſelf; and the weight which is laid 'upon it by thoſe on one ſide, who perhaps writ 'it, is as ridiculous as the project of thoſe who 'thought to advance the jacobite cauſe by it, if 'it came from that ſide.

Here the old gentleman broke off, and though he was preſſed to reſume the diſcourſe he had begun, when this interruption happened, he deſired to be excuſed, becauſe it was late, and promiſed to comply with our requeſt upon ſome other occaſion. If he keeps his word, as I am perſuaded he will, you ſhall hear again from,

Sir, yours, &c.

LETTER

LETTER III.

SIR,

OUR old gentleman having kept his word with the company, I deſigned to have kept mine with you; but ſome buſineſs calling me into the country, I ſend you a few minutes of the converſations which have paſſed, in hopes that the ſubject will not be left imperfect for as long a time as my affairs may oblige me to be abſent. Throw theſe minutes into what form and make what uſe of them you pleaſe. They are deſigned to ſerve an honeſt cauſe; the cauſe of truth and of liberty. You have eſpouſed it, and I hope will purſue it.

You are able to do this with ſucceſs, even in oppoſition to the moſt plauſible writers; and how much more againſt the curſory obſervator, who appeared in the Daily Courant, and the London Journaliſt?

I do not ſuppoſe you will think it worth your while to ſet ſeriouſly about anſwering them; but it may be worth while, now and then, to ſhew them how little they deſerve to be anſwered.

They complain heavily of the prolixity and dulneſs of the letters which you have publiſhed. Might they not be taught, what they have already taught the world, that an eſſay of two or three columns may be longer than an eſſay of five or ſix? Let them not carp at my words, ſince they cannot miſtake my meaning.

Might they not be convinced that they are the leaſt competent judges in the whole nation, of the dulneſs of others, for this plain reaſon: that it is not in the caſe of dulneſs, as it is in that of wit and learning; in which he is the beſt judge of theſe qualities in others, who poſſeſſes them himſelf in the moſt eminent degree?

But there is a judge, before whom all productions of this ſort are tried, and by whoſe ſentence alone they muſt ſtand, or fall. This judge is the public; and I am apt to think that theſe authors may be informed of the ſentence pronounced by the public on your papers, Mr. *D'Anvers*, and on their own, if they will take the trouble to enquire of Meſſieurs *Roberts*, *Peele*, and *Francklin*.

I am even inclined to believe that they have enquired; and that, deſpairing of ſucceſs before this tribunal, they have appealed to another, where thoſe whom the public rejects, are pretty ſure of being received.

Sure I am that they cannot hope to ſucceed any where elſe, whilſt they found their merit on Billingſgate, falſe quotations, groſs miſrepreſentations, and an eternal begging of the queſtion.

That they are guilty of all theſe may be ſoon proved. I will point out ſome inſtances; as many as the haſte I am in allows me time to mention.

The Curſory Obſervator accuſes you and me (for theſe writers are pleaſed to ſuppoſe us to be the ſame perſon who correſponds with himſelf) of quoting falſely and applying fooliſhly in every caſe, whilſt he quotes falſely himſelf, and ridicules the application of what, it is manifeſt, he never read.

head. His whole charge is built on a lie and a blunder.

Machiavel is made, according to him, in one of my letters, to ſuppoſe "that the firſt deſtruction "of Rome by the Gauls (and I never heard of a "ſecond) was a judgment from heaven on the "people for their having departed from their antient "obſervances and religious ceremonies.—" With this he makes himſelf wonderfully merry; and having heard that *Machiavel* did not paſs for a very ſtrong believer, he ridicules the imputation of ſuch a ſuppoſition to that great politician.

But let this ſcribbler learn to read, before he blots any more paper. Let him learn to ſpeak of what is, or is not in books, after he hath looked into thoſe books, and not from his idle imagination of what an author would, or would not have ſaid, agreeably to the character of the author, which his ignorance hath taken upon truſt.

My old gentleman never ſaid that *Machiavel* ſuppoſed the deſtruction of Rome by the Gauls was a judgment from heaven; but he reckoned amongſt other particulars in which the Romans had begun to degenerate, and to which they were brought back by this great misfortune, that of neglecting the ceremonies of religion and the laws of juſtice. Now *Machiavel* does ſay this in expreſs and ſtrong terms, as this writer would have known, if he had conſulted the firſt chapter of the third book of his diſcourſes on *Livy*.

But I will tell him ſomething more. This very *Machiavel* * hath written a whole chapter concerning the religion of the Romans; in which he mentions that Rome was more obliged to *Numa* than

* L. 1. c. 11.

to *Romulus*; in which he ſhews that her grandeur and felicity were owing to her religion; nay, he aſſerts in general, that as religion raiſes commonwealths, ſo the contempt of it muſt ruin them. "Good Gods! is this talking like *Machiavel?*— Why truly it is thus that *Machiavel* talks; and in talking thus he ſhews more learning and ſenſe than the Obſervator is maſter of.

Caſt your eye, Mr. *D'Anvers*, on the next paragraph; in which this able perſon undertakes to prove from reaſon, as well as hiſtory, a matter of fact. The fact is this: that the deſtruction of Rome by the Gauls, was owing to the oppoſition ſet on foot to the meaſures and perſon of the great and much injured *Camillus*.

It was a great miſtake, it ſeems, to mention this incident in the Roman hiſtory, in one of my letters. The obſervator ſhall find that it was a greater blunder in him to dwell upon it.

He knows as little of *Livy* as he does of *Machiavel*, or I believe of any other good author. Let him turn to the Roman hiſtorian. He will find that *Livy*, in the tranſition which he makes from the proſecution of *Camillus* to the invaſion of the Gauls, ſays "that if there be any "thing certain in human affairs, Rome could "not have been taken, if that citizen had re- "mained in it." But does he attribute the invaſion of the Gauls to this man's baniſhment? No. He attributes it to the conduct of three raſh and fooliſh brothers, who were ſent ambaſſadors to the Gauls, and who, by breaking the law of nations, juſtly provoked this people. He attributes it to the force of a faction, which prevailed to ſcreen theſe criminals, and expoſed the ſtate to ruin, rather than give him up to juſtice.

Thus

Thus the fact ſtands in hiſtory. Let the Obſervator now conſider whether it would be very difficult to make certain applications of it, which he would not like. I doubt theſe applications would appear much more appoſite than that which is ſaid to be intended in his paper, of the character of the great and much injured *Camillus*.

He ſucceeds, you ſee, but ill, when he meddles with facts; and I do not find that he pretends much to reaſon. The reſt of his paper contains little more than fool, knave, libeller, incendiary, &c. I ſhall therefore take notice of but one thing more; and that is the advantage he would make of a miſtake in printing.

He muſt have perceived, or he can perceive nothing, that it was a miſtake in printing. If the meaning of my letter had been, that the Craftſman might deſtroy the whole proof of arrogance brought againſt him, by anſwering in the negative all the queſtions aſked in the paragraph referred to, it ſhould have been ſaid "five ſilly queſtions;" for they are five, not four; but the truth is, that no regard was had to the two introductory queſtions; and that the three main queſtions which follow, were alone meant. A writer muſt be reduced very low, by his cauſe, or be very low in his character, who catches at ſuch an impertinent opportunity of being what he imagines ſmart.

I ſhould ſay a word or two to the profound Mr. *Oſborne*, who hath been pleaſed to let us know that he prefers the abſolute monarchy of *Auguſtus* to the free ſtate of the Roman commonwealth. He prefers likewiſe, I ſuppoſe, at leaſt his diſcourſe leads one to think ſo, the violence, the treachery, and the bloody maſſacres, on which this abſolute monarchy

narchy was founded, to the civil diſorders, which were occaſioned by eſtabliſhing and maintaining an equal commonwealth. I ſhould deſire him to compare the reigns of a *Caligula*, a *Nero*, a *Domitian*, an *Heliogabalus*, which had never happened, if the uſurpation of *Auguſtus* had never happened, with the glorious fourth and fifth centuries of the republic of Rome; but I have not, at preſent, time for this. I hope you, Mr. *D'Anvers*, will give him ſome ſalutary correction at your leiſure, and make him aſhamed of having prophaned the language of a free people in ſo proſtitute a manner, and to ſuch ſlaviſh purpoſes! Adviſe him to learn better notions of government from Mr. *Gordon*'s excellent diſcourſes, prefixed to his tranſlation of *Tacitus*; in which he will find his favorite *Auguſtus* ſet in a true light, and proved to be an infamous tyrant, though ſomewhat more artful than his ſucceſſors. He muſt certainly acknowledge the obligation; ſince you cannot be ſuſpected of doing it on any account, but that of a charitable diſpoſition towards him. If he was capable of impoſing on the dulleſt Quidnunc in any coffee-houſe, or of ſeducing the moſt raw boy that ever eloped from ſchool, you might be ſuſpected of ſome farther and deeper deſign; but when you write againſt ſo harmleſs a creature, your efforts muſt paſs, and ought to paſs, for the pure effects of the moſt diſintereſted, the moſt refined charity.

Let me only aſk the favor of you to touch three points, amongſt others, whenever you condeſcend to meddle with Squire *Oſborne*. One is to aſſure him in my name, and, if you pleaſe, in your own, that a good miniſter ought not to be abuſed; nay, more, that he who abuſes him, is a rogue, a raſcal, and an impudent (I had almoſt ſaid, for I conform to his dialect, a traiterous) fellow; and might have juſtified

juſtified myſelf by the authority of a writer on Mr. *Oſborne*'s ſide, who talked of allegiance to miniſters: but let this important author know, at the ſame time, that we defy him to make the leaſt uſe of theſe conceſſions againſt any one ſentence, any one word in any Craftſman that hath been publiſhed.

There are two other things, of which I deſire you likewiſe to take notice. One is ſcandalouſly impudent; the other infamouſly unfair.

When his patron is commended by any honeſt man in Britain, it is done moſt certainly with a ſneer. The "great man" is an expreſſion which hath undoubtedly occaſioned more ſneers than this nation had ſeen in a century before; but it is ſaucy and impudent in Mr. *Oſborne* to ſuppoſe that one, who ſpeaks of the king and royal family with all the reſpect that is due to them, means a ſneer.

The other thing, which I deſire you to take notice of, is the malicious and mean comment made on an expreſſion in my laſt letter to you, where I called his preſent majeſty a formidable rival of the pretender. Mr. *Oſborne* is pleaſed, out of the abundance of his loyalty, to reſent this as an inſult on the king. Now though, in ſtrictneſs of fact and propriety of language, his majeſty neither is a rival to any body, nor can have a rival, being our rightful and lawful king, by the conſent of his people in parliament, the only good title to the crown of theſe realms; yet in pretenſion there is a rivalry; and I may defy Mr. *Oſborne* to give any other reaſon for keeping up ſo large an army in times of peace.

You will obſerve, Mr. *D'Anvers*, that the only deſign of this letter is to make ſome ſhort obſervations on two ſilly papers which have been publiſhed againſt my former letters to you. You are now

deſired

desired to apply the old gentleman's general positions to the English history, from the minutes which I have sent you, and which I believe will be as agreeable to the public, as it was to the company in which he delivered it.

I am, SIR,

Your friend and reader, &c.

REMARKS

REMARKS

ON THE

HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

LETTER IV.

FEW nations have gone through more revolutions, few governments have appeared more unſteady, or fluctuated more between prerogative and privilege, than this of Great Britain.

If we are freemen, it is becauſe the ſpirit of liberty has been never yet quite extinguiſhed among us.

We have been ſurpriſed, betrayed, forced, more than once, into ſituations little better than that of downright ſlavery. But theſe uſurpations have not become ſettlements. They have diſordered the frame, but not deſtroyed the principles, of a free government. Like cloudy mornings, they have ſoon paſſed over, and the ſun of liberty has broke out again with double force and double luſtre.

It

It muſt be a pleaſure to reflect on that uniformity of ſpirit, which created and has conſtantly preſerved or retrieved the original freedom of the Britiſh and Saxon conſtitutions.

I feel a ſecret pride in thinking that I was born a Briton; when I conſider that the Romans, thoſe maſters of the world, maintained their liberty little more than ſeven centuries; and that Britain, which was a free nation above ſeventeen hundred years ago, is ſo at this hour.

However ſavage our Britiſh anceſtors may be repreſented by the Romans, whom the luxury of Greece and the effeminacy of Aſia had already corrupted, they certainly were a people of ſpirit and of ſenſe; who knew the ends of government, and obliged their governors to purſue thoſe ends.

Cæſar himſelf acknowledges that they fought boldly for their liberties, when he invaded them; and there is good reaſon to believe, from his manner of writing and abrupt way of leaving this iſland, that they gave him a warmer reception than he is willing to own.

But to ſpeak of them after an author, in whoſe time they were better known than they were by *Cæſar*, or even by *Tacitus*; *Dion Caſſius*, when he is about to relate the expedition of *Severus* into Britain, ſays, "that they held a great part of the "government in their own power."

Their long reſiſtance againſt the Saxons ſhews their love of civil liberty.

Their long reſiſtance againſt the uſurpations of the church of Rome, begun by *Gregory*, that flatterer of *Phocas* and *Brunehault*, under pretence of converting the Saxons, ſhews their love of eccleſiaſtical liberty.

Though

Though the Saxons ſubmitted to the yoke of Rome, in matters of religion, they were far from giving up the freedom of their Gothic inſtitutions of government.

The Saxon heretoges, that is, public generals, were choſen only to conduct them in war, not to rule over them in war and in peace.

Theſe heretoges, among the German colonies, who ſettled in the countries they conquered, and founded new governments, became kings, and had trappings enough to ſet off their majeſty, and to enforce their authority; but the ſupreme power centered in the micklemote, or wittagenmote, compoſed of the king, the lords, and the Saxon freemen, that original ſketch of a Britiſh parliament.

Here all important affairs were treated. The conduct of their kings was examined in it, and controuled by it.

The rights of the people in thoſe days, muſt have been carried to a very great height; ſince they went hand in hand with thoſe of the church; and ſince a poſitive law declared, that if the king did not defend both, he ſhould loſe even the name of king. "Nec nomen regis in eo conſtabit, verum "nomen regis perdit."

The principles of the Saxon commonwealth were therefore very democratical; and theſe principles prevailed through all ſubſequent changes.

The Danes conquered the crown, but they wore it little; and the liberties of the Saxon freemen they never conquered; nor wrought any alteration in the conſtitution of the government.

Thus much it was thought neceſſary to premiſe, concerning the original conſtitution of our government.

ment. We now come to that period of hiſtory, from whence we propoſe to deduce our following remarks.

WILLIAM, the Norman, is come down to us in hiſtory under the character of a conqueror; and though it may be diſputed whether he was ſtrictly ſo any more than ſeveral other princes who have ſupported their titles by their ſwords, yet we may confeſs that he impoſed many new laws and cuſtoms; that he made very great alterations in the whole model of government; and that he, as well as his two ſons, ruled upon many occaſions, like abſolute, not limited monarchs.

Yet neither he nor they could deſtroy the old conſtitution; becauſe neither he nor they could extinguiſh the old ſpirit of liberty.

On the contrary, the Normans and other ſtrangers, who ſettled here, were ſoon ſeized with it themſelves, inſtead of inſpiring a ſpirit of ſlavery into the Saxons.

They were originally of * Celtic or Gothic extraction, call it which you pleaſe, as well as the people they ſubdued. They came out of the ſame northern hive; and therefore they naturally reſumed the ſpirit of their anceſtors, when they came into a country where it prevailed.

* We have thought fit to explain the expreſſion in this place, though we know the word Celtic, as well as Scythian, hath been uſed in the ſame large and general ſenſe, which is made uſe of here; and we could ſhew, if ſuch a trifle deſerved it, that by the Celtæ antiquity did not always underſtand the people inhabiting a part of Gaul, notwithſtanding the quotations out of *Polybius*, *Diodorus*, &c. which have been urged, by way of cavil, againſt us.

Stephen,

Stephen, the fourth king of this race, owed his crown to the good will of the nation; and he owed this good will to the conceſſions he made in favor of liberty.

John came to the crown after the death of his father *Henry* the Second, and his brother *Richard* the Firſt, by the election of the people. His electors, indeed, found themſelves deceived in their expectations; for he governed in the moſt extravagant manner. But they ſoon made him feel whoſe creature he was. The conteſts between the laity and an ambitious uſurping clergy ran very high at this time. *John* had made his advantage of theſe diviſions. But the ſpirit of liberty prevailed, and that of faction vaniſhed before it. Men grew aſhamed of being the tools of private ambition, when public ſafety, was at ſtake. Thoſe of the high church and thoſe of the low church united in one common cauſe. The king bluſtered and drew out his army; but it was a Britiſh army. No wonder therefore, if the king ſubmitted, and Magna Charta was ſigned.

It was ſigned again by his ſon and ſucceſſor, *Henry* the Third, in full parliament, and with the greateſt ſolemnity. The people however abated nothing of their jealous, watchful ſpirit; and it was well for liberty they did not. The long reign of this prince was one continual ſtruggle between him and them. The iſſue of this ſtruggle was favorable to the latter. By exerting their ſtrength, they encreaſed it under *Henry* the Third. They loſt no ground under *Edward* the Firſt, and they gained a great deal under *Edward* the Second.

Thus was the preſent conſtitution of our government forming itſelf for above two centuries and an half; a rough building raiſed out of the demolitions which

which the Normans had made, and upon the ſolid foundations laid by the Saxons. The whole fabric was cemented by the blood of our fathers; for the Britiſh liberties are not the grants of princes. They are original rights, conditions of original contracts, co-equal with prerogative, and co-æval with our government. As ſuch, in the days we ſpeak of, they were claimed; as ſuch they were aſſerted by force of arms; as ſuch they were acknowledged; and as ſuch they were conſtantly maintained afterwards by that pertinacious ſpirit, which no difficulties nor dangers could diſcourage, nor any authority abate; not even that of the pope, as impudently as it was exerciſed, and as fooliſhly as it was revered in thoſe ſuperſtitious ages.

Had this ſpirit relaxed in the courſe of ſo many years, our government muſt have ſettled in an abſolute monarchy, or tyrannical ariſtocracy.

The Norman kings of imperious tempers, aſſumed great power. The barons did the ſame. The people groaned under the oppreſſion of both. This union was unnatural and could not laſt. The barons, enjoying a ſort of feudatory ſovereignty, were often partners and ſometimes rivals of the kings. They had oppoſite intereſts, and they ſoon claſhed.

Thus was the opportunity created of re-eſtabliſhing a more equal free government than that which had prevailed after the Norman invaſion.

The kings, the barons, and the clergy, not leſs ambitious or avaricious than either of the others, had powerful means of promoting their uſurpations. The commonalty had little or no ſhare in the legiſlature; made no figure in the government; and it is hard to conceive how they could act,

acts, as the others might, and certainly did by particular concerts, to the advancement of their particular intereſts.

All theſe diſadvantages were ſupplied by that ſpirit of liberty, which diffuſed itſelf through the whole maſs. Numbers were on the ſide of the commons. In all diſputes therefore it was neceſſary to apply to them. They made the proper uſe of ſuch conjunctures. Whoever loſt, they were ſure to be gainers; for ſo they deemed themſelves, when they ſuffered all the hardſhips of war, and even laid down their lives in the quarrel, if they left liberty more improved and better ſecured to their poſterity.

By conceſſions to the commons, our kings maintained and extended their prerogatives over the barons. By eſpouſing the national intereſt, the barons continued able to cope with the crown, till they broke among themſelves. Nay, even the church, notwithſtanding that antient and cloſe alliance between ſecular and eccleſiaſtical tyranny, was forced, on ſome few occaſions, to be a friend to the liberties of the people.

The king, the barons and the clergy, were all, in reality, enemies to public liberty. Their party were ſo many factions in the nation; yet they all helped, in their turns, to eſtabliſh liberty.

So true it is, that every thing, even the vices of mankind, and the misfortunes of a country, will turn to the advantage of liberty, where the ſpirit of it is maintained in vigor; as every thing, even the good qualities of mankind and the proſperity of a country may operate a contrary effect, where this ſpirit is ſuffered to decline.

As

As loſing the ſpirit of liberty loſt the liberties of Rome, even while the laws and conſtitutions, made for the preſervation of them, remained entire; ſo we ſee that our anceſtors, by keeping this ſpirit alive and warm, regained all the advantages of a free government, though a foreign invaſion had deſtroyed them, in great meaſure, and had impoſed a very tyrannical yoke on the nation.

LETTER

LETTER V.

WE are now come to the reign of *Edward* the Third. We muſt deſire our readers to ſtop here, and at the reign of his ſucceſſor a little; ſince no reigns can furniſh us with more memorable and pertinent examples, to ſhew how the ſpirit of liberty exerts itſelf in favor of good princes; how ſlow it is to act even againſt the worſt; and yet how effectually it is able to act, even in the moſt deſperate caſes.

Old *Froiſſart* ſays, * that the Engliſh had an opinion, grounded on obſervations made from the days of good King *Arthur*, that between two valiant and able princes in this nation, there always intervenes a king "moins ſuffiſant de ſens & de proueſſe; of "leſs ſenſe and courage." I ſhall not warrant the exact truth of this obſervation. The proportion, I fear, is much greater on the worſt ſide in all kingdoms. But certainly *Edward* the Third, whoſe ſtory gave occaſion to *Froiſſart* to broach this anecdote, ſtands between his father *Edward* the Second, and his grandſon *Richard* the Second, a bright inſtance of this truth, that "great and good princes "are favorers of liberty, and find their account in "promoting the ſpirit of it; whilſt the weakeſt and "the worſt princes chiefly affect abſolute power, "and often meet with the fate they deſerve for ſuch "attempts."

The former know that they have nothing to apprehend from this ſpirit; and they wiſely prefer the generous efforts of good will and affection to the reluctant compliances of ſuch as obey by force.

* Vol. i. c. 2.

The latter, conſcious that they are unable to lead, endeavor to drive their people. Unworthy to be kings, they ſtruggle to be tyrants.

Few were the blemiſhes which may be thought to tarniſh the luſtre of this reign of *Edward* the Third. Few and ſhort were the ſtruggles between him and his people; for as he was fierce and terrible to his enemies, he was amiable and indulgent to his ſubjects. He not only obſerved the laws, but he made the ſenſe of the nation, in ſome meaſure, a law to him. On this principle, in which, to a conſidering mind, there will appear as much wiſdom as goodneſs, he removed a ſon, nay, a favorite miſtreſs, from court.

Henry the Fourth, if I miſtake not, did ſomething of the ſame kind; and which of their ſucceſſors, after ſuch examples, could preſume to think it below his dignity to conſult the inclination of his people, and make them the rule of his conduct?

Under this great prince, the conſtitution of our parliaments, and the whole frame of our government became reduced into a better form. A ſpirit of liberty breathes in the laws of this glorious king: and the power and duty of parliaments are ſet forth, in ſome of them, with ſuch terms as would never have been paſſed by a prince who had put the leaſt pedantry, or the leaſt foppery, into his notions of kingſhip.

The ſpirit of liberty was not idle in this reign, though it had little or no occaſion of exerciſe againſt the crown. The uſurpations of the church were many and grievous. They had been long murmured againſt; but a falſe reſpect for religion had hitherto maintained them. This deluſion began now to be removed. *Wickliffe* aroſe to diſpel this magic charm; to undraw the veil of this pretended ſanctuary; and to expoſe the horrors and trifles which lurked behind it, to public view, indignation and contempt.

The

The ax was now firſt aimed at the root of popery; and prelates were taught the firſt leſſons of moderation. Parliaments ſat and proceeded on buſineſs, even on eccleſiaſtical buſineſs, without the intervention of mitres. There was, I believe, one parliament held, to which few or none of the prelates were ſummoned; in order, perhaps, to teach them how little their concurrence was eſſential to give due weight to the counſels, or full authority to the acts of parliament.

As this prince loved, inſtead of hating, as he encouraged, inſtead of diſcountenancing, the ſpirit of liberty in his people; ſo he was ſtrengthened and ſupported by it in ſuch a manner and in ſuch circumſtances as cannot be paralleled.

The nation had been miſerably haraſſed by civil wars and oppreſſions of various kinds, when he came to the crown. The burthen of perſonal ſervice, and the taxes raiſed to defend the dominions which his predeceſſors held on the continent, had exhauſted all degrees of people. This miſchief was ſo much reſented by them, that foreign intereſt and foreign counſels may be juſtly reckoned among the principal cauſes of all the diſputes, and even wars, between them and their former kings.

In this ſituation and in this temper of mind was the nation, when *Edward* the Third, by laying cl: n to the crown, and undertaking the conqueſt of France, opened to his ſubjects the terrible proſpect of being worſe than ever oppreſſed by the ſame grievances; and yet his nobility and commonalty ſeconded him in all theſe enterprizes, with fewer complaints than could have been expected. Theſe men, ſo apt to complain of grievances, and ſo little patient under them, carried him triumphantly through all his wars abroad, though they ſtruggled with want, peſtilence and famine at home.

What principle produced this wonderful change? Did higher notions of prerogative prevail? Had the doctrines of a ſlaviſh ſubmiſſion at once poſſeſſed our anceſtors? By no means. It was not the power, it was not the authority of the king, which forced; but it was the character of the man, which invited to theſe compliances. The ſpirit of liberty exerted itſelf in favor of the patron of liberty.

A corrupt parliament, a degenerate nobility, a ſervile commonalty, will ſacrifice any thing to any prince; to a *Richard* the Second, or an *Edward* the Third, equally and indiſcriminately. But a free, a generous, a virtuous people, ſuch as we may boaſt our anceſtors were in thoſe days, will ſacrifice every thing, except liberty, to a prince like *Edward* the Third, and liberty is a ſacrifice which a prince like him will never require at their hands. To him who would require it, they would ſacrifice nothing. Such a people may be well governed with eaſe; and it ought to be hard to govern them ill. They will do more for a prince whom they love and eſteem, than he has a right to expect from them. If they do leſs for a prince whom they deſpiſe or hate, they are ſurely very excuſable.

In order to render this example ſtill ſtronger and more uſeful, it may be proper to point out, beſides his general character, ſome of thoſe particulars in the conduct of *Edward* the Third, which probably induced his people to ſacrifice their eſtates, and their lives too, ſo cheerfully in a cauſe, to which, under other princes, they had been ſo averſe.

In the firſt place, as his father *Edward* the Second loſt his crown and his life, in the moſt miſerable manner, by ſuffering himſelf to be governed by his miniſters, and protecting them from the reſentments of the people; ſo his ſon very early exerted his own authority, and freed himſelf from the gurdianſhip, or rather ſubjection, of the queen and *Mortimer*, who

who had long oppreſſed the nation, and diſhonored the young king by their ſcandalous conduct.

The next reaſon ſeems to have been this: Though he was magnificent in his court, yet he limited, with great care, the exactions of his purveyors, kept a ſevere hand over them, and ſuffered no more to be levied on his people, than what the neceſſary expence of his houſehold required. He ſaved for his people, not for himſelf.

Thirdly, The taxes laid in his time, were laid for viſible and important ſervices, wherein the honor at leaſt of the nation was concerned; which every man knew and approved.

Fourthly, The expences were leſſened by that double œconomy, which is ſo rarely found, or even underſtood. I mean not only that inferior œconomy, which conſiſts in the management of the receipts and iſſues of the public revenue; but that ſuperior œconomy, which conſiſts in contriving the great ſchemes of negotiation and action. When the talents for this œconomy are wanting in thoſe who govern, the public pays for their want of genius; and the prince's or miniſter's errors, are ſo many additional taxes on the people. When theſe talents are not wanting, the very reverſe happens. The genius of the prince, or miniſter, comes in aid of the public charge. Much is ſaved; and art and management ſupply it all.

Edward the Third began his war againſt France, in conjunction with German allies. He ſaw no better expedient at that time. But as ſoon as fortune and intrigue had procured it for him, he took another, ſhorter, cheaper, and more effectual method. He ſupported the Earl of *Monfort*, competitor with *Charles* of Blois, for the dutchy of Brittany. "Avecques les Allemans, & les Barbançons, "ſays *Froiſſart*, il n'avoit riens fait, ſors deſpendre "groſſement; & l'avoit mené & demené les ſiegeneurs

" neurs de l'empire, qui avoient prints ſon or & ſon " argent, ainſy qu'ills avoient voulu, & reins fait. " Si deſcendit à la requeſte du comte joyeuſement, " &c." That is, " with the Germans and the " Barbançons, all he had been able to do was to " ſpend great ſums of money. The princes of the " empire, who had taken as much as they would " of his gold and his ſilver, and had done nothing " for it, were accuſtomed to amuſe him, and to " tire him out. He condeſcended therefore to the " requeſt of the earl very joyfully."

Fifthly, It was not owing to his ſucceſs that the people had a good opinion of his enterprizes, and promiſed themſelves an happy iſſue, how difficult or dangerous ſoever theſe enterprizes might appear. Their confidence was placed, and very juſtly, in thoſe qualities, and that tenor of conduct which they obſerved in their king, and to which his prodigious ſucceſs was owing. No man contrived, prepared, reſolved with more phlegm, or acted with greater fire; the reverſe of his ſucceſſor, who reſolved raſhly, and executed irreſolutely. He waited ſometimes for opportunities, but he always improved them when they happened; and thoſe accidents which govern, or dictate the meaſures, and perpetually ſhift the fluctuating ſchemes of weak governments, were bent by this great prince to ſerve the wiſeſt and moſt ſteady purpoſes.

Sixthly, If he drained away ſome of the national wealth by taxes, he reſtored it very amply again, by the great care he took of extending and improving trade; by which he opened new mines of treaſure; and for a few temporary contributions, enriched his people to future generations. A prince, who adds to the national ſtock, has a right to ſhare the advantage he procures, and may demand ſupplies from his people without bluſhing. But a prince who lives a rent-charge on the nation he governs,

verns, who ſits on his throne, like a monſtrous drone in the middle of an hive, draining all the combs of their honey, and neither making nor aſſiſting the induſtrious bees to make any; ſuch a prince, I ſay, ought to bluſh at every grant he receives from a people, who never received any benefit from him. The Duke of *Glouceſter* told *Richard* the Second, on his reſtoring Breſt to the Duke of *Brittany*, that he ſhould have taken a town by his own valor and conduct, before he reſigned what his anceſtors had left him. Much to the ſame purpoſe might an oppreſſed people juſtly anſwer a craving prince. When you have increaſed the riches and advanced the proſperity of the nation, you will have ſome right to make theſe demands upon us; but till then we ſhall think that you have none.

LETTER

LETTER VI.

THE glorious ſcene of government which diſplayed itſelf in the reign of *Edward* the Third, was ſtrangely altered on the ſucceſſion of *Richard* the Second; a violent, haughty, obſtinate and weak prince; whoſe reign, as one of our hiſtorians obſerves, "affords but little matter that may ſhine in "hiſtory; and cannot boaſt of any one great and "diſtinguiſhed captain, any one memorable battle, "or important ſiege; but propagations of truces, "abſtinences, ſufferances, patiences, tolerances "were the language and amuſement of the times; "and treaties were all the while kept on foot for a "perpetual peace; treaties, ſays he, hitherto fruitleſs, illuſory and impracticable."

It muſt be confeſſed that the reins of government hung pretty looſe in the hands of *Edward* the Third, towards the latter end of his reign; from whence proceeded the growth of thoſe factions which diſturbed the beginning of his grandſon's reign. Some part of this was owing, very probably, to the abuſe of *Wickliffe*'s doctrines; more to the cruel treatment which the inferior part of the commonalty received. The lords grew tyrants, and the commons rebels. But theſe commotions were ſoon ſuppreſſed by the united force of the reſt of the nation; much ſooner, and with conſequences leſs fatal than in other countries, where rebellion and popular in-

* Mr. *Francklin* was taken up for printing this paper and the preceding one, on the reign of *Edward* the Third; but no farther proſecution hath been yet commenced againſt him on that account.

ſurrections

ſurrections ſeem to have been the epidemical diſtempers of that age.

If the ſpirit of faction was ſoon quelled among the commons, it prevailed openly, ſcandalouſly, and dangerouſly in the court. Something of it might be diſcerned, perhaps, among the lords, who oppoſed the court: even in the Duke of *Glouceſter*, the favorite of the people; in the Duke of *Lancaſter*, a wiſe prince, and who acted long the moderating part; in *Arundel* and others. Nothing of it was to be obſerved in the general proceedings of parliament, and in the national conduct.

The juſtneſs of the character given before of *Richard* the Second, diſcovered itſelf very early in his actions. He had a brutality and a good opinion of himſelf; one of which might have betrayed him into a diſcovery of what it was his intereſt to conceal, if the other had not made him capable of doing it, even on reflection. Hence came thoſe famous and fooliſh ſayings of this prince, which hiſtory has preſerved, and which gave his people timely warning what they had to expect from him. Of his commons he ſaid, "that ſlaves they were, and ſlaves "they ſhould be." Upon an addreſs from parliament to remove his chancellor and treaſurer, his anſwer was, "that he would not remove, at their "requeſt, the meaneſt ſcullion out of his kitchen."

However, he found men, as all princes may eaſily do, who flattered him in his vices and follies; ſuch men, for inſtance, as *Nevil*, *Vere*, *Poole*, *Treſſilian*, and others; who, to faſten him to themſelves, made the nation odious to him; as they made him odious to the nation by their rapine, their inſolence, and by a weak adminiſtration; which expoſed the kingdom to be invaded by the Scots, and threatened and inſulted by the French.

During

During all this time, parliaments met frequently, and gave neceſſary ſupplies; ſome grievances they redreſſed; but bore the mal-adminiſtration of the court faction till the tenth year of this king; when they proſecuted the favorites with great juſtice, with temper, and yet with vigor. They ſpared nothing to provide for the defence of the kingdom by ſea and land; and having put the adminiſtration, for a time, into the hands of perſons choſen by themſelves, gave the king ſuch a warning, as might have taught him to abandon a faction, and to throw himſelf on his people: but it proved in vain. His favorite miniſters perſuaded him that they ſuffered for his ſake; that the aim of their enemies was to dethrone him by diſgracing them; and whilſt all the troubles of his reign were due to his ſupport of them, they made him believe that they ſuffered for executing his orders, and maintaining his authority.——Nay, they repreſented to him that, by accuſing the counſellors, a man plainly ſhews that he believes the ſovereign incapable of governing; and that the readieſt way to diſcredit a prince, is perſuading his ſubjects, that he makes uſe of ill miniſters.—Theſe arguments and artifices, ridiculous as they ſeem, ſucceeded, and had their effect for ſome time longer.

The deluded king entered into a cloſer conjunction than ever with his miniſters. He took their iniquities on himſelf; made their cauſe his own; was privy to their plots of poiſoning their enemies; of packing juries; of corrupting the judges to give opinions againſt law; and to all that dirty work which they wanted, not he. Nay, by his encouragement they raiſed troops; and a battle was fought in their quarrel; but they were defeated, and the fourteenth parliament, called the wonder-working parliament, having puniſhed the judges and miniſters with proper ſeverity, endeavored to reconcile the king and his people. They gave him great

ſubſidies,

ſubſidies, and renewed their homage and fealty to him.

Even all this ſtill proved in vain. No experience was ſufficient to reclaim *Richard* the Second. He governed tyrannically at home, and took a wife, and bought a peace from France. It is remarkable that the peace coſt him four hundred thouſand pounds, much more than he got by his wife. His favorite miniſters had before this time, endeavored to perſuade him to give up Calais, and purchaſe the friendſhip of France, to aſſiſt him againſt the lords and others, who oppoſed him. This is not the laſt, nor leaſt inſtance of conducting foreign affairs purely with regard to the intereſt of miniſters, and without any to the honor and intereſt of the nation.

The factions among the great men were of double advantage to the king for a time.

Firſt, the body of the people, who ſhewed themſelves ſufficiently animated with a ſpirit of liberty, grew cool in eſpouſing the quarrels of the lords, after they thought liberty ſecured by the proceedings of parliament, in the tenth year of this king; and though many particular actions of violence, of treachery, and of cruelty, were committed by *Richard* the Second, they bore all with the greateſt patience for ſeveral years.

In the next place, theſe factions among the great men enabled the king to divide them, to play one againſt the other; and to build up his tyranny on the ruins of both. His uncle, the Duke of *Glouceſter*, was baſely betrayed, and barbarouſly murdered by him. He procured a packed parliament, conſiſting of men impoſed on the ſhires and towns by the king's authority, wholly managed by court favorites, and which bent all its endeavors to deſtroy the liberties and privileges of the people. With the help of ſuch a parliament, he wreaked vengeance on thoſe who had oppoſed him; got his authority exalted

exalted above all law, and exerciſed a moſt cruel tyranny.

The people ſtill bore, and it is probable that the king, and others as well as he, imagined that they would be obliged to bear on, ſince the whole legiſlature united in their oppreſſion. But in this he was deceived. When the parliament took the part of the people, the people followed the motions of parliament. When they had no hopes from parliament, they followed the firſt ſtandard which was ſet up againſt the king. The ſame ſpirit of liberty, which had been ſo ſlow to act under ſo many provocations, acted with the greateſt vigor, when it was leaſt expected. The king at the head of an army in Ireland, the Duke of *York* at the head of another in England, and the Earl of *Saliſbury* at the head of a third, could do the king no ſervice. The armies would not fight for the king againſt their country. The whole nation abandoned him, or acted againſt him. Some of his miniſters were hanged; particularly thoſe who had been the great inſtruments of taxing and oppreſſing the people. He was, at length, forced to reſign, and to ſubſcribe an inſtrument with his own hand, by which he confeſſed himſelf unworthy to govern the kingdom any longer. This inſtrument of reſignation was not only unanimouſly approved of in parliament, but articles of accuſation were ordered to be drawn up againſt him, to juſtify their reſolution of depoſing him. Theſe articles were thirty-five in number, ſetting forth the particulars of his miſgovernment; two of which are to this effect:

"That he had put the adminiſtration of the pub-
"lic affairs in the hands of unexperienced and ill-
"deſigning perſons, to the great damage of the
"people, who were loaded with exceſſive taxes.

"That in his negotiations with foreign princes,
"he had made uſe of ſo many equivocations and
"ſophiſtries, that none would take his word
"any more."

It

It is very obſerveable, that theſe extremities fell upon *Richard* the Second, at a time when every thing ſeemed to contribute to his ſupport, in the exerciſe of that arbitrary power which he had aſſumed. Thoſe whom he had moſt reaſon to fear, were removed either by violent death or baniſhment; and others were ſecured in his intereſt by places or favors at court. The great offices of the crown, and the magiſtracy of the whole kingdom, were put into ſuch hands as were fit for his deſigns; beſides which, he had a parliament entirely at his devotion: but all theſe advantageous circumſtances ſerved only to prove that a prince can have no real ſecurity againſt the juſt reſentments of an injured and exaſperated nation; for, as *Rapin* obſerves upon the ſad cataſtrophe of this reign, and that of *Edward* the Second; "in ſuch governments as that of England, "all endeavors uſed by the king to make himſelf "abſolute, are but ſo many ſteps towards his own "downfal."

It is farther obſerved by another eminent writer upon this reign, which he juſtly calls a reign of favorites, "that the king in his diſtreſs, ſaw himſelf "forſaken by thoſe whom he ſhould have forſaken "before; the very men, who had ſo much flattered "him with their exceſſive love and loyalty; and "like thoſe mean inſects, which live with a little "warmth, but ſhrink at any change of weather, "they who had contributed to all his errors in his "proſperity tranſplanted their zeal into the new ſun-"ſhine, as ſoon as his ſucceſſor demanded the crown."

LETTER

LETTER VII.

FROM the reigns of *Edward* the Third, and *Richard* the Second, we ſhall haſten downwards, as faſt as ſome neceſſary obſervations will permit. Thoſe of the princes of York and Lancaſter, form a period of more than eighty years, which paſſed in foreign and civil wars, in frequent revolutions of government, and in all thoſe diſorders which uſually accompany and follow ſuch revolutions.

The party of *Richard* the Second, even after the death of tha tunhappy prince, broke out into open rebellion againſt *Henry* the Fourth: but their efforts were vain. He held the crown faſt, which the parliament had given him; and the chief of his oppoſers periſhed in their attempts. Happy had it been, if they alone had ſuffered; but here we muſt obſerve a neceſſary and cruel conſequence of faction. As it oppreſſeth the whole community, if it ſucceeds; ſo it often draws oppreſſion, not on itſelf alone, but on the whole community, when it fails. The attempts to dethrone *Henry* the Fourth juſtified him, no doubt, in ſupporting himſelf by a military force. They excuſed him likewiſe, very probably, in the minds of many, for governing with a ſevere hand; for doing ſeveral illegal and tyrannical actions; for invading the privileges of parliament at leaſt in the point of elections; and for obtaining, by theſe means, frequent and heavy taxes on the people: for as all this might appear the harder, becauſe it happened in the reign of a king who had no title to his crown but the good will of the people, and the free gift of parliament; ſo it might appear, on the other hand, the leſs grievous, becauſe ſome part of it was rendered neceſſary by the oppoſition which a faction made

made to a parliamentary eſtabliſhment; and becauſe the reſt of it was repreſented, perhaps, under that umbrage, to be ſo likewiſe, by the court logic of that age.

A people may be perſuaded to bear patiently a great deal of oppreſſion, as long as they can be perſuaded that they bear it only to defend their own choice, and to maintain their own acts; but if they diſcover this to be nothing more than a pretence, by which ſuch powers are kept up as are unneceſſary to their ſecurity, and dangerous to their liberty; by which the wealth of the whole nation is drained into the coffers of a few; and by which, in one word, they become expoſed to ruin by the very means which they took to avoid it; it cannot be expected that they will be patient very long.

It deſerves particular notice, that although *Henry* the Fourth was willing to ſhew his clemency, at the beginning of his reign, by inflicting a very ſlight puniſhment on the wicked and hated miniſters of the late king; yet it being alledged in their excuſe, that *Richard* had compelled them to act, the parliament took occaſion from thence to paſs an act, by which it was declared that, for the future, compulſion ſhould be no legal excuſe to juſtify actions contrary to law. The reaſonableneſs and expediency of this act are very manifeſt; for it is the indiſpenſible duty of a good miniſter, to diſſuade his maſter from all illegal meaſures; or, if he cannot prevail, to quit his ſervice, rather than ſuffer himſelf to be made the inſtrument of them: and if the commands of the prince were to be allowed a ſufficient juſtification, the prerogative of doing no wrong would be extended to miniſters, and nobody would be left accountable for mal-adminiſtration.

In the ſhort, but triumphant reign of *Henry* the Fifth, the ſpirit of faction was awed; and the ſpirit of liberty had no occaſion of exerting itſelf, at leaſt with ſtruggle and in any ſignal manner, under a prince juſt, moderate and pious, according to the religion of thoſe times.

The reign of his ſon was the reign of faction; and it diſcloſes an horrid ſcene of iniquity, folly, and madneſs. The ſcandalous management of public affairs, which brought infinite loſs and diſhonor to the nation, gave real occaſion, as well as pretence, to commotions and inſurrections. The contemptible character of the man who ſat on the throne, revived the hopes of the faction of York. The faction of Lancaſter took the alarm. Moſt of the great and active men were attached to one ſide or to the other, by obligation, by reſentment, by hopes, or by fears. The national intereſt was ſunk, to the ſhame of the nation, in the particular intereſt of two families.

In the civil wars, which happened a century and an half, or two centuries before this time, the point in diſpute was, how the people ſhould be governed. In theſe we are ſpeaking of, the point in diſpute was, who ſhould govern. The firſt was worth contending for, and deſerved all the blood which was ſhed in the quarrel. But this cannot be ſaid of the laſt, which ought always to be looked upon with great indifference; except in caſes, where it has ſo immediate and neceſſary a relation to the firſt, that ſecuring the firſt depends, in a great meaſure, on ſettling the laſt. Such caſes have happened; and particular inſtances may be eaſily found; but the contrary caſes, where men have fought for governors, without regard to government, are eaſy to be found likewiſe; and that was plainly the caſe of the two factions of York and Lancaſter.

The

The parliaments in thoſe days ſeemed to be in another temper; very little concerned who was king, and very much to preſerve the conſtitution. In the many revolutions which happened, each ſide would have the parliament for them. Whatever titles they ſet up, they were glad to hold the crown by the grant, or by the confirmation of parliament. The parliament wiſely complied, whoever prevailed. The chance of war determined who ſhould be king; at one time *Henry* the Sixth, at another *Edward* the Fourth, and the parliament accordingly placed them on the throne, and ſettled their government.

There is another obſervation which ought to be made, before we leave this period of time. The reigns of *Richard* the Second, and *Henry* the Fourth, had ſhewn the dangerous conſequences of that influence which the crown had obtained in the elections of members of parliament. The watchful ſpirit of liberty was ſoon alarmed, and prevailed to make ſuch regulations about elections, and about the qualifications of the electors and the elected, as ſeemed at that time ſufficient to prevent this influence for the future. Theſe regulations appear in ſeveral laws, made during the reigns of the three Lancaſtrian princes; and our elections proceed, in a great meaſure, upon them to this very day. Theſe regulations have required and muſt, in the nature of things, require to be altered, as the courſe of accidents or the change of national circumſtances ſhall ſuggeſt reaſons for ſo doing. But then ſuch alterations have been, and ought always to be contrived ſo as to adapt them better, and to enforce them more ſtrongly; becauſe the principle on which they are founded, can never vary, and is ſo eſſential to the preſervation of liberty, that if it be loſt, and if a practice in oppoſition to it ſhould ever prevail, the balance of our government would be that moment loſt, and the Britiſh conſti-

tution left at the mercy of any ambitious prince, or wicked miniſter.

For this reaſon, Mr. *Rapin* obſerves very juſtly, "that there are but two ways of depriving the "Engliſh of their liberties; either by laying aſide "parliaments, or bribing them." And in another place he ſays, "that the Engliſh freedom will be "at an end, whenever the court invades the free "election of parliaments."

It is neceſſary to inſiſt upon this obſervation a little; becauſe it hath been ridiculed, though dully, and great pains have been taken to explode the doctrine contained in it, which was laid down in theſe words: "In a conſtitution like ours, the "ſafety of the whole depends on the balance "of the parts; and the balance of the parts on "their mutual independency on each other." Theſe words, it ſeems, even with thoſe of *Thuanus* to explain them, convey no idea to the London Journaliſt; but this will be found, as I apprehend, to be his fault, or his defect, not *Oldcaſtle*'s. A man born without the ſenſe of hearing, or ſtopping his ears, and determined at any rate not to hear, may be deaf to the voice of *Stentor* himſelf.

I ſhall not enter into any altercations with the London Journaliſt, nor go out of the road to have the honor of ſuch company. But when I meet him in my way, I ſhall encounter him frankly, without the leaſt fear of being cruſhed by the weight of his arguments; or, which is more, by the power of his patron.

To ſay, like this author, that the "carrying on "of buſineſs, and maintaining government by "powers abſolutely diſtinct, and abſolutely inde-"pendent, is a meer Utopian ſcheme, muſt pro-"ceed from ignorance, or folly." Have not powers, abſolutely diſtinct and independent, been joined by federal unions? Are no ſuch examples to

be

be found, even at this day? Has not this been brought about by the very reaſon given to prove that it can never happen; becauſe men agree when they ſee reaſon for agreement; and they ſee reaſon for agreement, when they ſee their intereſt in agreeing? *Oſborne* could not be in earneſt, when he let ſuch ſtuff fall from his pen. He meant to elude the argument, and to perplex his readers, or he meant nothing. But this ſhall not paſs. The matter is too important. He ſhall be talked to as he deſires, without a metaphor; and what has been advanced ſhall be applied to our government.

A king of Great Britain is that ſupreme magiſtrate who has a negative voice in the legiſlature. He is intruſted with the executive power, and ſeveral other powers and privileges, which we call prerogatives, are annexed to this truſt. The two houſes of parliament have their rights and privileges; ſome of which are common to both, others particular to each. They prepare, they paſs bills, or they refuſe to paſs ſuch as are ſent to them. They addreſs, repreſent, adviſe, remonſtrate. The ſupreme judicature reſides in the lords. The commons are the grand inqueſt of the nation, and to them it belongs likewiſe to judge of national expences, and to give ſupplies accordingly.

If the legiſlative as well as the executive power, was wholly in the king, as in ſome countries, he would be abſolute; if in the lords, our government would be an ariſtocracy; if in the commons, a democracy. It is this diviſion of power, theſe diſtinct privileges attributed to the king, to the lords, and to the commons, which conſtitute a limited monarchy.

Again: as they conſtitute a limited monarchy, ſo the wiſdom of our government has provided, as far as human wiſdom can provide for the preſer-

vation of it, by this diviſion of power, and by theſe diſtinct privileges. If any one part of the three which compoſe our government, ſhould at any time uſurp more power than the law gives, or make an ill uſe of a legal power, the other two parts may, by uniting their ſtrength, reduce this power into its proper bounds, or correct the abuſe of it; nay, if at any time two of theſe parts ſhould concur in uſurping or abuſing power, the weight of the third may, at leaſt, retard the miſchief, and give time and chance for preventing it.

This is that balance which has been ſo much talked of, and this is the uſe of it. Both are plain to common ſenſe, and to experience; as will appear farther in the courſe of theſe remarks, where we ſhall have occaſion to ſhew, how often the proper uſe of this balance have ſaved our conſtitution; and to what misfortunes we have been expoſed by the neglect or improper uſe of it.

Since this diviſion of power, and theſe diſtinct privileges conſtitute and maintain our government, it follows that the confuſion of them tends to deſtroy it. This propoſition is therefore true; that, in a conſtitution like ours, the ſafety of the whole depends on the balance of the parts. Let us ſee whether it be true, that the balance of the parts conſiſts in their mutual independency.

To ſpeak again without any metaphor, the power, which the ſeveral parts of our government have of controling and checking one another, may be called a dependency on one another, and may be argued for by thoſe who want to throw darkneſs round them, as the dependency oppoſed to the independency, mentioned in the propoſition. But the fallacy is groſs. We have ſhewn that this power of controul in each, which reſults from the diviſion

of

of power amongſt all the parts of our government, is neceſſary to the preſervation of it: and thus a ſort of conſtitutional dependency, if I may have leave to expreſs myſelf in that manner, is created among them; but this mutual dependency cannot be oppoſed to the independency pleaded for. On the contrary, this mutual dependency cannot ſubſiſt without ſuch an independency; for whenever this independency is loſt, the mutual dependency is that moment changed into a particular, conſtant dependency of one part on two; or, which is ſtill more unreaſonable, of two parts on one. The conſtitutional dependency, as I have called it for diſtinction's ſake, conſiſts in this; that the proceedings of each part of the government, when they come forth into action and affect the whole, are liable to be examined and controuled by the other parts. The independency pleaded for conſiſts in this; that the reſolutions of each part, which direct theſe proceedings, be taken independently, and without any influence direct or indirect, on the others. Without the firſt, each part would be at liberty to attempt deſtroying the balance, by uſurping or abuſing power; but without the laſt, there can be no balance at all. I will illuſtrate this, by ſuppoſing a prince, who claims and exerciſes a right of levying money without conſent of parliament. He could not be oppoſed effectually, if the two houſes of parliament had not a right to oppoſe him, to call his miniſters to account; and to make him feel that, far from being abſolute, he was under this conſtitutional dependency; but he would not be oppoſed at all, if the two houſes of parliament were under his influence, and incapable of directing their proceedings independently of him. One would be aſhamed to inſiſt thus much on a point ſo very clear,

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if ſome men were not ſo hardened to all ſenſe of ſhame, as to maintain the contrary; and that there are men capable of doing this, is one of thoſe melancholy ſymptoms which characterize the preſent age. I could almoſt appeal to the cool thoughts and the private reflections of ſome of theſe writers, whether any thing can be more ſcandalous than the taſk they have undertaken. To ſkreen their patrons, they endeavor to diſtinguiſh us out of our greateſt national advantages; as was obſerved in the caſe of Dunkirk. To reconcile the minds of men to ſuch meaſures as their patrons may want, and as no honeſt man will take, they endeavor to demoliſh the very corner ſtones on which the whole fabric of liberty reſts. Their iniquity, it muſt be confeſſed, is very ſyſtematical. When they write for corruption, they write for the means. When they write for the dependency of the parliament on the court, they write for the end. Well might *Oldcaſtle* ſay of theſe writers, their patrons and abettors, "that the maſk was pulled off on one "ſide." Let me conjure them, in the name of modeſty, to call themſelves whigs no longer. It is time they ſhould lay that appellation aſide, ſince it will not be hard to prove, from the general tenor of their writings, that the maxims they advance, the doctrines they inculcate, and the conduct they recommend, lead to the deſtruction of civil liberty, as much as the political leſſons of *Sibthorpe*, *Manwaring*, or Archbiſhop *Laud* himſelf. They and their followers declared themſelves directly againſt liberty. To plead for it was almoſt blaſphemy; and to aſſert it little leſs than the ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt, according to the doctrines taught by thoſe divines. Such abſurdities made few converts in thoſe days; and the preachers of them would meet with the utmoſt contempt in theſe. But the writers,

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of whom we now complain, affect to maintain the cauſe of liberty, whilſt they betray it. They aſſert the principles of liberty in general, and ſometimes reaſon upon them well enough; but when they apply them to particular caſes, they prevaricate, evade, and exert all their poor endeavors to turn the cannon of liberty againſt herſelf. The others had *faenum in cornu*. They put mankind on their guard againſt them, and were the true promoters of all the miſchief and confuſion which followed, when the nation run into the utmoſt extremes, in oppoſition to them. Theſe men inſinuate themſelves as friends to liberty. They are looked upon as ſuch by ſome few perſons, who mean well to liberty, even at this time; and yet they are almoſt wholly employed in promoting that which is deſtructive of liberty, and inconſiſtent with it, corruption and dependency. *Laud* and the others endeavored openly to lop the branches and cut down the tree; but theſe men are privately poiſoning the root of liberty. The power of the court, and the authority of the lawyers, could not make the levying ſhip-money paſs for law, nor prevail on the nation to bear it. But if it were poſſible to ſuppoſe an Houſe of Commons as dependent as theſe lawyers, (and they would be as dependent, if the doctrines which we oppoſe prevailed amongſt them) the nation might then be loaded with taxes, oppreſſed with debts, and reduced to the greateſt miſery by law. Our liberties as well as our eſtates, might be taken from us. We might be legally undone. Theſe are poſſible conſequences of ſuch doctrines. If they are not probable, we owe no thanks to the weekly preachers of them. The nature of our preſent ſettlement, which is built on the foundation of liberty, the intereſt and honor of the prince now on the throne, as well as of all his illuſtrious poſterity, are

are our ſecurity againſt theſe dangers; but ſtill I ſay, we owe no thanks to the writers on the ſide of the miniſtry.

I have dwelt pretty much upon this point, to ſhew what is the real deſign of theſe remarks; and I will venture to add that thoſe perſons who oppoſe ſuch doctrines as we have been oppoſing, will appear at laſt to be the trueſt friends to his majeſty King *George*, and the Proteſtant ſucceſſion; which can ſubſiſt only upon thoſe principles upon which it was originally eſtabliſhed.

LETTER

LETTER VIII.

IF the reign of *Henry* the Sixth was a reign of faction, thoſe of the houſe of York were ſo likewiſe.—The popularity, bravery, cruelty, raſhneſs, uxorioufneſs, incontinence of *Edward* the Fourth; in ſhort, his good and his bad qualities worked the different effects of ſupporting, exaſperating and increaſing factions. The characters of *Henry* the Sixth's queen and of the Earl of *Warwick*, to mention no more of the principal actors on that bloody ſtage, conſpired to maintain and aggravate this national calamity.

In theſe long continued ſtruggles, the whole nation became involved, and the factions of York and Lancaſter growing every day more animated and better diſciplined, we are not to wonder that they fought *uſque ad internecionem;* at leaſt, till the field of battle, the ſcaffold, and ſome theatres of clandeſtine murders, had left no man on one ſide alive, who was in a condition to oppoſe or give jealouſy to the other. But that which may very juſtly raiſe our wonder, is that *Edward* the Fourth, having ſecured to himſelf and his family the poſſeſſion of the throne, by the murder of *Henry* the Sixth and his ſon, and by the total defeat of the whole Lancaſtrian party, ſhould ſuffer two new factions to be nurſed up, which divided his own party, occaſioned the murder of his ſons, and by eſtabliſhing the ſhort-lived tyranny of his brother, brought the Earl of *Richmond* to the throne, and ſunk for ever the houſe of York in that of Lancaſter.

Edward the Fourth's queen was the original cauſe of all this miſchief, and a principal ſufferer herſelf in

in the courſe of it. She was reſolved to govern at any rate; and *Rapin* obſerves, "that as her being "queen gave her no manner of title to meddle "with the affairs of the public, ſhe knew how to "manage that matter another way; namely, by "the influence ſhe had over the king. Though "*Edward* often proved falſe to her, ſhe bore it "very patiently, and never ſhewed her uneaſineſs "at it. *Edward*, charmed to find himſelf at liberty "to purſue his inclinations, without danger of con-"tinual reproaches, repaid her moderation with the "moſt obliging and condeſcending behavior; of "which ſhe knew how to make a good uſe." She maintained this aſcendant over her huſband to the laſt, and for a little complaiſance, which coſt her nothing in preſent, ſhe purchaſed a degree of power in the ſtate, which coſt her dear in conſequence, by alienating the affections of the people from her huſband during his life, and ruining his family afterwards, as I have hinted before.

"Her aim was, according to *Rapin*, to ſecure her "power during the king's life, and in caſe ſhe ſur-"vived him, to make ſure of the government of "the kingdom, in the name of the prince her ſon, "when he ſhould come to be on the throne; but "by a fatality, not unuſual to the beſt-laid projects, "this very thing proved the occaſion of her own, "and her family's ruin."

I cannot think, as *Rapin* ſeems to do, that her project deſerved to be ranked amongſt thoſe which are the beſt laid. It appears to be the narrow project of a woman, who had cunning, inſinuation, and the ſpirit of intrigue, with much pride and ambition; but wanted that extenſive knowledge, and that ſuperior genius, ſuch as *Catherine* of Medicis and our Queen *Elizabeth* poſſeſſed, which is neceſſary to conduct ſo great a deſign as her paſſion prompted her to undertake; for

for what was her project? Was it to acquire an intereſt in the nation, by deſerving well of it? Nothing leſs. It was ſingly this; to form a faction at court, by raiſing her relations and immediate dependents, which ſhould be wholly her own, and into whoſe hands ſhe might throw all the power and profit which the king had to beſtow. She had the good luck to compaſs this deſign, and triumphed, no doubt very wiſely, in her great ſucceſs. Surrounded by her creatures, ſhe looked no farther than that circle, and either took no notice of the temper of the nation, or judged of it by the temper of the court. But the riſe of this faction immediately formed another, and eſtabliſhed the diſtinction of antient and new nobility. The former had the true natural ſtrength, which great eſtates in land and eſtabliſhed credit in the nation gave them. The latter had no ſtrength of their own, none but that advantitious ſtrength, which aroſe from employments and favor at court. They brought nothing to court, which could make the court amends for the envy and diſcontent which their elevation created. To ſupply this, two things were done; which ſerved, perhaps, to fortify the queen in her deluſion, and thereby made the ruin of her ambitious projects the ſurer. All thoſe who were not in the good graces of her faction, were diſgraced at court, and in effect baniſhed from it. Nay, they were perſecuted by the power of it; as the Duke of *Clarence*, the king's own brother, was even to death. The names of the parties of York and Lancaſter might ſubſiſt and be made uſe of on proper occaſions; but in reality, the being for or againſt the party of the queen, was the ſole diſtinction which prevailed; and even the friends of the houſe of York, whom the queen did not affect, were debarred from having the king's ear, excepting only three of his old and moſt faithful ſervants, who maintained

maintained themſelves againſt her and her faction. I mean *Stafford* Duke of Buckingham, *Haſtings* and *Stanley*.

Another method which this queen took to ſtrengthen herſelf and her faction, was by raking up money by illegal and oppreſſive means; particularly by ſetting proſecutions on foot againſt the rich men of the kingdom, ſeveral of whom were arraigned of high treaſon, and encouraging the judges to get them found guilty at any rate. *Habington* obſerves in his hiſtory of this king, "that as their wealth was "the principal evidence againſt them, though their "perſons were acquitted, their eſtates were found "guilty."

The ſame hiſtorian obſerves farther, "that the "memory of theſe carriages hithertofore, in a bu- "ſineſs that concerned the life of a man reputed "innocent, drew the world into much fear that he "would now decline to rigor. Neither was the "king totally excuſed, although this cruel avarice "was laid to the queen, who having a numerous "iſſue and kindred, by favor raiſed up to the higheſt "titles, was almoſt neceſſitated, for ſupportance of "their honors, to rack the kingdom."

Edward ſeemed ſenſible before his death of the miſchievous conſequences which this conduct, and the claſhing of two factions might produce. He endeavored to prevent them, by "reconciling the "two parties; a poor expedient! as *Rapin* juſtly "obſerves, which could not eaſily produce the "effect he expected."

The Duke of *Glouceſter*, who had concealed his deſign till his brother's death, took advantage of theſe factions. He made his court publicly to the queen, and held a private correſpondence with the oppoſite party. Nay, he found means, by fomenting it, to raiſe a third for himſelf.

I have

I have dwelt the longer in this place, on the ſtrange turns and cruel effects of faction; becauſe I believe no example can be produced out of any hiſtory, which ſets them in a ſtronger light; and becauſe this period of time affording but ſmall matter to recommend the ſpirit of liberty, which had little to do in the tranſactions of it, I imagine that pointing out the fatal conſequences of the contrary ſpirit, which then prevailed, may anſwer the ſame end, as expoſing of vice is frequently the ſtrongeſt recommendation of virtue.

But we muſt not imagine, notwithſtanding all the contrary appearances in this period, that the ſpirit of liberty was abſolutely extinguiſhed. Though that flame was loſt, for the moſt part, in the conſtant glare of faction, yet it was ſtill alive; and by living, preſerved the conſtitution of our government during the whole courſe of the civil wars.

If we look cloſely into theſe ſcenes of confuſion, we may diſcover many particular inſtances of the operations of this ſpirit. Such were the difficulties and delays oppoſed to the grant of tonnage and poundage for nine years together; and the many reſtrictions added to this grant, when it was at laſt obtained by *Edward* the Fourth. Other inſtances to the ſame purpoſe might be quoted; but we chuſe to inſiſt on a more general obſervation, already mentioned by us, which runs through the whole period, and is ſo ſtrongly vouched by hiſtory as to admit of no cavil.

The obſervation we are going to make, contains a memorable exception to this propoſition, which is but too generally true, that the ſpirit of liberty and the ſpirit of faction are incompatible, and cannot long ſubſiſt together. The virtue of our anceſtors made this exception; and if it hath been remembered to their ſhame, that they ſunk the national intereſt

intereſt in the particular intereſt of two families; it ought to be remembered to their honor, that they did ſo in this ſingle point only, who ſhould reign, and in no other. We took notice, in a former paper, that upon every revolution, each ſide engaged the parliament for them, and that whoever prevailed, the parliament wiſely complied. This conduct, which laſted from *Richard* the Second down to *Richard* the Third, preſerved our liberties; but it could not have been purſued, nor could our liberties by conſequence have been preſerved, if the ſpirit of liberty had not been latent in the hearts of thoſe very men who ſeem to breathe nothing but faction. How could it have happened that the ſole title of conqueſt was ever eſtabliſhed in ſo many revolutions brought about by the ſword, if the actors in them had not been ſtrongly affected with a love and reverence for the free conſtitution of our government? The princes of York and Lancaſter themſelves were willing, nay deſirous, to have a parliamentary confirmation of their titles, real or pretended. But how came they to be ſo deſirous of it? How came they to think it neceſſary? The caſe is plain. The temper of their parties, and of their armies begot this neceſſity. The ſpirit of liberty prevailed enough in the whole body of the nation, out of which theſe parties and armies were compoſed to preſerve the principles of public freedom, though not enough to preſerve the public peace.—Each ſide contended to have a king of their own party; but neither ſide would have a tyrant.—They ſacrificed their lives to faction; but would not give up their liberties.—The victorious armies led their kings to the foot of the throne; but carried them no farther.

The author of the ſhort hiſtory of ſtanding armies obſerves, that, "in all the wars of York and Lan-

"caſter,

" caſter, whatever party prevailed, we do not find " they ever attempted to keep up a ſtanding army. " Such was the virtue of thoſe times, ſays he, that " they would rather run the hazard of forfeiting their " heads and eſtates to the rage of the oppoſite party, " than certainly enſlave their country, though they " themſelves were to be the tyrants."—This remark is juſt, as far as it goes; and it goes as far as that author wanted to carry it; but it is not ſo full, nor carried ſo far as hiſtory will warrant. That the princes, who obtained the crown by their armies, did not attempt to govern by their armies afterwards, is moſt true, and may reflect ſome honor on thoſe princes, and on the heads of their parties. But there is ſomething more than this remarkable in the conduct of thoſe times; for even in the heat of victory, in the raptures of a ſucceſsful revolution, and before the armies could be diſbanded, we ſee theſe princes obliged to aſcend the ſteps of the throne in ſuch manner, and under ſuch conditions, as the parliament thought fit to preſcribe, and as were not always agreeable to them. This, I am ſure, reflects great honor on the parliaments, who were actors in the laſt ſcenes of all theſe revolutions; and on the armies, who contented themſelves to become ſpectators in ſuch conjunctures.—We will take the firſt example which preſents itſelf in theſe wars.

The Duke of *Lancaſter* was at the head of an army of ſixty thouſand men, when he came to the crown. The proclamation which he publiſhed the very day he was crowned, ſhewed how very unwilling he was to ſeem to hold his crown purely by right of election. He would gladly have ſet up that of conqueſt; or a title derived from *Richard* the Second's reſignation; or a title by blood; or any title but the true one. Notwithſtanding this, he was obliged, when nothing could have obliged him but the ſenſe of his own party and army, to ſubmit to as formal an election as ever was made. The

two

two houſes took notice of the blind claim of right which he entered. They choſe him to be king, upon the queſtion put to them, after having given their negative to the Duke of *York*, to his ſons, and to others, who were ſeverally propoſed in the ſame manner to them. They ſeem induſtriouſly to have contrived and purſued, on this occaſion, a method of proceeding as oppoſite as poſſible to the views and inclination of this prince, whoſe army attended him, and whoſe rival was his priſoner.

Again: to take another example from the latter end of theſe wars. The battle of Northampton being won, and *Henry* the Sixth taken, the Duke of *York* haſtens out of Ireland to put himſelf at the head of his party and his army. The parliament meets. The duke aſſerts his undoubted right by deſcent to the crown, which he demands as due to him, without any interpoſition of parliament. He ſhews the utmoſt, and even an indecent impatience to take poſſeſſion of it. He is ſupported by his own party. He is oppoſed by others. But the matter is by all ſubmitted to the debate and deciſion of parliament. The debate itſelf muſt have been grievous enough to a prince ſo fond of a crown, and ſo much warmed with the notion of his hereditary right. But the deciſion of this affair muſt have wounded him to the quick. So little regard was paid to his right, that he was forced to content himſelf with leaving the crown on the head of *Henry* the Sixth during that prince's life, and not to have the proſpect of ſucceeding to it, till after that prince's deceaſe; which, by the way, was a point of the leſs value to him, becauſe he was older than *Henry* the Sixth, and could not hope to be the better for it, according to the courſe of nature. He ſubmitted to all theſe mortifications; and a very judicious hiſtorian attributes his ſubmiſſion to his moderation; but I believe thoſe who fully conſider his former conduct, and his paſſionate

ate behavior at this time, will hardly ſubſcribe to ſuch a judgment. His ſubmiſſion, like that of *Henry* the Fourth, in the caſe before-cited, was a ſubmiſſion, which the temper of his party rendered neceſſary. They would not force the reſolutions of the two houſes; and why the two houſes would go no farther in his favor, at that juncture, might eaſily be accounted for, if this were a proper place for that diſquiſition.—After the battle of Wakefield, where the Duke of *York* was killed, and that of St. Alban's, where the Earl of *Warwick* was beaten, the faction of York were determined, by the dangers they had run, and by the loſſes they had ſuſtained, to balance no longer, but to ſet the crown on the head of the Earl of *March*, and yet they proceeded no otherwiſeth an under the authority of parliament, which had ratified the agreement made between the late Duke of *York* and *Henry* the Sixth. By one article of this agreement it was ſtipulated, that if King *Henry* broke it in any point, the crown and royal dignity ſhould immediately devolve on the Duke of *York*, if alive; or, in failure of him, on his next heir. The Earl of *Warwick* therefore, in a kind of military aſſembly, (for a part of the army, at leaſt, was there) proceeded to the election of *Edward* the Fourth; but he proceeded on this foundation. The great efforts made to break this agreement and to defeat the effect of it, by King *Henry*'s queen, and the Lancaſtrian party, were interpreted, and not without color, as ſo many infractions of it. By conſequence, *Edward* the Fourth had an immediate right to the crown, by virtue of the act of parliament made in confirmation of this convention, which act and convention were produced by *Warwick*, who cauſed them to be publicly read. The proceeding of this aſſembly, which hath a tumultuous air in hiſtory, was therefore in reality a proclamation

clamation of a king made by authority of parliament, and not of an election of a king, without that authority.

Let us conclude, that if the ſpirit of faction hath, on ſome occaſions, prevailed over the ſpirit of liberty, ſo far as to defeat and even pervert the deſigns of the latter; the ſpirit of liberty hath likewiſe revived, in its turn, on other occaſions, and prevented the conſummation of that miſery which faction would naturally and of courſe have produced. Let us conclude that all ſtanding armies, for whatſoever purpoſe inſtituted, or in whatſoever habit cloathed, may be eaſily made the inſtruments of faction; becauſe a body of men ſeparated, in many reſpects, from the reſt of the nation, conſtrained to different cuſtoms, and in ſome meaſure ſubjected to different laws, may be eaſily perſuaded that they have a different intereſt. Let us conclude that theſe caſuiſts in red, are the moſt dangerous in this reſpect, that having ſwords by their ſides, they are able at once to cut thoſe gordian knots which others muſt untie by degrees. But let us conclude, at the ſame time, that if a ſpirit of liberty be kept up in a free nation, it will be kept up in the army of that nation; and that when it is thus kept up, though the ſpirit of faction may do great hurt, it cannot complete the public ruin. We ſee the truth of this obſervation exemplified near three centuries ago; and let us remember with gratitude, that the ſame truth was again confirmed to us no longer ago than two-and-forty years.

LETTER

LETTER IX.

ONE of the hiſtorians of Britanny, if I remember right, and I think it is *Argentre*, ſays the people of that dutchy grew ſo much tired with the diſputes between *Charles* of Blois and the *Monforts*, that the two parties agreed, juſt before a battle, to make an end of the quarrel at once, by taking off that prince, againſt whom the fortune of the day ſhould declare itſelf.—Our anceſtors were very far from following this example; but they ſeized the opportunity which was preſented to them, after *Richard* the Third had uſurped the throne, and murdered his nephews, of aboliſhing tyranny, and extinguiſhing faction.

The princes of *York* and *Lancaſter* butchered one another in ſuch a manner, that the right of the former centered in *Elizabeth*, eldeſt daughter of *Edward* the Fourth, and the pretenſions of the latter were allowed, by the whole Lancaſtrian party, to belong to the Earl of *Richmond*.—This was the ſtate of the families.

The faction of York deteſted *Richard* for his uſurpation and cruelties.—The faction of Lancaſter hated him for his name; and neither the great qualities which he really had, nor the good qualities which he affected, could reconcile mankind to his barbarity.—This was the temper of the nation.

The opportunity thus formed, was improved by the univerſal concurrence, which a ſpirit of liberty and a regard to the public good, independent of

party, inſpired. The faction of York became willing to receive a king of the houſe of Lancaſter, and the party of Lancaſter a queen of the houſe of York. All parties labored to unite the two roſes; and faction itſelf was bent, in this fortunate conjuncture, to extirpate faction.

The depoſition of *Richard*, and the advancement of the Earl of *Richmond* to the throne, upon this expreſs condition that he ſhould marry the princeſs *Elizabeth*, were purſued with ſucceſs, even when *Richard* thought himſelf moſt ſecure; when the parliament had been obliged to confirm his uſurpation; to declare the children of *Edward* baſtards; and to attaint the Earl of *Richmond*.

What a ſcene of national peace and proſperity was opened by this revolution and new ſettlement! But how ſoon was it ſhifted? How ſoon were the wiſe and honeſt views of the many defeated by the cunning and iniquity of the few?—*Henry* the Seventh, a creature of the people, if ever any prince was ſuch, had been raiſed to the throne, in order to cut up the roots of faction; to reſtore public tranquillity; and to eſtabliſh a legal government on the ruins of tyranny.—He did the very reverſe of all this. His reign and that of his ſon have been two of the ſevereſt, under which our country hath groaned ſince the conqueſt; and yet, in theſe very reigns, the foundations of liberty were laid much broader and ſtronger than ever.—How this came about, it muſt be uſeful, and perhaps it may be entertaining, to conſider.

Henry the Seventh, who would have been glad a little beforeto have aſſured himſelf of the crown on any terms, grew difficult as ſoon as he had obtained it. He durſt not avow a title by conqueſt; but he evaded the appearances of a parliamentary title

title very induſtriouſly, and made the ceremony of his coronation precede the meeting of his parliament. He evaded, in the ſame manner, the appearances of any communication of right from the princes *Elizabeth*, by deferring his marriage till an act had paſſed to ſettle the crown on him and his poſterity, without any mention of the houſe of York. In ſhort, his whole ſkill, credit and power were employed to get the act of ſettlement ſo generally and ſo ambiguouſly penned, as to leave him room to aſſert afterwards a right inherent in himſelf, and independent of the authority of parliament. Nay, he went farther; for, in the bull of confirmation, which he obtained from the pope, and in which he affected to have all ſorts of titles enumerated, he took particular care to have that of conqueſt inſerted.

Such a conduct gave ſufficient reaſon for alarm; but we do not find that it was taken. The tyrant was dead, and the new eſtabliſhment was made. The nation was overjoyed; and the work of liberty was done by halves. The new king found a compliance with all his meaſures, as new kings generally do. But little reflection was made, perhaps, at that time, on theſe proceedings of the court; or if a juſt reflection was made, we may eaſily believe that it was ſoon ſtifled by that adulation, which repreſents the moſt neceſſary precautions, the moſt juſt complaints, and the aſſertion of the cleareſt rights as proofs of diſaffection.

The whole courſe of *Henry* the Seventh's reign was anſwerable to theſe beginnings; and he ſeems to have eſtabliſhed himſelf in the power of purſuing principles of government, evidently repugnant to thoſe upon which he had been raiſed to the throne, before the nation was well aware of what he intended. He planted faction anew, and was the true cauſe of all the diſturbances which followed from it, and

and which bagan even in the firſt year of his reign. Many of the York party had ſignalized themſelves in his cauſe. All of them ſubmitted to his government; and that ſmall branch of this party, which had ſupported *Richard* the Third, was too inconſiderable to hurt him; but he ſoon made it conſiderable, by driving almoſt the whole York party into that intereſt. "He had conceived, ſays *Rapin*, ſo "mortal an hatred for the whole houſe of York, "that he let ſlip no opportunity to humble the "Yorkiſts; behaving always towards them not as a "juſt king, but like the head of a party."

That ſome of his miniſters, of the Lancaſtrian party, might find their private account in ſuch a meaſure, and ſacrifice to it both the intereſt of their maſter and their country, is obvious enough; but how the king, who was certainly an able man, could prefer dividing, inſtead of uniting his people in affection and obedience, would appear very marvellous, if experience had not taught us that men of the greateſt genius fall ſometimes into the ſame errors, as men of the leaſt genius would be apt to commit in the ſame circumſtances.—How this happens we are not, in this place, to enquire.

Henry the Seventh proceeded as he had been ſuffered to ſet out, and eſtabliſhed by degrees, and thoſe not ſlow, a power almoſt abſolute. His jealouſy, his pride, and his inſatiable ſordid avarice had their full ſwing. He became hated even by his own party, and might very probably have loſt his crown, if many circumſtances, both at home and abroad, had not conſpired in his favor, and if he had not improved them all with the utmoſt ability of council and dexterity of management. The chief of theſe circumſtances, and it well deſerves to be remarked, was this,—they who ventured their eſtates and lives in ſeveral inſurrections againſt him, and they who privately fomented theſe inſurrections, inſtead

inſtead of uniting on a national principle, and bending their endeavors to a reformation of government, united on a principle of faction; for the king's behavior had revived this ſpirit, as we obſerved above; but ſtill this ſpirit, though revived, had not attained its former ſtrength. The nation in general was tired of faction, dreaded a relapſe into the conſequences of it, and would not engage for a *Simnel*, a *Warbeck*, or even a real prince of the houſe of York. A national coolneſs on one ſide, and vigilance and vigor on the king's part, defeated all theſe enterprizes as faſt as they were formed. Every one of theſe defeats gave *Henry* additional ſtrength and increaſe of reputation, which is ſtrength in its effects. Thus it happened in this caſe; and thus it hath happened in many others. By making an ill uſe of his power, the king was the real author of all the diſorders in the ſtate, and of all the attempts againſt his government; and yet, the better to prevent ſuch diſorders, and to reſiſt ſuch attempts, farther powers were intruſted to him. Becauſe he had governed ill, it was put in his power to govern worſe; and liberty was undermined, for fear it ſhould be overthrown. It hath fared ſometimes with monarchy as with the church of Rome. Both have acquired greater wealth and power by the abuſe of what they had, and mankind have been egregiouſly the bubbles of both.

We muſt not however conclude that this king made force the ſole, though he made it the principal, expedient of his government. He was wiſe enough to conſider that his court was not the nation; and that however he might command with a nod in one, he muſt captivate, at leaſt in ſome degree, the good will of mankind, to make himſelf ſecure of being long obeyed in the other; nay more, that he muſt make his people ſome amends for the oppreſſions which his avarice particularly ex-

poſed

poſed them to ſuffer. For theſe reaſons, as he ſtrained his prerogative on ſome occaſions very high, ſo he let it down again upon others; and affected to ſhew to his parliaments much condeſcenſion, notwithſtanding his pride, as well as much communication of counſels, notwithſtanding his reſerve.

To attribute to this *Solomon* of Great Britain the ſole merit of the laws made in his time, as ſome have done, ſeems unreaſonable; but it was certainly great merit in him, and we may add rare merit, inſtead of oppoſing, or refuſing, conſtantly to remunerate his people, by promoting and paſſing of "good laws, which evermore were his retribution "for treaſure." Theſe are my Lord *Bacon*'s words, and better than his cannot be found to expreſs the general character of the laws which the wiſdom of thoſe times produced. "They were deep and not "vulgar; not made upon the ſpur of a particular "occaſion for the preſent; but out of providence "of the future, to make the eſtate of the people "ſtill more and more happy, after the manner of "the legiſlators in antient and heroical times."— Huſbandry, manufactures, general commerce, and increaſe of uſeful people were carefully attended to, and conſiderably advanced; ſo that whilſt the weight of taxes and the vexations of *Empſon*, *Dudley*, and their ſubordinate harpies were ſeverely felt, every man felt likewiſe the particular benefit which he received in the general advantages procured to the nation. Theſe drops of manna, which fell from the throne, ſoftened the murmurs of the people. They could not make the king beloved, but they made him leſs hated; and the middle and lower ranks of men, who felt leſs the rigor of his government, felt more immediately the effects of his care and his wiſdom.

We will not refine ſo much as to ſay that the commons were patient under the preſſures of this reign, becauſe

becauſe they foreſaw the conſequences of thoſe meaſures which the king took to leſſen the power of his nobility. He did not, perhaps, himſelf diſcern theſe conſequences in their full extent; but ſurely if this part of his conduct was politic, it was no leſs popular at that time; ſince the ſame exorbitant power of the peers, which had been ſo formidable to the crown, had not been leſs oppreſſive to the commons. The weight of perſonal ſervice had been terribly felt, during the wars of York and Lancaſter; and the obligation of that tenure had, no doubt, contributed to prolong them. The tenant therefore, who found this ſervice commuted into a rent, could not but think his condition mended, and be extremely pleaſed with this alteration, though he did not ſee the conſequences of the other; which, by opening a way to the lords to alienate their lands, opened a way to the commons to increaſe their property, and conſequently their power in the ſtate; as may be very eaſily obſerved in the ſucceeding reigns.

LETTER

LETTER X.

HENRY the Eighth came to the crown with vety great advantages. Whatever objections had been made to his father's title, there remained no pretence of objecting to his; and if any pretence had remained, the diſpoſition to make uſe of it would not have been found. The nation was grown weary of faction; fond of tranquillity; and every day more and more attentive to the arts of peace.—The prerogative had been extended wide and carried high; and the means employed to acquire and maintain this authority, had been eſtabliſhed by a reign of twenty four years.—The treaſures which *Henry* the Seventh had accumulated and left to his ſon, were immenſe; and in leaving him theſe treaſures, he left him that which was more valuable than all of them. He left him an opportunity of gaining the affections of his people, on his acceſſion to the throne, by putting a ſtop to that public rapine which had been ſo long exerciſed; and by diſgracing and puniſhing thoſe who had been the principal inſtruments of it. *Henry* the Eighth ſeized the opportunity and improved it. He confirmed, in the firſt moments of his reign that pardon which his father had granted in the laſt of his life, and when he could hope for no farther profit by not pardoning. He invited, by proclamation, ſuch as had been wronged to complain, and promiſed them ſatisfaction.

If *Henry* the Eighth had been avaricious, or weak enough to prefer wealth to popularity, he would have obſerved another conduct. He would have thought thoſe men fitteſt to ſerve him, who had ſignaliſed themſelves moſt in fleecing the people; and without

without any regard to their ability in playing the game of ſtateſman, he would have choſen them purely for their ſkill in packing the cards. *Empſon* and *Dudley* would have continued in power, and have riſen in favor. But he was too wiſe, or too honeſtly counſelled in theſe beginnings of his government, to purſue ſuch meaſures, or to employ ſuch miniſters. He kept ſome in his council, who were of approved abilities; but far from loading his own adminiſtration with the principal guilt of the former; far from grieving or provoking his people, by countenancing the moſt hated, and the moſt juſtly hated, men of the whole kingdom, he threw thoſe criminals out of the ſanctuary of the court, and expoſed them to that national vengeance, under the weight of which they periſhed.—The manner in which their lives were taken away, ſeems liable to great objection, and I would not be thought to approve it; for a ſpirit of liberty can never approve ſuch proceedings even againſt the worſt and the moſt guilty of men, as may be applied to deſtroy the beſt and the moſt innocent. All I mean to commend is the wiſdom of *Henry* the Eighth, in abandoning theſe miniſters; in gaining the affections of his ſubjects; and in making ſuch impreſſions of gratitude on their minds, as laſted long and were of ſervice to him, even when he oppreſſed the people in his turn.

Vanity and preſumption were reigning qualities in the character of this prince. The firſt betrayed him into continual errors. The laſt made him perſiſt in them. Pride is obſerved to defeat its own end, by bringing the man who ſeeks eſteem and reverence, into contempt. Vanity, ſelf-ſufficiency, preſumption, the offspring of pride, have much the ſame effect: ſince no one is ſo liable to be deceived and governed, as he who imagines that he is capable of neither.

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The characters of the princes and popes of this age, rendered the ſcene of foreign affairs very important. *Henry* the Eighth was happy enough to have no intereſt of his own abroad worth engaging him in the broils of the continent. He was free from guaranties of foreign dominions, and from all engagements to foreign princes, which could in the leaſt encumber him. In this ſtate he might have kept himſelf with equal dignity and advantage. He might have increaſed his ſtrength, whilſt other princes waſted theirs. He might have been applied to as the mediator or arbitrator of the Chriſtian world; and have found his account in all the wars and negociations, without being a party in them.—He did the very contrary. A roſe, bleſſed by the pope; an emperor ſerving in his army, and taking his pay; a whimſical project of conqueſt never deſigned to be made, and impoſſible to be kept, if they had been made, were ſufficient to draw him into the moſt extravagant engagements, in which he always played gold againſt counters with allies, who generally played counters againſt gold. His engagements of this kind became numberleſs, frequently inconſiſtent, and ſo very raſh and unadviſed, that whilſt his aim, or his pretence, was to keep a balance between the great powers of Europe, he more than once aſſiſted the ſtrongeſt to oppreſs the weakeſt.—The ſpring of all this ſtrange conduct lay in the private intereſts and paſſions of *Wolſey*, who became his firſt miniſter very early, and was his favorite earlier. If *Henry* the Eighth negociated perpetually, and was perpetually the bubble of thoſe with whom and for whom he negociated, this happened chiefly becauſe he was in the firſt place the bubble of his miniſter —*Wolſey*'s avarice was fed and his ambition flattered by the emperor; by the court of France; and by that of Rome, in their turns. He ſupported himſelf, in great meaſure, at home by the opinion of his credit abroad;

abroad; and his maſter's favor to him was ſtrengthened by the art of thoſe whom he ſerved at his maſter's and his country's expence. In ſhort, the ſucceſs, or diſappointment of his private ſchemes, were the hinges on which the whole policy of this nation turned for twenty years; and the groſſeſt miſmanagement, obſtinately purſued, by the miniſter, in the midſt of univerſal diſapprobation, was ſanctified by the king.

The king, no doubt, thought himſelf as infallible in the choice of men as in the choice of meaſures; and therefore when he had once given his confidence to *Wolſey*, no matter by what inducements, his preſumption ſkreened the miniſter from his ſuſpicion.

It was eaſy for *Wolſey* to keep his maſter from hearkening to particular advice, or to the general voice of the people; becauſe it was eaſy to perſuade him that he wanted no advice; that he could not be deceived, though his people might; and perhaps, that it was unbecoming a great prince to alter his meaſures, or withdraw his favor, on the clamors of the public. At the ſame time, we may fairly ſuppoſe (for the monuments of hiſtory will juſtify us in ſuppoſing) that the butcher's ſon was not ſuch a bungler, nor rendered by a low education ſo void of addreſs, as not to know how to inſinuate without the air of adviſing; and how to receive all his own ſuggeſtions back from his maſter, in the ſtyle of orders, with the utmoſt demonſtration of implicit ſubmiſſion to his judgment, and abſolute reſignation to his will.

But however blind the king might be, the eyes of the people continued open to his and their true intereſt. The diſcontent grew general; and to this general diſcontent were owing the principal difficulties which *Henry* the Eighth met with, during the firſt half of his reign.

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—As much complaiſance as he had been uſed to find in his parliaments, he durſt not always demand money of them, for the ſupport of his enterprizes. His miniſter ſoon put him upon the expedient of raiſing it by his own authority. But theſe attempts were reſented warmly, and oppoſed ſo ſturdily, even when the rough name of a tax was changed into the ſofter ſound of a benevolence, that the king was obliged to retract; to compound; to excuſe himſelf; to diſavow his miniſter; and to pardon all thoſe who had been concerned in particular inſurrections, from a fear of one which might become univerſal.

No prince could be more firmly ſeated on his throne. No prince could be leſs framed to brook oppoſition. No prince could be leſs ſuſceptible of fear. And yet to this point of diſtreſs did *Henry* the Eighth bring himſelf, by truſting his firſt miniſter too much, and regarding the ſenſe of his people too little.—All orders of men concurred on theſe occaſions; and the merchants ſignalized themſelves. Neither the flattery, nor the menaces of *Wolſey* could prevail on them to be ſilent, when they felt that their own and the national intereſts were ſacrificed or neglected at every turn. Much leſs could they be cozened ſo far as to expoſe their fortunes in trade, the only fortunes which merchants acquired in thoſe days, in order to conceal the blunder of a miniſter, or to ſtop the clamor againſt him. We find a remarkable inſtance of this behavior of the merchants in the year 1528; when the commerce of the Low Countries, on which our woollen trade depended principally at that time, was interrupted by a war with the emperor, which evidently took its riſe from no other motive than a pique of the miniſter.

The ill ſucceſs of theſe illegal methods, obliged the king to have recourſe to his parliament; but his parliament thought like his people; and the oppoſition

ſition given in the Houſe of Commons was ſuch as became the repreſentative body of the nation. That which happened in the year 1523, is worthy of particular obſervation. It was not grounded only on the exorbitancy of the ſum demanded, but likewiſe on the nature of the ſervice for which the demand was made. As high as prerogative was carried at this time, and as undiſputed a point as the power of the crown to make war or peace might be; yet it is undeniable that the commons would not give money, without knowing how it was to be employed; and that they proportioned their grants to the judgment they made of the reaſonableneſs or unreaſonableneſs of the employment deſigned. *Wolſey*, the moſt inſolent miniſter our nation had ſeen at that time, was however ſo far from objecting to this method of proceeding in the Houſe of Commons, that he opened to that houſe in a long diſcourſe, the reaſons of the king's meaſures, as he affected to call his own meaſures; and endeavoured to prove the neceſſity of ſupporting them. Nay, when neither his rhetoric could perſuade, nor his authority influence, he offered to debate the whole matter, and to anſwer the objections of thoſe who oppoſed the king's deſires. The houſe rejected his offer; obſerved their forms; maintained their dignity. They diſapproved a war, wantonly undertaken, and in which the intereſts of the nation were not concerned. They ſhewed however their regard to the king, by giving ſome part of the ſubſidy, and their regard to the kingdom, by refuſing, to the laſt, to give the whole.

As for the miniſter, he received the mortification which he deſerved.—Theſe frequent oppoſitions, on the part of the people and the parliament, were really made to the miniſter. *Henry* the Eighth ſeemed, on ſome occaſions, to deſire that they ſhould be

be ſo underſtood, even before *Wolſey*'s favor began to be in its wain; and yet we ſhall have no reaſon to be ſurpriſed, if we conſider the true character of this prince, that theſe very oppoſitions prepared his mind for receiving thoſe leſſons which *Wolſey* was ready to give him, againſt liberty, and in favor of arbitrary power.—A wicked miniſter, who neither gains, nor deſerves to gain, the good will of a nation, muſt ſecure and will endeavor to revenge himſelf, by perſuading his maſter to neglect it. Force and corruption being the ſole means by which he can maintain his power, and preſerve his ill gotten wealth, it is neceſſary for him that the prince whom he ſerves, ſhould look upon thoſe as the ſole expedients by which government can be ſupported. *Wolſey* purſued this abominable ſcheme. "He "looked upon the king's ſubjects, "ſays *Rapin*," as "ſo many ſlaves; and unfortunately for them, he "inſpired the king by degrees with the ſame prin- "ciples; and inſinuated to him, that he ought to "conſider the parliament only as an inſtrument to "execute his will."—Theſe were the ſeeds he ſowed, which fell on a rank ſoil, and produced, in the latter half of *Henry*'s reign, ſuch bitter fruit as this nation never taſted before, nor ſince.—*Wolſey* had been the ſcandal and the ſcourge of his country whilſt he lived; and he continued to be ſo even in the grave.

LETTER

LETTER XI.

THE divorce of *Henry* the Eighth and *Catherine* of Arragon begins a new and moſt memorable æra in the general hiſtory of England; and indeed of all Europe. It is the beginning likewiſe of a new period in the particular reign of which we are ſpeaking.—A king, who had been till now the great aſſertor of the authority of the pope, and the great defender of the doctrine of the church of Rome, undertakes to deſtroy the former in his dominions, and gives ſeveral incureable wounds to the latter.—A king, whoſe whole attention had been employed abroad, and in whoſe time "there was no treaty and almoſt "conventicle in Chriſtendom, wherein he had not "his particular agent and intereſt," as my Lord *Herbert* expreſſes himſelf, becomes wholly taken up with domeſtic affairs; and if he looks abroad, during the reſt of his life, it is chiefly on account of what paſſes at home.—He, who had connived at ſeditions and pardoned inſurrections, grows impatient of the leaſt contradiction.—He, who had often compounded with his parliaments, and ſubmitted to them on many occaſions, dictates all their proceedings; and the voice of the law is little elſe than the echo of the voice of the king.—In ſhort; he, who had been led, amuſed, governed by his miniſter, drives, over-bears, tyrannizes; butchers his ſervants and his wives, his commons and his nobility.

When *Henry* the Eighth firſt engaged in the affair of the divorce, he could not foreſee the conſequences of it; becauſe he certainly did not expect the difficulties which gave occaſion to them. He went on during

the two firſt years, in the beaten road, by which ſo many others had gone before to the ſame end; and he ſeemed to have no view beſides that of employing the authority of one pope to undo what the authority of another pope had done. Nay, after *Cranmer* had began to open other views to him, he ſeemed ſtill to cling to Rome, reſolved to ſucceed any way; but deſirous to ſucceed that way.—Happy was it that he took his meaſures no better, and that he was no better ſerved on this occaſion than on many others!—He ſuffered himſelf to be amuſed by *Clement* the Seventh, the leaſt ſcrupulous man alive; and who would have divorced him, or have done any other pontifical job for him, if the league formed to reduce the emperor's power in Italy had ſucceeded. But the emperor's power there continuing to prevail, the pope concluded his treaty with this prince on the moſt advantageous terms. He obtained that favorite point, for which he would have ſacrificed not only the intereſt of *Henry* the Eighth, but even thoſe of the papacy itſelf. I mean the reeſtabliſhment of the family of *Medicis* on the ruins of the Florentine liberty. The loſs of Genoa, the total deſtruction of the French army in the kingdom of Naples, and ſeveral other conſiderations, induced *Francis* the Firſt to make his peace with the emperor likewiſe, and to ſubmit to the treaty of Cambray.

Thus did *Henry* the Eighth find himſelf at once diſappointed in the expectations he had been made to entertain from the court of Rome, and deſtitute of all foreign aſſiſtance; *Francis* being the only ally, of whom he could avail himſelf to influence the councils of Rome, in oppoſition to the emperor.

In this ſtate of affairs, *Henry* reſorted to that which will be always the beſt and ſureſt reſerve of a king

king of Great Britain; the inclinations and affections of his people. He had not the trouble of diſpoſing them, for he found them already diſpoſed to his purpoſes. The ſpirit, raiſed by *Wickliffe* about two centuries before, againſt the uſurpations of the pope and the clergy was ſtill alive. The ſufferings of the Lollards, as his followers were called, had not abated it. The art of printing had been propagated; and the late ſucceſs of *Luther* had encouraged it. There were multitudes therefore in all parts of the kingdom, who deſired a complete reformation of the church, both in doctrine and in diſcipline. Others again were content that the papal authority, grievous in its nature, and ſcandalous in its exerciſe, as well as the extravagant power and impertinent immunities of the clergy, ſhould be taken away. But they meant to go no farther. Many would not go even ſo far as this; but were ſtill ſlaves to all their prejudices; and remained in the midſt of this defection, attached to the pope, as well as to the corrupted doctrine and the depraved diſcipline of the church.

Whilſt the divorce was ſolicited at Rome, and the proceedings relating to it were carried on by the direction and under the authority of the pope, it was the king's affair; it was the affair of his miniſters. But when it appeared impracticable in this method, and *Henry* reſolved, in order to accompliſh it in another, to deliver himſelf and his people from the yoke of Rome; the affair of the divorce became a national affair, and the cauſe of the king became the cauſe of his ſubjects. As he proceeded in it, he was encouraged to proceed. The concurrence of his people grew every day more general, and he was ſupported with the greateſt warmth. He ſoon held the clergy at his mercy, and the popiſh party was broken and terrified, if not entirely cruſhed.

During this eager purſuit after eccleſiaſtical liberty, a power very dangerous to civil liberty was erected. We obſerved before that the prerogative had been carried high, and extended wide, in the reign of *Henry* the Eighth, who obtained much by law, and obtained more by his manner of conſtruing and executing the law. His ſon, parting with none of his authority, and improving the conjuncture ſo as to acquire a great deal more, acquired ſo much at laſt, that the power of the crown exceeded by far that proportion, which is conſiſtent with the ſecurity of public liberty and private property. It is true, indeed, that he always took care to have the law on his ſide; and would neither venture on the exerciſe of acts of power againſt it, or without it. His experience in the former part of his reign had taught him the danger of ſuch a conduct; and, in the latter part, he had no occaſion to purſue it. The opinion of the nation went along with him now; and, as exorbitant as his demands frequently were, his parliaments refuſed him nothing. At one time, they gave up to him, in a great degree, the legiſlative authority; and his proclamations were made, under ſome reſtrictions, equivalent to acts of parliament. At another time, they aſcribed to him a ſort of infallibility; and letters patent, under the great ſeal, were made neceſſary to determine the atricles of faith, which men were to believe fully, and the doctrines, rites and ceremonies, which they were to obſerve and practiſe, under ſeveral penalties.—The ſuſpicious ſtate of affairs abroad was amplified to give a pretence to one of theſe laws; and the confuſed ſtate of religion at home, and the claſhing of parties about it, might afford ſome color to the other. —The truth is, that any pretence ſerved, at this time, to grant whatever the king deſired; a ſtronger inſtance of which cannot be imagined than that of the ſubſidy, obtained in the year 1540. *Henry* had got immenſe riches by the firſt and ſecond ſuppreſſi-

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on of monaſteries. A principal inducement to the laſt, which was likewiſe the greateſt, was this: that the king might be enabled, without taxing the people, to defend them againſt ſuch invaſions, as the court had been pleaſed to ſuppoſe; and with the rumors of which the nation had been purpoſely alarmed. Theſe invaſions did not happen. *Henry* continued in peace with all his neighbours; and yet the very next year, he not only accepted from the clergy of the province of Canterbury, with the approbation of parliament, a grant of the fifth part of their revenue; but he demanded a ſubſidy likewiſe of the Houſe of Commons. So extravagant a demand could not but meet with ſome oppoſition. The ſubſidy however was granted in as large a proportion, as if the nation had been engaged in a dangerous war. The reaſons for granting it were almoſt burleſque. It was affirmed, by the king's party, that he had laid out vaſt ſums in ſecuring the coaſts; and that the keeping his ſubjects in peace and plenty coſt him more than the moſt burthenſome war—Thus a precedent was made of converting into ordinary aids of the government thoſe heavy taxes, which ought never to be felt by the people, unleſs upon the moſt extraordinary occaſions. That they ought to be laid in time of war, neither was, nor ever could be, doubted. That they were equally neceſſary in time of peace, was now eſtabliſhed by the logic of the court; and we may be ſure that the argument would have been urged with ſtill more force and effect, if the nation had fallen, by the management of the courtiers in that age, into ſuch a ſituation as could neither be called properly a ſtate of war, or a ſtate of peace.

The abſolute power which *Henry* the Eighth exerciſed over the purſes, lives, liberties and conſciences of his people, was due to the entire influence which he had gained over the parliament; and this depen-

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dency of the two houſes on the king did, in effect, eſtabliſh tyranny by law.—If we look for the true cauſe of this dependency, we ſhall find it, as *Rapin* hath very judiciouſly obſerved, in thoſe diviſions of the nation, concerning religion, which I have mentioned above.—The party, which oppoſed all reformation, by a bigotted attachment to the diſcipline, as well as doctrine of the church of Rome, furniſhed the king with as many pretences for graſping at power, and ſqueezing money out of his people, as ambition could wiſh, or profuſion require.—The other two parties concurred with the king, and went together to a certain point; that is, to throw off the papal yoke, and to leſſen the power of the clergy. But here they ſeparated, and went different ways; one to carry the reformation forward, and the other to ſtop it where it then ſtood; whilſt the king ſeemed to keep in a middle way between them both.—Sometimes he ſeemed to favor thoſe whoſe principles led them to an entire reformation; and he touched the doctrine, though with a gentler hand than the diſcipline of the church.—Sometimes he appeared zealous for the doctrine, and even for ſome part of the diſcipline; and the manner in which he often executed that bloody ſtatute, the law of ſix articles, would incline one to think that he joined to his political conſiderations a tincture of religious prejudice on theſe heads. But however that was, certain it is that the hopes which each of theſe two parties entertained of the king, and the fears which they entertained of one another, occaſioned their continual bidding for him, if I may be allowed to uſe ſuch an expreſſion. This emulation formed then what it always muſt form, the moſt dangerous conjuncture to which liberty can be expoſed. When the motives of contending parties are founded on private ambition and avarice, the danger is great. How much greater muſt it be, when theſe motives are founded on religion likewiſe; when the heads

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and hearts of both ſides are heated even to enthuſiaſm; when this ſpirit mingles itſelf with the ſpirit of faction; ſo that ſome through folly, and ſome through knavery, are ready to ſacrifice public liberty to their particular ſchemes of religion?

In ſuch circumſtances as theſe was this nation when *Henry* the Eighth died; and if he had left a ſon and ſucceſſor, of full age, and bold and enterprizing like himſelf, our liberties had been irretrievably loſt, according to all appearances.—*Henry* the Eighth, by applying to his parliaments for the extraordinary powers which he exerciſed, and by taking theſe powers for ſuch terms, and under ſuch reſtrictions as the parliament impoſed, owned indeed ſufficiently that they did not belong of right to the crown. He owned likewiſe, in effect, more than any prince who went before him, how abſolutely the diſpoſition of the crown of England belongs to the people of England, by procuring ſo many different and oppoſite ſettlements of it to be made in parliament, and yet tyranny was actually eſtabliſhed. The freedom of our government might floriſh in ſpeculation; but certainly it did not ſubſiſt in practice. —In the caſe therefore ſuppoſed above, our forefathers would very ſoon have found how fatal it is, in any circumſtances, by any means, or under any pretences, to admit incroachments on the conſtitution; and how vain it is, when theſe encroachments are once admitted, for the ſervice of ſome preſent turn, to preſcribe limitations, to the exerciſe or duration of them.

But providence directed the courſe of things better, and broke thoſe ſhackles which we had forged for ourſelves. A minority followed this turbulent reign; the government was weak; the governors divided; and the temper of the peope ſuch as made it prudent to ſooth them. This the Duke of *Somerſet*

Somerſet did out of inclination, and the Duke of *Northumberland* out of policy. To the former we owe not only the complete eſtabliſhment of the church of England on the ruins of popery, but the firſt and great ſteps which were made to reſtore a free government. In the very firſt year of his adminiſtration, ſeveral acts which had paſſed in the reign of *Henry* the Eighth, and in ſome preceding reigns, grievous to the people, and deſtructive of liberty, were repealed; and among others that abſurd act which gave to proclamations the force of laws. The law of the ſix articles was likewiſe repealed. Others were explained, and ſeveral new laws were made in favor of civil, as well as eccleſiaſtical liberty; both of which got ſo much ſtrength, in the reign of *Edward* the Sixth, that they were able to ſtand the ſhort but violent ſhock of Queen *Mary*'s reign. This princeſs lived long enough to confirm, not to deſtroy, our religion by perſecution. The ill-concerted inſurrection of *Wyat* gave ſtrength to the faction which prevailed at court, and diſcouraged, for ſome time, all oppoſition; nay, the methods taken to influence the elections, and to gain by corruption the members who were choſen, were carried on ſo openly, that the price for which each man ſold himſelf, was publicly known. No wonder then if the papal authority was reſtored, and the queen's marriage with *Philip* the Second approved. But this ſtate of things could not laſt long, nor was the nation diſpoſed to bear a continual ſacrifice of her intereſt to Rome and Spain.

The parliament, corrupt as it was, began to revolt againſt the court. The ſpirit of liberty revived; and that ſpirit, and the ſpirit of reformation in religion, had made more progreſs than was readily perceived. This progreſs had been made principally among the commons; and therefore, though the authority

thority of the crown, of the council, and of the great lords kept up other appearances, yet there was a ſecret fire burning, which muſt and would have broke out. The effects of the cauſes, laid in the reign of *Henry* the Seventh, began now to appear. The lands of the nobility were leſſened, and thoſe of the commons increaſed. Trade had been encouraged for ſeveral years. We ſee that ſome care had been taken of it, even in the troubleſome times of *Edward* the Fourth, and very much was done towards the advancement of it in the reigns of *Henry* the Seventh and *Henry* the Eighth. The Weſt-Indies had been diſcovered about half a century before; and part of the immenſe treaſures, which flowed from thence into Europe, began to increaſe the profits; and increaſing the profits, to increaſe the induſtry of our merchants. *Henry* the Eighth had ſold a very great part of the church lands at low prices, on purpoſe to engage the body of the nation in one common intereſt againſt the Romiſh clergy. The commons had made their uſe of this ſtrain of policy, and had got into very great eſtates in lands, by theſe as well as by other means: ſo that the king, the lords and the church, who had formerly held ſo great an overbalance of property in land, had now little more than one-third of the whole belonging to them; the conſequences of which were not foreſeen by Queen *Mary*; neither did ſhe live long enough to feel them in any great degree. They did not eſcape the penetration of her ſiſter. She foreſaw them, and the great glory and happineſs of her reign may juſtly be attributed to this firſt principle; that ſhe had the wiſdom to diſcern not only the actual alteration, which was already made, but the growing alteration, which would every day increaſe in the ſtate of property; that ſhe accommodated at once the whole ſyſtem of her government to this great change; and inſtead

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of depending upon expedients, which were now no longer of ſeaſon, choſe the ſole expedient that remained, for making herſelf and her people happy; which was to place the whole ſtrength and ſecurity of her government in the affections of her people, and in her ſuperior credit with them.

LETTER

LETTER XII.

WE have now brought theſe remarks on the Engliſh hiſtory not only down to times little remote from our own, but to a period when the monarchy ſettled on a new foundation; upon which it ſtill continues and reſts more firmly than ever at this hour. The obſervations therefore, which remain to be made, in order to illuſtrate what hath been advanced concerning the ſpirit of liberty and the ſpirit of faction, will for theſe reaſons be the more appoſite, the more affecting, and by conſequence the more uſeful; but, for theſe very reaſons likewiſe, it is probable that they will become the occaſions of louder complaints, and of more impertinent clamor. We ſhall be ſincerely ſorry for this; becauſe we look on the alarm, which hath been taken at our endeavors to revive the ſpirit, and to confirm and propagate the doctrines of liberty, in a country where liberty is ſtill avowed, and under a government eſtabliſhed on the principles of liberty, as a moſt ſuſpicious and melancholy ſymptom. But the ſtronger this ſymptom appears, the more incumbent we ſhall think it upon us to purſue the honeſt deſign, to which we have devoted ourſelves with conſtancy and vigor.

The ſhameleſs crew, who write againſt their country, as they would write againſt their God, for hire, ſhall have little regard from us. The ſcandalous licence with which they have preſumed to draw odious parallels and the impudence with which they have imputed theſe parallels to us, have been abundantly expoſed already. The few, the very few things, which they have alledged in point of fact,

fact, or argument, have been often anſwered; perhaps too often, conſidering how little weight they carried with them, and how little impreſſion they were capable of making on the underſtanding even of thoſe who had other reaſons for inclining to that ſide of the queſtion. The ribaldry which theſe ſcribblers employ, hath been and will continue to be deſpiſed, not anſwered. It cannot be expected that we ſhould take notice of every little, frivolous, childiſh declamation, which appears in public, however ſome perſons may demean themſelves by pretending to admire them. The menaces, affectedly and inſolently thrown out on one ſide, and the flattery, ſervilely offered on the other, are equally objects of our contempt; and if we take a little notice of the former, once for all, before we proceed any farther in theſe remarks, it is purely becauſe we cannot underſtand them to be the language of theſe writers. When they talk in this ſtyle, they ſpeak the language of him who guides their pens, and who is known to reward their labors. To him therefore it may not be improper to addreſs ourſelves in the following manner.

"The perſons, whom you threaten, Sir, neither "value your favor, nor fear your anger. When- "ever you attempt any act of power againſt any of "them, you ſhall find that you have to do with "men who know they have not offended the law, "and therefore truſt they have not offended the "king; who know they are ſafe, as long as the "laws and liberties of their country are ſo; and "who are ſo little deſirous of being ſafe any longer, "that they would be the firſt to bury themſelves in "the ruins of the Britiſh conſtitution, if you, or "any miniſter as deſperate as you, ſhould be able "to deſtroy it. But let us aſk, on this occaſion, "what you are, who thus preſume to threaten?— "Are you not one, whoſe meaſure of folly and ini-

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"quity is full; who can neither hold nor quit his "power with impunity; and over whoſe head the "long-gathering cloud of national vengeance is "ready to burſt?—Is it not time for you, Sir, in- "ſtead of threatening to attack others, to conſider "how ſoon you may be attacked yourſelf?—How "many crimes may be charged upon you and yours, "which almoſt every man can prove, and how ma- "ny more are ready to ſtart into light, as ſoon as "the power by which you now conceal them, ſhall "determine?—When next you meditate revenge "on your adverſaries, remember this truth: the "laws muſt be deſtroyed before they can ſuffer, or "you eſcape."

Let us now return to our ſubject.—In the early days of our government, after the Norman invaſion, the commons of England were rather formidable in their collective, than conſiderable in their repreſentative body; by their numbers in extraordinary emergencies, rather than by their weight in the ordinary courſe of government. In later days they began to acquire ſome of this weight by degrees. They repreſented grievances; they gave or refuſed ſubſidies; and they exerciſed, in a regular, ſenatorial manner, the powers lodged in them by the conſtitution; but ſtill they did not obtain the entire weight, till they were wholly emancipated; and they were not ſo till the great change, which we are ſpeaking of, happened. Before this time, they had too much of the dependency of tenants: and the king, the nobility and the clergy had too much of the ſuperiority of landlords. This dependency of the commons added to that, which the crown frequently found means of creating, either by influencing their elections, or by corrupting their repreſentatives, notwithſtanding all the proviſions made againſt it, which we have touched in a * former paper, kept this

* See the Craftſman, No 225.

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part of the legiſlature in ſuch a ſtate, as made it unable fully to anſwer the end of its inſtitution; and the ſyſtem of our government was by conſequence, in this reſpect, defective.

Could *Henry* the Seventh have found means, as he reduced the nobility lower, to have hindered the commons from riſing higher; could he have opened a way to the diminution of the property of the lords, and have prevented that increaſe of the ſame property amongſt the commons, to which, on the contrary, he gave occaſion, and which time and accidents conſpired to bring about; the balance of this government would have been totally loſt, though the outward forms of it had been preſerved. Our liberty would have been loſt by conſequence; and our kings, with an houſe of lords and an houſe of commons, and all the appearances of limited monarchs, might have been as arbitrary as thoſe princes are, who govern countries, where no ſuch conſtitution prevails. The reaſon of this will appear plain to thoſe who remember what hath been obſerved, in ſome of our former papers, that a dependent exerciſe of the power lodged in the two houſes of parliament will endanger, and may, more effectually than any other expedient, deſtroy liberty; and that the preſervation of our freedom is no way to be ſecured but by a free and independent exerciſe of theſe powers. Now ſuch an exerciſe could not have continued, much leſs have been improved, if *Henry* the Seventh had been able, at the ſame time, to weaken his nobility, and to keep his commons from acquiring new ſtrength. But this was impracticable. At leaſt, it was not attempted. *Henry* the Seventh haſtened to the cure of that evil which preſſed him moſt, the power of the nobility, as his ſon ſoon afterwards effectually reduced the exorbitant power of the clergy; and in pulling down theſe powers, which, as they

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were conſtituted and had been exerciſed, hurt the crown more than they ſerved the people, theſe princes became the inſtruments of raiſing another power, which is the beſt, if not the ſole effectual barrier againſt uſurpaitons of illegal, and abuſes of legal prerogatives; and which, at the ſame time, can never be applied to do any real hurt to the crown, unleſs in caſes where it is bent and forced to do this hurt by the crown itſelf, in the firſt place, againſt the natural tendency and direction of it.

This increaſe of the property of the commons, by taking off from them a conſtant dependency of one ſort, and by rendering them leſs obnoxious to an occaſional dependency of another, gave greater dignity, and added greater weight in the balance of government, to their repreſentative body. The Houſe of Commons became more powerful, without the attribution of any new powers, and purely by the different manner in which their independency, the effect of their property, enabled them to exerciſe the ſame powers, which they enjoyed before. A concert with a few great lords, and a few leading prelates, was now no longer ſufficient to guide the ſenſe of parliament, and to eſtabliſh the meaſures of government; no, not even in caſes where this concert might be extended to ſome of the commons themſelves. Intrigue and cabal became unneceſſary, when the national intereſt was wiſely purſued; and ineffectual when it was not. The way was open to gain the parliament, by gaining the nation; but to impoſe on the nation, by gaining the parliament was hard; for the weight without doors determined, in thoſe days, the weight within. The ſame cauſes, which rendered the Houſe of Commons more conſiderable to the court, to the nobility, to the clergy, to the commons themſelves, rendered likewiſe the whole body of the commons of more importance to

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thoſe who were choſen to repreſent them. Beſides which, the frequency of new elections, which was deemed an advantage, as long as the ſervice was deemed an honorable burthen, gave the nation frequent opportunities of modelling the repreſentative body, according to the intereſts and inclinations of the collective body. From hence it followed, that that credit and influence in the nation, which can only be acquired and preſerved by adhering to the national intereſt, became the ſole means of maintaining a laſting credit and influence in the Houſe of Commons; upon which the harmony of government and the happineſs of prince and people depended more than ever.

Thus were we brought back, in times very diſtant, and in circumſtances very different, to the principles of government, which had prevailed amongſt our Saxon anceſtors, before they left Germany. Whatever particular pre-eminencies, or powers, were veſted in the principal men, the great affairs of ſtate were directed by the whole body of the nation.—De minoribus principes, de majoribus omnes.

Such were the natural effects of this new ſettlement; and thus our limited monarchy became capable of as much perfection, as wiſdom and favorable accidents can communicate to any human inſtitution; for can we raiſe our ideas of this kind of perfection higher than ordering the diſtribution of property and power in ſuch a manner, that the privileges of the people and the prerogative of the crown cannot be taken away, unleſs with their own conſent, or by their own fault? Now to this point of perfection was the conſtitution of our government brought, and farther it could not be brought; becauſe it is impoſſible to ſecure either prince or people againſt themſelves, or againſt the effects of their own conduct.

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One part of what hath been ſaid upon this ſubject will not, I think, be diſputed. The other, perhaps, may ſeem a paradox; and a ſettlement, which rendered our government more democratical, will not be readily allowed to have been advantageous to the crown, though it muſt be allowed to have been ſo to the people.—Let us examine therefore whether it was really ſo, or not.

In all limited monarchies, and we are not ſpeaking of any other, the power of preſerving theſe limitations muſt be placed ſomewhere. The queſtion therefore is, whether it can be placed more advantageouſly, even for the crown as well as the people, than in the whole body of the nation.

Whilſt the commons had not property enough to have any ſhare in this power, the ſole check, which could be oppoſed to the encroachments of the crown, was the power of the barons and of the clergy. But theſe two orders of men had their particular intereſts, frequently oppoſite to each other and to thoſe of the people, as well as to thoſe of the crown; ſo that they were not only very incapable of forming a ſecure barrier to liberty, but their power became terrible and dangerous to the crown itſelf. They ſlided eaſily into faction. They often encroached on the prince's authority, whilſt they reſiſted his encroachments, real or pretended, on their own privileges; and under the plauſible veil of law, or goſpel, private ambition had a greater ſhare than public liberty in their conteſts. It is true, that during theſe conteſts, Magna Charta was ſigned and confirmed; and the condition of the people, in point of liberty, very much improved. But this was the accidental effect of the conteſts between the kings, the barons and the clergy, as we have remarked in ſpeaking of thoſe times, and not the natural effect of the property and power, lodged in the barons and the clergy. The commons were

courted by all ſides, becauſe they were wanted by all. Had they been bubbles enough to look on the nobility and clergy as the proper guardians of liberty, and to have adhered to them accordingly, they might indeed have avoided being ſlaves to their kings, but they would have rendered both their kings and themſelves little leſs than ſlaves to their temporal and ſpiritual lords.

After the reigns of *Edward* the Firſt, and *Edward* the Third, power came to be better poized, and our government took a more regular form. The prerogatives of our kings, and the privileges of our nobility, the authority and immunity of the church, and the rights of the people, were more aſcertained; and yet, after this time, the ſame obſervations will hold good in a very great degree. It is certain that the vaſt over-balance of property and power, which ſtill continued in the nobility and clergy, inſtead of preventing, ſoftening, or ſhortening the calamities which followed, helped to form and maintain thoſe factions, which began, renewed, fomented the civil wars of York and Lancaſter, as well as the wicked conduct of *Richard* the Second, and the weak conduct of *Henry* the Sixth. Redreſs of grievances and ſufficient ſecurity againſt them for the future might have ſatisfied the people, if they had been left to themſelves; but nothing leſs than revolutions of government could ſatisfy the factions into which the great men were divided, and into which they divided the nation, by their influence over the people, and by the advantages which the ill conduct of the Yorkiſts and Lancaſtrians gave to each other.

Thus we ſee how unſafely for the crown, as well as inſecurely for the people, that property and power, which is neceſſary to preſerve the limitations of our monarchy, was placed before the time, when that great change in the one and the other happened,

happened, which makes the ſubject of this diſcourſe. But as ſoon as this change did happen, the crown was no longer expoſed to the ſame miſchiefs.

When the little power, which *Henry* the Fourth of France had in the town of Rochelle, was objected to him, he made an anſwer worthy of his heroic ſpirit. "I do, ſaid he, all I deſire to do "there, in doing nothing but what I ought."—This moderation of temper is, in all governments, the beſt, and, in limited monarchies, the only ſure and durable foundation of power. By preventing jealouſy in the people of the prince, it takes away all advantage againſt his government from faction; and the more watchful the people are over their liberties, the more ſenſible will they be of this moderation, and the more grateful for it. Faction proceeds always without reaſon; but it can hardly ever ſucceed without pretence, and ſufficient pretence will hardly be found under ſuch a government.

When a prince, who manifeſts this moderation of temper purſues the true intereſt of his people, and ſuffers no other intereſt to come into any degree of competition with it, far from being the object of their jealouſy, he will be the principal object of their affection; and if he joins to this character of goodneſs that of ability, he will be the principal object of their confidence likewiſe. Theſe are the ſtrongeſt chains, by which a people can be bound to their prince; eaſier indeed, but far ſtronger than thoſe of adamant, by which *Dioniſius* the elder boaſted that he had ſecured the tyranny of Syracuſe to his ſon; force, fear, a multitude of troops, and a guard of ten thouſand barbarians.—A prince who eſtabliſhes his government on the principles of affection, hath every thing to hope and nothing to fear from his people. A prince, who eſtabliſhes his government on any other principles, acts in contradiction to the very end of his inſtitution. What

objection therefore could be made, even on the part of the crown, to a ſettlement of property and power, which put the guardianſhip of liberty into ſuch hands as never did, nor ever will invade the prerogative and authority of the crown, whilſt they are employed to thoſe purpoſes, for which alone they were intruſted? It is confeſſed that if a prince ſhould attempt to eſtabliſh his government on any other principle than theſe; if he ſhould chuſe to depend rather on deceiving, corrupting, or forcing his people, than on gaining their affection and confidence; he might feel the weight of their property and power very heavy in the ſcale againſt him. But then it muſt be confeſſed likewiſe that in ſuch a caſe, this oppoſition of the people would be juſt; and that the prince, not the people, would be anſwerable to himſelf and his family, to *God* and to man, for all the ill conſequences which might follow.

We hope that we have ſaid nothing, in order to ſhew the excellency of our conſtitution, as it ſettled about the time of Queen *Elizabeth*, which is not agreeable to reaſon; and ſure we are that the truth of theſe general propoſitions will be confirmed by the particular examples which are to follow.—The reign of Queen *Elizabeth* will be one continued proof that the power of preſerving the limitations of a monarchy cannot be placed better, for a good and wiſe prince, than in the whole body of the people; and that the ſpirit of liberty will give greater ſtrength, as well as procure greater eaſe, to the government of ſuch a prince, than any abſolute monarch can hope to find in the moſt abject ſpirit, which principles of blind ſubmiſſion and paſſive obedience are capable of inſpiring.—The reigns immediately ſucceeding this, will be one continued proof, that whenever the power of the people hath been exerciſed againſt the crown, it hath been owing primarily to the weak management and obſtinacy

ſtinacy of the court, and to the unhappy choice which thoſe princes made of governing by factions, in oppoſition to the ſenſe and intereſt of the nation. From whence it will follow, that the great calamities which befel our country, in the middle of the laſt century, are unjuſtly charged on the ſpirit of liberty, or on the nature of the Britiſh conſtitution of government.

LETTER

LETTER XIII.

THERE is no part of our annals, nor perhaps of the annals of any other country, which deſerves to be more ſtudied, or to be oftener called to remembrance both by thoſe who govern, and by thoſe who are governed, than the reign of Queen *Elizabeth*. We ſhall not however deſcend into all the obſervations which it affords; nor even into all thoſe which might properly ſerve to our preſent purpoſe.

In ſome* papers we made a few remarks on this reign, and on that of King *James* the Firſt. We apprehend that the contraſt between them appeared very ſtrong on that occaſion. This contraſt will probably appear ſtill much ſtronger, and by conſequence be the more inſtructive, when thoſe remarks and theſe we are going to make come to centre in one ſingle point; to ſhew that the conduct of Queen *Elizabeth*, under great diſadvantages, produced all the good effects, which prince or people could deſire; becauſe it was wiſely ſuited to the nature of our government: whereas the conduct of King *James* the Firſt, who had many and great advantages which his predeceſſor wanted, made his reign grievous to the people, uneaſy to himſelf, and acceſſory to thoſe misfortunes which befel his ſon; becauſe it was ill-ſuited to the nature of our government, and founded on principles deſtructive of liberty.

Few princes, no, not even her cotemporary *Henry* the Fourth of France, have been ever raiſed to a

* See the Craftſman, N° 137, 138, 139.

throne

throne under more disadvantageous circumstances, or have been surrounded in it with more complicated difficulties than Queen *Elizabeth*.—Let us take a general survey of them.

The division and animosity of parties had been carried to the height of religious rage. The cruelty of Queen *Mary*'s reign, in which much Protestant blood had been shed, and even that of her sister with difficulty spared, rendered of course the persecuting side more desperate, and the other more exasperated. It is hard to imagine that Queen *Elizabeth* had been able to cultivate many personal attachments to herself, before she came to the crown; except that of Sir *William Cecil*, afterwards Lord *Burleigh*, and perhaps one or two more. Her imprisonment for a time, and the great constraint under which she lived, during her sister's whole reign, gave her little opportunity for it; and the jealous eye, with which *Gardiner* and other ecclesiastical zealots observed her conduct, made it dangerous to attempt it.

In general the Protestants desired her succession; and the Papists feared it. But the former were under oppression, and even a kind of proscription. The latter had the whole authority of the church and the state in their hands, in this kingdom; and that of Ireland, bigotted to popery and prone to rebellion, was at their devotion.—The Protestants themselves were divided, and those who meant equally a reformation, fell into the utmost asperity against each other, concerning the manner of making it, and the point to which it ought to be carried, on account of religion as well as of policy.

In this divided state, and in the ferment which such divisions must necessarily cause, Queen *Elizabeth* found the people, whom she came to govern. Surely, a more nice and perilous state can hardly be imagined;

imagined; eſpecially for her, who was led by inclination and determined by particular circumſtances of intereſt to eſtabliſh the reformation; that is, to declare for the weakeſt, though not the leaſt numerous party.

It is obſerved, I think by *Nathaniel Bacon* in his hiſtorical and political diſcourſes, that the methods taken by *Henry* the Seventh to accumulate treaſure, made a rich king indeed, but did not inrich the crown. His ſon had ſeveral opportunities of doing both; inſtead of which he impoveriſhed himſelf, the crown, and the people, by all the methods which the moſt wanton profuſion could invent. He exhauſted the wealth of the nation. He did more. He debaſed the coin, by mingling it with copper, and loaded the public with debts. Theſe again were conſiderably increaſed in the reign of *Edward* the Sixth. Queen *Mary* was ſo far from diminiſhing them, that one of the principal complaints againſt her adminiſtration, next to the cruelty ſhe exerciſed, was the great diſſipation of the revenue, occaſioned by her reſtitutions to the church, and by her new foundations of monaſteries.—In this low, incumbered ſtate Queen *Elizabeth* found the revenues of the crown, and the wealth of the nation.

Her ſituation abroad was ſtill worſe than her ſituation at home. Calais, and the other Engliſh poſſeſſions in Picardy, had been loſt in a quarrel, where the intereſt of England had no concern. For the ſake of Spain, we had war with France. The war with Scotland ſtill continued; and Queen *Elizabeth* had no one ally, on whoſe aſſiſtance ſhe could depend.

Such diſtreſſed ſituations are rare; and when they have happened, they have been often rendered leſs difficult in reality, than in appearance, by ſome particular

particular circumſtances which have attended them. But when *Elizabeth* began her reign, no ſuch circumſtances exiſted in her favor. On the contrary, almoſt every circumſtance aggravated her diſtreſs. The thrones of France and Spain were filled neither by old men, worn out with age and cares; nor by weak men, unequal to their rank and buſineſs; nor by children, under the tuition of regents. *Henry* the Second reigned in France; *Philip* the Second in Spain; princes, in the vigor of their age; of great ambition; of great talents; and ſeconded by the ableſt miniſters and generals in Europe. The French monarchy had been growing up from the time of *Lewis* the Eleventh, towards that fulneſs of power and affluence of wealth, at which the Spaniſh monarchy was already arrived. Both theſe princes were, by bigotry and by policy, attached to the court of Rome; implacable enemies to the reformation; and ſuch by conſequence to Queen *Elizabeth*. *Henry* the Second had a farther reaſon for being ſo. He graſped, in his ambitious views, the crown of England, as well as that of Scotland; and looked on Queen *Elizabeth* as the uſurper of a right, belonging to his daughter-in-law. *Philip*, indeed, kept ſome faint and affected meaſures with *Elizabeth*, as long as he apprehended the union of ſo many crowns in the houſe of Valois: but this apprehenſion was ſoon at an end; and even his ſhews of friendſhip with it. *Henry* the Second, and his eldeſt ſon, *Francis* the Second, died in about two years. The deaths of theſe princes did, perhaps, diminiſh the difficulties and dangers to which Queen *Elizabeth* ſtood expoſed on one hand; but then they increaſed theſe difficulties and dangers on the other; ſince they took off all reſtraint from *Philip* in purſuit of his enterprizes againſt her. His life laſted almoſt as long as hers, and his inveterate enmity as long as his life.

Another

Another ſource, from which difficulties and dangers were inceſſantly ariſing to Queen *Elizabeth*, lay in the objections which the Papiſts made to her title, on a principle of religion; and which were but too really, though indirectly abetted by ſome Proteſtants, on a principle of faction.—Whilſt diſputes about the ſucceſſion to the crown were confined to England, and turned on maxims of our own growth, if I may uſe that expreſſion, we have ſeen how little regard was paid to the titles, and to the pretended divine, indefeaſable right of princes But when foreign nations came to be intereſted in the ſucceſſion of our crown, they reaſoned and they proceeded on other notions; not on thoſe which both cuſtom and law had eſtabliſhed here.

The attacks of this kind, made on Queen *Elizabeth*, were the more grievous to her, becauſe they not only united the Roman-Catholic powers againſt her; but they made the diviſions wider and more irreconcileable at home, where ſhe placed the chief ſtrength and ſecurity of her government.

Mary Queen of Scotland was a pretender, neither abjured in England, nor diſavowed and unſupported in other countries. Sovereign of one part of the iſland, ſhe had a powerful party in the other; wife of the dauphin, and after that Queen of France; encouraged and aſſiſted by her uncles, who poſſeſſed more than regal power in that kingdom; by Spain, and by the whole popiſh intereſt; ſhe was juſtly formidable to Queen *Elizabeth*, as long as ſhe lived.—Another circumſtance made her ſo ſtill more. The ſucceſs of the reformation ſeemed to increaſe the zeal of thoſe who continued in the communion of the church of Rome. The influence of the court of Rome became conſequently ſtronger at this point of time. It appeared

appeared both in France and in England too as powerful, though not as ſucceſsful, here at leaſt, as it had appeared in the eleventh century, in the days of the brave but unfortunate emperor, *Henry* the Fourth, and of that inſolent friar, *Gregory* the Seventh.—Even this circumſtance may juſtly ſeem to have been inforced by another, by the eſtabliſhment of the order of jeſuits. This order, the offspring of a mad Spaniard, has had the principal honor, though other religious orders have endeavored to ſhare it, of giving to the pope an authority like that which was exerciſed by the king of the aſſaſſins, or the old man of the mountain, as he is called by ſome of the French hiſtorians; an authority which proved fatal to *Henry* the Third, and *Henry* the Fourth of France; and which had like to have proved ſo to Queen *Elizabeth*, and even to her ſucceſſor.

Such were the difficulties and dangers which encompaſſed this princeſs. The ſituation of England, in her time, reſembled that of a town powerfully beſieged without, and expoſed to treachery and ſedition within. That a town, in ſuch circumſtances, ſhould defend itſelf, and even force the enemy, by its own ſtrength, to raiſe the ſiege, hardly falls within the bounds of probability. But that all this ſhould happen, and the inhabitants feel none of the inconveniencies of a long and obſtinate ſiege, nay, that they ſhould grow opulent during the continuance of it, and find themſelves at laſt better able to offend the enemy than they were at firſt to defend their walls, ſeems an adventure of ſome extravagant romance. But it conveys a true image of this reign.—Unallied and alone, Queen *Elizabeth* maintained a glorious and ſucceſsful war againſt the greateſt power and the richeſt potentate in Europe. She diſtreſſed him in the Weſt-Indies. She inſulted him in Spain. She took from him the empire of the ſea. She fixed

it

it in herſelf. She rendered all the projects of univerſal monarchy vain; and ſhook to the foundations the moſt exorbitant power which ever diſturbed the peace, or threatened the liberties of Europe. She ſupported the oppreſſed people of the Netherlands, againſt the tyranny of their prince. She ſupported the Proteſtant ſubjects of France, againſt *Catherine* of Medicis and her ſons, thoſe execrable butchers of their people. She ſupported the kings of France, *Henry* the Third and Fourth, againſt the ambition of the princes of the houſe of Lorraine, and the rebellious league of their popiſh ſubjects. She, who ſeemed to have every thing to fear in the beginning of her reign, became in the progreſs of it terrible to her enemies. The pretender to her crown loſt her own. The Engliſh, who appeared at firſt ſo favorable to the Queen of Scotland, became at laſt as deſirous to ſacrifice the life of that unfortunate princes to the ſecurity of Queen *Elizabeth*. Whilſt war, confuſion, and the miſeries which attend them, raged in the dominions of thoſe who bent their aim at the diſturbance of her government; ſhe preſerved her ſubjects in peace and in plenty. Whilſt the glory of the nation was carried high by atchievements in war; the riches and the ſtrength of it were raiſed by the arts of peace to ſuch a degree, as former ages had never ſeen, and as we of this age feel in the conſequences. Well therefore might my Lord *Bacon*, ſpeaking of Queen *Elizabeth*, ſay, * "As "for her government, I aſſure myſelf I ſhall not "exceed, if I do affirm that this part of the iſland "never had forty-five years of better times; and "yet not through the calmneſs of the ſeaſon, but "through the wiſdom of her regiment."

Having made theſe remarks on the difficulties and on the ſucceſs which attended Queen *Elizabeth*, it is

* Advancement of learning, lib. 1.

time

time to consider the cause, which produced the stupendous effects of her reign. Now this cause is, I think, very plain. She was wise enough to see clearly into the nature of that government, at the head of which she was placed; and to know that * "the supreme head of such a government owes a "supreme service to the whole." She was wise enough to know that to be powerful, she must either usurp on her people, deceive them, or gain them. The two first, she saw, were hard, dangerous and dishonorable. The last, she saw, was easy, safe and glorious. Her head and her heart concurred to determine her choice, She made herself very soon the most popular person in the kingdom. In her reign, the sense of the court, the sense of the parliament, and the sense of the people, were the same; and whenever she exerted her own strength, she exerted the whole strength of the nation. Nothing she asked was ever refused by parliament; because she asked nothing which would have been refused by the people. She threw herself so intirely on the affections of her subjects, that she seemed to decline all other tenure of the crown. At least, she was not very solicitous about clearing her title to it by descent. An act, declaring her right according to the order of succession settled in parliament thirty-five *Henry* the Eighth contented her; and she neglected the precaution, which her sister had taken, in getting the act, which excluded them both from the crown, repealed, as far as it related to herself. The particular reasons of her conduct, in this case, might perhaps be guessed at with more probability than they have been; but certainly one general reason outweighed them all in the mind of this heroical princess. She knew that however the subtlety of lawyers and political casuists might influence opinions, nothing but her own conduct could give her the hearts of her

* See *Nath. Bacon's* Hist. and Pol. Discourse.

people.

people. Theſe ſhe deemed her great ſecurity. Theſe ſhe acquired; and the little gloſſes, which might have been put on her title, ſhe deſpiſed. The being not only tied but knit to her people was her aim; and ſhe purſued this great point of view on all occaſions; the leaſt, as well as the greateſt; and even on thoſe, where ſhe thought it neceſſary to refuſe or to reprimand. Nature, as well as art, fitted her for this conduct. She had dignity without pride. She was affable without ſinking into low familiarity; and when ſhe courted her people, ſhe courted them like a queen. This popularity was ſometimes carried ſo far, both in her manners, and in her expreſſions, that her enemies have endeavored to make it paſs for groſs and fulſome affectation, and for ſuch, indeed, it ought to have paſſed if it had gone alone. It might have ſhocked, inſtead of alluring, if it had not been ſeconded by every action of her life, and contradicted by none. —Let us now conſider therefore, in ſome inſtances, what that conduct was, which convinced her people ſo intirely of her goodneſs and her wiſdom; and which procured her ſuch large returns of gratitude, of duty, of affection and zeal.

LETTER

LETTER XIV.

A FIRST and eſſential condition, towards obtaining the love and confidence of a free people, is to be neither feared nor deſpiſed by them. Queen *Elizabeth* was, at no time, in any danger of the latter; and ſhe ſoon put herſelf above all the ſuſpicions, which might have expoſed her to the former. The only difference between her and her parliament, which carried any paſſion or unkindneſs with it, happened in the ninth year of her reign. It was founded on the apprehenſions of the dangers which would ariſe after her death, if the ſucceſſion was not fixed during her life. But we do not find the leaſt inſinuation of any jealouſy of her government; though the heat of both houſes, at that moment, was too great to have concealed any uneaſineſs, which had lain at their hearts. That ſhe was fond enough of her prerogative is certain: but then ſhe took care that it ſhould never be grievous; or that if it was ſo, on ſome occaſions, to particular perſons, it ſhould appear, by the occaſions themſelves, and by the manner of exerciſing it, ſpecious to the public.—The prerogative certainly run high in thoſe days. Her grandfather had raiſed it by cunning, and her father by violence. The power of the privy council in civil affairs, and the cenſorian power of the ſtar-chamber in criminal affairs, as my Lord *Bacon* very properly ſtiles it, took too much of the pleas of the crown and of the common pleas out of their proper channels, and * "ſerved

* *Bac.* Hiſt. and Pol. Diſc.

"rather

" rather to ſcare men from doing wrong, than to " do any man right."—But the exerciſe of theſe powers having continued in four preceding reigns, the people were accuſtomed to it; and care being taken to give no flagrant occaſion of clamor againſt it, we are not to wonder if it was borne, without oppoſition or murmur, in a reign as popular as this.

The high-commiſſion court, that we may quote another inſtance, had no doubt very extraordinary powers. The biſhops, who held the principal ſway in it, exerciſed by theſe means two very great authorities at the ſame time; one, as ordinaries in their dioceſes; the other, as judges in this court; ſo that they might fine and impriſon, as well as excommunicate and deprive. Now, it is not very probable, that the parliament, who thought the firſt of theſe powers too much, as may be ſeen by the attempts made againſt it, in the twenty-eighth year of this reign, were very well pleaſed to ſee the ſecond in the ſame hands. However, the ſteadineſs of the queen, in maintaining this part of the prerogative, which had been given her, was the leſs unpopular, on account of the unſettled ſtate of religion at this time; of the great moderation of the biſhops in theſe early days of the reformation; and of the prudent manner, in which the juriſdiction of the high-commiſſion court was executed.

The effects of a bare-faced prerogative are not the moſt dangerous to liberty, for this reaſon; becauſe they are open; becauſe the alarm they give is commonly greater than the progreſs they make; and whilſt a particular man or two are cruſhed by them, a whole nation is put on its guard.—The moſt dangerous attacks on liberty are thoſe which ſurprize, or undermine; which are owing to powers, given under pretence of ſome urgent neceſſity; to powers, popular and reaſonable, perhaps, at firſt; but ſuch as ought not to become

ſettled

ſettled and confirmed by a long exerciſe; and yet are rendered perpetual by art and management; and, in a great degree, by the nature of theſe powers themſelves. Examples of this kind, might be produced from the Spaniſh and other hiſtories. But Queen *Elizabeth* was far from ſetting any ſuch example. She ſhewed her moderation, in deſiring no ſuſpicious powers, as well as in the exerciſe of her prerogative; and this moderation was the more remarkable, becauſe no prince ever had the pretence of neceſſity to urge on ſtronger appearances. Her whole reign may be almoſt called a ſtate of defenſive and offenſive war, in England, as well as in Ireland; in the Indies, as well as in Europe. She ventured to go through this ſtate, if it was a venture, without the help of a ſtanding army. The people of England had ſeen none, from the days of *Richard* the Second; and this cautious queen might perhaps imagine, that the example of his reign and thoſe of other countries, where ſtanding armies were eſtabliſhed, would beget jealouſies in the minds of her people, and diminiſh that affection, which ſhe eſteemed and found to be the greateſt ſecurity of her perſon, and the greateſt ſtrength of her government. Whenever ſhe wanted troops her ſubjects flocked to her ſtandard; and her reign affords moſt illuſtrious proofs, that all the ends of ſecurity, and of glory too, may be anſwered in this iſland, without the charge and danger of the expedient juſt mentioned.

This aſſertion will not be contradicted by thoſe, who recollect in how many places, and on how many occaſions her forces fought and conquered the beſt diſciplined veteran troops in Europe. Other examples might be brought to ſhew how careful Queen *Elizabeth* was to avoid every thing which might give the leaſt umbrage to her people. But

we have ſaid enough on this head. Let us proceed to another.

The conduct ſhe held, with reſpect to parties, deſerves to be remarked; becauſe the moderation, the wiſdom, and the equity, which ſhe ſhewed in it, contributed very much to cool the ferment in the beginning of her reign; by which ſhe had time to captivate the good will of her people; to ſettle her government; to eſtabliſh her authority; and even to change the national religion, with little contradiction, and without any diſturbance.

Notwithſtanding all the indignities ſhe had ſuffered, and all the dangers ſhe had run, before her acceſſion, ſeveral perſons were reſtored, and not a man was attainted in her firſt parliament. The ſteps I have mentioned being once made, ſhe ſtood on firmer ground, and had leſs to fear from the ſpirit of faction. This clemency once ſhewn, ſhe could, more ſafely and with greater reaſon, exerciſe ſeverity, when the preſervation of the public peace made it neceſſary.

The peace of the kingdom was the ſtandard, to which ſhe proportioned her conduct. She was far from caſting herſelf with precipitation and violence even into that party which ſhe favored, and on which alone ſhe reſolved to depend. She was far from inflaming their ſpirits againſt the adverſe party; and farther ſtill from puſhing any ſort of men, puritans, and even papiſts, into deſpair; or provoking them to deſerve puniſhment, that ſhe might have a pretence to inflict it. She purſued her own ſcheme ſteadily; but ſhe purſued it gradually; and accompanied it with all the artful circumſtances which could ſoften the minds of men, and induce thoſe, who were the moſt averſe to her meaſures, to bear them at leaſt patiently. On theſe principles ſhe proceeded, in the whole courſe of her reign.

To

To the papiſts ſhe uſed great lenity; till the bull of *Pius Quintus*, and the rebellion, and other attempts, conſequent upon it, obliged her to procure new laws, and execute more rigor. Yet even then ſhe diſtinguiſhed * "papiſts in conſcience from papiſts in faction." She made the ſame diſtinction with regard to the puritans. "Their zeal was not "condemned; only their violence was ſometimes "cenſured;" until they attempted to ſet up their own diſcipline in oppoſition to that which had been eſtabliſhed by national authority; until their motives appeared to be "no more zeal, no more conſcience, "ſays Secretary *Walſingham*, but mere faction and "diviſion."

Thus cautious and ſteady was the conduct of Queen *Elizabeth* towards parties; ſteady to the principle, and therefore varied in the application, as the behavior of parties towards her government varied; not as ſucceſs abroad, or the change of ſervants at home, might have influenced that of a prince of inferior abilities. What has been ſaid relates to parties in the nation; for as to parties at court, the conduct of this queen, though directed to the ſame general end, ſeems to have been different. In the nation ſhe choſe one party. She rendered the ſyſtem of that party the ſyſtem of the whole. By this eſtabliſhment, the other parties became ſo many factions; and by the conduct we have deſcribed, ſhe defeated and diſarmed theſe factions. At court, ſhe countenanced and perhaps fomented the parties, which different characters and different intereſts created. But however that was, ſhe found means to attach them all to herſelf; and ſhe found this benefit by keeping her ear open to them all, that the truth could not be concealed from her by the moſt powerful of her mini-

* *Walſingham's* letter.

ſters; as we have explained in a former letter, upon this ſubject. On her acceſſion to the throne, ſhe retained thirteen of her ſiſter's counſellors, and balanced them by no more than eight of her own religion. "On thoſe, as well as on all others, which "ſhe afterwards admitted into the miniſtry, ſays "*Cambden*, ſhe beſtowed her favors with ſo much "caution and ſo little diſtinction, as to prevent ei-"ther party from gaining the aſcendant over her; "whereby ſhe remained miſtreſs of herſelf, and "preſerved both their affections and her own power "and authority entire."

The favors, by which ſhe diſtinguiſhed the Earls of *Leiceſter* and *Eſſex*, are not exceptions, in the courſe of ſo long a reign, ſufficient to deſtroy the truth of this general obſervation. Beſides, both theſe lords felt the weight of her diſpleaſure, nay, one of them, the rigor of her juſtice, when they preſumed too much on her favor, and ſwerved from their duty. The ſingular confidence which ſhe placed in *Cecil*, and ſome others of her miniſters, cannot be quoted in oppoſition to it; for if ſhe diſtinguiſhed them, it was rather by their labors, than the favors ſhe heaped on them. She ſupported them indeed againſt their enemies; but then the merit of theſe men was far from being problematical. Their works teſtified daily for them, in bold and well concerted enterprizes; in wiſe and well conducted negociations. The people reaped the benefit of their ſervices, as well as the prince. They were juſtified in the nation, as well as ſupported at court. In ſhort, by this diſcernment of ſpirits, by this ſkilful management of parties, without the help of military force, unleſs in actual rebellions, Queen *Elizabeth* preſerved her people in tranquillity; though there paſſed not an hour in her whole reign, without ſome intrigue againſt her life and the public peace.

This

This moderation, in aſſuming and exerciſing power, might have been illuſtrated more, and evinced againſt all the little cavils made, and to be made, if we had not avoided too great prolixity. But it is time to haſten to the conſideration of ſome other parts of her conduct.

Queen *Elizabeth* was accuſed of avarice by her enemies; and perhaps ſhe was ſo by ſome of her friends. Among that hungry crew, which attends all courts for the loaves and the fiſhes, ſhe could not eſcape this charge. But ſurely the nation had reaſon to applaud her frugality. Her grandfather hoarded up riches: Her father diſſipated them. The conſequence under both theſe princes was, that every ſlight occaſion became a ſufficient pretence to aſk for ſubſidies; nay, they were aſked and granted too, when even the ſlighteſt occaſion did not exiſt. They were aſked by *Henry* the Seventh for wars which he never intended to make; and by *Henry* the Eighth for reſiſting invaſions which were never deſigned againſt him. Thus was the nation equally oppreſſed by the avarice of one, and by the profuſion of the other.

But Queen *Elizabeth* neither hoarded up nor laviſhed away; and it is juſtly to be queſtioned whether any example of a prudent œconomy in private life, can be produced equal to that which ſhe practiſed in the whole management of her affairs. The famous *Burleigh* uſed to ſay, that "he never cared to "ſee the treaſury ſwell like a diſordered ſpleen, "when the other parts of the common-wealth were "in a conſumption; and his miſtreſs thought that "money, in the pockets of her ſubjects, was better "placed than in her own exchequer." Surely, theſe maxims were wiſe, as well as popular. If a prince amaſſes wealth, to hoard it up, like *Henry* the Seventh, it is uſeleſs to himſelf, and loſt to the public.

public. If he ſquanders it away, like *Henry* the Eighth, he will enrich particular men, and impoveriſh the ſtate. But whilſt theſe treaſures remain in the purſe of the ſubject, they circulate in commerce; they increaſe the common ſtock; and they increaſe by conſequence the riches of a prince like Queen *Elizabeth*; for to ſuch a prince this purſe will be always open.

As immenſe as the expences were, which ſhe found herſelf obliged to make from the moment ſhe aſcended the throne, ſhe received nothing in taxes from her people till the ſixth year of her reign. The taxes then given, were given by way of retribution; which was generally the method in her time. In former reigns, the people granted aids, not without a general communication at leaſt of the uſes, to which they were to be applied; but often without a ſufficient aſſurance that they ſhould be ſo applied. In this reign that method of proceeding was inverted.

The prince in the world who deſerved to be truſted moſt, deſired to be ſo the leaſt. The aids which ſhe had from her people, were not ſo properly grants, as reimburſements of money, advanced for national ſervices.—And what ſervices? For eſtabliſhing the Proteſtant religion; for defending England; for reſcuing Scotland; for carrying on a ſucceſsful war againſt an opulent and potent enemy; for aſſiſting the ſubjects and even the kings of France; for ſupporting the people of the Netherlands; for refining the debaſed coin; for paying all the debts, and reſtoring the credit of the crown; for providing ammunition at home, which before this time we had been always obliged to purchaſe abroad; for improving both home and foreign tarde; for rebuilding and augmenting the navy; and for doing all this, without any burthenſome impoſition on the people; as the parliament more than once acknowledged.

It

It was ſo much a maxim of Queen *Elizabeth*, to ſave for the public, not for herſelf; and to meaſure her riches by the riches of the nation, not by the treaſures ſhe had in her coffers; that ſhe refuſed ſupplies offered, and remitted payments of ſupplies granted, when ſhe found that ſhe was able to carry on the public ſervice without them. The two great principles of that œconomy, which enabled her to do ſo much for her people, and to oppreſs them ſo little, ſeem to have been theſe. Firſt, ſhe made the moſt of her revenues; not by tormenting and racking her ſubjects, like *Henry* the Seventh, but by keeping a ſtrict hand over her officers, and hindering them from enriching themſelves, either by direct fraud, or by a clandeſtine management, which may be juſtly termed indirect fraud, and is often more pernicious than the other. —Secondly, ſhe practiſed that ſuperior œconomy, of which we have ſpoken in a former paper, with the utmoſt ability. What could be done by wiſdom, or courage, ſhe never attempted by money; nor expected that her ſubjects ſhould buy her out of difficulties. Strong at home, ſhe affected little to lean on foreign help. As her alliance was often courted, and ſhe ſeldom courted that of others, it was in her power, and ſhe took the advantage, to engage in no expence, but ſuch as the intereſt of her kingdom rendered immediately neceſſary. To this intereſt alone ſhe proportioned her expence. This was the ſole rule of her conduct. The Hugenots, whom ſhe aſſiſted in their firſt war, made their peace without her, and aſſiſted to retake from her the places ſhe had bargained for with them; yet ſhe helped them, in the wars which followed, with her troops, her ſhips, and her money. The Dutch had given her no cauſe to complain of their behavior. Yet when France abandoned them at the

the treaty of Vervins, and they had no ſupport but hers remaining, ſhe made a new bargain with them, and leſſened her own charge; becauſe ſhe knew they were able, at that time, to ſupply the deficiency.

In all theſe expences, ſhe was careful neither to ſtarve nor overfeed the cauſe, while it laſted; and ſhe frequently ſtipulated a repayment; which ſhe might exact afterwards, if ſhe found reaſon ſo to do; or which ſhe might remit, and thereby create a ſecond obligation to her, if ſhe found her account in ſuch an inſtance of generoſity. Queen *Elizabeth* was not only thus frugal for her people, but perpetually attentive to the methods of enriching them. In the very firſt parliament which ſhe held, amidſt the moſt important affairs; ſuch as the ſettlement of the crown on her own head; the change of religion, and the eſtabliſhment of the church; regulations for the improvement of trade, and increaſe of ſhipping, were not forgot.

We might purſue the ſame obſervation through the whole courſe of her reign, both in parliament and out of it; and ſhew, in numberleſs inſtances, how ſhe roſe to the higheſt, and deſcended even to the loweſt circumſtances, which in any degree affected the trade and navigation of her ſubjects. We might ſhew the advantages ſhe took, in theſe reſpects, not only of the faults committed by other governments, but of the misfortunes of other countries. In a word, we might ſhew how war itſelf, one of the greateſt public calamities, inſtead of impoveriſhing, became a ſource of riches to this nation, by the manner in which ſhe made it.

But theſe particulars would carry us beyond the bounds we have preſcribed to ourſelves. In general, it will not be denied that, beſide the ſpirit of induſtry, which

which exerciſed itſelf at home, Queen *Elizabeth* raiſed and puſhed to the higheſt degree, by the protection and encouragement ſhe gave, a ſpirit of diſcovering new countries, making new ſettlements, and opening new veins of trade. The force of this firſt impreſſion has laſted long amongſt us. Commerce has thrived under neglects and diſcouragement. It has ſubſiſted under oppreſſions and obſtructions; and the ſpirit of it is not yet extinguiſhed by that of ſtockjobbing; though the ſpirit of ſtockjobbing be to that of trade, what the ſpirit of faction is to that of liberty. The tendency of both is to advance the intereſt of a few worthleſs individuals, at the expence of the whole community. The conſequence of both, if ever they prevail to the ruin of trade and liberty, muſt be, that the harpies will ſtarve in the midſt of imaginary wealth; and that the children of faction, like the iron race of *Cadmus*, will deſtroy one another.

Before Queen *Elizabeth*'s reign, the commerce of England was confined and poor. In her reign, it extended itſelf over all the known, and even into the unknown, parts of the world. We traded to the north, and opened our paſſage into Muſcovy. We carried our merchandiſe up the Duina, down the Volga, and acroſs the Caſpian Sea into Perſia.

Our merchants viſited the coaſt of Africa; all the countries of the Grand Seignior; and following the tracks of the Venetians into the Eaſt-Indies, they ſoon followed the Portugueſe thither by the Cape of Good Hope. They went thither through the South Sea, and ſailed round the world. In the Weſt-Indies, they not only traded, but eſtabliſhed themſelves, in ſpight of all the power of Spain.

Before Queen *Elizabeth*'s reign the fleet of England was ſo inconſiderable, that even in the days of her

her father, if I miſtake not, we were forced to borrow or hire ſhips of Hamburgh, Lubec, Dantzic, and other places.

In her reign, it ſoon grew to ſuch a number and ſtrength, that it became terrible to the greateſt maritime powers of Europe.

On ſuch foundations were the riches and power of this kingdom laid by Queen *Elizabeth*; and theſe were ſome of the means ſhe employed to gain the affections of her ſubjects. Can we be ſurpriſed if ſhe ſucceeded?

LETTER

LETTER XV.

QUEEN *Elizabeth* ſucceeded in gaining the affections of her ſubjects, not only by the conduct which ſhe held at home, but by that which ſhe held in the management of the national intereſt abroad.

We have endeavoured to explain ſome particulars of the former. It remains that we give the leaſt imperfect ideas we are able of the latter, and that we apply the whole great example of this reign, to confirm the doctrines we have advanced.

Queen *Elizabeth* could not have eſtabliſhed and preſerved, as ſhe did, the tranquillity of her people in the midſt of diſturbance, nor their ſecurity in the midſt of danger, if ſhe had not taken ſome ſhare in the general affairs of Europe. She took therefore ſuch a ſhare as the intereſt of England neceſſarily required at that time; and ſhe conducted herſelf in the management of it with wiſdom and addreſs ſuperior to any of her predeceſſors.

Her ſiſter had been rendered by bigotry an egregious bubble to the court of Rome. Perſuaded by her huſband, and deceived by her miniſters, ſhe was ſo likewiſe very fatally in the quarrel which broke out between France and Spain. The parliament, in aſſenting to her marriage with a foreign prince, had impoſed ſuch conditions, as were judged ſufficient to preſerve the conſtitution of the government, and the independency of the kingdom.

Philip

Philip had ſworn to the obſervation of theſe conditions. Such of them, as he had not either time, or opportunity, or temptation to break, were obſerved; but the others proved too weak to hold him. Thus, for inſtance, we do not find that he enriched himſelf at the expence of England. He is ſaid, on the contrary, to have brought hither very great treaſures; and his father had truſted the diſtribution of an immenſe ſum to *Gardiner*: ſo that if he bribed the nation, it was with his own money, not theirs; but he engaged the nation in a war with France, becauſe France broke with Spain; notwithſtanding the expreſs condition made by parliament, * "that the match ſhould not at all "derogate from the league lately concluded be-"twixt the queen of England and the king of "France, but the peace ſhould remain inviolate "between the Engliſh and the French."

This ſacrifice of the national to a foreign intereſt coſt us Calais; a conqueſt, which the French looked upon as a compenſation for near two hundred other places, which they were obliged, by the treaty of Cambray, to give up to *Philip*. Boulogne had been ſacrificed in the preceding reign, not to a foreign intereſt, but to that of the miniſter, *Dudley* Earl of Warwick, afterwards Duke of Northumberland. The people were willing and able to aſſert their right, and to defend their poſſeſſion; but the ſituation of the miniſter, and the ſchemes of private intereſt, which he was carrying on at home, required that he ſhould avoid, at any rate, a war, even a defenſive war. In ſhort Boulogne, for which France had engaged to give two millions, was delivered up for four hundred thouſand crowns; and the very ſame miniſter, who had oppoſed with violence all

* *Cambden.*

the

the public conſiderations, urged by the protector for yielding this place, yielded it to purchaſe a treaty neceſſary for himſelf, detrimental and diſhonorable to the nation.

We have ſaid enough, in a former letter, concerning the wild conduct of *Henry* the Eighth in foreign affairs; and there is no need of going any farther back. Theſe examples are ſufficient to ſhew the oppoſition between that of Queen *Elizabeth* and that of her predeceſſors. She was neither deceived, like them, by her miniſters; nor betrayed by her paſſions, to ſerve any other intereſt at the expence of England.

It would be eaſy to prove, from many inſtances, how careful ſhe was to avoid every thing, which might even warp the ſteady tenor of her conduct in this reſpect. As long as ſhe had no real intereſt diſtinct from that of the country ſhe governed, ſhe knew that no fictitious intereſt could be impoſed on her. She kept herſelf therefore clear of any ſuch real intereſt, and thought that the crown of England deſerved her ſole, her undivided care.

Much has been ſaid of her behavior in all the treaties of marriage propoſed to her. We ſhall not engage in that diſquiſition. But this, we think, cannot be controverted; that if ever ſhe was in earneſt reſolved to marry, ſhe was ſo when the articles of marriage between her and the Duke of *Anjou* were ſigned. It is hardly poſſible, as *Rapin* obſerves, to account for her conduct on this occaſion by any other principle. Now upon this ſuppoſition, what motive could determine her to break this match in ſo abrupt a manner? The reaſons urged by *Cambden*, and other writers in general, prove too much. They ſerve rather to prove that ſhe ſhould not have entered into theſe engagements at all,

all, than to account for her breaking them as ſhe did. But among the reaſons, on which *Walſingham* inſiſted, when he was ſent into France upon this occaſion, we may obſerve one in particular, founded on a fact, which happened after the ſigning of the articles; and which accounts for the queen's conduct in this caſe agreeably to principles, on which ſhe proceeded in all others. The Duke of *Anjou* had accepted the ſovereignty of the Low Countries. By this ſtep, he had engaged himſelf in a war with Spain; and the queen would not, on his account, engage her people in it, * "deſiring nothing more "than that by this marriage the realm might be "preſerved in peace and tranquillity."

She might incline to marry this prince, under all the limitations and reſerves contained in the articles, whilſt he had no dominions on the Continent; and yet ſtart backwards and reſolve to break the match, as ſoon ſhe ſaw him actually poſſeſſed of the ſovereignty of the Low Countries.

Nay, if we ſhould ſuppoſe, againſt hiſtorical probability, that ſhe never deſigned to conſummate her marriage, though ſhe entered into articles, yet there will ſtill remain no reaſonable way of accounting for the ſudden reſolution ſhe took of breaking at this preciſe point of time; unleſs we ſuppoſe, that ſhe thought this reaſon the ſtrongeſt and the moſt unanſwerable of all thoſe which could be urged in excuſe of a meaſure liable to ſeveral objections, and ſome very inconvenient contingencies.

There were few things, which ſhe had more at heart than reſcuing the Netherlands from the Spaniſh yoke; and there was nothing in the whole extent of foreign affairs, to which ſhe gave greater

* *Camden.*

attention.

attention. Even at this time, ſhe ſupplied the Duke of *Anjou* with very conſiderable ſums, for the ſupport of his enterprize; and about four years afterwards, ſhe eſpouſed more openly the cauſe of theſe provinces, by making a treaty with the States, and by ſending an army to their aſſiſtance. But as ſhe would not marry a prince who was their ſovereign, ſo ſhe would not accept this ſovereignty, when it was offered directly to her. She perſiſted in avoiding an engagement, which might in its conſequence carry her farther than the intereſt of England required; or oblige her to make greater efforts than were conſiſtent with that eaſy and floriſhing ſtate, in which ſhe reſolved to preſerve her own people.

Much more might be ſaid; but this may ſuffice to ſhew what the firſt and fundamental principle was, by which Queen *Elizabeth* governed herſelf in all foreign affairs. She conſidered the intereſt of no kingdom, no ſtate, nor people, no not even the general intereſt of the reformation, as zealous a Proteſtant as ſhe was, nor the preſervation of a balance of power in Europe, as great an heroine as ſhe was, in any other light than relatively to the intereſt of England. She aſſiſted or oppoſed, ſhe defended or attacked, juſt as this intereſt directed; and the degree, to which it was concerned, was the exact and conſtant meaſure to which ſhe proportioned her good and her ill offices, her friendſhip and her enmity. She was diverted from this principle of conduct neither by weakneſs, nor ſtrength of mind; neither by fear, nor hope; neither by puſillanimity, nor courage; neither by moderation, nor ambition.

We may conclude this head, by venturing to affirm that, in the whole courſe of her reign, there was not a penny of Engliſh money ſpent, nor a drop of

of Engliſh blood ſpilt, except where it was neceſſary to keep off from this nation ſome real viſible diſadvantage.

Queen *Elizabeth*'s policy was deep; and the means ſhe employed were often very ſecret; but the ends to which this policy and theſe means are directed, were never equivocal. Let us now deſcend into ſome particular inſtances of the wiſdom and addreſs, with which ſhe purſued this great principle.

Theſe particulars may be reduced properly, we think, under two general heads. The firſt is this; ſhe watched the "ebbs and flows of the power "and intereſt of Europe; the viciſſitudes and "fluctuations in the affairs of peace and war." We uſe the words of a * late writer, but ſhall make a very different application of them.

This uncertain, varied, ſhifting ſcene was ſo far from being the cauſe of bad meaſures, or the excuſe for bad ſucceſs, at the time we are ſpeaking of, that it was the very ſource from whence Queen *Elizabeth* derived thoſe opportunities, which ſhe improved ſo glorioufly. A weaker council than hers might have been puzzled, and weaker heads might have been turned by ſo confuſed a ſtate of affairs. Unable to ſteer ſteadily through ſo many difficulties, every current would have carried ſuch men along with it. Every blaſt of wind would have driven them before it. Perpetually toſſed about, at the mercy of every event, they muſt have lived from day to day, or from hour to hour.

If the kingdom had eſcaped intire deſtruction in this forlorn condition, it muſt have been by miracle,

* Vide Obſervations on the Writings of the Craftſman.

and

and without any merit on the part of thoſe who governed; but this intire deſtruction would much more probably have followed, after a long ſeries of calamities; without any other excuſe on their part, than that of charging the cataſtrophe to the account of fortune, the common ſcape-goat of unſkilful miniſters.

The conduct and the ſucceſs of Queen *Elizabeth* and her miniſters were very different. She managed France, until ſhe had taken ſuch meaſures, as left her leſs to fear from Scotland; and ſhe managed Spain, until ſhe had nothing to fear from France.

She knew what deſigns *Henry* the Second built on the pretenſions of his daughter-in-law, *Mary* Queen of Scotland; and no one, who conſiders the hiſtory of this time, nay, even as he finds it deduced by *Rapin* himſelf, will be of his mind, that ſhe expected to "enjoy great tranquillity by the "peace," which ſhe made ſoon after her acceſſion to the throne, with France and Scotland.

But the making this treaty gave her time, which was of the utmoſt importance to her to gain, abroad as well as at home, in the beginning of her reign. The manner in which ſhe made it, gave her reputation likewiſe; and ſhe was wiſe enough to know of what real advantage reputation is, and how much that of a prince depends on the firſt ſteps he makes in government.

She practiſed in this negotiation a rule, which ſhe obſerved to the laſt. How much ſoever *Philip* reſented her proceedings at home, it was plain he could not abandon, at that time, her intereſts abroad. The point of honor, drawn from the conſideration that England had entered into the war for the ſake of Spain, did not probably weigh much with him; but the pretenſions of France gave him

a juſt alarm; and the ſame reaſons, which are ſaid to have induced him to ſave her life, when ſhe was princeſs, ſtood in force to make him ſupport her, now ſhe was queen, againſt the power of France. Notwithſtanding this plauſible conſideration, Queen *Elizabeth* reſolved to treat for herſelf, and by herſelf. "She was of opinion, ſays *Cambden*, that it "would not redound to the honor of England, or "herſelf to be reduced to the neceſſity of ſupport-"ing her intereſts by a dependence on Spain." She exerted the ſame ſpirit, and behaved herſelf with the ſame dignity, on a very remarkable occaſion, and in a very nice conjuncture, at the latter end of her reign; at the treaty of Vervins.

She deſpiſed the offers made her by *Henry* the Fourth. She reſolved to continue the war, and to ſupport alone the ſtates of the Low Countries, rather than to ſuffer the man in the world, who had the greateſt obligations to her, to treat for her.—True it is, that ſhe had reaſon to be diſſatisfied with his behavior; but beſides that, the good underſtanding between this prince and *Philip* the Second being promoted by the court of Rome; it is poſſible Queen *Elizabeth* might think ſuch negotiators, as were devoted to that court, not quite ſo proper to be truſted with the intereſts of her kingdom.

As ſoon as *Henry* the Second was dead, and his ſon *Francis* the Second, a young and in every ſenſe a weak prince, was on the throne of France, ſhe acted with leſs reſerve and caution. The treaty, which had been privately negotiated before with the malecontents of Scotland, was now ſigned; her army marched to their aſſiſtance; the French were driven out of that kingdom; the reformation was ſolemnly and legally eſtabliſhed there; and Queen *Elizabeth* was the avowed defender of the liberties, privileges, and religion of the Scotiſh nation.—*Francis* the Second lived a very ſhort time,

and died without leaving any children. The fear therefore of an union of the crowns of England and Scotland with that of France, terrified *Philip* the Second no longer. Queen *Elizabeth* had therefore the more to fear. The court of France had ſtill the ſame bigotry, and the ſame hatred to her; though not the ſame pretenſions. The court of Spain could be now no more reſtrained, by any political conſideration, from purſuing thoſe deſigns againſt her, even in conjunction with France, which no other conſideration had hitherto retarded.

The projects formed and the engagements taken between theſe powers, at the congreſs at Bayonne, were not abſolute ſecrets. She felt the effects of them every day, in conſpiracies againſt her government, and even her life. Too weak to defend herſelf by force on ſo many ſides, ſhe defended herſelf by ſtratagem; improved every incident; and took ſome advantage of every turn. She contented herſelf to countermine the intrigues of the courts of Rome, of France, and of Spain. With the firſt ſhe kept no meaſures, becauſe ſhe could have no war. With the two laſt ſhe kept all meaſures to prevent one. Though Queen *Elizabeth*'s whole reign was properly a ſtate of war, and there was no point of time in it, where ſhe was free from all attacks, private as well as public, indirect as well as direct; yet the firſt twenty-five years of her reign may be ſaid, in one ſenſe, to have been neither a ſtate of war, nor a ſtate of peace; becauſe both ſides pretended to look on the treaties of peace as ſubſiſting; and either diſavowed, or excuſed the hoſtilities reciprocally committed, not conſtantly, but occaſionally committed. If ſhe had fallen into this ſtate from that of a ſettled peace, diſentangled from all pretenſions, either of her own upon others, or of others upon her, there would be no occaſion to admire her conduct. But that ſhe ſhould be able,

when ſhe neither had, nor could have a ſettled, ſecure peace with her neighbors, to ſtand ſo long on the ſlippery verge of war, and avoid the neceſſity of engaging directly in it, till ſhe was in a condition of doing ſo with ſucceſs, is juſtly matter of the greateſt admiration.—If ſhe had only aimed to keep off the evil day, it might at laſt have come upon her with a double weight of misfortune. If ſhe had only gained time to prolong ſuſpence, ſhe might have loſt opportunities; waſted her ſtrength; tired, jaded and exhauſted her people. But this was far from being the caſe. She was in this ſtate by good, not by bad policy; and ſhe made the uſe ſhe deſigned of it. She diſappointed, divided, and weakened her enemies. She prepared the opportunities which ſhe afterwards improved. She united, animated, and enriched her people; and, as difficult as that may ſeem to be for a prince in ſuch a ſituation, ſhe maintained her own dignity, and ſupported the honor of the nation.—To exemplify all theſe particulars, would be to write her hiſtory; but it is neceſſary to ſay ſomething upon them.

Of the two powers abroad, from whom alone ſhe had any thing to apprehend, and with whom ſhe was principally concerned, France gave her the leaſt and the ſhorteſt trouble. *Charles* the Ninth came a minor to the crown. Two factions, drunk with religious enthuſiaſm, and headed by men of the moſt deſperate ambition, deſolated the kingdom. The queen mother blew up the flames firſt; and tried in vain afterwards to extinguiſh them, by a deluge of blood. Queen *Elizabeth*, who had probably encouraged the famous conſpiracy of Amboiſe, which broke out juſt before the death of *Francis* the Second, continued to abet and ſupport the Proteſtant party; but ſtill ſubordinately to ſuch meaſures, as her ſituation, relatively to Scotland, or Ireland, or Spain, obliged her to keep with *Charles* the Ninth. Theſe meaſures were ſometimes

times ſuch, and even after the maſſacre of St. *Bartholomew*, as the zeal of the Huguenots could hardly forgive her. But ſhe went wiſely and ſteadily on to her own purpoſes.

" Non ponebat enim rumores ante ſalutem."

When *Henry* the Third came to the crown, and the league was once formed, the crown of France wanted her aſſiſtance, and had it; and as powerful as the princes of the houſe of Lorraine were, they could give her little open diſturbance; unleſs they prevailed in their wicked, and almoſt chimerical projects in France. With theſe princes, and their faction therefore ſhe never kept any meaſures; as they never kept any with her. As politic a prince as *Philip* the Second is eſteemed to have been, he was amuſed by the regard which Queen *Elizabeth* affected ſometimes for his perſon, and always for the treaties ſubſiſting between them; and he loſt the opportunities in which he might have attacked her with advantage. The ſlow councils of Spain, and the ſlower execution of them, produced opportunities, which her ſagacity and vigor improved. The ſupport ſhe gave to the Huguenots made the Spaniards afraid of provoking her, by too haſty and direct attacks, to give the ſame ſupport to the people of the Low Countries. She turned their game againſt them, and acted in the Low Countries in the ſame manner as they acted in Ireland, and even in England; but with better effect. From the year 1577 ſhe began to favor this revolt; and in the year 1585 ſhe made a formal treaty with the States. Such of theſe meaſures as could be concealed, ſhe concealed. Such of them as could not be concealed, ſhe excuſed, or endeavored to juſtify and reconcile, with the treaties between Spain and England.

As

As the time ſhe gained, and the diverſions ſhe gave by this management, put it quite out of the power of France, and made Spain leſs able to hurt her; ſo they alone put it in her power to ſettle her government, and to do all the great things at home, of which we have ſpoken in other papers *. We ſhall not repeat them here; but ſhall conclude this head by obſerving, in an example or two, how ſhe maintained her own dignity in other caſes, beſides that of treating, which is taken notice of above, and how ſhe ſupported the honor of the nation, and the intereſts of her ſubjects.

During the time ſhe was the moſt careful to avoid a war with Spain, and had the moſt reaſon to be ſo; even in the year 1568, whilſt thoſe revolutions, which broke out ſoon afterwards, were preparing, ſhe would not ſuffer the leaſt injury to be offered to any of her ſubjects with impunity. Some veſſels and effects, belonging to an Engliſh merchant, had been ſeized by the Spaniards in the Weſt-Indies. She did not make war upon this; but ſhe ſoon found and ſeized an opportunity of reſenting the inſult. She laid her hands on very great ſums of money, claimed indeed by Genoeſe merchants, but ſent to the Low Countries, and deſigned, no doubt, for the Spaniſh ſervice there. The Duke of *Alva* ſeized, in return, the perſons and effects of the ſubjects of England; and ſhe immediately made repriſals on thoſe of the Flemmings. What compoſition was made with the Genoeſe does not, I think, appear; but as the ſeizure was to the diſappointment and loſs of Spain, ſo the compoſition was probably to the advantage of England; ſince, at this very time, Queen *Elizabeth* diſcharged the debts contracted by her father and brother to foreigners.

* Vid. the firſt ſeven volumes of the Craftſman, printed for *R. Franklin.*

As

As to the effects of the Netherlands, ſhe returned the overplus of the value, after having repaid to her own ſubjects the full amount of their loſſes. She carved for her people; and would not leave it to a diſpute, what reparation they ſhould have; much leſs whether they ſhould have any reparation, or not.

Such a conduct as this, which ſhe held, even whilſt ſhe kept meaſures with Spain, and avoided a war, foretold what might be expected from her, and what ſhe actually performed, when ſhe thought it no longer expedient to keep the ſame meaſures. But this will come, with other reflections, more properly under the next general head; to which we think that the particular inſtances of Queen *Elizabeth*'s wiſdom and addreſs, in the management of foreign affairs, may be reduced.

LETTER

LETTER XVI.

IF Queen *Elizabeth* conſidered every former intereſt relatively to the intereſt of England, ſhe conſidered likewiſe every meaſure to be taken in foreign affairs relatively to the ſituation of England. This we eſtabliſh as the ſecond general head, to which the particular inſtances of her wiſdom and addreſs, in the management of foreign affairs, may be properly reduced.

She conſidered herſelf as queen of a country cut off from the Continent, and ſeparated by the ſea from all other countries, except Scotland. Her conduct therefore towards Scotland was very different, in many reſpects, from that, which ſhe held towards every other nation.—A due obſervation of theſe different principles, on which Queen *Elizabeth* proceeded in the divided ſtate of our iſland, may ſerve to ſet, in a ſtronger and clearer light, that ſingle principle which remains to be followed in our united ſtate.

The ſituation of an iſland affords great advantages, when they are wiſely improved; and when they are neglected, as great diſadvantages may reſult from this very ſituation.——The reign, now before us, is a glorious and unanſwerable proof that the halcyon days, ſo much boaſted of, and ſo ſeldom found, days of proſperity, as well as peace, may be enjoyed in an iſland, whilſt all the neighbouring continent is filled with alarms, and even laid waſte by war. But our own hiſtories will ſhew us likewiſe, how an iſland may approach, as it were, too near the continent, and be fatally drawn into that great vortex.

vortex. Leſt we ſhould ramble too widely in the large field which opens itſelf, let us confine our reflections to ſome of thoſe different means and objects, either of defence, or offence, which nature, improved by art, preſents to people who inhabit iſlands, or to people who inhabit the continent, according to their different ſituations. A powerful navy is of indiſpenſable neceſſity to the former of theſe. Without it, they muſt be poor and expoſed. With it, they may be rich and ſecure. Barriers of fortified towns, and great ſtanding armies are of the ſame neceſſity to the latter. Without this ſecurity, they lie open to every inroad, and at the mercy of every neighbor. With it they may be ſafe from foreign danger, and even terrible to thoſe who live round them. But then, as the ſea is a barrier of no expence, and as a maritime force carries no domeſtic danger along with it, but enriches the community it defends, ſo a fortified barrier, and a regular army, which are neceſſary to ſecure a nation ſituate on the continent againſt foreign danger, carry great domeſtic inconveniencies, and even dangers too, along with them. Both of them, like armor, too heavy to be borne, waſte the ſtrength of thoſe who are covered by them; and an army like a ſword, which recoils on the blow, may wound the conſtitution it was meant to defend.—But farther: as particular families, by uniting together, formed larger ſocieties, for their common defence, and gave riſe to the kingdoms, and ſtates, which have appeared in the world; ſo theſe larger ſocieties have, ever ſince, found it neceſſary, or advantageous, to unite together in various manners; ſometimes by an entire union, or an incorporation of different people into one body politic; ſometimes by a partial, or fœderal union of diſtinct ſtates in one common cauſe; and at all times by alliances, made on particular occaſions, and ſuggeſted by a real or ſeeming conformity of intereſts. This occaſional union, by alliances with other ſtates, of which

which alone we are to ſpeak in this place, is ſo neceſſary to all the nations on the continent, that even the moſt powerful cannot ſubſiſt without it; and thoſe who manage it beſt, are accounted wiſeſt. Their ſeveral intereſts are the objects of their alliances; and as the former are ſubject to change, the latter muſt vary with them. Such variations, whether occaſioned by the courſe of accidents, or by the paſſions of men, though made by a few, will affect many; becauſe there always are, and always muſt be, ſyſtems of alliances ſubſiſting among theſe nations; and therefore, as a change in ſome of the parts of one ſyſtem neceſſarily requires a change in all the reſt; ſo the alteration of one ſyſtem neceſſarily requires an alteration of the others.

Thus are they always toſſed from peace to war, and from war to peace. Perpetual negotiation is the life and ſoul of their governments. Their well-being, nay, their ſafety at home, requires that they ſhould be always buſy abroad. It is neceſſary for them to be mediators, arbitrators, or, which is infinitely worſe, guaranties, to be contracting parties in preliminary, proviſional, or explanatory treaties; in defenſive, or offenſive alliances; by which means they get over daily difficulties, by the multiplication of laſting incumbrances.

The interfering and claſhing of their rights and pretenſions, and the various obligations, by which they ſtand bound to one another, appear to be and are the immediate cauſes of all theſe diſputes and contentions. But the principal and remote cauſe ariſes from the proximity and other circumſtances of their ſituations. That neceſſity, or advantage, which gave occaſion to the original engagements, has maintained and multiplied them ſince; and the laſt would not be reaſonable, if the firſt had not been neceſſary.

Here

Here then ariſes an eſſential difference between thoſe objects, which are proper to the policy of an iſland, and thoſe which are ſo to the policy of the continent; a difference greatly to the advantage of the former; the circumſtances of whoſe ſituation not requiring ſo conſtant and intimate an union with other ſtates, either for defence or offence, render unneceſſary a great part of the engagements which prove ſuch heavy and laſting incumbrances on the latter.

An iſland under one government, advantageouſly ſituated, rich in itſelf, richer by its commerce, can have no neceſſity, in the ordinary courſe of affairs, to take up the policy of the continent; to enter into the ſyſtem of alliances we have been ſpeaking of; or, in ſhort, to act any other part than that of a friendly neighbor and a fair trader. If an extraordinary criſis happens on the continent, which may endanger the ſafety even of thoſe who are ſeparated from it, ſuch as we ſaw at the beginning of the preſent century, ſelf-preſervation will no doubt determine men, as it ought, to unite by ſtricter alliances with thoſe powers with whom they are occaſionally united by a more immediate intereſt; but even in this caſe, neither will ſelf-preſervation require, nor good policy ſuffer, that ſuch a people ſhould enter deep into the quarrels, or involve themſelves intricately, much leſs continually, in the political ſchemes of the continent. We paſs over offenſive caſes, becauſe it is manifeſt that the people of an iſland can have no intereſt in making foreign acquiſitions; and that therefore it would be abſurd in them to ſpend their blood and treaſure in acquiring for others; or to attack any farther than is neceſſary to defend.

We confine ourſelves to the caſe of defence before-mentioned; and upon that we ſay, a people on the

the continent may have reaſon to engage as deeply in defence of another country, as if they defended the walls of their own towns, or the doors of their own houſes; becauſe another country may be the ſole barrier of their own. But this can never be reaſonably done by the people of an iſland, who have another, and a better barrier than any the continent can form for them. Such a people are to look on their engagements with other countries, as on outworks caſt up in haſte, which may ſerve to defeat a weak attack, or to delay and diſappoint a ſtrong one. But it would be the height of folly in them, even in one of thoſe extraordinary conjunctures, which we now ſuppoſe, to lay the whole ſtreſs of their defence here; to ſpend their ſtrength improperly; and to forego thoſe advantages that nature has given them.

The nations on the continent might teach them another leſſon. They are careful to employ every advantage of their ſituation; a river; a lake; a ridge of mountains; and ſhall the inhabitants of an iſland neglect the ſea? Shall they do by choice all which other nations are obliged to do by neceſſity? Surely not, and if at any time ſuch a conduct can be proved neceſſary to certain purpoſes, we think it will reſult from this proof, that ſuch purpoſes ſhould be laid aſide, not that ſuch meaſures ſhould be purſued.

Theſe reflections, with others of the ſame kind, preſent themſelves naturally to thoſe who conſider the conduct of Queen *Elizabeth*, and the events of her reign. We may therefore conclude that they were, at leaſt, ſome of the principles of her government.

How ſhe formed, or rather how ſhe protected, and aided a party, already formed in Scotland, on principles of religion and liberty, has been obſerved; as well

well as the ſucceſs of this meaſure, by which the troops of France were driven out of that kingdom, and the influence of France on the government was either removed, or guarded againſt. To maintain and improve this advantage, was the great affair of her life. England was, with reſpect to Scotland, like a kingdom on the continent, and Queen *Elizabeth* employed, with reſpect to Scotland, all the policy of the continent.

We find her buſy on that ſide in almoſt every page of her hiſtory; almoſt always negotiating, and always intriguing. A friend, an enemy, a mediatrix, an umpire, a guarantee, ſhe played every part, which might keep others from hurting Scotland, and Scotland from hurting her. Her armies were at all times ready to march, and her fleets to ſail thither. As ſtrict an œconomy as ſhe practiſed every where elſe, ſhe was profuſe there; but her profuſion turned to account, and therefore deſerves another name. There may be ſuch ſchemes, ſuch management, and ſuch ſucceſs, as may render even the ſmalleſt expence, profuſion; but thoſe of Queen *Elizabeth* were ſufficient to juſtify the greateſt. The ſecret ſervice of her reign was private in tranſaction and public in effect; not equally inſcrutable in both.

About the fourteenth year of her reign, ſhe had brought the affairs of Scotland to ſuch a paſs, that ſhe ſeemed to have nothing to fear from that quarter. The plots in favor of Queen *Mary*, had been diſcovered; the inſurrections defeated; and the Duke of *Norfolk* executed in England. In Scotland, the ſame party was broken. The Earl of *Morton*, a man abſolutely devoted to Queen *Elizabeth*, was regent; the caſtle of Edinburgh was taken; the civil war was finiſhed with complete ſucceſs; and ſhe enjoyed great tranquillity; becauſe, according

according to *Rapin*'s obſervation, ſhe could now be only attacked by ſea; that is, ſhe had now the whole advantage of an iſland.

This happy ſtate did not continue long without interruption. *Morton* loſt, and reaſſumed his power, was diſgraced, proſecuted, and at laſt beheaded. King *James* had taken very young the government of this kingdom; and young, as well as old, was governed by his favorites. The party of his mother in Scotland did not indeed riſe again, ſo as to give Queen *Elizabeth* any umbrage. But his general character, and his behavior on ſome particular occaſions, the character of his favorites, and the intrigues they were known to carry on, obliged her to reaſſume, if ſhe had ever laid it aſide, and to purſue her antient conduct towards Scotland. She purſued it to the end of her reign: and although King *James*, when he had more experience, and was better adviſed, kept ſuch meaſures with her, as were neceſſary to ſecure and to facilitate his ſucceſſion; yet this wiſe queen continued to give quite another attention to the affairs of Scotland, than ſhe gave to thoſe of any other country; or would have given to theſe, if Scotland had been divided from England by the ſea.

It is impoſſible to make theſe reflections, and not to reflect at the ſame time, on that happy change which the union of the two kingdoms has brought about. We are now one nation under one government; and muſt therefore always have one common intereſt; the ſame friends, the ſame foes, the ſame principles of ſecurity, and of danger. It is by conſequence now in our power, to take the intire advantage of our ſituation; an advantage, which would make us ample amends for ſeveral which we want, and which ſome of our neighbors poſſeſs; an advantage which, conſtantly attended to, and wiſely improved, would

would place the Britiſh nation in ſuch circumſtances of happineſs and glory, as the greateſt empires could never boaſt. Far from being alarmed at every motion on the continent; far from being oppreſſed for the ſupport of foreign ſchemes; we might enjoy the ſecureſt peace, and the moſt unenvied plenty. Far from courting, or purchaſing the alliances of other nations, we might ſee them ſuing for ours. Far from being hated or deſpiſed, for involving ourſelves in all the little wrangles of the continent, we might be loved and reſpected by all thoſe who maintain the juſt balance of Europe, and be formidable to thoſe alone who ſhould endeavor to break it.

Having made theſe few reflections on that part of Queen *Elizabeth*'s policy which regarded Scotland, it is neceſſary that we ſhould ſay ſomething of that which regarded the nations on the continent. Now with theſe it is plain ſhe took the feweſt engagements ſhe poſſibly could, and ſhuned as induſtriouſly the occaſions of mingling her intereſts and counſels with theirs, as ſhe ſought the occaſions of mingling both with thoſe of Scotland.

We believe, upon very good grounds, that periods of four or five years might be pointed out, in which this nation has been a party to more treaties than were made by Queen *Elizabeth* in the courſe of forty-five years; and yet we preſume it will not be eaſy to ſhew, that this nation had more imminent dangers to avoid and more formidable powers to reſiſt; or that ſuch ends were attained with greater glory and ſucceſs at theſe, or any other periods, than in the reign of Queen *Elizabeth*. Let us deſcend into ſome particulars.

With the northern crowns ſhe kept in terms of amity, and good correſpondence; and had ſome negotiations

negotiatſons with that of Denmark, concerning the intereſts of her ſubjects in trade. The ſame intereſt drew her into negotiations with the Muſcovite, and ſhe found means to conduct them to her great advantage.

The ſettlement made in Germany, a little before the abdication of *Charles* the Fifth, continued. The Proteſtants were quiet there, and deſirous to remain ſo. The general intereſt of religion did not call upon her to look that way; and it is evident, by the whole conduct of her reign, that ſhe thought the particular intereſts of her kingdom very little concerned in thoſe of the empire.

How attentive ſoever ſhe might be to penetrate into the councils of the court of Rome, and to trace the intrigues of the Vatican from their ſource; ſhe bore no part whatever in the affairs of Italy.

In ſhort, as all the meaſures ſhe took in foreign affairs were conſidered relatively to the ſituation of England, ſhe had nothing to do in the much greateſt part of the buſineſs of the continent; and ſhe was ſo far from entering into engagements by treaty, that ſhe was ſcarce ever concerned in negotiations about it. In France, Spain and the Low Countries, ſhe had more to do; but even there the part ſhe took was ſtrictly no more than the ſecurity and welfare of her own kingdoms required; and ſhe acted it in no other manner than was ſuitable to the ſituation of England.

The ſtate of Scotland, of Ireland, and for ſome time of England itſelf, gave her juſt reaſon to apprehend that the French, or Spaniards, or both, might get footing there. Each of theſe had, at different times, pretenſions of their own to her crown. The cauſe of *Mary* Queen of Scotland afforded

afforded them, for a long time, both pretence and opportunity; and the united force of the Roman Catholic party was, at all times, ready to ſupport their enterpriſes. Spain was the greateſt maritime power in Europe, and able to attempt the invaſion of England, even when Queen *Elizabeth* had been above thirty years on the throne, and had raiſed her navy from the low condition in which ſhe found it. In a word, the whole coaſt, from the ſtreight of Gibraltar almoſt to Jutland, belonged to France and Spain. Such circumſtances formed a conjuncture, wherein theſe two powers had advantages againſt her, which they could have had in no other; and if ſhe was obliged to act towards them in a different manner from what ſhe did towards the other powers of the continent, it was becauſe ſhe ſtood expoſed to loſe, at leaſt in part, with reſpect to them, the advantages of her ſituation.

How ſhe acted towards them, has been obſerved already. She amuſed them and eluded their deſigns, by the moſt artful ſeries of management. She ſought no alliances againſt them with other nations; and though ſhe did not fail to abet and ſupport the inſurrections of their ſubjects, yet even with theſe ſhe was cautious of entering into engagements by treaty. She did it with the Huguenots by a treaty ſigned in 1562, which the vidame of Chartres had negotiated. The ſucceſs of the treaty, and the ungrateful behavior of the Huguenots to her, confirmed her in the principle of depending little on allies, and much on herſelf. She choſe rather to aſſiſt when and where ſhe thought fit, and to aſſiſt gratis, than to be tied down to the conſequences of conſtant obligations, for the notional advantage of reciprocal engagements.

In the year 1577 ſhe began to take ſo intimate a concern in the affairs of the Low Countries, that

the moſt important counſels and reſolutions of thoſe ſtates were communicated to her; and ſhe lent them an hundred thouſand pounds; yet it does not ſeem probable, that ſhe entered ſo ſoon into a formal alliance with them, though ſuch an alliance be mentioned by *Meteren*, as well as *Cambden*, and inſerted from the former in the collection of treaties.

In the year 1585 the clouds gathered on every ſide, and threatened Queen *Elizabeth* with that terrible ſtorm, part of which fell upon her, and part of which ſhe averted. She beheld *Philip* maſter of Portugal as well as Spain. She beheld the Duke of Guiſe growing apace to be maſter of France. She ſaw theſe two princes cloſely united by principles, which might continue in force long enough to complete her ruin. She ſaw the Low Countries almoſt quite reduced by the arms of Spain; and the Proteſtants of France in the utmoſt danger of being ſo by the league. Dangers from Ireland, and dangers from Scotland, impended over her.

In ſuch a criſis, more terrible, as we apprehend, than any which has threatened this nation ſince that time, what was the conduct of our heroic queen? Did ſhe immediately prepare to oppoſe theſe dangers, by making alliances on the continent? Did ſhe purchaſe acceſſions to theſe alliances? Did ſhe raiſe armies, and pay ſubſidies abroad? Did ſhe give guarantees to every prince and ſtate who aſked them; and, in order to ward againſt one danger, ſow the ſeeds of many? By no means. She ſent indeed Sir *Thomas Bodley* to the King of Denmark, as well as to the landgrave of Heſſe, and other Proteſtant princes of the empire, "to procure a "league for defence of their religion," ſays *Camden*. But this league does not appear, nor any other effect of theſe negotiations. "As ſhe was very ſav-"ing of her money, it is likely," ſays *Rapin*, "that

" that ſhe did not employ the moſt proper means " to bring the princes of Germany into her in- " tereſts." She ſecured herſelf by a great deal of management on the ſide of Scotland. She aſſiſted the king of Navarre, and the prince of Conde, with money and ſhips; and the ſole treaty ſhe made on the continent was that with the ſtates of the Low Countries, concluded the tenth of Auguſt, 1585 at Noneſuch. Her chief dependence was upon her own ability and courage; upon the affection and zeal of her people. Neither failed her. Sure of being attacked, ſhe began the attack. Whilſt *Cavendiſh* pillaged the coaſts of Chili and Peru, ſhe ſent *Drake* to the coaſts of Spain, with orders to burn all the Spaniſh ſhips he ſhould meet. Her orders were executed with the ſpirit with which they were given. More than an hundred veſſels, loaded with proviſion and ammunition, were burned at Gibraltar. The Spaniſh admiral was inſulted at the mouth of the Tagus, and the Spaniards were taken, or deſtroyed, even under his eyes; an infamy ſo great, that the ſuffering of it was ſcarce in example before that time. The riches coming from the Indies to Spain, fell into the hands of the Engliſh. The projects of *Philip* were diſappointed in the year 1587; and when the invaſion was attempted in the year 1588, his army was blocked up in the ports of the Low Countries, and his invincible armada was beat, ſcattered and deſtroyed.

We have now gone through all we propoſe to ſay at this time, concerning the conduct of Queen *Elizabeth*, both at home and abroad; concerning that conduct, which, by convincing her people of her goodneſs and her wiſdom, procured from them thoſe large returns of gratitude, of duty, of affection and zeal, the ſole foundations on which ſhe reſted her authority and her ſecurity; and the ſole foundations on which they can be reſted, ſuitably to

the nature of our government. The limitations, neceſſary to render monarchy conſiſtent with public liberty, muſt be many and great; for which reaſon it has been objected to them, that they took off from that weight of authority and reſtrained that fulneſs of power, which are many times neceſſary to be exerted, even for the good of the whole community. If this objection was well founded, it would be a ſufficient anſwer, to ſay that a few accidental inconveniencies, which may happen, and which may be recompenced too, in government, deſerve not to be prevented, at the expence of leaving liberty perpetually expoſed. But the reign of Queen *Elizabeth* proves, beyond contradiction, that a prince like her will enjoy, at the head of the freeſt people on earth, all the authority, and all the power neceſſary to promote the joint ſecurity, proſperity and glory of prince and people. So that all the objections which can be raiſed on this ſide to the Britiſh conſtitution of government, will centre here; that it has not provided for ſtrengthening and enlarging the authority and power of a weak or a wicked prince.

A prince who never ſeparates the intereſts juſt mentioned, and who purſues them wiſely, will have abſolute power in the moſt limited monarchy. A prince who ſeparates theſe intereſts, turns government itſelf into faction; and the ſpirit of liberty will riſe againſt him. An arbitrary government is ſuited to any character. A free government requires a great, at leaſt, a good one. In the former, all kinds and degrees of power are in the prince, or flow from him. In the latter, his powers are limited and confined. When he wants to encreaſe, or extend them, he muſt derive the faculty of doing ſo from his people; and from hence it follows, that as long as ſuch a conſtitution remains entire and uncorrupted, the proſperity, nay,

nay, the eaſe, and even the ſecurity of the government, will depend on the diſpoſition of the people towards the prince; as the diſpoſition of the people will always depend on the behavior of the prince towards the people. Queen *Elizabeth* ſaw theſe truths in all their force. She was both willing and able to proportion her conduct to them. She never felt therefore any want of power. She was ſupported by the ſpirit of liberty; and ſhe overcame that of faction. Some of her ſucceſſors either did not ſee theſe truths in all their force, or were unable to proportion their conduct to them. Theſe princes therefore felt the limitations of our monarchy like ſhackles upon them. The ſpirit of liberty either oppoſed, or did not ſupport them; and they nurſed up a ſpirit of faction to the ruin of themſelves, of their families, and almoſt of the nation.

LETTER

LETTER XVII.

THE ſcene we are now going to open will appear vaſtly different from that which we juſt cloſed. —Inſtead of an uninterrupted, pleaſing harmony of government, we ſhall meet with a perpetual, jarring diſſonance; inſtead of ſucceſs and glory abroad, diſappointment and contempt; inſtead of ſatisfaction, proſperity and union at home, diſcontent, diſtreſs, and at laſt civil war will preſent themſelves to us in all their horrors.

To conſider this melancholy change, and to ſhew from whence it proceeded, whether from the prince, or from the people, is our preſent buſineſs. That it was brought about and carried on by faction, muſt not be denied. The ſole queſtion will therefore be, which was the factious ſide? Now to determine this, we need only enquire, which ſide was for uſurping on the other; which was for preſerving and which for altering the eſtabliſhed conſtitution of government. On this point the queſtion will turn; for in a country of liberty, in a limited monarchy, whatever ſome perſons may think, or deſire to have believed, it is certain that there may be faction for the crown, as well as againſt the crown. The reaſon is plain. There may be conſpiracies againſt liberty, as well as againſt prerogative. Private intereſt may ſcreen or defend a bad adminiſtration, as well as attack or undermine a good one. In ſhort, conſpiring againſt any one part of the conſtitution, in favor of another, or perverting, to the ſupport of national grievances, the very means, which were inſtituted to redreſs them, are deſtructive

tive of the whole frame of ſuch a government, and are the proper characteriſtics of faction.

On which ſide faction, thus defined, is likely to be found the oftener, and to act the moſt effectually, we ſhall not ſtay to examine here. They who have read the firſt of theſe letters, may remember what is there ſaid, to ſhew the difference between the motives and the means, which a prince hath of uſurping on his people; and thoſe which the people have of encroaching on their prince. We ſhall only obſerve to our preſent purpoſe, that as he, who confines his notions of faction to oppoſitions made to the crown, reaſons, in an abſolute monarchy, in favor of the conſtitution; ſo he, who confines them thus, reaſons, in a limited monarchy, againſt the conſtitution, is weak enough to deceive himſelf, or wicked enough to attempt deceiving others; and, in either caſe, is thus far a betrayer of public liberty.—On ſuch principles as theſe we ſaid, in our laſt paper, that government itſelf might be turned into faction; and that ſome of Queen *Elizabeth*'s ſucceſſors had nurſed up a ſpirit of faction, to the ruin of themſelves, of their families, and almoſt of the nation.—We preſume that this will appear, in the courſe of our enquiries, to be undeniably true; and that there will be as little room to doubt whether the factious conduct of the court, in the reigns of King *James* and King *Charles* the Firſt, gave a riſe to all the ſtruggles between them and their people, as there is room to deny that the deſtruction of our conſtitution, in church and ſtate, was the dreadful conſequence of theſe ſtruggles. The ſpirit of liberty and the Britiſh conſtitution of government, whoſe cauſe we are pleading, and whoſe cauſe we are ſorry there ſhould be ſo much occaſion to plead, will therefore, we hope, remain clear of all imputations.

We

We wiſh that this juſtice could be done without opening wounds which are hardly yet intirely healed, and without arraigning the conduct of princes, whoſe memories have been held in great veneration by many worthy perſons: but ſince this cannot be; nay, ſince the opening of theſe wounds may contribute to the more effectual healing of them; and ſince arraigning the conduct of theſe princes hath been rendered the more neceſſary by the accounts which have been given of it, and by the principles on which it hath been defended; we muſt ſpeak with the ſame liberty of them, as we have uſed in ſpeaking of thoſe who reigned before them.

The Ægyptians paid ſo much reſpect to their very limited monarchs, that when they meant to warn theſe princes againſt particular vices, they commended them for oppoſite virtues. We cannot perſuade ourſelves that this method of reforming, or inſtructing, by panegyric, the uſual and moſt deadly poiſon of other princes, had a good effect on thoſe of Ægypt. But however this might be, when theſe princes were dead, notwithſtanding the reſpect ſhewn to them living *, they underwent the ſame trial as the cuſtom of the kingdom had eſtabliſhed for all private perſons, and funeral honors were equally denied to them, and to the meaneſt and moſt guilty of their ſubjects, when their memories were condemned, on a ſolemn and ſtrict examination of the conduct they had held in life.

Though we propoſe to enquire with all this freedom; and though we are perſuaded that the reſult of theſe enquiries will be a confirmation of what hath been advanced by us; yet are we very far from admitting many of the objections which have been made to the conduct of King *James* and King *Charles*

* *Diodor. Sic.* l. 2. c. 3.

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the Firſt. Much leſs do we approve thoſe cruel inſinuations againſt them, which are to be found in ſeveral invectives, not hiſtories, dictated by a ſpirit of faction, not by the ſpirit of liberty. The ſpirit of liberty reflects on the errors of princes with ſorrow, not with triumph, and is unwilling to aggravate what it wiſhes had never happened.—In the temper which this ſpirit inſpires therefore, we ſhall proceed. We ſhall dwell on no facts, but ſuch as we think uncontroverted; and ſhal lmake no reflections, nor draw any conſequences from them, but ſuch as ariſe naturally and without the leaſt force.—The truth would not be ſo evident, as we preſume it is in this caſe, if any thing more was neceſſary to the illuſtration of it.

Amongſt the many advantages which King *James* had on his acceſſion to the throne of England, we might very juſtly reckon the recent example of his predeceſſor. Her penetration diſcovered the conſequences of that great change in the balance of property, of which we have ſpoken in Letters XI. and XII.; and ſhe accommodated at once the whole ſyſtem of her government to it, as we have there obſerved.—Whatever doubts ſhe might have entertained, concerning the ſucceſs of her own meaſures, before ſhe had experienced the happy effects of them, King *James* could reaſonably entertain none. Experience as well as reaſon, pointed out to him the ſole principle, on which he could eſtabliſh his government with advantage, or even with ſafety; and Queen *Elizabeth*'s reign had every year afforded him freſh proofs that this principle of government, which is eaſy in the purſuit, is effectual in the end to all the purpoſes which a good man and a juſt prince can deſire to obtain. But King *James* paid as little regard to her example, as he did to her memory. In the laſt reſpect he was indecent. In the other unwiſe. He boaſted moſt ridiculouſly of an influence which he never had over her councils. Happy

would

would it have been for him, for his family, and for this whole nation, if her example had really had a due influence over his conduct; or, at leaſt, if his example had obtained leſs influence over the conduct of his ſucceſſor.—Fraught with learning, not with knowledge; ignorant of the true principles of government; more a ſtranger to our conſtitution by his notions and his habits of thinking, than to our country by his birth; obſtinate though not ſteady; miſled by ſelf-opinion, and confirmed in error by ſuperlative pedantry, King *James* the Firſt ſeemed to expect the love, and to demand the obedience of his ſubjects, purely becauſe the crown had dropped on his head. Whereas Queen *Elizabeth* ſeemed, both by her declarations and her actions, to think herſelf intitled to the firſt, and ſecure of the laſt, for no other reaſon than this; becauſe ſhe wore the crown to the greateſt advantage of her people. Her good ſenſe taught her what he had not found in his books; that the ties between prince and people are not the ſame with thoſe between particular perſons in private life. Theſe perſons converſe and live familiarly together. Natural ſympathies therefore, more eaſily to be felt than deſcribed, may unite them without the motives of gratitude, or expectation. Thoſe common good offices, which the heart alone ſuggeſts, are often ſufficient to maintain ſuch unions; and a man, who is neither a ſaint, nor a hero, may hope to find and keep a friend. But public, or political, or ſtate-friendſhip, by which we mean an intimate and affectionate union between the governors and the governed, cannot be contracted without gratitude or expectation, nor maintained without both. If it could; if ſubjects were attached to their prince by a kind of inſtinct, as hard to be accounted for, and yet as prevalent as the ſympathies we have mentioned, the aſſertors of the divine right of princes, and of the univerſal obedience due to them, would have had long ago a more plauſible argument than they

have yet produced in favor of their doctrines. They would have been able to ſtop the mouths of all gainſayers; even of him who required a miracle to become their convert; and who reſolved never to believe that ſlavery was of divine inſtitution, till he beheld "ſubjects born with bunches on their backs, like "camels, and kings with combs on their heads like cocks;" from which marks it might be collected that the former were deſigned to labor and to ſuffer, and the latter to ſtrut and to crow. But till ſome ſuch miracle is wrought, or the inſtinct ſuppoſed above is born with men, we think it will remain true that the union we ſpeak of, between prince and people, neither can, nor ought to ſubſiſt on any other terms, than thoſe of good government on one part, and of gratitude and expectation on the other. —This union may be, and hath been, maintained by abſolute princes with their people; becauſe it is not impoſſible that an abſolute prince ſhould be a wiſe and good man; and becauſe ſome ſuch there have been. But here lies a difference. The abſolute monarch may exert the whole power of the ſtate. He may govern eaſily, ſafely, and with all other advantages, though he neglects to cultivate this union; or, which is worſe, though he breaks it. But the caſe of a limited monarch is not the ſame, for the reaſons which we touched upon, at the end of our laſt letter. It is therefore the immediate, the perſonal, the higheſt intereſt of ſuch a prince, as it is the duty of every prince, to contract this union, and to maintain it inviolate. The wiſdom of our conſtitution hath made it ſo; and, in making it ſo, hath imitated that divine wiſdom, which appears in the conſtitution of the moral world. In this, it may be eaſily proved from a conſideration of the circumſtances in which we ſtand as individuals, that the general good of ſociety is the particular intereſt of every member. Our Creator deſigned therefore that we ſhould promote this general good. It is by

conſequence

conſequence our duty to do ſo; and every man, who believes a wiſe, all-directing mind, and who knows that proportioning of means to ends is eſſential to wiſdom, muſt ſubſcribe to this opinion.—And yet, determined by falſe appearances of good, or attracted by the force of immediate objects, men may, and they frequently do, imagine that they purſue their particular and ſeparate intereſts, whilſt they neglect, or act againſt, the general and common intereſt of ſociety.

In like manner, King *James* the Firſt, and thoſe princes who have trod in his ſteps, imagined no doubt that they purſued a particular, ſeparate intereſt of their own, whilſt they neglected an union with their people, and even made ſuch an union impracticable, by tranſgreſſing, in pretenſions and in fact, the bounds which our conſtitution preſcribed to them. But the miſtake is equal in both caſes; for in both caſes, intereſt and duty remain indiviſibly united, however they may be ſeparated in opinion; and he who ſins againſt one, ſins moſt certainly againſt the other; though the natural conſequences of his actions do not appear immediately, nor on every occaſion, to follow.

Theſe conſequences followed in a ſignal and terrible manner upon the occaſions which we have mentioned, and into the particulars of which we ſhall deſcend ſome other time. Theſe examples therefore are complete. The cauſes and the effects come together under one view; and if we carry our obſervations forward to later times, we ſhall ſee cauſes of the ſame kind laid again, and producing effects of the ſame nature; effects always proportionable to them; ſometimes jealouſy, diſcontent, tumult; ſometimes open reſiſtance, and depoſition of the prince; for though, in all theſe caſes, the people have ſuffered, as well as the prince; yet in ſome, the prince alone

alone hath been undone; and thus, by an equal diſtribution of juſtice, the principal ſhare of the common calamity hath fallen on him, without whom no part of it could have happened.

Though theſe general reflections, which we have premiſed, may appear long to ſome of our readers, and may ſeem too nearly allied to reflections already made; yet we hope for indulgence, on account of the importance of the matter. It muſt ſurely be of uſe to explain very clearly, and very fully, from whence the weakneſs of our government at ſome times, and the diſorders and revolutions of it at others, have proceeded ſince that æra, when our liberties became better ſecured, and our conſtitution capable of greater improvements, by a new ſettlement of the balance of property and power. No point hath been more miſtaken. None hath been more artfully miſrepreſented.

LETTER

LETTER XVIII.

WE have obſerved already of how great advantage the example of Queen *Elizabeth* might have been to King *James* the Firſt. It might have taught him to ſtruggle through the moſt intricate difficulties. But he had none ſuch to encounter, till he created them by his own management.—On the contrary, his acceſſion to the throne of England was accompanied with all the favorable circumſtances of eaſe and ſecurity, which were neceſſary to form a conjuncture proper for him; ſo that with abilities, much inferior to thoſe of his predeceſſor, he might have reigned as gloriouſly abroad, and as happily at home.—Many of the difficulties and dangers which ſurrounded her, were perſonal to her. They aroſe from her birth, from her title, and from that which *Mary* Queen of Scotland pretended. They therefore ceaſed with her. Many others ſhe had conquered by a wiſe and ſteady adminiſtration. Many had been worn out by length of time; and many had been ſo changed by the courſe of events, that King *James* was ſafe, where ſhe was moſt in danger; and ſtrong, where ſhe was weakeſt.—His title was not conteſted; nor any oppoſition, either open or ſecret, given to his ſucceſſion. They who had founded ſo high the right of his mother, could not refuſe to acknowledge the ſame right in him; and the reſt of the nation ſubmitted to it; for how little regard ſoever many of them might pay to this right in their hearts, or how great ſuſpicion ſoever of his future conduct might be juſtly infuſed into them by his paſt behavior, the people would have a king, and there was no other prince, in whom the Proteſtant intereſt could unite at that time.—That riddle of a plot, in which Sir

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Walter Raleigh was involved, does not deſerve to be mentioned, as an exception to the national unanimity we ſpeak of.—True it is that, in other reſpects, the nation was far from being united, either by a conformity of opinion, or by an acquieſcence of thoſe who differed from the eſtabliſhment.—It was, no doubt, a ſevere misfortune, and ſuch it continues to this very hour; that the great and glorious work of the reformation, being carried on at different times, and in different places, was carried on likewiſe without a general concert. The ſeveral churches reformed themſelves, according to the different circumſtances they were in, and according to the different characters of the few, who led the many in each of them. The ſeparation of them all from the church of Rome was entire; but, in ſome, it was thought proper to reform; in others to alter the whole model: in ſome, many things were retained, which had been in practice before the reformation; in others, a total oppoſition to every inſtance of conformity with the church of Rome ſeemed to be the ſole ſtandard of Chriſtian purity.—This variety of opinions and eſtabliſhments amongſt the reformed was a great evil in itſelf; but this evil was aggravated by a circumſtance of the moſt fatal conſequence. The reformers, and eſpecially thoſe who came lateſt, as our excellent Mr. *Hooker* * obſerves, by enforcing too peremptorily their particular modes of reformation, brought the people in many caſes to receive and reſpect, as divine laws, even thoſe orders and that diſcipline, which expediency or other political motives had ſuggeſted. Now, the natural tendency of this perſuaſion was not only to render all comprehenſion, or reconciliation amongſt the reformed churches impracticable; but to make the diviſions, in any particular church incurable.——Thus, when Queen *Elizabeth* com-

* Eccl. polity, pref.

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pleted that eſtabliſhment of a church, which *Edward* the ſixth had begun, many diſſented from it; and the ſcruples of private conſcience were pleaded againſt ſubmiſſion to the public authority of the ſtate.—If regard had been paid to all who had petitioned the queen, or admoniſhed the parliament, in the heat of theſe times, it ſeems probable that no eſtabliſhment at all could have been made; and if none had been made, an eccleſiaſtical anarchy muſt have enſued. How far the number of ſeparatiſts might have been leſſened by more compliances with the learned and moderate amongſt them, for ſuch there certainly were, we ſhall neither preſume to determine, nor go about to enquire. It is ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe to obſerve, that although theſe ſeeds of diſturbance had been ſowed before the acceſſion of King *James*, yet no diſturbance had happened, nor was any likely to happen at that time. The meaſures which had been purſued, and the temper which had been obſerved in Queen *Elizabeth*'s reign, tended to diminiſh the religious oppoſition by a ſlow, a gentle, and for that very reaſon an effectual progreſſion; and, in the mean while, to prevent ſuch conſequences of it as might diſorder or weaken the government.—By the laws which were made, the ſeveral diſſenting ſects were diſcouraged and kept in awe; but by the execution of theſe laws, they were not exaſperated. They were puniſhed, not provoked. They felt the weight of the government as often as they attempted to diſturb it, but they never felt the oppreſſion of party; and when they were treated like factions, they had not the pretence to complain that they were treated ſo by a faction.--Upon this foot there was even room to hope, that when the firſt fire of theſe men's zeal was ſpent, reaſonable terms of union with the eſtabliſhed church might be accepted by ſuch of them as were not intoxicated with fanaticiſm. Such as theſe were friends to order, though hey diſputed about

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it, and could have the leſs pretence to reject with obſtinacy that which had been ſettled by Queen *Elizabeth*, becauſe they knew that their own diſcipline had been eſtabliſhed where it prevailed, as the church of England had been by the ſupreme authority; that it had been made a law of the country; that the people had been bound by oath to the maintainance of it; and that *Calvin* himſelf had been a moſt rigorous exactor of conformity to it.--If ſuch as theſe had been once incorporated with the eſtabliſhed church, the remaining ſectaries would have been of little moment, either for numbers, or reputation; and the very means, which were proper to gain theſe, were likewiſe the moſt effectual to hinder the increaſe of them, and of the other ſectaries in the mean time.—Upon the whole matter, we think it very plain that King *James* the Firſt, beſides the advantage of coming to the crown, after all the difficulties and dangers of completing the reformation, and eſtabliſhing a new church were over, had an eaſy and ſecure opportunity of preventing any bad conſequences which might be apprehended from the diviſions of his Proteſtant ſubjects; and that the improvement of this opportunity, conſiſted in giving neither alarm to the well affected, nor pretence to the factious.

The deſigns of the Roman-Catholic party, againſt the conſtitution in church and ſtate, were carried on with as much rage, but not with as much ſtrength, as ever. The hydra-heads, which ſprouted continually out of that body in the former reign, had been lopt ſo often, that they appeared more rarely; and if the venom of that principle which produced them, was not abated; yet many of the ſprings, which fed and nouriſhed it, were exhauſted. The *Guiſes*, *Mary* Queen of Scotland, *Phillip* the Second, were dead. The reformation was eſtabliſhed; not only in outward form, but in the hearts

of men. It was grown up to be a part, and a favorite part, of the conſtitution. The ſpirit of liberty had blended our civil and religious rights together, and was become equally jealous of both. Let us add, for we may add it with great juſtice, that the church of England was, by the ſobriety, wiſdom and ſanctity of her inſtitution, eſtabliſhed on a rock; that this rock was defended by the greateſt number of excellent men, which any Chriſtian church could boaſt of: and from all this let us conclude, that as ſhe was able to reſiſt the attacks of thoſe ſects, which private conceit, miſtaken zeal, ſome enthuſiaſm, and perhaps, ſome faction had nurſed up in her own boſom; ſo ſhe was better able than any other Proteſtant church to defend herſelf, and the ſtate too, againſt the fallacies, the ſeductions, and the violence of Rome. The policy of this court ſaw it, and neglected nothing to prevent the conſequences. Seminaries had been erected at Doway and other places abroad, for the education of Engliſh youth in popery. *Gregory* the Thirteenth had given the direction of that, which was erected at Rome, to the Jeſuits; and upon that occaſion theſe incendiaries crept into England. If we may believe ſome accounts, they mingled themſelves amongſt the clergy of the church of England and the puritan miniſters. That they took all methods to foment our diviſions is probabel; and that they were not men, who would ſtick at any, may be certainly collected from that account of their conduct here, and of the doctrines they taught, which is contained in the complaints exhibited againſt them by the reſt of the * popiſh clergy.

Thus was the ſpirit of the church and court of Rome kept up here, even at the time of the acceſſion of King *James*; a ſpirit, which might ſerve to bring

* *Thuan.* lib. 126.

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about an aſſaſſination, or any barbarous and deſperate ſtroke, like that of the gun-powder-treaſon, which a few enthuſiaſts were capable of executing; but not to ſubvert the reformation, and introduce popery anew. The efforts of this party now were like the laſt convulſions of a ſtrong body, mortally wounded; frightful to behold; ſufficient to hurt others; but tokens of death, not ſymptoms of recovery.—King *James* had it therefore in his power to keep down with eaſe a party, which Queen *Elizabeth* had ſubdued with pain; and whatever impreſſion the bloody deſigns they had often formed, and ſometimes brought to effect, might make on his mind; certain it was, and the event made that certainty undeniable, that no degree of favor to them, except the utmoſt, could effectually ſecure him againſt their attempts; and that the leaſt degree of favor ſhewn, or encouragement given them, would be productive of the greateſt national miſchief.

We have dwelt the longer on theſe points of religious diviſions, becauſe we think a clear and juſt notion of them abſolutely neceſſary to fix a right opinion, concerning one of the principal cauſes, which were laid in this reign, of all the national calamities that followed.—We ſhall mention the other advantages which attended King *James* the Firſt, as briefly as we can; not becauſe they were ſmall, for, on the contrary, they were exceedingly great; but becauſe they are more notorious, and have no need of being ſo much developed, in order to be made ſenſible.

Thus, for inſtance, the different condition in which he found the navy, the commerce, and the wealth of the nation, as well as the revenues of the crown, from that in which Queen *Elizabeth* had found them all at her acceſſion, is known in general by every one who hath dipt into hiſtory. Without

entering into more particulars therefore than we have done already, we may venture to conclude that he reaped the benefit of her œconomy, and was a rich, as well as a powerful king. We know very well that when the ſeſſion of parliament was opened by commiſſion in 1610, by the Earls of *Suffolk* and *Saliſbury*, one of the reaſons urged, for demanding money of the commons, was grounded on a debt of Queen *Elizabeth*, which was ſaid to have abſorbed three hundred and fifty thouſand pounds, due on the laſt ſubſidies granted to her. If this fact was true, all that reſulted from it is; firſt, that Queen *Elizabeth* left a mortgage on the lands of the crown, and money enough to diſcharge it; ſecondly, that King *James* parted with his money to recover his lands; and we ſhall not oppoſe any perſon, who will charitably believe that this prince would have paid the debts of his predeceſſor, though they had not been thus ſecured, out of the money ſhe left in her coffers; becauſe to have done otherwiſe, would have been a manifeſt violation of all the rules of religion, honor and common morality. But we much doubt whether even this averment of the lords, who opened the ſeſſion, will have any great weight, when it ſhall be conſidered that their whole diſcourſe was too miniſterial to be ſincere; and that ſome of the reaſons, by which they accounted for the king's want of money, ſuch, for inſtance, as the charge of protecting his wife and children from being robbed on the road to London, were really burleſque.

The advantages which this prince had in the ſituation of foreign affairs, both at his acceſſion to the throne and during the greateſt part of his reign, were remarkably great; and we doubt whether it is poſſible to find more than one conjecture equally favorable ſince that time.—*Philip* the Third was on the throne of Spain; a prince of ſmall capacity, and leſs application;

tion; governed by his favorite, and his favorite deteſted by the people. Before the end of King *James*'s reign he died; and *Philip* the Fourth, his ſon, ſucceeded, a youth of ſixteen years old, and governed as abſolutely by *Olivarez*, as his father had been by the Duke of *Lerma*. The declenſion of the Spaniſh monarchy haſtened on apace, under theſe princes. It is ſaid that *Philip* the Third refuſed to ſupport the Roman Catholic party, in the beginning of the reign of King *James*; which is the more probable, on account of the early and precipitate ſteps made by this prince, towards a peace with Spain. The defeat of Don *John d' Aquila* in Ireland, and the entire reduction of Tyrone, which happened a little before the death of Queen *Elizabeth*, diſcouraged the Spaniards from making any more attempts of that kind. They turned their eyes from theſe iſlands to the continent; to the Low Countries and to Germany, where they continued, during the courſe of many years, to conſume their remains of ſtrength, in abetting the ambitious projects of that branch of the houſe of Auſtria.

As King *James* had nothing to apprehend from the enmity of Spain, ſo he was ſecure of the friendſhip of France. *Henry* the Fourth was now eſtabliſhed on that throne. He was in peace indeed with Spain, but intended not to be ſo long. We are very far from believing that this prince could ſeriouſly entertain ſo chimerical a project as that of making an entire new ſettlement of Europe, by dividing it into fifteen ſtates, which *Pareſixe* and other authors have related, upon the faith of the compilers of *Sully*'s memoirs; but, without doubt, he had great views of checking the ambition, and reducing the power of the houſe of Auſtria. It was therefore his intereſt to live well with the king of Great Britain; and accordingly he ſent the marquis of *Roſny*, afterwards duke of *Sully*, to renew the treaties with King

King *James*, as ſoon almoſt as this prince was ſeated on the throne of England. When *Henry* the Fourth was ſtabbed by *Ravaillac*, a minority followed in France, and the counſels of that court were, for many years, chiefly employed about their own affairs; ſo that nothing could happen on that ſide, even after this great change, to give the leaſt diſturbance to King *James*.

The ſtates of the Low Countries were no longer in the ſame diſtreſſed condition. Their commonwealth had taken form; their naval force was increaſing; and their commerce extending itſelf every day. Oſtend kept the Spaniſh forces at bay for more than three years; and when *Spinola* had made himſelf maſter of that heap of ruins, the Dutch thought themſelves ſufficiently recompenſed by the acquiſition which they had made, in the mean time, of Sluyce and other important places. The truce of eight months between Spain and the States was ſigned in 1607. It was prolonged afterwards; and in the year 1609, the truce of twelve years was concluded at Antwerp; by which the King of Spain was forced to acknowledge the liberty and independency of the United Provinces. Thus was that commonwealth eſtabliſhed to be a great and laſting acceſſion of ſtrength to the Proteſtant intereſt; and King *James* might have reaped the benefit of an uſeful alliance, where Queen *Elizabeth* had no other advantage than that of defending the oppreſſed, and diverting the forces of a common enemy.

The affairs of the North, indeed, were in great confuſion about the ſame time. The crown of Sweden belonged to *Sigiſmund* in courſe of deſcent; but *Sigiſmund* was a papiſt, and king of Poland. For both theſe reaſons, he had been excluded, and his uncle *Charles* preferred to the throne by the ſtates of Sweden; who provided, by the act of ſettlement, not only that their kings ſhould be of the religion of the country, but that none of the princes

princes of the royal family ſhould accept another crown, nor any foreign dominions. Their experience, it ſeems, had ſhewn them the neceſſity of ſuch limitations. This gave occaſion to thoſe long and cruel wars, which followed between Sweden and Poland. Others ſucceeded between Sweden and Denmark; but the ſcene of them all was ſo remote, and the intereſts of this country ſo abſolutely unconcerned in the events of them, that he, who ſhould have adviſed King *James* to take any part in them, would have paſſed, in thoſe days, for a very bad politician.

The indolent *Rodolphus* ſlept on the throne of the empire till the year 1614. His brother *Matthias* ſucceeded him; and their couſin *Ferdinand* ſucceeded *Matthias*. During the reign of *Rodolphus*, there were troubles in Hungary, in Tranſilvania, in Bohemia, and in ſeveral parts of the empire. Moſt of them were cauſed, all of them were fomented, by religious diviſions. During the reign of *Matthias*, theſe troubles increaſed. They grew up to maturity, as the acceſſion of *Ferdinand* to the empire approached. The Bohemians, long oppreſſed, and long provoked, took arms at laſt in 1618. Many cauſes conſpired to render all accommodation impracticable. Amongſt the principal were the deſigns, which all the branches of the houſe of Auſtria had laid and begun to execute againſt liberty and the Proteſtant religion in Germany; the character of *Ferdinand*, violent, cruel, a bigot, though artful; and, to ſpeak impartially, the ambition of *Frederic*, elector Palatine. If this ambition had been the ſole motive to engage King *James* in theſe quarrels, we muſt think that he could not have anſwered to his own people the engaging in them, as popular as the Palatine, his wife, and his cauſe were in England. But theſe quarrels were of another importance. *Frederic* loſt not only the crown

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of Bohemia, but his own patrimony. The Proteſtant religion, and the liberty of Germany, were well nigh ſacrificed to the bigotry and ambition of the emperor; ſo that the intereſt of this nation, as well as the king's family intereſt, was very much concerned to prevent theſe conſequences, and yet, even upon this foot, we muſt likewiſe think that it would not have been long popular in thoſe days, when the memory of Queen *Elizabeth*'s policy was freſh in the minds of men, to have maintained great armies on the continent, and to have fed with ſubſidies ſo many hungry princes, who had, at leaſt in the beginning, nothing leſs at heart than the common intereſt.

This difficult and dangerous ſituation of affairs on the continent, in which we allow that King *James* ought to have taken ſome part, may be thought, perhaps, to form an exception to what hath been ſaid, concerning thoſe circumſtances of advantage, of eaſe, and ſecurity, which accompanied the reign of this prince; but there will be room to think ſo no longer, when it ſhall be conſidered that King *James* had time and means to prepare for this critical conjuncture. The diſtreſs in foreign affairs began with Queen *Elizabeth*'s reign; and ſhe was in danger abroad. before ſhe was ſettled on her throne at home; but he had reigned near eighteen years before any thing happened on the continent, which could give him a juſt occaſion of acting vigorouſly in that ſcene. Beſides, when this occaſion did happen, he had it in his power to have acted with great glory to himſelf, and effectually for the ſervice of thoſe whom it was his intereſt to ſupport, without taking any other part than that which becomes a king of England, in oppoſition to that which becomes a prince on the continent, and agreeably to the principles of his predeceſſor's conduct. This will appear evidently true, when we come to conſider the part he did take; and we ſhall inſiſt upon it the rather, becauſe we

we obſerve with how much affectation the caſe we are now ſpeaking of, hath been quoted as parallel to the preſent ſituation of affairs; and how impertinently it hath been taken for granted, that King *James* the Firſt was condemned in his own time, and hath been condemned ſince, for not doing what theſe time-ſerving politicians recommended; that is, for entangling himſelf in the affairs of the empire, as if he had been a prince of the empire; and for not acting on every appearance of danger, or even of inconveniency to any little ſtate of Germany, in ſuch a manner as is agreeable neither to the intereſt nor ſituation of our iſland.

What hath been ſaid may be ſufficient to ſhew how few the difficulties were, compared with the advantages, which King *James* had to encounter both at home and abroad; and how fortunate a conjuncture was prepared for him by the wiſdom of his predeceſſor, and by an happy combination of circumſtances.—What uſe he made of theſe advantages, what conduct he held, and what conſequences it had, muſt be the ſubject of another diſcourſe.

LETTER

LETTER XIX.

BY what hath been ſaid, in former letters, we think it appears, that from the time our conſtitution ſettled on the foundation on which it remains ſtill, there hath been not only no poſſibility of governing this nation with ſtrength and dignity, without the concurrence of the people in their repreſentative body, nor with eaſe and ſafety without their concurrence in their collective body; but that this concurrence hath depended, and does and muſt always depend, on the union of intereſt and affection between the king and his ſubjects.

We beg leave to repeat that Queen *Elizabeth* ſaw this to be a ſure, and the only ſure principle, on which ſhe could eſtabliſh her government under ſuch a conſtitution; that ſhe very wiſely took the government on the terms of the conſtitution, and the conſtitution as ſhe found it; that inſtead of ſtruggling through trouble and danger to bend the conſtitution to any particular notions or views of her own, ſhe accommodated her notions, her views, and her whole character to it.—Let us obſerve, by the way, that this is no more than what every prince ought to do; and what every free people will expect and exact too, if need be, that he ſhould do. He is made for their ſakes, not they for his. He is raiſed to maintain, not to alter, the conſtitution.

Now King *James* begun and continued, through the whole courſe of his reign, to govern without any regard to this principle; nay, in abſolute defiance of it. He choſe other expedients of government, and truſted to ſo many broken reeds.

Without

Without any talents to procure the eſteem, he awakened the jealouſy and never courted the good will of his people; but, inſtead of it, endeavored to inſtil into their minds what was rooted in his own, a very good opinion of himſelf, and a very mean opinion of them. He endeavored to perſuade men, who felt that the balance of property was on their ſide, and that they held a great ſhare of the ſupreme power in their hands, that though they had this property, yet they had no right, or a very precarious one, to this power. He meant, by the force of new-fangled opinions to attach the nation to him, as Queen *Elizabeth* had done by the ties of affection and confidence: or he meant to govern without the concurrence of the nation; or he meant nothing. The firſt was chimerical, the ſecond was wicked, and the third was ſtupid.—*Elizabeth* had been jealous of her prerogative, but moderate in the exerciſe of it. Wiſer *James* imagined that the higher he carried it, and the more rigorouſly he exerted it, the more ſtrongly he ſhould be ſeated in his throne. He miſtook the weight for the ſtrength of a ſceptre; and did not conſider that it is never ſo likely to ſlip or to be wrenched out of a prince's hands, as when it is heavieſt. He never reflected that prerogative is of the nature of a ſpring, which by much ſtraining will certainly relax and often break; that in one caſe it becomes of little, and in the other of no uſe at all.

As abſurd as the notions and principles of government were, by which King *James* hoped to eſtabliſh his authority, he found numbers to adopt them; for numbers are at all times liable to be deceived, ready to be tempted, and prone to be corrupted.—New ſyſtems of law and policy were not only received, put propagated. Some men were heated by oppoſition. Others were educated in prejudice. The plaineſt rights of the people were called in

in queſtion. The leaſt juſtifiable pretenſions of the crown were eſtabliſhed as true axioms of government, and certain principles of the Engliſh conſtitution. What father *Paul* obſerves to have happened in the church, happened here in the ſtate. Our court, like that of Rome, by affirming and denying boldly, and by inſiſting peremptorily, brought many things to be received as certain, which had been never proved, and many others to be looked on as problematical, which had been often demonſtrated. Thus were thoſe diviſions created, which could alone render the others fatal. Diſputes about the uſe of the ſurplice, or the croſs in baptiſm, would not have unſheathed all the ſwords in the nation. Puritaniſm neither did, nor could make ſuch deadly wounds; but when they were once made, puritaniſm feſtered in the ſore, and rendered them mortal. King *James* conjured up, by uſing tricks of government, that ſtorm in which his ſucceſſor periſhed. His ſucceſſor, for we will finiſh the ſketch we have begun, a religious and a juſt prince, came a party-man to the throne. His prejudices, confirmed by habit, fortified by the flattery of his courtiers, and provoked by the oppoſition which his father and he met with, carried him to continue an invaſion on the people's rights, whilſt he imagined himſelf only concerned in the defence of his own. The faction of the court tainted the nation, and gave life and ſtrength, if it did not give being, to the factions in the ſtate. If the ſpirit of liberty could have prevailed in time againſt the firſt, there had been no danger from the others. But the long and obſtinate reſiſtance of the firſt gave time and opportunity, and even aſſiſtance to the others to extinguiſh this ſpirit. Cavaliers and Roundheads divided the nation, like Yorkiſts and Lancaſtrians. No other option was left at laſt. To reconcile theſe diſputes by treaty became impracti-

cable,

cable, when neither ſide would truſt the other. To terminate them by the ſword, was to fight, not for preſerving the conſtitution, but for the manner of deſtroying it. The conſtitution might have been deſtroyed under pretence of prerogative. It was deſtroyed under pretence of liberty. We might have fallen under abſolute monarchy. We fell into abſolute anarchy. The ſum of all is this: We were deſtroyed by faction; but faction prevailed at court near forty years before it prevailed amongſt the people. It was the original principle on one ſide. It was an accident on the other. Churchmen and royaliſts attacked the conſtitution. Puritans and commonwealths-men, and, above all, a motely race of preciſe knaves and enthuſiaſtic madmen, ruined it. But the laſt could never have happened, if the firſt had not; and whoever will diſpaſſionately trace the cauſes of that deteſtable civil war, will find them laid in the conduct of King *James* the Firſt, as early as his acceſſion to the throne of England.

Having given this general idea of the two reigns which followed that of Queen *Elizabeth*, it is time to examine whether this idea of them can be ſupported by a ſeries of uncontroverted facts.—Let us deſcend into ſome particulars.

"A prince that is invited, or comes newly to a "kingdom," ſays *Wilſon*, "muſt have his chariot "wheels ſmooth-ſhod;" and ſurely if ever prince had motives and an opportunity to render himſelf popular, King *James* had both. *Eſſex*, *Southampton* and others, even *Cecil*, a principal miniſter of the late queen, had held a correſpondence with him, for their own private intereſt; but the millions who ſubmitted to his acceſſion, ſubmitted to it upon truſt, and were determined by the nature of the conjuncture, not by any knowledge of the perſons who compoſed this new royal family. It was not therefore enough for them to be placed in and about the throne. Their

Their true intereſt required that the hearts of the people ſhould be gained to them; and that popularity ſhould ſupply that ſpirit in their favor, which ſeldom fails to operate in favor of thoſe princes, who are born and bred amongſt the people they are to govern. The opportunity of doing this lay fairly before King *James*. He was received with tranſports of joy, and all ranks of men made their court to him.—If he looked on this national behavior, for ſo it was, to be the effect of a deſire in the people to endear themſelves to him, and to unite cloſely with him; this ſhould have ſuggeſted to his mind the eaſe with which he might acquire popularity, by improving the diſpoſition, and captivate the good will of a people, ſo deſirous to be pleaſed with their king. If he looked on this national behavior as the effect of levity, inconſtancy and love of change, it ſhould have taught him to apprehend how ſoon this honey-moon would paſs away; how ſoon the ſtream of popular favor might turn againſt him; and how ſoon they, who ſeemed to have forgot Queen *Elizabeth*, might return to regret her.—But that which a Scotſman foretold, happened. This behavior of the Engliſh ſpoiled a good king, made a bad king worſe.* It was natural for a vain man to believe what his flatterers told him, and what he, his own greateſt flatterer, told himſelf; that theſe applauſes and tranſports of the people were due to his eminent merit, and were an homage paid for the honor he did them in accepting their crown.—He took therefore much ſtate. He did not indeed make his journey, as *Henry* the Seventh made his entry into London, in a cloſe chariot; but he forbid by proclamation the concourſe of the people to him.* "He diſperſed them with frowns, that we "may not ſay with curſes."—Such different turns of thought can vanity inſpire. Some will be re-

* *Wilſon.*

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ſpected, like eaſtern monarchs, unſeen within the ſhrine of their court. Others grow fond of public triumphs; delight in noiſy acclamations; and are pleaſed to drive, like Indian pagods, over a proſtrate crowd.

As much as King *James* neglected to gain the public, even at the cheap price of affability, he ſunk into low familiarity with his favorites, and was profuſe of riches and honors to particular men. He beſtowed, at firſt on a few, and afterwards on one man, that affection which he had promiſed the whole nation, in ſome of the plauſible, commonplace diſcourſes which he held at certain times. There is no need of mentioning the particular inſtances of a profuſion he acknowledged himſelf. The eſtates he gave to his courtiers impoveriſhed the crown; and, as it always happens, the people were forced to pay for thoſe very grants, at which they murmured. Honors he beſtowed in ſo laviſh a manner, and with ſo little diſtinction, that they ceaſed, in ſome ſenſe, to be honors. To know the Britiſh nobility, it was become almoſt neceſſary to have nomenclators, like thoſe who attended the candidates at Rome, to tell them the names of the citizens. The jeſt went ſo far, that an advertiſement of * "an art to help weak memories to a "competent knowledge of the names of the nobi-"lity," was paſted up at Paul's.

Thus King *James* began, and thus he continued his reign. That experience, which he ſaid, in his firſt ſpeech to his parliament, would teach him not to be ſo eaſily and lightly moved in granting, taught him nothing. What a contraſt does this conduct make with the affability of Queen *Elizabeth*, with the œconomy and reſerve ſhe uſed, in diſpoſing of her treaſure, and in conferring honors?—But King *James* ſtood in need of helps, to the want of which

* *Wilſon.*

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ſhe was ſuperior. " A good government, ſays " one of our writers, makes a good people." When a prince hath turned the ſpirit of a nation in his favor, he need not be ſolicitous about gaining particular men; but when he hath turned this ſpirit againſt him, he muſt employ all arts, even the loweſt, to detach particular men from the body of the people, and to make them act by motives of private intereſt againſt the public ſenſe. This is faction; and therefore whenever a court is induſtrious to ſeduce, to inveigle, to corrupt particular men, we may ſecurely conclude, without waiting for any other ſign, that ſuch an adminiſtration ſtands on a factious, not on a national, bottom.—But to return to King *James*.

Whilſt he neglected the affection and ſought the reverence of the public, he loſt one, and was diſappointed of the other. His private and his public character both fell into contempt. Learning was the part upon which he valued himſelf. This he affected more than became a king, and broached, on every occaſion, in ſuch a manner as would have miſbecome a ſchoolmaſter. His pedantry was too much even for the age in which he lived. It would be tedious to quote the part he took in the conference at Hampton Court; and in the theological wrangles between the Gomariſts and Arminians; or to go about to prove, by ſome inſtances, what appeared in all his words and actions; what is univerſally allowed; and what the unkingly volume he left behind him teſtifies.—Let us only obſerve, that the ridicule which aroſe from hence, and which fixed on him, was juſt; becauſe the merit of a chief governor is wiſely to ſuperintend the whole, and not to ſhine in any inferior claſs; becauſe different and, in ſome caſes perhaps, oppoſite talents, both natural and acquired, are neceſſary to move, and to regulate the movements of the machine of government; in ſhort, becauſe as a good adjutant may

make a very bad general; ſo a great reader, and writer too, may be a very ignorant king.

There were many other circumſtances, which concurred to leſſen this prince in the eyes of his ſubjects and of all mankind; as we ſhall have occaſion to obſerve frequently in the courſe of theſe remarks.—In the mean time, we ſhall obſerve here, that the ſtate he affected, and the pompous titles he was fond of, ſerved to render his puſilanimity, which, with his vanity, made up the main of his character, more conſpicuous, and his perſon by conſequence more contemptible.—The hoſtilities between the Engliſh and Spaniards continued, when Queen *Elizabeth* died. This great queen, not content to have done herſelf and her ſubjects juſtice, on many ſignal occaſions, put it likewiſe into their power to do themſelves juſtice, by granting letters of repriſal on the ſubjects of Spain. King *James* was ſo fond of peace, that is, ſo afraid of war, that without ſtaying to be ſolicited on this head, or to be complimented on his acceſſion to the throne by the King of Spain, he revoked theſe letters in a few weeks after he came into England. He diſarmed his ſubjects, before he had provided for their better ſecurity. He ſtopt them in the courſe of doing themſelves juſtice, before he was ſure of obtaining reparation for their paſt loſſes. The impreſſions which ſuch a proceeding muſt make on the minds of a trading people, are eaſily felt. He, who had revoked theſe letters in ſuch a manner, was not likely to grant them on any other occaſion. What protection therefore, and much leſs what encouragement to trade could be expected from a prince, who began his reign by ſacrificing this, the moſt valuable intereſts of his people, to a foreign and hoſtile nation; to the mean arts of falſe policy, and even to his fears?—Again; one of the firſt embaſſies which King *James* ſent abroad, was that of the Earl of *Hert-*

ford to Bruſſels. A Dutch man of war meeting the ſhip which carried the ambaſſador, refuſed to ſtrike *; and having offered this affront to the united croſſes, which had never been offered to that of St. *George*, went off with impunity. It is ſaid that the ambaſſador hindered the captain from aſſerting the honor of the Britiſh flag. But two things are certain; one, that Queen *Elizabeth* would have ſeverely puniſhed her officer, and have exacted ample reparation from the States General; the other, that King *James* did neither. This commonwealth had been raiſed by Queen *Elizabeth*, and was ſtill in want of the ſupport of England. The ſovereignty of her ſtate had not been yet acknowledged by any of the powers of Europe. How much the pacific temper

* N. B. This fact ſtands in hiſtory, as it is here related; but having looked into Sir *William Monſon*'s naval tracts, we find it differently told. He ſays nothing of ſtriking, or not ſtriking the flag; but confeſſes that an affront was offered by two Dutch men of war. He adds, that he ſent for the captains on board his ſhip; that he threatened to right himſelf upon them; but that he diſmiſſed them at the intreaty of my Lord *Hertford*, on their excuſing themſelves, and promiſing to puniſh the offenders. How ſeverely theſe offenders were puniſhed may be collected from hence. "One of theſe captains," ſays Sir *William Monſon*, "was he, "who ſince that time committed a foul murder upon his majeſ- "ty's ſubjects in Ireland, that were under protection."—If we had no other proofs of the indignities offered to our nation by the Dutch, from the time of the acceſſion of King *James* the Firſt, than the memorials of this gentleman, they would be ſufficient. He complains of theſe indignities very much, and mentions ſeveral. In this very tract he affirms that the Hollanders took and burned our ſhips, and murdered our men for trading to the ports of Flanders, whilſt they ſuffered their own countrymen, even in our ſight, to trade thither. The truth is, that our nation was inſulted with impunity, during this pacific reign, not only in Europe, but in every other part of the world; not only by the Dutch, but by other nations; and that our government fell from the higheſt eſteem into the loweſt contempt. If therefore the inſtance we have quoted ſhould be diſputed, on the repreſentation of this fact by Sir *William Monſon*, an hundred others, and ſeveral of them more flagrant, might be ſoon produced.

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of King *James* was capable of bearing had not yet become ſo apparent, as he made it in the courſe of his reign. From all which it is eaſy to collect, that if he had demanded ſatisfaction, he muſt and would have received it. But the good prince was afraid, where no fear was, and bore diſhonorably what he might have reſented ſafely; nay, what he ought to have reſented in any circumſtances, and at any hazard. We are not to wonder if ſo poor a conduct as this ſoon brought King *James* into contempt mingled with indignation, amongſt a people, eagerly bent on commerce, and in whom high notions of honor and a gallant ſpirit had been infuſed, by the example of Queen *Elizabeth*, and encouraged during the whole courſe of a long reign.

Theſe things, and ſeveral others of the ſame kind, which I omit, might however have been borne. The ridicule might have appeared leſs in the eyes of men accuſtomed to it. The other faults might have been excuſed, or ſoftened at leaſt, by hopes of amendment. But there are ſome things behind, which no excuſe would alleviate, nor any patience endure. We ſhall now bring them forward, and ſhall ſpeak of them under three heads.—The pretenſions ſet up, and the attempts made againſt the freedom of this conſtitution.—The management of parties.—The conduct of our national intereſts abroad, againſt the ſenſe of the nation.

LETTER XX.

A Fundamental principle, on which King *James* affected to eſtabliſh his authority, was that of an hereditary right to the crown. This ſacred right, according to the political creed which he impoſed, was not to be conteſted, much leſs to be ſet aſide; and yet this ſacred right was a mere chimæra; contradicted by the general tenor of cuſtom from the Norman invaſion to his time; by the declared ſenſe of his immediate predeceſſors; by many ſolemn proceedings of parliament; and by the expreſs terms of law.—Two families (for the race of *Plantagenet* was grafted on the Norman race, and they may be reckoned properly as one) had furniſhed, indeed, all our kings; but this conſtituted no hereditary right. When a prince of the royal family, but in a degree remote from the ſucceſſion, comes to the crown, in prejudice of the next heir, hereditary right is violated as really as it would be, if an abſolute ſtranger to this family ſucceeded. Such a prince may have another, and we think a better right; that, for inſtance, which is derived from a ſettlement of the crown, made by the authority of parliament; but to ſay he hath an hereditary right, is the groſſeſt abuſe of words imaginable. This we think ſo plain, that we ſhould be aſhamed to go about to prove it; and yet there are men, in this age of paradoxes, either dull enough, or proſtitute enough to aſſert hereditary right, even in the caſe abovementioned.

Our kings of the Norman race, were ſo far from ſucceeding as next heirs to one another, and in a regular courſe of deſcent, that no inſtance can be produced

duced of the next heir's ſucceeding, which is not preceded and followed by inſtances of the next heir's being ſet aſide.—Thus *Edward* the Firſt ſucceeded his father *Henry* the Third; but his father *Henry* the Third and his grandfather *John* had both been raiſed to the throne, in plain defiance of hereditary right; the right of *Arthur*, nephew to *John*, and the right of *Arthur*'s ſiſter, couſin-german to *Henry*. —*Edward* the Second ſucceeded his father *Edward* the Firſt; but *Edward* the Third depoſed *Edward* the Second; the parliament renounced all allegiance to him; and *Edward* the Third held the crown by a parliamentary title, as much as *William* the Third.—If we go up higher than this æra, or deſcend lower, we ſhall find the examples uniform. Examples, ſufficient to countenance this pretenſion of hereditary right to the crown of England, are to be found no where.—But we haſten to King *James*; who raiſed, or, if you pleaſe, revived this pretenſion, ſo needleſly for himſelf, and ſo very unprofitably for his poſterity.

The Britiſh race began in *Henry* the Seventh; and from him alone King *James* derived that right, which he aſſerted in ſuch pompous terms; that undoubted right to the throne, as he called it in his firſt ſpeech to parliament, which God, by birthright and lineal deſcent, had in fulneſs of time, provided for him. Now ſurely, if ever any prince came to the crown without the leaſt colour of hereditary right, it was *Henry* the Seventh. He had no pretence to it, even as heir of the houſe of Lancaſter. His wife might have ſome, as heir of the houſe of York; though her hereditary title was not free from objections, which the character of *Edward* the Fourth rendered probable; but the title of his wife had no regard paid to it either by him, or the parliament, in making this new ſettlement. He gained the crown by the good will of the people. He kept it by the

the confirmation of parliament, and by his own ability. The notional union of the two roſes was a much better expedient for quiet than foundation of right. It took place in *Henry* the Eighth; it was continued in his ſucceſſors; and this nation was willing it ſhould continue in King *James* and his family. But neither *Henry* the Eighth, nor his ſon *Edward* the Sixth, who might have done ſo with much better grace, laid the ſame ſtreſs on hereditary right as King *James* did. One of them had recourſe to parliament on every occaſion, where the ſucceſſion to the crown was concerned; and the other made no ſcruple of giving the crown by will to his couſin, in prejudice of his ſiſter's right. This right, however, ſuch as it was, prevailed; but the authority of parliament was called in aid by *Mary*, to remove the objection of illegitimacy, which lay againſt it. *Elizabeth* had ſo little concern about hereditary right, that ſhe neither held, nor deſired to hold her crown by any other tenure than the ſtatute of the thirty-fifth of her father's reign. In the thirteenth of her own reign, ſhe declared it by law high treaſon, during her life, and a præmunire, after her deceaſe, to deny the power of parliament, in limiting and binding the deſcent and inheritance of the crown, or the claims to it; and whatever private motives there were for putting to death *Mary* Queen of Scotland, her claiming a right in oppoſition to an act of parliament, was the foundation of the public proceedings againſt her.

Such examples, as we have quoted, ought to have ſome weight with King *James*. A prince, who had worn the crown of Scotland, under ſo many reſtraints, and in ſo great penury, might have contented himſelf, one would think, to hold that of England, whoſe penſioner he had been by the ſame tenure, and to eſtabliſh his authority on the ſame principles that had con-

contented the beſt and greateſt of his predeceſſors; but his deſigns were as bad as thoſe of the very worſt princes who went before him.

Happily for Great Britain, he wanted the capacity of *Henry* the Seventh; the reſolution of *Henry* the Eighth; and the favourable opportunities which they had the luck to find, or the art to contrive, of raiſing prerogative, acquiring wealth, and encroaching on liberty.

We obſerved, in diſcourſing on the reign of *Henry* the Seventh, that he had laid the foundations of an exorbitant power, before the nation was well aware of what he intended.—King *James*, on the contrary, ſhewed his whole game from the firſt. Beſides the pleaſure, which his vanity found in boaſting of an abſolute, independent right to the crown, inherent in himſelf, he imagined that the tranſition would be eaſy, and ſo indeed it proved amongſt many, from this to ſome other uſeful apophthegms. He hoped to get, and he did get, an act of recognition of his right of ſucceſſion; for we cannot perſuade ourſelves, with *Rapin*, that he was indifferent on this point: and though this act, as well as the oath of ſupremacy, which had been eſtabliſhed long before, and that of allegiance, which was eſtabliſhed ſoon after, is in itſelf, as it hath proved in effect, but a feeble prop to ſupport the pretence of hereditary right; yet King *James* certainly looked on it as an admiſſion of his claim, and meant a real advantage, where the parliament very probably meant nothing more than a compliment.—This prince brought with him the true ſpirit of a miſſionary; and, by preaching a new doctrine, endeavored to eſtabliſh a new power, from the notion of independent right was deduced the notion of independent authority; a right ſuperior to law; an authority unbounded by it; a right, which could not be proved; an authority, which might not be defined.—The inference from both

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theſe was obvious. This independent king muſt be accountable to *God* alone. He could not be accountable to man.

If this excellent ſyſtem of policy could have been generally impoſed, his ſacred majeſty might have battened, with great eaſe and delight, in the full ſunſhine of arbitrary power; and that he ſhould ſucceed in impoſing it, his own vanity and the ſervile flattery of his miniſters had made him to expect. True it is, that the language he held was not ſo plain, nor the efforts he made ſo direct and violent, in the beginning of his reign, as they grew ſoon afterwards; but yet, if we conſider the multitude of his proclamations; the nature of ſome; the ſtile of all; the obedience he exacted to them; the acts of power which he exerciſed; thoſe which he eſſayed; and many other particulars of his conduct, which for brevity we omit; we muſt of courſe conclude, that he thought himſelf ſure, at that time, of laying the foundations, ſince he prepared to erect ſo great a ſuperſtructure. He was deceived. Inſtead of making his impoſitions paſs on the people, he only awakened their jealouſy. He had, in his own age, and he hath in ours, the demerit of beginning a ſtruggle between prerogative and privilege; and of eſtabliſhing a ſort of warfare between the prince and the people. But the ſpirit of liberty baffled all his deſigns. The ſpirit of liberty was not enervated by luxury in thoſe days. It was not only alive, but vigorous and active. It roſe in the nation, as that of faction roſe at court. The ſame principle which complied with Queen *Elizabeth*, reſiſted King *James*. The oppoſition began as ſoon as the invaſion; and tyranny was, at leaſt, nipt in the bud.

King *James* made one attempt, indeed, in the beginning of his reign, which bid fairer for ſucceſs than any of thoſe which he made afterwards; and which,

which, if it had ſucceeded, would have done the great work of his reign, by means more ſilent and more dangerous; more ſoft in appearance, and more deadly in effect. We mean the attempt he made on the privileges of the Houſe of Commons, in the caſe of elections. In the proclamation for calling his firſt parliament, he aſſumed a new and unjuſtifiable prerogative, by his manner of preſcribing to the electors and to the elected; and by ſubjecting both to ſevere penalties, if they failed, not only againſt the laws and ſtatutes, but againſt the purport, effect and true meaning of his proclamation. In the courſe of the ſeſſion, he endeavored to put this prerogative in execution, by inſiſting firſt, that the commons ſhould confer with the lords; and when this was refuſed, that they ſhould confer with the judges, on the merits of an election and return for the county of Buckingham, which they had already heard and decided. If the king had prevailed in this attempt of garbling the Houſe of Commons, he would have prevailed very probably in that which he made ſometime afterwards, of impriſoning and puniſhing the members of it. Thus he might have intimidated thoſe by one prerogative, whom he could not exclude by the other. Such an influence as muſt have reſulted from hence, joined to that which the executive power gives unavoidably to every king, would ſoon have rendered the Houſe of Commons as dependent upon him, as the Houſe of Lords at that time appeared to be; for if money gets money, which will not, we ſuppoſe, be denied in this ſtockjobbing age, it is no leſs true, and perhaps no leſs viſible, that influence begets influence. Now we apprehend that, in this caſe, the barrier of liberty had been totally deſtroyed, and that King *James* would have virtually been in poſſeſſion of arbitrary power; for whether the will of the prince becomes a law, by force of prerogative, and independently of parliament; or whether it is made ſo,

upon every occaſion, by the concurrence of parliament, arbitrary power is alike eſtabliſhed. The only difference lies here. Every degree of this power, which is obtained without parliament, is obtained againſt the forms, as well as againſt the ſpirit of the conſtitution; and muſt therefore be obtained with difficulty, and poſſeſſed with danger. Whereas in the other method of obtaining and exerciſing this power, by and with parliament, if it can be obtained at all, the progreſs is eaſy and ſhort; and the poſſeſſion of it is ſo far from being dangerous, that liberty is diſarmed, as well as oppreſſed, by this method; that part of the conſtitution, which was inſtituted to oppoſe the encroachments of the crown, the mal-adminiſtration of men in power, and every other grievance, being influenced to abet theſe encroachments, to ſupport this mal-adminiſtration, and even to concur in impoſing the grievances.—National concurrence can be acquired only by a good prince, and for good purpoſes; becauſe public good alone can be a national motive. But King *James* was not ignorant that private good may be rendered a ſuperior motive to particular men, and that it is morally poſſible to make even parliaments ſubſervient to the worſt purpoſes of a court. *Richard* the Second, by influencing the elections, and Queen *Mary*, by corrupting the members, had created ſuch a dependence of the parliament on the court, that the firſt had well nigh eſtabliſhed, in ſpight of all other oppoſition, his abſolute power; and that the latter was able to ſubvert what her father and her brother had done; to govern with the utmoſt cruelty; and to ſacrifice the intereſts of the nation to thoſe of a huſband, whom ſhe took againſt the general inclination of her people.—If therefore King *James* could have created the ſame dependence, he might have promiſed himſelf the ſame ſucceſs. He might have governed in great quiet and ſafety, with the concurrence of parliament, tyrannically

rannically at home, and ignominiouſly abroad. He might have beggared the nation, as he beggared himſelf, and have given an abſolute dominion over both to one inſolent and incapable miniſter. But this concurrence could not be obtained; becauſe the dependence of parliaments upon the king could not be created. By aſſerting their privileges, they prevented any direct and open influence of the crown. Had King *James* been rich, and it was in his power to have been ſo; had luxury and the offspring of luxury, corruption, both which he introduced, prevailed in the body of the people, an indirect and private influence might have been eſtabliſhed; this nation might have been enſlaved by the leaſt beloved and moſt deſpiſed of all her kings. But the king continued poor, and the nation honeſt; this indirect and private influence was either not attempted, or attempted without effect; and we are perſuaded that no advocate for it could have been found, even in this reign, or the next. There were men wicked enough to aſcribe ſuch powers to the king, as would have deſtroyed effectually the powers of parliament; but there was no man abſurd, as well as wicked enough, to allow thoſe powers which are given to parliament by the conſtitution, and to argue for an expedient, which muſt of courſe render them ineffectual or pervert them to purpoſes oppoſite to thoſe for which they were inſtituted. Thus liberty was preſerved, by preſerving the independency of parliaments. The proceedings of the commons, in the whole courſe of the affair we have mentioned, were extremely moderate. They went farther, not only in expreſſions and outward demonſtrations of reſpect and ſubmiſſion, but in real compliances, than could have been expected, or that was perhaps ſtrictly right; and when an expedient was fallen upon to draw the king, with ſome reputation, out of the conteſt, they gave way to it, although by admitting a writ for the election of a member, in the room of one

whoſe

whoſe election they had allowed, they ſuffered a precedent to be eſtabliſhed, which might be turned againſt them. But the ſpirit of liberty, though eaſily alarmed, is ſlow to reſent even great provocations, and to act with violence, even againſt the worſt princes. Repeated injuries, imminent and extreme danger can alone bring things to ſuch a paſs; and no king of this nation was ever diſtreſſed by his people, without receiving frequent warnings, as well as accumulating inſupportable grievances. King *James* felt ſome part of this diſtreſs in proceſs of time. He deſerved it perhaps already. The commons however contented themſelves in an addreſs to him, to aſſert their privileges, and to complain of this invaſion of them, amongſt other grievances.—The proceedings of parliament were carried on in ſubſequent ſeſſions, with the ſame moderation and temper. In that which followed the diſcovery of the gunpowder treaſon, the oath of allegiance was impoſed; and this pledge of fidelity, for the future, was the ſole hardſhip, for ſuch the court of Rome and a great number of that communion eſteemed it, which the Roman Catholic party drew on themſelves by ſo execrable an attempt. The parliament complied, on this occaſion, with the king, probably againſt their own ſentiments; ſince nothing could be more different than his notions and theirs, concerning the conduct to be held with papiſts, and even concerning popery itſelf; and ſince the favor he ſhewed, not to ſay the court he made to this party, had already created great uneaſineſs, and began to be a moſt unpopular part of his government.—He had no war on his hands, and his revenues were at leaſt as conſiderable as thoſe of the late queen. The commons however gave him one of the greateſt ſupplies which had ever been given in parliament; and upon this occaſion it may not be improper to obſerve, in confirmation of what we have advanced already, that the natural bent

bent of the people, to live well with their kings, is so strong, that parliaments under no other influence than this, will neglect nothing to gain them; nay, that a prince like King *James*, disliked, distrusted, despised, may prevail on his parliament, for a time, and till all hopes of gaining him are lost, to do as well as bear in his favor, what would not be attempted in a better reign, nor succeed, perhaps, if it was attempted.

His design of uniting the two kingdoms of England and Scotland failed. It was too great an undertaking for so bad a workman. We must think that the general arguments against it were grounded on prejudice; on false and narrow notions. But there were other reasons, drawn from the jealousies of that time, and from the conduct of the king, who had beforehand declared all the post-nati, or persons born since his accession to the English throne, naturalized in the two kingdoms; and these were, without doubt, the true reasons which prevailed against the union.—The next time the parliament assembled, to proceed on business was in the year 1610, and by that time the general discontent of the nation began to shew itself in loud and universal murmurs. Some monopolies, the rigid and impolitic proceedings of the high-commission court and star-chamber, and many other causes combined to raise them. But no particular grievance either had, or deserved to have so great an effect as the continual endeavors which were used to establish practices and principles absolutely destructive of the general constitution of the English government.—Such was the attempt made by *Bancroft*, archbishop of Canterbury, when he presented the twenty-five articles, commonly called Articuli Cleri, and petitioned the king to grant prohibitions upon them. —Such again were the books published by *Cowel* and *Blackwood*, asserting that the king is neither bound by the laws, nor by his coronation oath; that he hath

hath a right to make laws and impoſe taxes, without the conſent of parliament; and that the nation was reduced to a ſtate of ſlavery by the Norman conqueſt.--Such, to conclude this head, were the many acts which the king himſelf had done, and the many declarations which he had made; nay, ſuch was the declaration he made in this very parliament, when he affirmed that although "all kings, who are not tyrants, or "perjured, will bound themſelves within the limits "of their laws; yet as it is blaſphemous to diſpute "what *God* may do, ſo it is ſedition in ſubjects to "diſpute what a king may do in the height of his "power."—Theſe doctrines were new, ungrateful and ſhocking to Engliſh ears; yet the parliament kept in temper, and bore ſuch language from this fearful, bullying prince, as the fierceſt of his predeceſſors, ſince *Richard* the Second, had never preſumed to hold. They took no notice of *Bancroft*, nor purſued any further meaſures againſt *Cowel* and *Blackwood*, after theſe libels had been called in by proclamation, and the reading of them had been forbid. Nay, there was a ſubſidy granted in this very ſeſſion, with as little pretence as there had been for granting the former.—All this temper, ſubmiſſion and generoſity of the parliamen were loſt on the king. They would not connive at grievances, nor ſacrifice liberty; and thoſe were the only terms, upon which an union with him was to be obtained.—From the year 1610 to 1614, he held no parliament; and it is evident, that he would never have called another, if his miniſters could have ſupplied his profuſion by all the illegal and oppreſſive means, which they uſed to raiſe money on the people, and which we forbear to enumerate, becauſe the moſt partial writers, who have endeavored to excuſe them, have not preſumed to deny them—Even under this neceſſity, he did not take the reſolution of calling a new parliament, till he was prevailed on by his favorite *Somerſet*, who had formed a ſcheme for influencing

encing the elections, and, at the head of several other undertakers, flattered himself and his master, that he could get such members chosen, "* as "should comply solely to the king's desires." But this project proved abortive. "The English free-"dom cannot be lost," says *Wilson*; and may his saying prove true to all future generations! "by "a few base and tame spirits, that would unmake "themselves and their posterity, to aggrandize one "man." It happened to King *James*, as it happened to his son. Disgrace at court proved a recommendation in the country; and the faces which appeared in this new parliament, made the countenance of the court to droop.

From this time began that conduct, on the part of the court, and on the part of the parliament, which continued to be held, with very fatal uniformity, till it ended in a civil war. That the people had reason to be jealous of the designs of the court, hath appeared and will appear still more flagrantly in the sequel; but that the court had at this time, nay, even in the month of May 1640, when King *Charles* dissolved the last parliament, he had it in his power to dissolve, any reason to be jealous of the parliament or the people, we deny; and are able to justify our denial by fact and authority; even the authority of my Lord *Clarendon*.—But the father and the son, and especially the former, having no end in calling their parliaments but to get money from their people, and to evade rather than refuse the redress of grievances; the art of the court was constantly employed, under pretence of the urgency of affairs, and in the parliament of 1614, without any pretence at all, to get the subsidies first dispatched. The commons, on the other side, who knew for what they were called together, and who

* *Wilson.*

expected

expected that little time would be allowed them to enquire into mal-adminiſtration and to repreſent grievances, when they had once given the money, inſiſted for the moſt part, for there happened occaſions in which they did not inſiſt, that the conſideration of grievances ſhould precede, or at leaſt go an equal pace with that of the ſupply. This was the rock on which ſo many parliaments ſplit. This alone occaſioned the diſſolution of that we are ſpeaking of, and made King *James* reſolve, though he could not ſupport his reſolution to the end of his reign, to govern by his prerogative alone, and without the aſſiſtance of his parliament; that is, to avow abſolute power.

LETTER

LETTER XXI.

IN our laſt diſcourſe, concerning the pretenſions ſet up, and the attempts made by King *James* againſt the freedom of the Engliſh conſtitution, we carried theſe remarks down to the year 1614. We choſe to ſtop there, becauſe it ſeems to be the very diametrical point of oppoſition, or a point very near to that, between the government of this prince and the government of Queen *Elizabeth*, which we have ſo largely inſiſted upon.—The diſtruſt between him and his people was now entirely formed. His offenſive and their defenſive pretenſions were now fully explained. An union of affection between him and his people, which the latter ſtill deſired and had long courted, was now grown deſperate. An union, unworthy of a free people, a factious union between the parliament and the court, founded in the dependence and ſubmiſſion of the former, and ſo much affected by the latter, was after many trials become evidently impracticable. The king, as he had managed affairs, could never govern with parliament, nor without it; and thoſe powers, which are deſigned to be mutual helps, were turned to be mutual clogs on one another; not by any deviation on the ſide of the people, or of their repreſentatives, from the true line of government; but by a manifeſt and almoſt continual deviation from it, on the ſide of the crown.

Thus were thoſe great diſorders in government and that national confuſion raiſed, which in a few years more deſtroyed the whole conſtitution. In ſhort, that melancholy ſcene, which had been preparing ever ſince the acceſſion of King *James*, was opened about this time, and continued open with

few variations, every one of which was for the worſe, till that tragedy began, wherein the nobleſt as well as the meaneſt blood in the nation was ſhed ſo profuſely, and with the beginning of which we purpoſe to conclude theſe remarks.

We have charged the whole, and we think very juſtly to the account of King *James*; who attempted to govern England by foreign, not by Engliſh maxims; nay, by ſuch as he was unable to govern his own country. Sure we are, that no part of it can be laid to the conſtitution, or people of England. The conſtitution was the ſame in his time as in the time of Queen *Elizabeth*; and the people claimed under him, no other privileges, nor powers, than they had enjoyed under her. It was his fault, not theirs, if by treading in the ſame path, which had kept them united with her, they were divided from him. Theſe are points, on which we think it proper to inſiſt a little more in this place, in order to caſt a greater light on the particulars which follow, and to avoid any prolix repetitions, when we come to wind up the whole.

King *James* had opened the parliament, which met in 1614, by aſking money for the portion and other expences of his daughter's marriage to the elector Palatinate, and promiſed the commons leave and leiſure to enquire into grievances, when they had complied with this demand; but diſtruſt, the bane of all harmony, prevailed amongſt them, as it is plain even from this conditional promiſe that it prevailed with him, and they reſolved to begin the work of the ſeſſion by a repreſentation of grievances.

A principal article in this roll was the growth of popery, encouraged no doubt by ſeveral paſſages in the conduct of King *James*, and particularly by two; his employing not only ſuſpected, but known Roman Catholics, in offices of the higheſt truſt and conſequence;

conſequence; and his avowed deſign of marrying his ſon to ſome princeſs of that religion. Shall we ſay, in the ſtile of King *James*, that it was preſumption in the commons to meddle in ſuch deep matters of ſtate? Shall we not rather think it was preſumption in the prince to determine a matter of this importance to the public welfare, to the preſent and to future generations, without the advice, nay, againſt the opinion of the great council of the nation? Shall we not rather applaud the wiſdom and foreſight, as well as the virtue of thoſe men, who diſcovered the fruit in the ſeed; whoſe minds foreboded all the miſchievous conſequences of ſuch an alliance, and who did their utmoſt to prevent the true, original cauſe of our greateſt misfortunes?

Under another head of grievances, complained of at this time, were the monopolies, and many illegal exactions of money from the people. The parliament had the more reaſon to loſe no time, and to ſpare no endeavors in putting a ſtop to theſe encroachments on liberty, becauſe the longer they laſted, the more familiar they grew. The court improved in the practice of them. The people, who ſubmitted to them by force, might have been brought to ſubmit to them by cuſtom, and the king might become able in time to ſupply his wants without the aſſiſtance of parliament; a caſe almoſt as deſperate as that of his being able to ſupply them when, in what manner, and in what proportions he thought fit, by the aſſiſtance of parliament. We ſay almoſt as deſperate, on the principles touched in our laſt letter; for, in the firſt place, if King *James* could have ſupplied his wants without parliaments, he would certainly have called none, and the condition of this nation had been worſe than that of Spain, of France, and of other nations, whoſe examples have been abſurdly enough quoted, to juſtify theſe

arbitrary methods of raiſing money, and to induce mankind to ſubmit to them. In France, for inſtance, the people muſt ſuffer; but they may complain. Their mouths are open; that is, their parliaments may repreſent, and even remonſtrate; nay, they have gone ſo far, as to refuſe with ſucceſs to regiſter and give the neceſſary forms of a law to an edict of the prince, which they judged oppreſſive to the people. But if King *James* had prevailed, he would have governed without even theſe ſhadows of a parliament. The people muſt have ſuffered and could not have complained. Their ſole mouth, the mouth of parliament, would have been ſtopped, and redreſs of grievances being no longer attainable by the applications of their repreſentative body, which would have no longer exiſted, they muſt have ſubmitted tamely and ſilently, or have ſought a remedy in their collective body, which can only act by reſiſtance and force. This ſituation would have been bad enough, *God* knows; yet not ſo bad as the other; for, in the ſecond place, if the parliament had been made dependent on the crown, no matter by what kind of influence; whether by the diſtribution of honors, the tranſlation of biſhops, the corrupting the electors and the elected, or the other methods King *James* took, the mouth of the people had not been ſtopped indeed; but it had been formed to ſpeak another language than that of the heart. —The people muſt have ſuffered, and the parliament muſt have rejoiced.—If they had felt an increaſing load of debt, the parliament muſt have teſtified great ſatisfaction at the diminution of it.—If they had felt the decay of trade, and the growth of national poverty, the parliament muſt have boaſted of the wealth and flouriſhing ſtate of the kingdom.—If they had ſeen the intereſt and honor of the nation, as they ſaw it too often, neglected or ſacrificed, the parliament muſt have exulted in the triumphs of both.

both.—In ſhort, ſuch a depending parliament muſt not only have connived at the grievances of their country, but have ſanctified them too. They muſt not only have borne the rod, but have kiſſed it too; not only the rod of their prince, but the rod of ſome upſtart miniſter, who owed his elevation to his diſhonor, and his favor to his ſhame.—But as the integrity of parliament ſecured the nation from any danger of this kind; ſo the neceſſities of the king were the great ſecurity againſt any danger of the other.—Was the parliament therefore to blame, who oppoſed ſtrenuouſly every innovation ſet on foot, to leſſen this ſecurity?

A third grievance, which the parliament deſired to have redreſſed, was that incredible waſte, which King *James* made of the revenues of the crown. Theſe revenues were, at that time, ſo much more than ſufficient for all the ordinary occaſions of the government, that Queen *Elizabeth*, who had ſo many extraordinary occaſions of expence, who paid ſo many old debts, without contracting new, and atchieved ſuch glorious enterprizes abroad, as well as at home, did not receive in grants from her people above * four millions in more than forty years. —If King *James*, who had no extraordinary occaſions of expence, who paid no debts, who atchieved no glorious enterprizes any where, had neither aſked money, nor raiſed it without aſking, the ſquandering his revenue had not probably come under debate in parliament; but, ſince he expected that the people ſhould provide for his debts, and ſupply his neceſſities, it was juſt that the repreſentatives of the people ſhould examine how they were contracted.

* We do not want to be told that the value of money was very different at that time from what it is now; but though we admit of the higheſt calculations, this ſum will appear ſurpriſingly ſmall for ſo many years, when compared with the profuſion and extravagance of ſome latter reigns.

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The immenſe eſtates, which were made in theſe days at court, the known corruption not only of inferior agents, but of principal miniſters, and even of thoſe who were at the head of the treaſury, made ſuch an examination the more neceſſary, and provoked and excited the more to it. The Houſe of Commons would have thought that they had betrayed their truſt, if they had neglected ſo important a part of it. By the proceedings, as well as declarations, of the parliaments in theſe times, it is plain that they thought they had not an arbitrary, but only a conditional power, over the purſe of the nation, though the ſtrings of it were in their hands; that they were to tax the people in no greater proportion than was ſtrictly neceſſary to ſupport the honor and intereſt of the nation, and the dignity of the crown; that they could make no judgment concerning this proportion, if they had not a full communication of the nature of the ſervice, for which extraordinary aids were demanded; and if they did not examine before they granted theſe aids, how the ordinary revenues and any precedent, extraordinary grants had been applied. Such maxims as theſe will not be condemned, we preſume. They have been always profeſſed and frequently purſued, from the time we ſpeak of, down to the age in which we live. Since the reign of King *William* the Third, our princes have indeed ſtood on a different foot. They have had a diſtinct revenue aſſigned to them for their particular uſe. The annual expences and the debts of the nation have been ſeparately provided for by parliament; and yet not only the management and application of theſe annual grants, but alſo the immenſe property of the creditors of the public have been left to the crown, as the management and application of thoſe revenues were, which belonged properly to the crown, and by deficiencies, on which the crown, not the nation, was immediately

ately affected. It is no wonder therefore if our parliaments have thought themſelves obliged, ſince this great alteration, ſometimes by committees, and ſometimes by extraordinary commiſſions, to inſpect more narrowly into revenues, which are ſtill managed by the officers of the crown, though they make no longer any part of the eſtate of the crown; and we perſuade ourſelves that no honeſt man would be ſorry, if the wiſdom of our preſent repreſentatives ſhould think fit to make any inquiſitions of the ſame nature; but even before this alteration, before the ſettlement of a civil liſt, and when our princes ſtood on the ſame foot as King *James* the Firſt, with reſpect to their private and public revenue, the maxims we ſpeak of were purſued on many occaſions, and always with the univerſal applauſe of the people. In the reign of King *Charles* the Second, for inſtance, our whig-patriots endeavored not only to detect and puniſh frauds and abuſes, by enquiries into the management of the public money, but to prevent them likewiſe, by appropriating what they gave to the uſes for which it was given; and thus much we think may ſuffice, to clear the conduct of the parliament of 1614 from any imputations on this head.

Let us mention, in this place, one grievance more, which we have touched upon in another. A former parliament had taken ſome notice of it, and this parliament would probably have taken more, if the king had allowed them time. The doctrines which eſtabliſhed the unbounded and ineffable prerogative of the king; which reduced the privileges of parliament to be no longer an antient and undoubted right and inheritance, but derived them from the permiſſion and toleration of the crown, and declared them liable to be retrenched at the will of the prince; and which by neceſſary conſequence changed at once the nature of the Engliſh conſtitution, from that

that of a free to that of an arbitrary government; all theſe doctrines, we ſay, or the principles, on which they were eſtabliſhed, had been already publicly and frequently aſſerted by King *James*. They were the language of the court; and a party had been formed in the nation, who made profeſſion of them. They were maintained in converſation. They were pleaded for in print; and they became ſoon afterwards the diſgrace and prophanation of the pulpit.

We have ſometimes compared, in our thoughts, theſe uſurpations of King *James* over the privileges of his people to thoſe of the popes, which gave that prince ſo much offence, over the rights of the emperors, and indeed over the civil rights of mankind. *Charlemagne* had made theſe prieſts princes. They continued for about two hundred and ſixty years, to ſubmit, in the main, to thoſe rules, which the imperial conſtitutions and eccleſiaſtical cuſtoms had eſtabliſhed; after which they ſtarted, at once, out of theſe bounds. They would be limited pontiffs no longer, but arbitrary high prieſts, like the dairo of Japan, ſomething more than human, and civil as well as eccleſiaſtical tyrants. They ſcorned to go to tyranny by degrees, but carried their uſurpations at one leap to the utmoſt pitch of extravagance. *Alexander* the Second denied the right of the emperors to chuſe, or to confirm the election of a pope. His ſucceſſor took the inveſtitures from them. *Henry* the Fourth aſſerted the imperial rights, in oppoſition to this invaſion; but *Gregory* the Seventh aſſerted, in oppoſition to him, that Rome was the capital of the world; that the pope was independent of all powers on earth; that kings and emperors were liable to be depoſed by the plenitude of his authority. The pope was believed by many, on his word; and there were more, who found their private account in ſeeming to believe him. Factions were raiſed

raiſed to maintain theſe principles. They were conſecrated by the church. They prevailed in thoſe days. More than five centuries were not ſufficient to aboliſh the practice, and more than ſix have not been ſufficient to extirpate the principle. True it is that theſe popes had ſeveral advantages, which King *James* had not; and, amongſt others, the minority of *Henry* the Fourth at the time when they began this monſtrous uſurpation; whereas when King *James* ſet up his pretenſions, and talked, and writ of prerogative, in terms as ridiculous and full of as much bombaſt as thoſe which the briefs and other public acts of *Hildebrand* contained, the commons of England were grown up to a full maturity of property and power. Shall we condemn them for endeavoring to preſerve the principles of liberty, that they might preſerve the ſpirit of it; and by preſerving the ſpirit, deſerve and ſecure the continuance of ſo great a bleſſing? Should an Engliſh parliament have ſat quiet and ſilent, in humble dependence on the prince, whilſt ſlavery in ſpeculation, as well as practice, was making ſuch large advances; whilſt the laws of the land, the laws of nature, and thoſe of *God* himſelf, were perverted to impoſe a yoke of baſe and ſervile prejudices on the underſtandings and conſciences of mankind? We think not. Sure we are that our parliaments have been always watchful to cenſure and explode, in time, ſuch doctrines as might, even by induction and conſequence, weaken the foundation of liberty. The inſtances of this kind are ſo well known, and ſome of them ſo recent, that we need not quote them. But, in order to juſtify ſtill farther the ſenſe and conduct of our forefathers, let us appeal even to the preſent ſenſe of mankind. We all know that there are mercenary and abandoned wretches amongſt us, who have dared to plead for a dependence of the parliament on the crown; not

for

for that dependence of the ſeveral parts of the government on one another, which our conſtitution hath formed, and on the preſervation of which the freedom of our government intirely reſts; but for the moſt indirect, the moſt iniquitous, as well as dangerous dependence imaginable; for a dependence, to be created by corruption, which muſt always produce effects as infamous as its cauſe. Corruption, we ſay, hath been defended, nay, recommended, for we will repeat the aſſertion, as a neceſſary expedient of government. The repreſentation of the county by the independent gentlemen of the country, hath been faucily and aukwardly ridiculed; as if a bill, to prevent all perſons, who have neither places nor penſions, from ſitting in parliament, was proper to be paſſed, and thoſe ſalutary laws, which are in force for preventing perſons who have places and penſions from ſitting there, were as proper to be repealed. Nay, theſe incendiaries, who go about to deſtroy our conſtitution, have not bluſhed in the ſame breath to admit that ſtanding armies have been generally the inſtruments of overturning free governments, and to affirm that a ſtanding army is neceſſary to be kept up in ours; if you aſk them againſt whom, they anſwer you very frankly, againſt the people; if you aſk them why, they anſwer you with the ſame frankneſs, becauſe of the levity and inconſtancy of the people. This is the evil; an army is the remedy. Our army is not deſigned, according to theſe doctors of ſlavery, againſt the enemies of the nation, but againſt the nation. We are confident that the preſent army is incapable of being employed to ſuch purpoſes, and abhors an imputation, which might have been juſtly caſt on *Cromwell*'s army, but is very unjuſtly inſinuated againſt the preſent.

Now let us ſuppoſe that the time was come, when the parliament ſhould think fit to cenſure and put a

ſtop

ſtop to the influence of ſuch writings as theſe; would any honeſt man, if he laid his hand upon his heart, diſapprove their proceedings? On the contrary, would not every man, who wiſhed that the conſtitution of this government might be preſerved, applaud ſuch meaſures and bleſs the repreſentatives of his country for their zeal againſt the betrayers of it?

Upon the whole matter, we think it very plain that the alarm, which was taken at the propagation of theſe infamous doctrines, in the reign of King *James* the Firſt, is abundantly juſtified not only by the examples of other parliaments, but by the general ſenſe of mankind in all ages.

Whenever the fundamentals of a free government are attacked, or any other ſchemes, ruinous to the general intereſt of a nation, are purſued; the beſt ſervice that can be done to ſuch a nation, and even to the prince, is to commence an early and vigorous oppoſition to them; for the event will always ſhew, as we ſhall ſoon ſee in the preſent caſe, that thoſe who form an oppoſition in this manner, are the trueſt friends to both, however they may be ſtigmatized at firſt with odious names, which belong more properly to thoſe who throw the dirt at them.

If the oppoſition begin late, or be carried on more faintly, than the exigency requires, the evil will grow; nay, it will grow the more by ſuch an oppoſition, till it becomes at length too inveterate for the ordinary methods of cure; and whenever that happens; whenever uſurpations on national liberty are grown too ſtrong to be checked by theſe ordinary methods, the people are reduced to this alternative: They muſt either ſubmit to ſlavery and beggary, the worſt of all political evils; or they muſt endeavor to prevent the impending miſchief by open force and reſiſtance, which is an evil, but one degree leſs eligible than the other. But when the oppoſition is begun early

early and carried on vigorouſly, there is time to obtain redreſs of grievances, and put a ſtop to ſuch uſurpations by thoſe gentle and ſafe methods, which their conſtitution hath provided; methods, which may and have often proved fatal to wicked miniſters, but can never prove fatal to the prince himſelf.—He is never in danger but when theſe methods, which all arbitrary courts diſlike, are too long delayed.

The moſt plauſible objection to ſuch proceedings, and by which well-meaning men are frequently made the bubbles of thoſe who have the worſt deſigns, ariſes from a falſe notion of moderation. True political moderation conſiſts in not oppoſing the meaſures of government, except when great and national intereſts are at ſtake; and when that is the caſe, in oppoſing them with ſuch a degree of warmth, as is adequate to the nature of the evil, to the circumſtances of danger attending it, and even to thoſe of opportunity. To oppoſe upon any other foot; to oppoſe things which are not blame-worthy, or which are of no material conſequence to the national intereſt, with ſuch violence as may diſorder the harmony of government, is certainly faction; but it is likewiſe faction, and faction of the worſt kind, either not to oppoſe at all, or not to oppoſe in earneſt, when points of the greateſt importance to the nation are concerned.

The truth of all this reaſoning will be confirmed by what remains to be ſaid of King *James* and King *Charles* the Firſt.—If there had not been an early and honeſt oppoſition, in defence of national liberty, againſt King *James*, his reign would have ſufficed to eſtabliſh him in the ſeat of arbitrary power.—If the oppoſition had been more generally backed with the weight of the nation in due time; if the court

court had not been able to divide men againſt their general intereſt, upon principles of prerogative and liberty, King *James* muſt have complied in time; the conſtitution would have been reſettled on its right foundation; his family would have been preſerved; all our national calamities would have been prevented; and the ſins of the court might have been expiated by the puniſhment of one or two of the miniſters.—But a prerogative party having been nurſed up from the beginning, and gained ſtrength in the whole courſe of King *James*'s reign, the ſtrength of the nation was divided, and the conteſt continued ſo long between the king and the people, that reſentment and paſſion, and prejudice and faction took place on all ſides. The ſoft and gentle methods of cure, which our conſtitution had provided, became impracticable. A provoked people ſought their remedy in reſiſtance. A civil war followed. The Engliſh government was ſubverted, inſtead of being reformed.

What hath been ſaid will ſerve to juſtify the conduct of the parliament, as well as the general alarm, which the nation had taken in 1614. Theſe were the crimes, the heinous, unpardonable crimes, for which King *James* diſſolved this parliament, with ſo much indignation, after they had ſat but a few weeks, and had not time given them to paſs even one law. Theſe were the crimes, for which he confined to the Tower and other priſons, and puniſhed in other ways, ſo many of the moſt active members. Laſtly, theſe were the crimes, which made him reſolve, what he had before attempted, to govern without parliament.—The particular conſequences of theſe meaſures will appear in our next letter, when we come to conſider his conduct of our national intereſts abroad, againſt the ſenſe of the nation;

tion; in which period of time, the foreign affairs are ſo intermixed with parliamentary and domeſtic affairs, that we ſhall not divide them, but ſpeak of them together, having firſt very briefly made our obſervations on his management of parties.

LETTER

LETTER XXII.

IN Letter XVIII, we have ſpoken of the ſtate of parties at the acceſſion of King *James*. We are now to make our obſervations on his management of them. It is neceſſary we ſhould do this, in order to give a complete and juſt idea of his government; and yet ſo much hath been ſaid on the ſubject by writers of all denominations, and even by ourſelves, that there remains but very little to be added, either for curioſity or inſtruction.

We might obſerve how he drew himſelf into ſome trouble, if not danger, and expoſed himſelf to the neceſſity of ſhedding ſome blood, in the very firſt months of his reign, by eſpouſing the paſſions of a party; by diſgracing and proſcribing men, who had no crime at that time towards him but their attachment to the late Queen; by avowing the cauſe of the Earl of *Eſſex*, whoſe deſigns had been, no doubt, as treaſonable, at leaſt, and as chimerical too, as thoſe into which he drove *Grey*, *Cobham* and *Raleigh*, or which were imputed to them.

Several other anecdotes, concerning factions at court and parties in the nation, might be collected and remarked upon. But we ſhall paſs them over, and confine ourſelves to obſerve, in a very few inſtances, how he adapted his particular management of parties to the general and main deſign of his policy; what ſtrength he acquired; what ſtrength he loſt by this conduct; and what conteſt he entailed on poſterity.

There

There were no parties, at this time, in the nation, but ſuch as were formed on religious differences; and it had been a great object of the policy of Queen *Elizabeth*, to keep all parties within thoſe bounds. We know the maxims on which ſhe proceeded, by a letter of Sir *Francis Walſingham*, writ expreſly on this ſubject. She thought that "conſciences were not "to be forced, but won and reduced by truth, "time, inſtruction and perſuaſion; and that cauſes "of conſcience loſe their nature, when they exceed "their bounds and grow matter of faction."— By keeping to theſe maxims, ſhe ſucceeded. The parties in the church made none in the ſtate. They were obliged to live in due ſubjection to laws, wiſely made and moderately exerciſed, they were never puniſhed, whilſt they continued in this ſubjection, much leſs were they provoked or encouraged to go out of it. The powers of the church were applied to the ſupport of the eſtabliſhment, not rendered ſubſervient to any factious deſigns of the court; and eccleſiaſtical violence was reſtrained from confirming the obſtinacy of thoſe who diſſented, by perſecution of them, or from increaſing their numbers, by perſecution of others.

Directly oppoſite to this conduct was that of King *James*.—In haſte to ſhew his parts, he had a conference between the biſhops and the puritan miniſters at Hampton-court, in a few months after his acceſſion; where he made himſelf a principal party in the diſpute. His courtiers flattered him, and Archbiſhop *Whitgift*, who died ſoon afterwards, and probably doated then, declared himſelf "verily per-"ſuaded that the King ſpake by the ſpirit of *God*." But ſurely ſuch a confidence, however it might frighten and ſilence, could neither inſtruct, nor perſuade; and the King was ſo far from truſting, like his predeceſſor, to the force of truth and the aid of time, that in this very conference he theatened to employ another kind

kind of force, if he did not meet with compliance in a time to be limited. The biſhops were at firſt to admoniſh paternally and to confer amicably; but leaſt they ſhould not ſucceed by preaching, writing and living men into conformity, the ſole means they ought to deſire; or, if they deſired others, the ſole means they ought to be ſuffered to employ, they were to have recourſe to compulſion afterwards.—The ſame ſpirit reigned in the firſt ſpeech which this prince made to his parliament; for there he not only maſſed together, imprudently as well as unjuſtly, all the diſſenters from the eſtabliſhed church, under the general denomination of puritans and noveliſts, but he declared them all "inſufferable in any well-governed common-wealth:" ſo that he put them all out of his protection, even though they confined themſelves within thoſe bounds, to which cauſes of conſcience may reaſonably extend, and proſcribed them for their opinions, not their practices.

On theſe principles he proceeded, and what we have ſaid here may ſuffice, upon this head, for his whole reign.—The conſequence of this conduct was that thoſe ſects, who were not dangerous at firſt, became ſo at laſt. They became ſo, in ſome degree, from the moment the declarations we have mentioned were made: for nothing is found more true in nature and experience than this, that they who are oppreſſed by governments, will endeavor to change them; and that he who makes himſelf terrible to multitudes, will have multitudes to fear.—But this was not all.—As he made theſe ſects his enemies, ſo he gave them great advantages of popularity and ſtrength.—The firſt of theſe advantages, which we ſhall take notice of, aroſe from the great indulgence he ſhewed to the Roman Catholics, and the favorable ſentiments of that religion, which he expreſſed on all private, and many public occaſions. We need not deſcend into the particular inſtances;

for though we give little credit to *Deageant's* memoirs in general, and none to what he ſays of a letter written by King *James* to the pope, acknowledging him vicar of *Chriſt* and head of the church; yet is there a multitude of other proofs, too notorious and too well ſupported to be denied.—We think it plain, upon the whole matter, that ſeveral paſſages in his conduct, both before and after his coming into England, were unworthy of a Proteſtant king at any time, and were equally impolitic at this time, when the zeal of Papiſts to attack, and of Proteſtants to defend the reformation was at the higheſt pitch; and when even the leaſt condeſcenſion on either ſide, would have been thought little leſs than apoſtacy. Fear for his perſon, and little notions of policy were probably the motives, which determined this part of his conduct; but whatever the motives were, the effect was certainly this. He made the cauſe of the court to paſs amongſt many for the cauſe of popery; and it was not hard by conſequence for the puritans, who were oppreſſed by the court to make their cauſe paſs for that of the reformation. We are far from thinking that this was properly the caſe on either ſide; but the appearances were ſtrong enough to fix ſuch prejudices in the minds of men, already prepared by jealouſy and ſuſpicion. This advantage ſo fooliſhly given, operated ſtrongly againſt the court, both in this reign and the next. In this it was applied to no ill purpoſes. In the next it was very wickedly improved; but they who gave it firſt, and who continued to give it afterwards, are juſtly to be reputed the accomplices of thoſe who improved it ſo wickedly, how much ſoever they ſtood in oppoſition to one another.

A ſecond advantage of popularity and ſtrength, which King *James* gave to the puritans, was this: He ranked amongſt their party, nay he drove into that party, as much as he was able by

by ſevere uſage, all thoſe who ſtood up in defence even of civil liberty. The averſion which he expreſſed to the puritans, formed a kind of league between him and the warmeſt of the eſtabliſhed clergy; and when theſe were once become a court party, we are not to wonder if others grew as warm as theſe, and if the greateſt part of that body of men united in a cauſe which flattered their paſſions, and opened the road of preferment to them. No king, no biſhop, was the language of the court. No biſhop, no king, was that of the church. Had the monarchy and the hierarchy been attacked, this united zeal in a common cauſe would have been commendable and ſucceſsful too; for the nation was not now, nor for a long time afterwards, ſo diſtempered, that any faction could raiſe its head with effect againſt the juſt prerogative of the crown and the eſtabliſhed rights of the church. But the truth requires we ſhould ſay, that this union was formed to offend and invade, and to extend both beyond the bounds preſcribed to them by the Engliſh conſtitution. It was great blindneſs in the clergy not to ſee that to enlarge the bottom of the court, they narrowed their own; that they fixed a centre of union, wherein all their divided enemies would meet and unite with many, who were then friends to the church, but might come, as it happened afterwards, from being againſt the clergy to be againſt the church itſelf. It was a great misfortune to the nation, that the clergy did not ſee theſe truths in time; ſince if they had ſeen them, they might have been happy inſtruments of preventing that miſchief which followed ſoon after the time we ſpeak of, and that diviſion of intereſts between the crown and the people, which was created by King *James*, and hath proved ſo fatal to his poſterity.—But to return.—By a contrary conduct, by eſpouſing and ſanctifying the principles and by promoting the meaſures

of King *James*, the clergy became part of the faction of the court, and ſhared very unjuſtly the imputation of favoring popery, but very juſtly that of advancing tyranny. This was a ſecond advantage, which King *James* gave to the puritans. He varniſhed their cauſe with popularity, and he increaſed their numbers. He made puritans in his time, as Janſeniſts have been ſince made in France, and Jacobites in Britain, by calling men ſo, and by treating them as ſuch.—They muſt have been ſharp-ſighted, indeed, of whom my Lord *Clarendon* ſpeaks, and who could diſcern "the rebellion contriving "from, if not before, the death of Queen *Eliza-*"*beth*;" but they muſt be quite blind, who do not diſcern the ſeeds of rebellion ſowing in every part of the conduct of King *James*, and particularly in this which we have now touched; the management of parties.

Theſe evils were aggravated, and the conſequences of them were precipitated by his conducting our national intereſts abroad againſt the ſenſe of the nation.

During the firſt period, into which we divide this reign, that is, to the year 1614, King *James* meddled little, and, to ſay the truth, had little occaſion to meddle in foreign affairs.—The treaty which he made with Spain in 1604, had been much cenſured, and Sir *C. Cornwallis*, in a letter to the Lord *Cranburne*, aſſerts "that England never loſt "ſuch an opportunity of winning honor and wealth "unto it, as by relinquiſhing the war againſt an "exhauſted kingdom and a prince held in little ve-"neration, for ſuffering himſelf to be wholly go-"verned by a man generally hated." This treaty, however, was not probably ſo bad as it had been repreſented, and the commerce opened with Spain became a ſource of inexhauſtible riches to our nation; but ſtill there was ſomething prepoſterous and mean in the conduct of King *James* abroad, even whilſt he had

had ſo little to do there, and ſo ſafe a part to act. He courted that very power, the power of Spain, whom Queen *Elizabeth* had broke, and who would have courted him, if he had known how to put ſo much as dignity in his proceedings. He diſobliged the Dutch, whoſe power had been raiſed by Queen *Elizabeth*, and who muſt have continued to depend on him, if he had known how to be either a friend or an enemy; and yet he bore moſt ignominiouſly from this very people the greateſt injuries and affronts imaginable. He had neither the courage to chaſtiſe this infant ſtate, nor the ſenſe to protect it. Their treaty with their old maſters, the Spaniards, began in the year 1607; was continued in 1608; and ended in 1609, in a truce of twelve years. During the whole courſe of this long negociation, King *James* ſhewed his partiality in favor of the Spaniards; and though he ſigned, about this time, two treaties with the States as ſovereigns; yet he made no ſcruple, upon ſome occaſions, of declaring them rebels.—The death of the duke of *Cleves*, and the diſputes about that ſucceſſion, preſented to *Henry* the Fourth an opportunity he waited for; and he was ready, when *Ravaillac* ſtabbed him, to attack the houſe of Auſtria, whoſe power in Germany began once more to give umbrage, though *Rodolphus* the Second was ſtill on the imperial throne. King *James* left his troops with the Dutch, notwithſtanding the truce. They were employed in this quarrel; and we cannot think him to blame for taking no farther part in the hoſtilities. His views were, and they ought to have been, at this time, and in this reſpect, very different from thoſe of that heroical king of France. But in the new ſcene of German affairs, which opened a few years afterwards, and which continued, during the laſt period of his reign, that is, from the year 1614, nothing could be more ſcandalous than his taking no part at all, except his taking the part he did take.—That he ſhould have made

made himſelf a principal in that terrible war, which broke out in Germany in 1618, and which laſted thirty years, we cannot perſuade ourſelves; neither do we believe that any man, who does not take up his opinions on truſt, but examines this intricate and perplexed part of the hiſtory of the laſt century with care, will be of another mind; and yet King *James* muſt have made himſelf a principal in this war, if he had engaged in it, as he was adviſed by ſome to engage, and as he hath been blamed by many for not engaging.—The cenſures, under which he hath paſſed on this occaſion, would have been juſter, if thoſe who have made them, had diſtinguiſhed better between the patrimony of his children, by defending the Palatinate, and promoting their grandeur, by ſeconding their ambition; between contributing to ſupport the Proteſtant intereſt abroad, and taking on his ſhoulders a load, which it was neither reaſonable nor poſſible that he ſhould bear; between that conduct, which he ought to have held, as king of this iſland, and that which he might have been obliged to hold, if his dominions had lain on the continent. Our writings will not paſs, we believe, for apologies in favor of King *James*; and yet we ſhall explain this point a little leſs to his diſadvantage, perhaps than it hath been uſually taken.

If King *James* had followed the advice of thoſe who would have had him enter into an immediate war to maintain the elector Palatine on the throne of Bohemia, he muſt have exhauſted and ruined this nation to ſupport it. He muſt have furniſhed ſubſidies to *Bethlem Gabor* and the prince of Anſpach; he muſt have fed the war in Hungary; fomented the revolt in Auſtria; paid the army of the princes of the union; oppoſed the duke of Bavaria in Bohemia, and *Spinola* in the Palatinate.—Let us conſider in oppoſition to whom, and in concert with whom, he muſt have carried on this vaſt undertaking.—On one ſide, the whole popiſh intereſt in the empire

empire was closely united, and the cause of *Ferdinand* was the common cause of the party. The popish interest out of the empire, conspired in the same cause. The king of Poland assisted the emperor in Hungary. Troops from Italy and a great army from the Netherlands acted for him in Germany. The purse of the pope and that of the king of Spain were open to him. Even France, who ought in good policy to have opposed the house of Austria, was induced, by the bigotry of her court, and, perhaps, by the private interest of *Luines*, to declare for the emperor against the king of Bohemia.—On the other side, the Protestant interest, in the empire, was far from being closely united, and farther still from making the cause of *Frederic* the common cause of the party. Even the princes of the union had different views; many of them leaned to the emperor; none of them could be intirely depended upon; and the elector of Saxony, the most powerful of the Protestant princes of the empire, was so far from uniting with the others, that he was first privately, and afterwards openly, but all along very steadily, on the side of *Ferdinand*. Out of the empire, some assistance might have been expected from the king of Denmark and the Dutch; but even their accession must have been purchased; at least, it must have been made useful, at the expence of Britain. What other allies could King *James* have hoped for; and who can see, without smiling, in that godly prelate, Archbishop *Abbot's* letter to Sir *Robert Naunton*, the name of the duke of Bouillon, together with *Tremouille*, a rich prince in France, mentioned upon such an occasion?—Short and imperfect as the account we have given is, those who know the state of Europe at the time we speak of, know that it is true; and if we were to look no farther than the representations made by *Juliana* of Nassau to her son, against his accepting the

the crown of Bohemia, we ſhould diſcover in them, with the true and fatal reaſons why King *James* did not aſſiſt *Frederic* at all, unanſwerable reaſons why he ought not to have taken upon him the Bohemian quarrel in the manner he muſt have taken it, if he had taken it upon him at that time. That King *James* ſhould have prepared for this ſtorm, which was long in gathering; that he ſhould have labored to unite and to fortify the Proteſtants of Germany, before it happened; and to comfort and ſuccour and protect them, after it happened; that he had many fair opportunities of doing this, without engaging farther than the intereſt of Britain allowed; and that he neglected them all, we admit, and are able to ſhew.—He might have put himſelf on ſuch a foot in Europe, as to have mediated at leaſt, which was the only part he attempted to act, ſucceſsfully for the Bohemians, and to have ſcreened his ſon-in-law from the vengeance of the emperor, and the ambition of the Duke of Bavaria. But he put himſelf on ſuch a foot, and he acquired ſuch a character, that he had no credit among the Proteſtants, nor much influence over his ſon-in-law, and that the Roman Catholic party, ſure of amuſing him, neglected and deſpiſed him. He might have declined taking the Bohemian quarrel upon him, and yet not have made his court to the emperor and the king of Spain, by diſavowing and condemning *Frederic*, and even by ſuffering them not only to drive this prince out of Bohemia, but to take the Palatinate from him and his family, and give a wound, almoſt mortal, to the whole Proteſtant cauſe in Germany. Nay, he did worſe. By fooliſh embaſſies and ridiculous negociations, he gave time and furniſhed advantages, which could not have been had without his aſſiſtance, to the popiſh party. By the ſame means he checked, he weakened, he diſcouraged, and more than once diſarmed the Proteſtant

teſtant party. In ſhort, not only the principles of his conduct were wrong, but the meaſures of it compoſed ſuch a ſeries of blunders as we ſeldom find in hiſtory; becauſe it is hardly poſſible, in the courſe of nature, that ſuch characters, in ſuch ſituations, ſhould appear above once in a century.

It may be objected, perhaps, by ſome of the writers, who adorn and inſtruct the preſent age, that King *James* was univerſally and juſtly condemned for not taking the Bohemian quarrel upon him, as well as for not defending the Palatinate; and that he muſt have purſued, in the laſt caſe, the ſame meaſures as we think him juſtified for not purſuing in the former. We ſhall not refute this objection by ſhewing, as it would be eaſy for us to do, in various particulars, the prodigious difference between the two caſes; the inſuperable difficulties he would have encountered in one, and the many facilities he would have had in the other. The deduction would be too long and extenſive for the narrow limits of theſe eſſays. But we ſhall content ourſelves with making two obſervations, ſufficient to ſatisfy any reaſonable man, and which will ſhew, at the ſame time, what different notions of the part this nation ought to take in foreign affairs, were entertained by our forefathers, from thoſe, which we, their wiſer offſpring, have purſued. When King *James* took the reſolution of calling the parliament, which ſat in 1621, the battle of Prague was loſt, and Bohemia too with it. The * affections of the people were raiſed, but it was for the recovery of the Palatinate; and in this point the ſenſe of the parliament went along with the affections of the people. On the other point, the ſenſe of the parliament had not been expreſſed, there having been no parliament held from the year 1614 till this time. But what this ſenſe would have been, may be eaſily

* See *Ruſh.* coll.

collected,

collected, from the advice given in the petition and remonſtrance of the commons at this time. As zealous as they were to engage even in a war, for recovering the Palatinate, they were not enough tranſported by their zeal, or enough biaſſed in favor of any foreign intereſt, to forget the true intereſt of Britain. They adviſed the king to a war; but they adviſed him not to reſt upon a war in thoſe parts only, which would conſume his treaſure and diſcourage his people. They adviſed that the bent of this war might be againſt that prince, the king of Spain, whoſe armies and treaſures had firſt diverted and ſince maintained the war in the Palatinate. On which ſide now was the ſenſe of the nation; and how impertinent are they who have quoted this ſenſe, to authorize our taking part in every German quarrel, by paying ſubſidies, maintaining armies, and involving ourſelves in all the affairs of the continent? How monſtrous is the abſurdity and impudence of * thoſe who have aſſerted that the caſe of the people of the Palatinate, invaded by a powerful enemy, who pretended to nothing leſs than the conqueſt of them, is parallel to that of the people of Hanover, invaded by no body, and over whom no foreign power pretends to any dominion! —The parliament pointed out to King *James* a meaſure effectual for ſupporting the Proteſtant intereſt abroad; but ſuch a meaſure as this nation might purſue by exerting her natural ſtrength.— The power of Spain ſupported the emperor and the popiſh league; an army of Spain conquered the Palatinate; and yet the artifices of that court deluded King *James* to ſuch a degree, that he dreamed of recovering the patrimony of his children by the good offices of the Spaniards, and was incapable of purſuing in earneſt any other meaſures, even at

* See Obſervations on the Preſent State of Affairs.

the

the time when *Spinola* was ſtripping them of this patrimony, and reducing them to ſeek their bread in another country. To this dependence in Spain he ſacrificed not only them, but his own honor, the affection of his ſubjects, the proſperity of his kingdoms, and the ſecurity of the Proteſtant religion. It was this magic charm, which the parliament endeavored in vain to diſſolve, by preſſing him to a war with Spain, which his maritime force could have carried on principally; which would have ſtopped that ſource from whence the popiſh party in Germany derived ſo many ſupplies; and which would have rendered the Proteſtant party, by conſequence, a more equal match for the emperor.— But this was not the ſole wiſe and honeſt view, which the parliament propoſed, by pointing out and inſiſting on this meaſure. There was another, which touched them more nearly, and which they had more at heart. We ſhall mention it in our next diſcourſe, and it will lead us from our obſervations on this reign to thoſe few on the next, with which we intend to cloſe, at leaſt for the preſent, all our remarks on the Hiſtory of England.

LETTER

LETTER XXIII.

ANOTHER object beſides recovering the Palatinate which the parliament had in view, when they preſſed King *James* to break with Spain, was preventing the marriage of the prince of Wales to the infanta. He had been bantered and abuſed by the Spaniards, when he treated a marriage between his eldeſt ſon, prince *Henry*, and *Anne* of Auſtria; and yet no ſooner did the duke of Lerma, in the year 1616, make ſome overtures of marrying the infanta *Mary*, ſecond daughter of *Philip* the Third, to prince *Charles*, but this *Solomon* of ours catched at the bait which was thrown out to him, and hung faſt on the hook for ſeven years together.

The ſcheme of farther uſurpations in Germany was already laid by the houſe of Auſtria; and the character of *Ferdinand*, who was to ſucceed *Matthias*, and who did ſucceed him three years afterwards, gave hopes of puſhing theſe uſurpations with vigor and advantage.—The part of Spain had been great in promoting theſe deſigns. It was eſſential to their ſucceſs that it ſhould be ſo likewiſe in the execution of them. No oppoſition, of any moment, was to be apprehended from France, where the principles of deſpotiſm and of bigot-popery prevailed more than ever, and who had concluded, in the year 1615, a double marriage with Spain. The truce of twelve years, made with the Dutch in 1609, would enable the Spaniards to ſupport the popiſh league from the low countries, as in all caſes they might do from Italy; and if they could keep the king of Great Britain from diverting the forces of Spain in the mean time, there was reaſon to hope that theſe united powers might conquer

quer both the Palatinates, as well as Bohemia, and break the force of the Proteſtant league in Germany, before the expiration of the truce and the renewal of the war with the united provinces of the low countries ſhould create another diverſion.—This was a principal part of the plan laid by the houſe of Auſtria and the other Roman Catholic princes, for oppreſſing the Proteſtants and invading the liberties of Germany. To the eternal infamy of King *James*, it ſucceeded even beyond the hopes of thoſe who laid it.—The hints which *Digby* gave him in the very beginning of this negociation, might have put him on his guard, and a thouſand things, which happened in the courſe of it, would have undeceived, provoked and determined any other man. His preſumption, his fear, and, above all, his perverſe ſyſtem of policy, prevented any effects of theſe kinds. We forbear entering into the particulars of what he did for Spain; of what he ſuffered Spain to do; and of all the indignities, which he received from every branch of the houſe of Auſtria, during theſe tranſactions. Moſt of them have been obſerved, and are ſufficiently known; and it would be an unneceſſary work to point out ſome few inſtances more, which have not been, perhaps, taken notice of, or explained as much as they deſerved. We ſhall ſpare ourſelves and our readers this diſagreeable recollection, and only obſerve in general the plan upon which King *James* appears to have acted; as we have obſerved what the plan was of thoſe who made ſo fatal an uſe of his weakneſs. His ſilly pride could not be ſatisfied, unleſs he matched his ſon with a daughter of Spain or France. He had been diſappointed formerly on that ſide, and lately on this. He was reſolved at any rate not to be diſappointed a third time. The immenſe ſum which had been promiſed for the infanta's portion, tempted him the more, becauſe for ſeveral years he would call no parliament to grant him ſupplies, and he found it hard

hard to raiſe them, even in ſmall proportions, without a parliament. He imagined vainly, that this alliance with Spain would give him great conſideration abroad; and wickedly, that it would afford him means of raiſing and extending his prerogative at home. He ſaw the miſchiefs which accrued to the Proteſtant intereſt abroad, either as immediate, or as remote effects of his conduct; either in conſequence of what he did, or in conſequence of what he neglected; and we are willing to believe that he felt, in ſome degree, thoſe which fell on the family into which he had married his daughter. But the intereſt of the Proteſtants in general touched him little. Abroad, as well as at home, he choſe rather by condeſcenſions and ſubmiſſions to court his enemies, than to unite his friends among one another, and to attach them to himſelf. In his zeal for the imaginary rights of princes, he could not forgive the elector Palatinate for taking arms againſt the emperor; and whilſt he looked on him as a rebel, forgot that he was his ſon. If he remembered it at any time, and felt any concern, the ſentiment was ſurely very faint; ſince we find that the diſtant and uncertain proſpect of making ſome tolerable compoſition for this unhappy prince, by the interceſſion of Spain, was always ſufficient to calm his paternal ſolicitude. He ſaw, without doubt, at leaſt during the life of *Philip* the Third, who did not die till the year 1621, that Spain was not much in earneſt to give him the infanta; but he ſeemed reſolved to overcome all difficulties, and to determine the councils of Spain, and even of Rome, in his favor, by dint of conceſſions. The truth is, he went ſo far in his conceſſions at laſt, that theſe councils ſeemed to be determined. Thoſe of Spain, at leaſt, were ſo moſt certainly in the year 1623, even before the voyage of the prince into Spain; and the articles ſworn to both by him when he was there, and by his father here, amounted to little leſs

than a direct eſtabliſhment of popery. That this charge is juſt will, we think, appear evident, when it ſhall be remembered, without entering into more particulars, that by theſe articles the king and prince of Wales engaged for the ſuſpenſion, and even abrogation of all laws made againſt Roman Catholics; that they engaged never to conſent to the making any new laws of the ſame kind; and that, as the children to be born of this marriage were to be educated by their mother, till ten years of age, in compliance with the king of Spain's demands; ſo the prince was prevailed on to promiſe that he would lengthen this term till twelve years, according to the deſire of the pope.

Thus was King *James* amuſed till the beginning of the year 1623, when the Upper Palatinate and the dignity of elector were taken from *Frederic* and conferred on the Duke of *Bavaria*, by the diet of Ratiſbon: or, to ſpeak more properly, by the prerogative of *Ferdinand*, who acted in the diet as dogmatically and as abſolutely as King *James* endeavored to act in his parliaments. When this point was gained by amuſing King *James*, and the Proteſtant intereſt was broken in Germany, the next point was to be carried by concluding with him and making the match on ſuch terms, as might ſecure an immediate toleration, and open the proſpect of a future eſtabliſhment of popery in this kingdom. —The parliament of 1621 beheld part of this ſcene, and apprehended, upon very juſt grounds, the ſequel. They ſaw the fatal conſequences of the negociation, whilſt it was in ſuſpence, and they dreaded thoſe which would follow the concluſion of it. To ſtop the firſt, and to prevent the laſt, there was but one expedient; the forcing King *James* into a war, for recovering the Palatinate. This they endeavored with all their might; but he meant nothing leſs, and had called a parliament purely to get money from his people, on pretence of a war he was reſolved

ſolved not to make. Some money he got by this trick; but when he had ſquandered it away in trifling negociations and a ridiculous ſhew of war, he could get no more: ſo that this parliament ended as others had done, and even with greater diſſatiſfaction between the king and the people, both on account of his conducting foreign affairs againſt the intereſt and ſenſe of the nation, and of his attacking more openly than ever the privileges of parliament. The parliament remonſtrated, petitioned, proteſted. The king diſſolved the parliament in a rage; impriſoned ſeveral members of the Houſe of Commons, and even ſome of the Houſe of Lords. He reſumed his project of governing without parliaments, ſince he could not govern as ill as he had a mind to govern with them. But this project was not purſued above two years; for what his parliament could not obtain from him, an unworthy favorite did obtain. Motives of private intereſt, and perhaps of a worſe nature, made that great turn in affairs, which ſo many motives of a public nature and of national intereſt had never been able to make. In ſhort, a cabal at court prevailed on this prince to alter his conduct in thoſe very points, on which the parliament, ſeconded by the clamors of the whole nation, had been never able to prevail.—We ſhall not attempt to gueſs, as many have done, at the ſecret reaſons, which determined *Buckingham*, nor at thoſe by which he determined the prince of Wales to undertake the romantic, and, in every light, ridiculous journey into Spain, to carry the treaty of marriage to a concluſion; then to break it off again in ſo abrupt and ungracious a manner; and to become ſo earneſt for engaging in a war with Spain. Whatever theſe reaſons were, the reaſon given for breaking the match was not the true one. The reſtitution of the Palatinate had been very coolly preſſed, not to ſay neglected, even whilſt the prince was at Madrid; and yet after he came from thence, the king of Spain had ſigned an act, by which

which he engaged for this reſtitution: ſo that on the principles on which this negociation had been conducted, there ſeemed to be no reaſon for breaking it off given by Spain at the time when it was broken. But the parliament which King *James* called upon this occaſion, proceeded like the laſt, on other principles than the court had done, and was therefore, very conſiſtently with theſe principles, ready to ſeize the opportunity offered, by adviſing the king to break the match, and enter into a war for recovering the Palatinate, and by giving him very large ſupplies for this purpoſe.—We cannot, upon this occaſion, ſubſcribe to the cenſure paſſed by my Lord *Clarendon*, how much ſoever we eſteem his hiſtory, and honor the memory of that noble hiſtorian; for in the firſt place, the ſupplies given by this laſt parliament of King *James*, were not only very large, as we have juſt now ſaid, but they were ſuch as the king was contented with, and thanked the parliament for, in his anſwer to the ſpeaker of the Houſe of Commons. Secondly, we cannot agree that it was the parliament, properly ſpeaking, who prevailed on the king, and engaged him in the war. The parliament adviſed him to it indeed; but nothing can be more manifeſt than this, even by my Lord *Clarendon*'s own account, that the meaſure was reſolved on before, and that it was the meaſure of the prince and of *Buckingham*, which the king, however unwillingly, adopted. The parliament in truth did no more than adviſe him to break a treaty which he had already broken; and thoſe who reflect on precedent paſſages, will eaſily concur with us, that if this had not been the caſe, it would not have been in the power of the parliament to break the match; much leſs to engage the king in the war. Thirdly, if ſubſequent parliaments did not ſupport thoſe great mountains of promiſes, as they are called, which this parliament raiſed, we ſhall venture to affirm that it was the fault of the court, not of the parliaments.

This laſt article requires to be ſet in a very clear light, becauſe it opens to us a ſource of cauſes, from whence a great part of the miſchiefs, which followed in the next reign, aroſe; or by which, at leaſt, they were aggravated and precipitated.—— Firſt, therefore, we obſerve that the meaſures of the court were ſo fooliſhly taken for puſhing the war, that if parliaments had given by millions, and given with as little ſtint in thoſe days, as they have given ſince, their grants muſt have been ineffectual to any good purpoſe. Juſt before the death of King *James*, an army had been raiſed for the Palatinate war, under the command of the famous *Mansfeldt*. The French firſt and the Dutch afterwards refuſed paſſage to theſe troops, or even to ſuffer them to land. The cry of the court was loud againſt the perfidy of France, as it had been againſt the emperor and Spain in their turns. This will be always the caſe, when ſilly miniſters bungle themſelves into difficulties, of which others make their profit; or when they knaviſhly engage a national quarrel for ſome private indirect intereſt, and inflame the people to reſent imaginary injuries. But the truth is, that King *James* had nobody to blame but himſelf, when he took general and ambiguous anſwers for ſufficient engagements, and did not ſee that France would refuſe paſſage to theſe troops for the ſame reaſons as made her decline entering, at that time, into a league againſt the houſe of Auſtria.

Another blunder committed about the ſame time, by this wiſe king, and that wiſe miniſter, his ſcholar, *Buckingham* muſt be mentioned. He was to take poſſeſſion of Frankendal, which had been depoſited in the hands of the infanta *Iſabella*. The infanta agreed to yield the place to him, and to give paſſage to his troops, who were to compoſe the garriſon according to her engagements; but refuſed to anſwer for their paſſage over the lands of the empire, to which ſhe was not engaged. Then, and not

not till then, he made this diſcovery in geography, that his troops muſt march over the lands of the empire to get from the Low Countries into the Palatinate. Such blunders as theſe were ſufficient to diſguſt the parliaments of that age, and to make them backward in ſupplying a war thus managed. Much more reaſon had they to be ſo, when they ſaw the ſame managers and the ſame management continue in the next reign. This diſguſt at the management of the war, however, would not have produced ſo many fatal conſequences, if it had ſtood alone. But we obſerve, in the ſecond place, that the parliaments which met after the acceſſion of King *Charles*, became incenſed as they diſcovered more and more that the account given by the Duke of *Buckingham*, in the reign of King *James*, and on which the reſolutions of that parliament had been taken, was falſe in almoſt every point. A ſyſtem of lies dreſſed up to deceive the nation, and impoſed on the parliament, could neither remain undiſcovered, nor eſcape the reſentment and indignation it deſerved, when diſcovered. Beſides, that parliament and the nation too, when they expreſſed ſo much joy at the breach with Spain, flattered themſelves that, by preventing the marriage with the infanta, they had prevented all the dangers, which they apprehended from that marriage; whereas it appeared ſoon afterwards that they ſtood expoſed to the very ſame dangers by the marriage concluded with France; nay, to greater; ſince the education of the children by the mother, that is, in popery, had been confined to ten years by the former treaty, and was extended to thirteen by the latter. In ſhort, it cannot be denied, and my Lord *Clarendon* owns, that as the inſolence of *Buckingham* cauſed the war with Spain, ſo his luſt and his vanity alone threw the nation into another with France. Spain was courted firſt without reaſon, and affronted afterwards without provocation. Ships

were lent to the king of France againſt his Proteſtant ſubjects; and the perſecution of his Proteſtant ſubjects was made the pretence of a rupture with him. Thus was the nation led from one extravagant project to another, at an immenſe charge, with great diminution of honor and infinite loſs to trade, by the ignorance, private intereſt, and paſſion of one man. The conduct therefore of the parliament who attacked this man, was perfectly conſiſtent with the conduct of that parliament, who had ſo much applauded him; and one cannot obſerve without aſtoniſhment the ſlip made by the noble hiſtorian we have juſt quoted, when he affirms that the ſame men who had applauded him, attacked him, without imputing the leaſt crime to him, that was not as much known when they applauded him, as when they attacked him. Now it is plain that many of the crimes imputed to him, in the reign of King *Charles*, when he was attacked, could not be known, and that many others had not been even committed in the reign of King *James*, when he was, upon one ſingle occaſion, applauded.

To the diſguſts taken at the management of foreign affairs, muſt be added thoſe which were daily given by the court in the management of domeſtic affairs. Real, not imaginary, grievances aroſe, and were continued in every part of the adminiſtration. Some of theſe King *Charles*, like his father, was obſtinately bent to maintain, and his right of impoſing them was aſſerted. Others were diſguiſed and excuſed rather than defended; but in redreſſing even theſe, he ſhewed ſuch a reluctance, that he complied without obliging, and increaſed the diſguſt of his people, even whilſt he granted their requeſts. We have ſaid in a former diſcourſe, that King *Charles* came a partyman to the throne, and that he continued an invaſion on the people's rights, whilſt he imagined himſelf only concerned in the defence of his own. In advancing this propoſition, we

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were far from meaning a compliment at the expence of truth. We avow it as an opinion we have formed on reading the relations publiſhed on all ſides, and to which, it ſeems to us, that all the authentic anecdotes of thoſe times may be reconciled. This prince had ſucked in with his milk thoſe abſurd principles of government, which his father was ſo induſtrious and, unhappily for king and people, ſo ſucceſsful in propagating. He found them eſpouſed, as true principles both of religion and policy, by a whole party in the nation whom he eſteemed friends to the conſtitution in church and ſtate. He found them oppoſed by a party, whom he looked on indiſcriminately as enemies to the church and to monarchy. Can we wonder that he grew zealous in a cauſe, which he underſtood to concern him ſo nearly, and in which he ſaw ſo many men, who had not the ſame intereſt, and might therefore be ſuppoſed to act on a principle of conſcience equally zealous? Let any one, who hath been deeply and long engaged in the conteſts of party, aſk himſelf on cool reflection, whether prejudices, concerning men and things, have not grown up and ſtrengthened with him, and obtained an uncontrolable influence over his conduct. We dare appeal to the inward ſentiments of every ſuch perſon.—With this habitual biaſs upon him King *Charles* came to the throne; and, to complete the misfortune, he had given all his confidence to a mad man. An honeſt miniſter might have ſhewn him how wrong his meaſures were; a wiſe one how ill-timed. *Buckingham* was incapable of either. The violence and haughtineſs of his temper confirmed his maſter in the purſuit of theſe meaſures; and the character of the firſt miniſter became that of the adminiſtration. Other circumſtances, which often happen, happened likewiſe in this caſe. The miniſter was univerſally hated; the king was not. To ſupport the miniſter,

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it was neceſſary that the prerogative ſhould be ſtrained, and violent and unpopular means ſhould be employed. To ſupport the government, nothing of this ſort was neceſſary. Nay, the very contrary meaſures were neceſſary to reconcile the king to his people, and to ſtop in time that alienation of their minds from him, which began even then to appear. In this difference of intereſts, thoſe of the crown were ſacrificed to thoſe of the miniſter. King *Charles*, who had encouraged parliamentary proſecutions, in his father's reign, would not ſuffer them in his own. He diſſolved his parliaments and broke almoſt all the few ties of union, which remained between himſelf and the nation, that he might ſcreen ſome of the moſt unworthy men who ever diſſerved a prince, or diſhonoured a court.—Before the death of *Buckingham*, irreparable miſchief was done. "The "diſtemper of the nation was ſo univerſal," according to my Lord *Clarendon*, "that all wiſe men looked "upon it as the prediction of the deſtruction and "diſſolution that would follow." This prediction was ſoon verified. The king executed what he had often threatened. Parliaments were laid aſide. The very mention of them was forbid; and he continued to govern without any for twelve years. During this interval, the diſtemper lurked indeed; but it grew more malignant; and if a national ſerenity appeared about the time when the king went into Scotland, it appeared juſt when the poiſon worked moſt effectually and began to ſeize the heart. Jealouſies about religion and liberty were now at their height. The former, as far as they affected the king and his Proteſtant miniſters, were ill-founded; but for that very reaſon, it would have been eaſy to cure them; and if they had been cured in time, as we think, on my Lord *Clarendon*'s authority, that nothing could have led the Scotch nation into rebellion, ſo are we perſuaded that a great motive and ſpur to the

rebellion

rebellion in England would have been taken away. The latter were certainly but too well founded. The king had, in a manner, renounced the conſtitution; and inſtead of governing with the aſſiſtance and concurrence of a parliament, he governed by illegal acts of power, which the council, the ſtar-chamber and the high commiſſion exerciſed.—There was ſomething ſtill more dangerous to liberty in practice. Not only the government was carried on without law, or againſt law, but the judges were become the inſtruments of arbitrary power, and that law, which ſhould have been the protection of property, was rendered, by their corrupt interpretations of it, ſo great a grievance that "the foun-"dations of right were, to the apprehenſion and "underſtanding of wiſe men," ſays my Lord *Clarendon*, "never more in danger to be deſtroyed."

Whilſt things were in this ſituation here, King *Charles* lighted up another fire in Scotland, by reſuming the project of modelling that church, which King *James* had begun. Archbiſhop *Laud*, who had neither temper or knowledge of the world enough to be entruſted with the government of a private college, conducted this enterprize and precipitated the public ruin. The puritans of England ſoon united in a common cauſe with the puritans of Scotland; and the army which the latter had raiſed, marched into England. Many of thoſe who had appeared againſt the court, and even ſome of thoſe who were on the ſide of the court, favored, in different manners, the Scots, and hoped to apply this force and to improve this incident ſo as to reſtrain the prerogative within known, perhaps narrower bounds, and to ſtrengthen the barriers of public liberty.—That this might have been brought about, and that the civil war which followed, might have been prevented, appeared very manifeſtly in the temper

temper and proceedings of the parliament, which met in April 1640, when all had been done, which could be done, to deſtroy the conſtitution; for if the king had been able to continue to govern without parliaments, the conſtitution had been deſtroyed; and when calling a parliament was viſibly the effect of neceſſity and fear, not choice, the parliament, which was called, ſhewed wonderful order and ſobriety in their whole behavior. If ſome paſſion had appeared in their debates, it might have been well excuſed in an Houſe of Commons aſſembled at ſuch a time; and yet ſcarce an angry word was thrown out. The few, that eſcaped from ſome, were either ſilently diſliked, or openly diſapproved. The king, even in this criſis of affairs, preſerved the ſame carriage he had formerly uſed towards them, and ſhewed too plainly that he regarded them only as tax-layers. In a word, about a month after their meeting, he diſſolved them, and as ſoon as he had diſſolved them, he repented, but he repented too late, of his raſhneſs. Well might he repent; for the veſſel was now full, and this laſt drop made the waters of bitterneſs overflow.—Here we draw the curtain, and put an end to our remarks, by obſerving, firſt, that if the ſpirit of liberty had once relaxed in the ſpace of almoſt forty years, liberty muſt have been ſwallowed up by prerogative; ſecondly, that after theſe long conteſts between the king and the people, and when the latter had received the utmoſt provocations, the ſpirit of liberty was not tranſported into any exceſs; determined to defend the people, but unwilling to offend the king. The king, and he alone, could have done it, forced the affairs of the nation, as he had put his own long before, into the hands of a faction. The true friends of the conſtitution were divided; and divided, were too weak to prevail on either ſide. The ſpirit of faction, not

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the ſpirit of liberty, is anſwerable for all which followed; and who is anſwerable for reducing the conteſt on both ſides, to be the conteſt of faction may, we think, be ſufficiently collected from what hath been ſaid in theſe diſcourſes.

LETTER

LETTER XXIV.

SIR,

SINCE you have gone through the taſk, which you undertook at my deſire, and have carried your remarks on the hiſtory of England, as far as you judge them neceſſary at this time, I think myſelf obliged to return you thanks for your trouble, and to ſay ſomething to you, concerning the clamor raiſed and the conduct held upon this occaſion, by thoſe, who, not content with the merit of being your adverſaries, have declared themſelves ſuch at laſt to the very being of the Britiſh conſtitution, and to the principles on which the preſent eſtabliſhment is built, and on which alone it can ſtand ſecure.

Before I left the town, nay, as ſoon as my firſt letter to you appeared, the whole poſſe of miniſterial ſcribblers was ſummoned. Their numbers were augmented; perhaps their penſions. Their ſtrength, indeed, continued much the ſame; but their fury redoubled. At my return to London, I am informed that theſe weekly ſwarms have continued to buz about ever ſince; that the inſects have been diſperſed by every flap of your pen; but, that, like true inſects, they have ſtill gathered again and renewed their din.—I ſay, that I am informed of this; becauſe, among other circumſtances, which compoſe the eaſe and quiet of a country life, we are ſure of not being infeſted there by theſe mighty ſwarms of little creatures. As their lives are ſhort, the extent in which they ramble is narrow, and few of them take their flight beyond the bills of mortality.

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The manner in which theſe writers have ſupported the diſpute between you and them, and the explanations to which they have been puſhed, confirm all the ſuſpicions which it was natural to entertain, when ſo great an alarm was taken at the firſt direct avowal of an attempt to revive the ſpirit of liberty, and to recall to the minds of men the true notions of the Britiſh conſtitution. They were ſo earneſt to diſcourage the proſecution of ſuch a deſign; they were ſo eager to find fault, where ſo little fault was to be found, that they catched at every word, in which they imagined the leaſt ſlip had been made, though the ſubject would not have been affected, nor the merits of the cauſe have been altered, if theſe ſlips had been real, and had proceeded from my ignorance, as the objections proceeded from theirs.

I ſhould not ſo much as mention this, if it was not neceſſary to ſhew that your real crime, as well as mine, towards the perſons, who encourage and direct theſe authors, is our ſtarting the ſubject, not our manner of treating it. Their anger appeared, the clamor of their party was raiſed, and all the powers of ſcurrility and calumny were called forth to their aid, before any of thoſe pretences were found out, which they afterwards ſo meanly and ſo immorally employed againſt us. To prove this beyond the contradiction of any man of ſenſe and candor, it will be only neceſſary to appeal to the whole ſcope of my firſt letters to you, which raiſed the ſtorm; for what do thoſe letters contain beſides general and inoffenſive reflections on the nature of liberty and of faction, and on the neceſſity of keeping the ſpirit of liberty alive and active, even in times of apparent ſecurity? Your writings were juſtified, indeed, in theſe letters; but ſo they had been in others, and on many precedent occaſions. —The charge of Jacobitiſm was refuted, indeed, with the contempt it deſerved, and factious deſigns

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of another kind were pointed out; but factious deſigns had been imputed to the ſame perſons before and upon the ſame grounds. It remains then that this new alarm was taken, as I juſt now ſaid, at the general deſign of thoſe papers: and if that was ſufficient to give ſuch an alarm, ſure I am that you are more than juſtified for all you writ before this diſpute begun, and for all you have publiſhed in the courſe of it.

The old gentleman, who defended you in the former letters, thought you deſerved the acknowledgments of every honeſt man for attempting to revive this ſpirit, even ſuppoſing you to have no other reaſon than your obſervation that a contrary temper prevailed. How much is this reaſon inforced, how much more do you deſerve the acknowledgments of every honeſt man, if it is become evident not only that a ſupine temper, contrary to the activity of this ſpirit had prevailed; but that a contrary ſpirit hath been raiſed, and that principles, deſtructive of all liberty, and particularly adapted to deſtroy that of the Britiſh government, are avowed, taught and propagated? If I pronounced too haſtily, in my ſecond letter, that the maſk was pulled off, ſurely we may now ſay, upon knowledge, not belief, that the maſk is fallen off from your adverſaries in the ſcuffle. I ſhall not repeat what is ſaid in your diſcourſes, nor add any thing to them. You have there quoted the doctrines of ſlavery. You have ſhewed the direct and indirect tendency of them all; and you have remarked that ſome of them have been taught even by thoſe who have in the ſame breath admitted the conſequences of them. Nothing leſs therefore than a conſtant and vigorous oppoſition, of which you have ſet us the example, will be able to ſtop the progreſs of thoſe pernicious doctrines. The principles which King *James* the Firſt eſtabliſhed, were not more abſurd than theſe. Their tendency was more obvious; but for that reaſon,

ſon, they were leſs dangerous. If thoſe principles prevailed very far by time and encouragement, and had like to have prevailed farther; why ſhould not theſe have the ſame, or greater ſucceſs? It may be ſaid, perhaps, that the authority of the crown helped the progreſs of the former, which is not our preſent caſe. To this diſtinction I ſhall ſubmit very readily; but if theſe principles have gained ſome ground already, and that they have gained ſome cannot be denied, without this authority to inforce them; is there not reaſon to fear that they may gain more, and is not every degree they gain a degree more of danger to this conſtitution of government? Surely, Sir, there can remain no doubt in the breaſt of any man, who hath given the leaſt attention to the diſputes between you and your adverſaries, whether they or you are on the ſide of liberty; and therefore it is an aggravation of their guilt, that they have endeavored to make your writings paſs for an oppoſition to the preſent happy eſtabliſhment, and their cauſe for that of the crown. You and I have ſufficiently declared ourſelves, and anſwered them, on the firſt head. If they had been able to produce an inſtance, where, departing from your ſubject, you had given occaſion to draw any odious parallel, the intention of drawing ſuch a parallel might, with ſome color, have been imputed to you; but ſince they have not been able to do this, and have been defied to do it, the reproach and infamy of making ſuch parallels, as well as the ſcandalous immorality of imputing them to others, muſt lie at their door. —Let us ſee how well their pretenſions are ſupported on the ſecond head, and whether we cannot prove, without any forced conſtructions of their words, or arbitrary interpretations of their meaning, that the open and ſecret abettors of theſe writers are either enemies of the preſent eſtabliſhment, or have ſome private intereſt more at heart than the true intereſt of this eſtabliſhment.

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This eſtabliſhment is founded on the principles of liberty; on the very principles you have maintained. It was made by the people of Great Britain, to ſecure the poſſeſſion of their liberty as well as their religion. Had contrary principles prevailed; either thoſe which tend to ſubvert the conſtitution, by raiſing prerogative, and which were juſtly objected to ſome of the tories formerly; or thoſe which tend to ſubvert it, by undermining liberty, and which are as juſtly objected to ſome of the whigs now; this eſtabliſhment could never have been made. Who are enemies and who are friends therefore to public liberty, and to the preſent eſtabliſhment? Are you their enemy, who defend not only the general principles of liberty, but the particular principles, and the particular ends, on which and for which this eſtabliſhment was made? Are your adverſaries friends to either, when they only ſeem to admit ſome general notions of liberty, that they may promote with greater effect, on particular occaſions, the doctrines of ſlavery; and when they endeavor to deſtroy the principles and to defeat the ends of the preſent eſtabliſhment? The revolution and the acts of ſettlement have ſecured us againſt the dangers which were formerly apprehended from prerogative. To what purpoſe are meaſures and principles of policy daily pleaded for, which would expoſe us to greater dangers than theſe? Why are ſuch inceſſant pains taken to ſhew by what means liberty may be undermined and our conſtitution deſtroyed even now, after all we have done and all we have ſuffered to ſecure one, and to improve the other? I ſhall not give particular anſwers to theſe queſtions; nor offer to aſſign the private intereſt, which the perſons, who are guilty of this, may have at heart; for I will, upon no occaſion, even ſeem to follow the example of your adverſaries; nor preſume to deliver my ſuſpicions; though real and well-grounded, as the intentions

intentions of other men. This alone I will repeat; that they who argue and hire others to argue in this manner, do in fact promote ſome intereſt, which is repugnant to the ends for which the people of this nation eſtabliſhed the Proteſtant ſucceſſion and the preſent ſettlement of the crown. They have not yet attacked the religion, but they manifeſtly attack the liberty of their country; and as much as theſe two are interwoven together, though it be true that whenever our religion is in danger, our civil liberty muſt be ſo likewiſe; yet it is as true that religion may be ſafe and civil liberty in danger.

I have nothing more to add upon this head, before I proceed to that which ſhall conclude my letter, except my deſires that you will perſiſt, and my hopes that you will ſucceed in the cauſe you have undertaken; the cauſe of your country, the cauſe of truth and of liberty. The means you employ are thoſe of argument and perſuaſion; the lawful, and the ſole lawful means, which can be employed to rouze an indolent, to inform a deceived, to reclaim a corrupt, or to reconcile a divided people. Let the factious continue to aſſert, as they have had already the impudence and the folly to do, in one of their miniſterial pamphlets, that the faults they are pleaſed to aſcribe to the people of Great Britain * render an army neceſſary. Inſtead of endeavoring to perſuade and to win, let them endeavor to force and corrupt their countrymen. The ſpirit of liberty abhors ſuch means, and the cauſe of liberty would be diſhonored by them. If this nation was as corrupt and depraved as it is ſaid to be by thoſe who do their utmoſt to corrupt and deprave it; if our country was in that declining ſtate, and the freedom of our government as near its period as they affirm, there would remain no part for any honeſt man to take,

* See Obſervations on the Preſent State of Affairs.

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except that of ſitting ſilently down and periſhing in the common ſhipwreck: but ſurely this is not yet our caſe, unleſs we are induced to believe it ſo; unleſs we make our ruin irretrievable by ſtruggling no longer againſt it. There are men, many, we think, who have not bowed the knee to *Baal*, nor worſhipped the brazen image. We may therefore hope that there is ſtill a bleſſing in ſtore for us. In all events, Mr. *D'Anvers*, you are ſure of one advantage, which no violence, no injuſtice can take from you; the inward ſatisfaction of having ſerved your country, to the utmoſt of your power, by thoſe lawful means which the conſtitution of its government allows, and by no others.

If I hear in that retreat, to which age, the circumſtances of fortune, and, above all the temper of my mind determine me, that you ſucceed, I ſhall rejoice in the common joy. If I hear that you fail, my concern for you will be loſt in the common calamity.

The article with which I propoſe to conclude my letter is of ſuch a nature that I cannot omit it, on this occaſion, with any regard to truth, juſtice, honor, and the ſentiments of a moſt reaſonable indignation. The writers, who are employed againſt you, have received, with an unlimited commiſſion to rail, particular inſtructions to direct their Billingſgate chiefly at two gentlemen. The art of blackening characters, by private cloſet-whiſpers, hath been always practiſed, when power and confidence have been given to the inſolent and the baſe. Perhaps it may have been thought proper, at this time, to confirm the effect of ſuch inſinuations by an eccho from the preſs; and to prevent a general national clamor from ſounding in ſome ears, by raiſing an artificial clamor round about them: but whatever the deſign may have been, ſure I am that this ſtrain of malice could not have been employed againſt men,

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who value it leſs, or who hold in greater contempt both the contrivance and the contrivers. This they may do, becauſe they are falſely and maliciouſly accuſed; but he, who is the object of a juſt clamor and of national hatred, and who cannot turn his eyes on himſelf, without confeſſing to himſelf that he is a principal cauſe of the grievances of his country, muſt tremble at a clamor which he knows ought, and which he hath reaſon to fear will, ſooner or later, prevail againſt him.

The calumny againſt one of the gentlemen, mentioned above, is confined to two heads; that he hath left his friends and party, and that he is urged to oppoſe the miniſter by the ſtings of diſappointed ambition. How ridiculous is the charge, and on whom can ſuch ſtuff impoſe? Hath he changed his notions of right and wrong in matters of government? Hath he renounced the principles of good policy, which he formerly profeſſed? His greateſt enemy is defied to ſhew that he hath; and yet, unleſs this can be ſhewn, nothing can be more impertinent, or more ſilly, than the imputation of leaving his friends and party. If he purſues the ſame general principles of conduct, with which he firſt ſet out, and is in oppoſition now to ſome few of thoſe, with whom he concurred then, they have left him, becauſe they have left the principles they profeſſed. He left neither. For inſtance, he inveighs againſt public profuſion and private corruption. He combats both with a conſtant inflexibility, which might have done honor to a Roman citizen, in the beſt times of that commonwealth. Hath he left his friends in doing this? No; they who oppoſe him in it, have left both him and virtue; and ſuch men, though they have ſometimes had the honor to concur with him, could never be his friends.

Is the latter part of the charge better founded? Is it not a manifeſt begging of the queſtion, and a begging of it on the leaſt probable ſide? He aſſiſted a miniſter to riſe to power. He oppoſes this miniſter in power. Ergo, Spight and reſentment are his motives. May not the abuſe, which he apprehends this miniſter makes of his power, may not meaſures, which he fears are wicked, knows are weak, and ſees obſtinately purſued, be his motives? May not dangerous ambition, inſatiable avarice and inſolent behavior be his provocations? May not this gentleman think himſelf the more obliged to contribute to this miniſter's fall, for having contributed ſo much to his elevation? Let me aſk farther, whom we ſhall ſooneſt ſuſpect to have been actuated by ſentiments of private intereſt? the perſon accuſed, or his accuſer? Whoſe circumſtances moſt demanded, whoſe family moſt required, an increaſe of wealth and fortune; thoſe of the accuſed, or thoſe of the accuſer? Who hath given greater proofs of avarice to gather, and profuſion to ſquander; the accuſed, or the accuſer? In whom have we ſeen ſtronger evidences of that vindictive temper, which prompts to perſonal ſpight and reſentment; in the accuſed or the accuſer?—If we may form any judgment of the gentleman accuſed, there is not the leaſt color of reaſon to ſuppoſe that his oppoſition proceeds from a ſpirit of ambition, or a deſign of puſhing himſelf into the adminiſtration. He hath already poſſeſſed two very conſiderable employments in the ſtate; one of which he voluntarily laid down, as by his conduct in parliament, againſt ſome meaſures of the court, he forced the miniſters to take the other away, having behaved with unſpotted integrity in both; and if I am rightly informed of his reſolution by thoſe who ſeem to know him very well, it will hardly be ever in the power of the greateſt man in England, or of the beſt friend he has in the world, to

perſuade

perſuade him to accept of a third—There is an ambition, with which theſe ſpreaders of calumny and their maſters are intirely unacquainted; the ambition of doing good and the receiving the reward in fame. He, who hath this ambition, can never be diſappointed in the other; and if any man, in our age and country, hath reaſon to be ſatisfied with his ſucceſs in the purſuit of this ambition, it is the gentleman of whom we ſpeak.

Whenever the defamation, which hath been diſplayed againſt the other gentleman is examined with the leaſt knowledge of facts, or the leaſt impartiality of judgment, it will appear equally falſe, and perhaps ſtill more ſcandalous; for, in this caſe, the ſlanderers take an ungenerous and mean advantage, which they have not in the other; the advantage, which his ſingular ſituation gives them. They, who would have declined a conteſt with him, whilſt he was in a condition to anſwer for himſelf, have not bluſhed to declaim againſt him in another condition. They have experienced, in his caſe, that the unfortunate are not friendleſs. They may live, perhaps, to experience, in their own, that the guilty are ſo. —Another advantage, which theſe ſlanderers take againſt this gentleman, ariſes from the various ſcenes of life, through which he hath paſſed; ſome diſtant in place; ſome ſecret in their nature. Here calumny hath more room to aſſert, and innocence leſs opportunity to defend. Common honeſty, in ſome caſes, and even decency, in others, ſhut the mouth of the man who carries theſe qualities about him; and even more in his own cauſe than in that of another perſon; but calumny is ſubject to none of theſe controuls; and we ſpeak on our own knowledge, when we affirm that, in the preſent caſe, the falſe imputations, which the accuſers bring, are ſcreened from abſolute detection by nothing but the honor of the accuſed.

Let us take notice of ſome of the crimes, (for crimes and heinous crimes they would be, if the facts were, in any degree true) which are laid to the charge of this gentleman.

His ingratitude and treachery to the late Duke of *Marlborough* and the Earl of *Godolphin* ſtand firſt in the roll. I believe no man acknowledges more ſincerely than he the ſuperior merit of theſe two illuſtrious men, or wiſhes more ardently that they were now alive, and had the conduct of the affairs of Great Britain; but I know no obligation of gratitude or honor, which he lay under to continue in their adminiſtration, when the meaſures of it were altered. They might have reaſons, perhaps good reaſons, for altering their meaſures. He could have none in point of honor, whatever he might have had in point of intereſt, for complying with that alteration. Some of the enemies of this gentleman came into the world on ſuch a foot, that they might think it preferment to be the creatures of any men in power. He who came into it upon another foot, was the friend, but not the creature, of theſe great men, and he hath had the ſatisfaction of proving himſelf ſuch on different occaſions and without oſtentation, at leaſt to one of them, at a time, when the creatures of great men uſually renounce them; at a time, when they could do him neither good nor hurt. That he came to court, on the call of the late queen, in oppoſition to them, and exerted himſelf in her ſervice, when they ſerved her no longer, will not be objected to him by any man, who thinks more allegiance due to the prince than to the miniſter. If the preſent miniſter hath a mind to avow a contrary doctrine, he hath my conſent; but then let thoſe who engage with him, remember on what terms they engage.—On the ſame falſe principle is another accuſation brought. This gentleman

man had no patron, or patroneſs, but the late queen. He neither projected, nor procured the diſgrace of her laſt miniſter, nor knew that it was reſolved, whatever he might ſuſpect, till he heard from herſelf that it was ſo. Much more might be ſaid on this article; but we chuſe to paſs it over for many reaſons, and among others, for this; that whilſt we defend the living, we are unwilling to ſay any thing which might be drawn by theſe ſlanderers into an inſult on the dead.

The laſt charge of ingratitude, brought againſt this gentleman, is hard to be anſwered ſeriouſly. Thus much however ſhall be ſaid truly and ſeriouſly. He acknowledges, with the deepeſt ſenſe of gratitude poſſible, the clemency and goodneſs of his late majeſty; but ſure he hath reaſon, if ever man had reaſon, to diſclaim all obligation to the miniſter. The mercy of the late king was extended to him unaſked and unearned. What followed many years afterwards, in part of his majeſty's gracious intentions, was due ſolely to the king. That they were not fulfilled, was due ſolely to the miniſter. His ambition, his cauſeleſs jealouſy and private intereſt continued a ſort of proſcription, with much cruelty to the perſon concerned, and little regard to the declarations which his royal maſter had been pleaſed ſo frequently to make.

That this gentleman was engaged in the cauſe of the pretender, is true. That he ſerved him unfaithfully, is falſe. He never entered into theſe engagements, or any commerce with him, till he had been attained, and cut off from the body of his majeſty's ſubjects. He never had any commerce, either direct or indirect, which was inconſiſtent with theſe engagements, whilſt he continued in them; and ſince he was out of them, he hath had no commerce, either direct or indirect, in favor of that cauſe. On ſuch an occaſion as this it is decent, not arrogant, to challenge

challenge all mankind. I do it therefore, in the behalf of this gentleman, to produce one ſingle proof, in contradiction of any one of theſe general affirmations. For the truth of ſome, I may appeal even to thoſe who have been in the ſervice of his late, and are in that of his preſent majeſty; and particularly to a noble lord *, who by the poſt he was in, when moſt of theſe tranſactions paſſed, muſt have had the beſt opportunities of knowing the truth of them, and by whoſe teſtimony I am willing that the gentleman I defend ſhould ſtand or fall; a deciſion to which, I am ſure, he will himſelf be ready to ſubmit his life, and, what is more, his honor.

I make you no excuſe for the length of my letter. The juſtice I have done, or endeavored to do, to thoſe who have been vilely calumniated, and particularly on the occaſion of your writings and of mine, will be a ſufficient excuſe of itſelf.

I am, SIR, &c.

* The late marſhal Earl of *Stair*.

A FINAL

ANSWER

TO THE

REMARKS

ON THE

CRAFTSMAN'S VINDICATION;

AND TO

ALL THE LIBELS, WHICH HAVE COME, OR MAY COME, FROM THE SAME QUARTER AGAINST THE PERSON LAST MENTIONED IN THE CRAFTSMAN OF THE TWENTY-SECOND OF MAY, 1731.

A FINAL

ANSWER

TO THE

REMARKS, &c.

IT is impoſſible to have read the papers, which have been publiſhed againſt the writings of the Craftſman, and not have obſerved that one principal point hath been labored with conſtant application, and ſometimes with a little art. The point I mean hath been this; to make all the diſputes about national affairs, and our moſt important intereſts, to paſs for nothing more than cavils, which have been raiſed by the pique and reſentment of one man, and by the iniquity and dangerous deſigns of another. Nothing, which could be ſaid or done to inculcate this belief, hath been neglected. The ſame charges have been repeated almoſt every week, and the public hath been modeſtly deſired to pay no regard to undeniable facts, to unanſwered and unanſwerable arguments, becauſe theſe facts and theſe arguments were ſuppoſed, by the miniſterial writers, to come from

from men, to whom theſe hirelings aſcribed, againſt all probability, the worſt motives, and whoſe characters they endeavored to blacken without proof. Surely this proceeding rendered it neceſſary, at leaſt not improper, at the end of thoſe remarks, which were to conclude the collection of the Craftſman, to ſay ſomething concerning the perſons, who had been ſo particularly attacked on account of the part which they, who railed at them, were pleaſed to ſuppoſe that theſe gentlemen had in the writings contained in that collection. This, I ſay, was neceſſary; at leaſt proper; not in order to raiſe a ſpirit, as it is impertinently ſuggeſted in the libel which lies before me; but to refute calumny, and to remove at leaſt ſome of thoſe prejudices, which had been raiſed, or renewed, on the occaſion of theſe writings, and which were employed to weaken the effect of them; an effect, which may be ſaid with truth to have been aimed at the noble pair of brothers; ſince it keeps up a national ſpirit of enquiry and watchfulneſs, which it is the intereſt of theſe perſons, as it hath been their endeavor, to ſtifle; and which it is the intereſt of every other man in Britain to preſerve in himſelf, and to nouriſh in others; an effect, which cannot be ſaid, without the greateſt untruth, to have been aimed againſt the preſent ſettlement; ſince the higheſt inſolence, which can be offered to his majeſty, is to attempt to blend his intereſt and his cauſe with thoſe of his unworthy ſervants, as the tools of theſe unworthy ſervants are every day employed to do, and probably at his majeſty's expence.

Something was ſaid therefore by the Craftſman, in his journal of the twenty-ſecond of May, to the purpoſe I have mentioned. If he went out of his way, (for he ought moſt certainly to confine himſelf to things, and meddle with perſons as little as poſſible)

ſible) he went out of it on great provocation. He carried truth and reaſon along with him; and he uſed a moderation and a decency, to which his adverſaries are ſtrangers.

To ſet this matter in a full light, let us conſider what he ſaid; let us conſider how he hath been anſwered; and, by fairly comparing both, let us put the whole merits of this cauſe upon one ſhort but deciſive iſſue. It will be time afterwards to make a few obſervations on the clamor raiſed; on the reaſons and deſigns of it; in a word, to detect the mean artifice and ſilly expedients, to which the two honorable patrons of the remarker are reduced. In doing this, I ſhall neither affect to declaim, nor to inveigh, though I have before me an inexhauſtible fund of matter for both, and the law of retaliation to bear me out. As I am perſuaded the men I have to do with can raiſe no paſſion in the perſon concerned, ſo have I no need of endeavoring to raiſe the paſſions of others.—But to proceed.

The Craftſman took notice of thoſe accuſations which are brought againſt the gentleman he mentions in the ſecond place.—I meddle not with the defence of the other, which hath been undertaken by an abler pen.—Some of theſe he anſwered in general only; and yet he anſwered them as particularly as he ought to have done for reaſons of honor, which are touched upon by him, and which ſhall be a little more opened by me.

But there were other points, not at all affected by theſe reaſons, on which no explanation was neceſſary to be given by the accuſed, and on which the Craftſman had a right to demand proofs from the accuſers. They were points of a more determined nature; ſuch as admitted of no different conſtructions; ſuch as could not be altered by circumſtances. They were of a more public nature; ſuch

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as the men who brought the accuſations, muſt have it in their power to prove, if they were true; and ſuch therefore as muſt be falſe, if the men, who brought the accuſations, were not able and ready to prove them.

On theſe the Craftſman inſiſted. He affirmed propoſitions directly contrary to the accuſations brought. He appealed to unqueſtionable authority for the truth of what he affirmed; and to one in particular, which ſhould have been treated with more reſpect by the remarker, ſince it will outweigh, at home and abroad, a thouſand ſuch authorities as thoſe of his patrons. He challenged all mankind to produce one ſingle proof, in contradiction of any one of the general affirmations.

Was there any thing unfair or indecent in this proceeding? Was there any thing in it, which could provoke the choler of thoſe, who are friends to truth and juſtice? If they, who brought theſe accuſations, had been ſuch, an opportunity was preſented to them of convicting the guilty man at the very tribunal before which his cauſe had been pleaded. By producing proof on theſe heads, they had it in their power to condemn him upon all the reſt; and if this part of the charge was made good, the opinion of mankind would have been fairly enough decided as to the other.

Iſſue being joined therefore in this manner, the accuſed perſon muſt be found guilty of all the crimes laid to his charge; or his accuſers muſt be found guilty of ſlander, of calumny, and of the worſt ſort of aſſaſſination.

Thus the Craftſman left the matter.—Let us ſee what hath been ſaid in anſwer to him.

I paſs over the many ſcurrilous productions of thoſe weekly miniſterial ſcolds, who are hired to call

call names, and are capable of little more. The elaborate libel, intitled "Remarks on the Craftſ-" man's Vindication," ſeems to be the utmoſt effort of their and their patron's collected ſtrength; and though I have waited ſeveral days to ſee if they had any more ſcandal to throw out, yet I never doubted an inſtant from what quarter this remarkable piece came into the world.

The whole pamphlet is one continued invective, and deſerves no more to be called Remarks on the Craftſman, or an anſwer to him, than the railing and raving and throwing of filth by a madman deſerve to be called an anſwer to thoſe who unwarily paſs too near his cell. All that malice could ever invent, or the credulity of parties, inflamed by oppoſition, receive, is aſſembled. Truth is diſguiſed by miſrepreſentation, and even many things which the noble pair know to be falſe, are affirmed as true.

But you will aſk, perhaps, whether the challenge is not accepted, and whether proofs are not brought to contradict the plain and poſitive affirmations made by the Craftſman? I anſwer, the challenge is accepted, and the remarker aſſures us that he hath brought proof in numerous inſtances againſt theſe affirmations; which is the more generous, becauſe the Craftſman exacted but one ſingle proof in contradiction of any of them.

The firſt of theſe affirmations was, that the gentleman concerned never entered into engagements, or any commerce with the pretender, till he had been attainted and cut off from the body of his majeſty's ſubjects.—Let us examine the facts, which we find ſcattered up and down in the remarks, which may be applied to prove, in oppoſition to this affirmation, what hath been ſo often aſſerted, that this gentleman was a zealous jacobite and an

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agent of the pretender, even in the reign of the late queen.

The firſt fact of this kind is this. He *left* the kingdom. His high treaſon, among other crimes, was confeſſed by his ſhameful flight.

Had the libeller proved this high treaſon, I might agree that the gentleman's leaving his country was a conſequence; but I can never admit that it is a proof of his guilt. Could no other reaſon for leaving his country be given, except his guilt, his leaving his country would be a ſtrong preſumption againſt him. But many other reaſons will ſoon occur to thoſe who remember the paſſages of that time; and reaſons there are of a more private nature ſtill, which would be very far, to ſay no more, from reflecting diſhonor on a ſtep, which is called, by theſe foul-mouthed advocates of power, ſhameful and ignominious. One thing it may be proper to aſſure them of, that they may pretend to miſtake the Craftſman, and to miſapply his words no more. It is this. The gentleman never declined a conteſt with the two honorable patrons of this libel. One of them was, in thoſe days, below his notice; and he never found, upon trial, that he had reaſon to apprehend being foiled by the other. But we muſt not yet diſmiſs this article.

If the proof we are examining proved any thing, it would prove too much. If to decline, in certain circumſtances, a trial; if to go into voluntary exile, either before a trial, or even after condemnation, were abſolute proofs of guilt, the conduct of many greater and better men than the perſon now accuſed would deſerve our cenſure, and that of calumniators, as vile as theſe libellers, would merit our approbation. *Metellus* and *Rutilius* muſt be condemned. *Apuleius* and *Apicius* muſt be juſtified.

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This ſort of proof therefore not appearing ſufficient to make good the charge, that this gentleman was engaged with the pretender before his attainder, great pains are taken, and much rhetoric is employed to ſhew, what we ſhall not preſume to contradict, that he ought not to have engaged in that cauſe after his attainder. Neither did the Craftſman inſiſt on this circumſtance as a defence of the perſon accuſed. He fixed this date of the engagements mentioned, in contradiction to thoſe who had falſely affirmed that theſe engagements were much more antient. But he neither urged it as a defence, nor pleaded it as an excuſe; and yet I am perſuaded that this very circumſtance had ſome weight with his late majeſty, when that excellent prince, the mildneſs of whoſe temper, and the clemency of whoſe nature, would have rendered him amiable in the moſt private ſtation, and made him almoſt adorable in that great elevation, to which the providence of *God* had raiſed him; when that excellent prince I ſay, was pleaſed, on his own motion, and without any application from the perſon here ſpoken of, to extend his preſent, and to promiſe his future, favor to him.

Though the Craftſman did neither ſay nor intend what has been objected by the remarker to him, yet he might perhaps mean ſomething more than hath been obſerved; and if he did mean it, he meant to inculcate, upon this occaſion, a very uſeful, general truth. Let us grant that the man, who engages againſt his country, even when he has been oppreſſed in it, or driven out of it by violence, is not to be defended; that theſe are occaſions, wherein we ought to kiſs the rod, which ſcourges us, and reverence that authority, which we think has been unjuſtly exerciſed againſt us. But then let it be granted likewiſe that human paſſions are ſo ſtrong, and human

man reaſon ſo weak, that men, who ſuffer perſecution, or who imagine they ſuffer it, are ſeldom able to keep within theſe bounds of heroical moderation. They will be apt to ſeize the opportunities which may be offered, of reſiſting, or of attempting to repair, the injuries done them. They will flatter themſelves, that they do not vow their revenge againſt the people, the innocent and collective body of their countrymen, nor go about to ſubvert the conſtitution of the government. They will perſuade others, nay, they will perſuade themſelves, that they do not ſeek revenge, but redreſs; nor aim to deſtroy the law, which puniſhes, but to prevent the abuſe of it, which perſecutes. Thus will men, who actually ſuffer, be apt to reaſon; and if the caſe be common to numbers, they will be apt to proceed from reaſoning on ſuch principles, to act upon them. Wiſe governments therefore have been careful to diſtinguiſh between puniſhment and perſecution; have never ſuffered the former, however juſt, neceſſary, or ſevere, to carry the leaſt appearance of the latter. *Ludlow* was juſtly puniſhed. My Lord *Clarendon*, whom the remarker hath ſo ſtrangely yoaked with the regicide, was unjuſtly, ungratefully and cruelly perſecuted. We may pronounce, without uncharitableneſs, that the former would have taken any opportunity of ſubverting a ſecond time the conſtitution of his country; not from reſentment alone, but from principle. The latter would have been moved by no reſentment, to diſturb that frame of government, which he had contributed ſo much to reſtore. The former example therefore hath nothing to do in this place; and if I admit the latter, it will only ſerve to ſhew us how men ſhould act, not how they do act. It will be one example of virtue, oppoſed to innumerable inſtances of frailty. Innumerable, indeed, are the inſtances

ſtances of men in all ages, who, having been driven out of their country by violence, have endeavoured, even by violence, to return to it. This is the general and known courſe of nature; depraved indeed, but human: and ſince it is ſo; if we allow that they, who diſturb a government, becauſe they think themſelves perſecuted, deſerve no excuſe, we muſt allow that thoſe, who give occaſion to this diſturbance by perſecution, deſerve very little.

I hope I may deſerve ſome for this digreſſion, into which the remarker led me; and I return to my ſubject, by ſaying that neither the Craftſman hath pretended, nor do I here pretend, to excuſe the engagements which this gentleman took, after his attainder and which his late majeſty ſo graciouſly pardoned; but that his taking theſe engagements, after his attainder, is no proof that he was under them before; and that his going out of the kingdom, in the late king's reign, is no proof that he was a zealous jacobite, and an agent of the pretender in the late queen's reign.

The libeller, finding himſelf unable to make this charge good, leſſens the charge that he may ſuit his proof to it. If he cannot prove that the gentleman was in the intereſts of the pretender, before his attainder, he will prove at leaſt that he had a ſtrong propenſion to thoſe intereſts; and how does he prove even this? He aſſerts that in the year 1702, this gentleman was "one of the virtuous one hundred and "ſeventeen, who gave their votes to throw out the "bill for ſettling the Proteſtant ſucceſſion, &c." Falſe and impudent aſſertion! A few pages before he pretends to have the journal book of the Houſe of Commons before him. Had he it before him now? If he had, how can he affirm, in direct contradiction to it? If he had not, how could he venture to affirm any thing, concerning this matter? The bill for ſettling the Proteſtant ſucceſſion, in the preſent royal

family, paſſed the Houſe of Commons in the month of May 1701, not in 1702; and it paſſed nemine contradicente, to bring in a bill "for the farther ſe-"curity of his majeſty's perſon and the ſucceſſion of "the crown in the Proteſtant line, and extinguiſh-"ing the hopes of the pretended prince of Wales, "and all other pretenders, and their open and ſe-"cret abettors." This bill was accordingly brought in, and the perſons who, by order of the *houſe*, prepared and brought it in, were Sir *Charles Hedges* and one Mr. *St. John*. In the progreſs of this bill through the houſe, it appears that there were ſome debates and diviſions about particular clauſes and amendments; but the bill was paſſed without any diviſion: ſo infamouſly falſe is the aſſertion made by this libeller, that there was no diviſion of an hundred and ſeventeen, or of any other number, for throwing out either the bill which ſettled the ſucceſſion; or the bill, which was made for the farther ſecurity of it. There was a diviſion indeed, of an hundred and ſeventeen againſt an hundred and eighteen, upon a clauſe added by the lords to a bill for inlarging the time for taking the oath of abjuration, &c. and this happened in the year 1702; but what relation hath this fact to the fact aſſerted? Whether the gentleman voted againſt this clauſe, or not, I am unable to ſay; and it is to no purpoſe to enquire; for the clauſe regarded only ſuch perſons as had neglected to take the abjuration oath in time, and provided that if ſuch perſons had forfeited any office, benefice, &c. to which any other perſons had been preferred, the former ſhould not be reſtored by taking the advantage of this act. If this pretended proof is not another inſtance of the vileſt calumniation, the libeller himſelf confeſſes that the Craftſman's challenge was properly made; and that there is not one proof in the world againſt his general affirmations.

Another

Another fact, which is advanced and moſt pathetically declaimed upon, for reaſons not hard to be diſcovered, is likewiſe applied to maintain the ſame charge. "This gentleman," ſays the libeller, "had "the impudence to oppoſe his preſent moſt ſacred "majeſty, when he demanded a writ of right—— "The writ of ſummons to parliament. He after-"wards cauſed the elector of Hanover's miniſter "to be forbid the court, for no other crime than "having demanded that writ." And did this gentleman oppoſe this writ? Nay, did any other ſervant of the late queen oppoſe it? Falſe and impudent is the aſſertion. It was ordered to be made out the very day * it was demanded. If the miniſter, who demanded the writ, was forbid the court, was this gentleman the cauſe of it? Is every diſagreeable circumſtance to be aſcribed to him in an affair, which was too important not to be laid, by the proper miniſter, that is by the chancellor, not the ſecretary, before her late majeſty and her council; and in which it may be ſuppoſed that her majeſty's reſentments were alone ſufficient to determine ſuch a reſolution? Beſides, if the miniſter received the affront mentioned, was it ſingly and abſtractedly for demanding the writ; or was it founded on the manner of demanding, and on many other circumſtances, ſome expreſſed and ſome hinted at in the letters, writ ſoon afterwards by the late queen to her late electoral highneſs the princeſs *Sophia* and to his preſent majeſty, which lie before me in the printed annals of Queen *Anne*'s reign? Was the reception, given by his late majeſty, then elector, to the miniſter, who made this demand, at his return home, ſuch a one as ſhewed his majeſty's approbation of this meaſure, and his diſapprobation of what had happened here upon it?—I ſay no more.

* Vide annals of the reign of Queen Anne.

We have now gone through all I can find in this libel, which ſeems not ſo much as to aim at making good the firſt head of accuſation, on which the Craftſman made his challenge.

On the ſecond head, the Craftſman affirmed that the "ſame gentleman never had any commerce, "either direct or indirect, inconſiſtent with the en- "gagements he took after his attainder, whilſt he "continued in them." Now, this *affirmation*, inſtead of being diſproved, is evaded. "It is foreign "to me," ſays the remarker—Is it ſo?—Have not all his ſcribbling aſſociates charged this gentleman over and over for being treacherous to the pretender; for being engaged with him; and at the ſame time a ſpy and a partiſan, ſuch is the language they uſe, of the late king? Is not the flat contradiction given to this lie a part of the challenge made by the Craftſman? Hath not this libeller accepted the challenge? Hath he not called it a weak, a fooliſh, and a ſlaviſh defence? May he evade it after all his boaſting? Is he not bound to make it good in every part, or to own the charge of calumny, which I make on him, on the whole ſcribbling crew, and on thoſe who pay them? What he, or they will own, I neither know nor care. What the public will determine is evident.

On a third head of accuſation againſt this gentleman, the Craftſman affirmed, that ſince he was "out "of the engagements laſt mentioned, he hath had "no commerce, either direct or indirect, in favor "of that cauſe." Now, upon this head, though the accuſation be not given up in terms, yet is it as little maintained or ſupported by proof as the laſt. The libeller, indeed, calls the gentleman a leviathan of treaſon; diſplays the terrible dangers which would have attended the reinſtating him; preſumes to call it a libel on the late king's memory to

ſay

ſay that he had ſuch intentions; and yet dares not deny that his majeſty ſignified his having ſuch intentions. In ſhort, with much bombaſt, he makes the panegyric of his patron, for defeating theſe intentions. I ſhall not condeſcend to make one ſingle remark on this rapſody of ſcurrility and adulation. Such poiſon carries its antidote along with it into the world; and no man will be at a loſs to judge whether public or private motives determined the ſervant, in this caſe, to defeat the intentions of the maſter. Which ever they were, he, who can believe that the gentleman ſo often mentioned has upon him any of that obligation, which the Craftſman diſclaims for him, deſerves to be pitied; and he, who can bring himſelf up to affirm it, deſerves to be deſpiſed. But before I leave this article, it may not be improper nor unſeaſonable to enquire, by what criterion good ſubjects to his majeſty and faithful friends to the preſent eſtabliſhment are to be diſtinguiſhed and known. Are all thoſe to be reputed ſuch, who aſſumed the greateſt zeal for the Proteſtant ſucceſſion formerly?—This cannot be; for many of the tories have this title; and all who ever wore that name, are proſcribed by the ſyſtem we have advanced.—Are all theſe to be reputed ſuch, who were alike zealous for the Proteſtant ſucceſſion, and who have beſides made conſtant profeſſion of the principles of whiggiſm?—This cannot be neither; ſince many ſuch as theſe are daily ſtigmatized with the reproachful names of malcontents and incendiaries; and ſince endeavors are uſed, by falſe deductions and by arbitrary interpretations, to prove them enemies to the government, and in effect arrant traitors.—What is this criterion then? I am able to diſcover but one, and it is this; being for, or being againſt, the noble pair of brothers, the two honourable patrons of the remarker. Without the merit of approving their conduct, no man is to be reputed a

faithful

faithful ſubject, or a friend to his country. With this merit, and with that of a blind ſubmiſſion, even they, who have been the moſt obnoxious, may be received; and they, who have been called enemies to the government, as loudly as any others, may be inrolled among its friends. This practice of endeavoring to confine the intereſt of the government to as narrow a bottom as that of two miniſters, has been of late moſt audaciouſly purſued. It has been ſaid in direct terms * that "if his late majeſty had "put the adminiſtration into any other hands, he "would have been unjuſt to thoſe brave men who "had done and ſuffered much to ſerve him; and "that he would not have deſerved to wear the "crown, if he had not employed the men whom he "did employ."—Here, again, there might be room for ſome particular reflections, if I was diſpoſed to make them. But I avoid this invidious part as much as my ſubject will allow me to do; and ſhall therefore content myſelf with deſiring theſe bold writers, their inſpectors and patrons, to conſider what the neceſſary conſequences of ſuch poſitions are. If they dare to aſſert that his late majeſty would have been unjuſt; that he would not have deſerved to wear the crown, if he had not employed the men he did employ; what might they not aſſert if his preſent majeſty ſhould at any time, think fit, in his great wiſdom and goodneſs to his people, to remove ſome of thoſe very men, whom his royal father did employ? The aſſertion is not even extended to party. It would have been ſtill indecent if it had. But it is confined to a certain number of particular men; as if the zeal for the Proteſtant ſucceſſion in the preſent royal family had not been directed, as it moſt certainly was, to the national advantage; but had been intended, as to be ſure it was not, for the ad-

* London Journal, May 15, 1731.

vantage

vantage of particular men, and to perpetuate the adminiſtration in a private family. This is ſuch language, as I believe was never held before, and as no man would preſume to hold now, if the encouragement to it did not proceed from thoſe, by whom it ſhould be diſcountenanced and puniſhed.

There is another fact, which I muſt not omit to take notice of in this place; becauſe, though it is not one of thoſe on which the Craftſman made his challenge, yet it hath been poſitively aſſerted by him, and half of it at leaſt as poſitively denied by the remarker.

The Craftſman ſaid "that the mercy of the late "king was extended to the gentleman we ſpeak of, "unaſked and unearned." That it was unearned the remarker thinks probable; and in thinking ſo he gives the lie to all his fellow ſcribblers, who have ſo often affirmed the contrary. That it was unaſked, he ſays, is a downright falſehood. He hath the journal-book of the Houſe of Commons before him; and there he finds "that the houſe was "acquainted, by his late majeſty's command, in "April 1725, that this gentleman had, about ſeven "years before, made his humble application and "ſubmiſſion, &c. which his majeſty ſo far accepted "as to give encouragement to hope for ſome future "mark of his majeſty's favor and goodneſs."—In this he exults; but here again the effrontery and falſehood which he charges on others, will recoil on himſelf. Who drew this miniſterial meſſage I know not; nor how far the ſtyle of it may be neceſſary, according to the forms uſual on ſuch occaſions; but the remarker might have known, if he had conſulted even his patrons, that his majeſty's mercy had been extended to this gentleman two years before the ſeven there mentioned; and that his mercy did not conſiſt in encouragement to hope for ſome future mark of his majeſty's favor and goodneſs, but in a gracious

gracious and abſolute promiſe of his favor *in the full* extent, which the circumſtances of that *gentleman* required. I may be the more bold in affirming this fact, becauſe the noble lord, * who *delivered the* meſſage I quote, is ſtill alive, as ſome other *perſons* are, to whom his late majeſty was pleaſed *to own* that this meſſage had been delivered by his order, and to expreſs his gracious intentions conformably to it.—But to proceed.

It appears moſt undeniably, that of the three heads, on which the Craftſman gave, and the remarker accepted the challenge, the remarker hath ſhewn himſelf unable to prove the firſt by any true facts, and hath ſcandalouſly attempted to do it by falſe ones; that he hath given up the ſecond; and that he hath not ſo much as attempted to prove the third.

Let us aſk now, ſhall men, thus plainly convicted of calumny on accuſations brought ſo often and charged ſo peremptorily by them, expect belief, when they endeavour to defame in any other caſe? Shall they, who are convicted of accuſing falſely in caſes, which are plain in their nature, where no proof can be wanting, and where no pretence can be alledged for not producing it, expect that the public ſhould condemn any man, and eſpecially a man who is under ſo many circumſtances of diſadvantage, peculiar to his ſingular and unexampled ſituation, becauſe they affirm him guilty in caſes, which are intricate in their nature, and where reaſons of honor, of prudence and of decency, may all concur to impoſe ſilence? How often have the noble pair defended themſelves, and been defended by others, on this principle; that no man ought to charge another, unleſs he is able and ready to prove the charge? How often have they called for proof on this principle,

* The preſent Earl of *Winchelſea*.

and

and triumphed that it was not immediately brought? Now, although this defence may not be ſufficient in every caſe, where matters of preſent tranſaction are concerned, and where the perſons attacked are in actual poſſeſſion of the greateſt power; yet ſurely it may be thought, with reaſon, to be a ſufficient defence, when matters long ago tranſacted, and long ago cenſured too, are concerned; when the perſons, who attack, are in actual poſſeſſion of the greateſt power; and the perſon, who is attacked, hath none of thoſe offenſive or defenſive weapons at his command, which power furniſhes in ſo abundant a manner.

The remarker thinks that no "reaſons of honor, "prudence, or decency ought to ſhut the mouth of "innocence; that ſhame and guilt alone are ſilent "in the day of enquiry."—When this day of enquiry is to come, and who is to be the ſubject of it, I know not; but let him learn that there are many caſes, wherein it is not honeſt, and many others may occur wherein it is not prudent, to ſay all that might be ſaid either in defence or in excuſe; that is, when the defence or excuſe of ourſelves muſt effect others, not concerned in the debate. In ſuch caſes the moſt innocent will rather bear the imputation of imaginary crimes, by keeping ſilence, than be guilty of a real crime, by breaking it; and to carry this as far as it can be carried, inſtances might be produced of men, who have died, rather than accuſe others, whoſe blood was thirſted after more than theirs.

Much hath been ſaid, and great complaints have been made, of the torture, as it is called in this libel, given to another gentleman's actions. If, by this, be meant ranſacking into all the private and public paſſages of his life, and wreſting every one into a crime; far be it from me to approve in his caſe, what I abhor this libeller for doing in the caſe of another.

ther. But it is really ſo? Have we ſeen accuſations of treachery and ingratitude towards ſeveral, who are dead, and towards any, who are living, inſiſted upon, in the former caſe? Has it been reproached to the patrons of the remarker, that they wormed out of power a perſon to whom they were nearly allied and ought to have been firmly attached by gratitude and friendſhip? And yet is that a ſubject which affords nothing to be ſaid? Are there no circumſtances, which might be aggravated at leaſt? Are there no ſtrong colors, which might be laid? Even I ſhould not be at a loſs to do it, if I thought it fair to do it; if I thought it honeſt to puſh any man to a ſilence, of which I might take a ſeeming advantage, or to a neceſſity of juſtifying or excuſing himſelf by ſaying what, ſuppoſing him innocent, he ought not to ſay. Are there no facts relating to former tranſactions of great importance not commonly known, and yet not abſolutely ſecrets, which remain ſtill unmentioned?—In ſhort, is it not apparent that there are men, who accuſe, indeed, when the immediate ſubject of debate leads, and provokes them neceſſarily and unwillingly to it, whilſt there are others, who wait for no ſuch neceſſity, but accuſe merely to defame.

It would be tedious, not difficult, to go through this whole invective; to deny with truth many things, which are falſely affirmed; and, by giving a juſt turn to others, to ſet them in a very different light from that wherein the author expoſes them to public view; to explain what he perplexes; to diſtinguiſh what he confounds. But I ſhall not take this taſk upon me, for the reaſons I have given, and for others which I am going to give.

As to the conduct which the perſon, againſt whom ſuch torrents of ribaldry are poured forth, held towards thoſe who were at the head of affairs, whilſt he was in buſineſs, I ſhall only add to what

hath

hath been ſaid already, what no man of candor will deny; that the heat and animoſity, which perpetual conteſts and frequent turns of party raiſe, have carried many, perhaps the perſon who is blamed, perhaps the perſons who blame him, to do what, in any other ſituation or temper of mind, they would carefully avoid: in a word, that the juſt man hath been, on ſuch occaſions, ſometimes unjuſt; the good-natured man ill-natured; and the friendly man unfriendly. Few there are, I fear, who could with a ſafe conſcience take up the firſt ſtone upon ſuch a trial. Few there are, who are blameleſs. But here is the difference. The juſt, the good-natured, the friendly man returns to the character, out of which he ſtarted. The unjuſt, the ill-natured, the unfriendly man perſiſts. The firſt reflects with ſorrow on what the laſt reflects with triumph; and whilſt one wiſhes undone what the heat of party carried him to do, the other is glad of the excuſe of party, ſuch as it is, to indulge the viciouſneſs of his own nature, and to repeat unjuſt, ill-natured and unfriendly actions to the living and even to the dead.

There is an example before us, which may ſerve to illuſtrate what I have ſaid.—Great advantage is taken of a memorial ſent to the late queen, by the late Earl of *Oxford*, wherein many hard reflections are made on others; but the hardeſt of all on the perſon here referred to. He is painted in the worſt colors, and accuſed to the queen of the greateſt faults. Should I deſcend into the particulars, I might ſhew that the accuſations were groundleſs; and point out, perhaps, the unjuſt cauſes of ſuſpicions which were taken, as well as the motives to the writing that memorial, which I wiſh had never been written, for a reaſon very different from that which the remarker would be ready to aſſign. But I ſhall not deſcend into any ſuch particulars, nor give

give a double advantage to the malicious, who would be juſt as well pleaſed to have any handle given them by the living, of inveighing againſt the dead, as they are ready to ſeize, on every occaſion, that which was given them, ſo many years ago, by one, who is now dead, of inveighing againſt the living.

The perſons, who had the honour to ſerve the late queen, in the laſt period of her life, have been theſe twenty years the ſubjects of great clamor. If the differences which happened amongſt them ſo long ago, gave in ſome meaſure, as I apprehend that they did, both occaſion and force to this clamor, it would be ſtrange conduct, indeed, in thoſe of them who remain alive, and in the relations and friends of thoſe of them who are dead, to preſerve the ſpirit of difference, and to aſſiſt in reviving this clamor.

The day will come when authentic hiſtory will relate the paſſages of thoſe times, without regard to the partial views of any party, or the particular defence of any man. 'Till this day does come, every one muſt decide, or ſuſpend his judgment, as he ſees reaſon to do; and they, who may ſuffer by theſe judgments, muſt bear it with that temper and reſpect which is due from every private man to public cenſures; nay, even to public prejudices.

But what hath all this to do with the characters and conduct of the noble pair? Suppoſe the men in power two reigns ago, to have been angels of darkneſs, will it follow that the two honorable patrons of the remarker are angels of light? What then is the meaning of ſo great a clamor, affectedly raiſed on ſo ſlender an occaſion as the Craftſman of the twenty-ſecond of May gave; wherein little was ſaid, and that little with much moderation, after much provocation? Why are ſo many pens employed, and ſo great pains taken, to divert the attention of the public from preſent to paſt tranſactions; from national

tional conſiderations to perſonal altercations?—The reaſon is obvious; and no other reaſon in nature can be aſſigned. The noble pair have been hard puſhed, on their management of public affairs, both at home and abroad. Not only their errors have been pointed out; groſs, palpable errors; but a long ſeries of error; a whole ſyſtem of cool, deliberate, conducted, defended, expenſive error hath been laid open to public view. What I believe never to have happened before, hath happened on theſe occaſions. The noble pair have been admoniſhed in time, and ſhewn the precipice, into which, whoever led, they were both falling. The conſequences of their meaſures have been foretold as early as poſſible, and even whilſt the cauſes was laying. Surely this conduct, on the part of their adverſaries, favors more of public ſpirit than of private reſentment; and yet, when they have taken advantage of it, they have ſtopt ſhort and triumphed in their eſcape, as they did in the caſe of the Iriſh recruits. Theſe very admonitions, which gave them time and opportunity to do ſo, have been modeſtly attributed to private reſentment alone; though nothing can be more manifeſt than this; that private reſentment would have found its account better in ſilence, would have preferred accuſations to admonitions, and would have waited longer to have ſtruck more home.

Sometimes, inſtead of ſtopping ſhort, they have gone on, anſwering for and being anſwered for, till the events have juſtified the predictions; till the inconveniencies, diſadvantages and difficulties, againſt which the noble pair had been warned in vain, have followed and increaſed upon them; till even their apologiſts have been forced to allow ſome errors, and till they themſelves have confeſſed their boaſted ſyſtem to be wrong, by changing it, and by boaſting of the change. Even after all this, they have complained

of

of clamor; and they ſtill complain, as if there had never been the leaſt occaſion for it given by them. —How their new ſchemes are planned, and how they will be purſued; whether theſe able men have failed hitherto, becauſe they ſet out on miſtaken principles of policy, or whether they have failed for want of ſkill to conduct the righteſt, we ſhall ſoon ſee.

But theſe are not the only circumſtances, which have borne, and ſtill bear hard upon them.—In the courſe of theſe and other diſputes, it ſeems to have been plainly and fully proved, that ſuch principles have been eſtabliſhed, and ſuch doctrines have been taught by the miniſterial writers, as tend manifeſtly to deſtroy the freedom of the Britiſh government. Such are, the dependency, I mean the corrupt dependency, of parliaments on the crown; the neceſſity of ſtanding armies, notwithſtanding the danger of them to liberty; and ſome other points, which I need not recapitulate. It is ſufficiently known how much, and with how much reaſon, the far greater part of mankind have been alarmed at theſe attempts; which, if they ſucceed, muſt hurt not only the inferior and temporary intereſts, but the greateſt and moſt permanent political intereſt, which a Briton can have at heart; that of the conſtitution of this government.

As theſe things have been objected ſtrongly on one ſide, ſo endeavors have been uſed on the other, to diſguiſe and to palliate them, or to evade the conſequences drawn from them. But theſe endeavors have not ſucceeded. How, indeed, ſhould they ſucceed? As well might thoſe, who make them, expect to perſuade mankind that ſlavery and beggary are preferable to liberty and wealth, as to make the world believe that theſe bleſſings can be preſerved

to

to Britain by the very means, by which they have been loſt in ſo many other free countries.

Since this therefore cannot be impoſed; ſince the minds of men cannot be convinced of ſuch abſurdities, they muſt be diverted, if poſſible, from the ſubject. A new cry is therefore raiſed, or an old one rather is revived. Diſputes, which inflamed the minds of men, whilſt the affairs they relate to were tranſacting, and the conflict of parties was the moſt fierce, are renewed at a time, when they can be of no benefit to the public, and when the ſame motives of party ſubſiſt no longer. One man, in particular, is made the ſubject of new invective. Nothing, which malice can ſuggeſt, and ill nature and ill manners utter, is omitted to render his perſon odious, and to repreſent his deſigns as dangerous. In the ſame breath, we are told that this odious, this dangerous man is endeavoring to come into power once more. He ſtands again "a canditate for grace and "truſt. He would again adminiſter the public, "abandon its allies, and ſacrifice its honor. No-"thing will ſatisfy him but the power, which he "once abuſed and would again abuſe; the truſts, "which he once betrayed and would again betray." Theſe are repreſented, with equal modeſty and fairneſs, to be his requeſts; and the hero of the remarker, that is, the remarker's paymaſter, who adminiſters the public ſo righteouſly; who never abandoned its allies; neither the emperor nor France; who never ſacrificed its honor to one, nor its intereſt to both; who never abuſed his power, nor betrayed his truſt, through ambition, through pride, through private intereſt, or private pique; this perſon is applauded for his oppoſition to ſuch requeſts, for his juſt and fatal diſcernment.

What fatality there may be in his diſcernment, I know not; but ſurely there is a fatality, which attends

tends thoſe who indulge themſelves in ſpeaking and writing, without any regard to truth. How could it happen elſe that the remarker ſhould ſo egregiouſly contradict himſelf, and deſtroy in his fortieth page the whole drift of his thirty-ninth? This bold and raſh ſcribbler takes upon him to marſhal and to characterize inſolently the friends of the man he rails at. If I was not of that number myſelf, I ſhould probably ſay more on the ſubject. This however I am under an obligation to ſay; that the friends of this gentleman muſt be ſuch to his perſon. They cannot be ſo to his power. That he takes it as the greateſt compliment, which can be made to him, to have a ſympathy of nature and a conformity of principles and deſigns with them attributed to him; that he thinks their friendſhip an honor to him; ſuch an honor as the warmeſt of his enemies have cauſe to envy, and do envy; ſuch an honor as the higheſt of his enemies would be heartily proud to obtain, and have not been able to obtain.

The friends now of this gentleman, whom he is ſometimes ſaid to lead, and who are ſometimes ſaid to employ him as their tool, juſt as it ſuits the preſent purpoſe of ſcandal to ſay; theſe very friends, it ſeems, the very men, who defend him, "would ne-"ver raiſe him above his preſent low condition, nor "make him the partner of their ſucceſs."—However they may employ him, the remarker and his patrons know how they mean to reward him.—Since this is the caſe, ſince they know it to be ſo; for what reaſon, in the name of wonder, is all this buſtle made about ſo inſignificant a tool?—Why ſo many endeavors to raiſe a jealouſy, and give an alarm, as if this man was aiming again at power?—Why ſo much merit aſcribed to the noble pair, for keeping him out of it?—His

own friends would not raiſe him to it.—How ridiculous then is the affectation of his enemies, who value themſelves on their oppoſition to him?

Let the noble pair ſtand or fall by their own merits, or demerits. I dare anſwer to them and to the world, upon better foundations than thoſe of the remarker's laying, that their connuance in power will never break the ſpirit of this man, nor their fall from it excite his ambition. His ambition, whatever may have been ſaid or thought about it, hath been long ſince dead. A man muſt be dead himſelf, who is utterly inſenſible of all that happens, either to the public or to himſelf; but he who ſeeks nothing but retreat, and that ſtability of ſituation, which is eſſential to the quiet of it, hath ſurely no ambition. Now that this is the caſe, and hath been long the caſe of the gentleman, concerning whom I ſpeak, I know to be true and I affirm boldly. He never had the leaſt, I ſay more, he never would have the greateſt obligations to any country, except his own; and yet ſo deſirous was this man of reſt and quiet, that he was contented to enjoy them where fortune had preſented them to him. A little frankneſs might have kept him abroad all his life, without complaint. Much art has been employed to confine him at home, and to teaze him there. If forgetting all former perſecutions, he reſented the laſt, would he be much to blame?

I am not conſcious of having ſaid, in this paper, a word againſt the truth; and I am ſure that I have the ſame truth on my ſide, when I aſſert that this man, whom the libeller repreſents to be ſo turbulent, ſo outrageous, and of ſuch pertinacious ambition, however he might have been willing formerly to have had the obligation to the noble pair, of enjoying, by their aſſiſtance, the full meaſure of his

late majeſty's intended goodneſs, would decline with ſcorn, after all that has paſſed, to be reinſtated in his former ſituation, at the intolerable expence of having the leaſt appearance of an obligation to them. Neither they, nor their advocates, can be half ſo ſollicitous to keep him out of power, and even out of a ſtate of aſpiring after power, as he is determined againſt the firſt, and indifferent about the laſt.

I am ſenſible that all this may appear a little improbable to the perſons I oppoſe. It will be hard for them to conceive that the man, who has once taſted power, can never renounce it in earneſt. No wonder they ſhould think in this manner. Thoſe who find nothing in themſelves to reſt upon with ſatisfaction, muſt lean on power, on riches, or both, and on other external objects. Nay, thoſe who have of the two vices, ambition and avarice, the meaneſt in the moſt eminent degree; and who would be glad to quit their power, and to retire with their gains, may be afraid to quit it, becauſe they have abuſed it. They may be ſo miſerable as to ſee no ſecurity out of power, nor any other in it, except that precarious, that temporary ſecurity, which is the laſt and uſeful refuge of deſperate men; the continuing the ſame violences to maintain, by which they acquired their power; the keeping up of diſſenſions, and the embroiling of affairs; thoſe noble arts, by which they roſe.

But there are men in the world, who know that there is ſomething in life better than power, and riches; and ſuch men may prefer the low condition, as it is called by the remarker, of one man, to the high condition of another. There are men who ſee that dignity may be diſgraced, and who feel that diſgrace may be dignified. Of this number is the gentleman whom I have undertaken to defend; who poſſeſſes his ſoul

without hopes or fears, and enjoys his retreat without any deſires beyond it. In that retreat, he is obedient to thel aws, dutiful to his prince, and true to his oaths. If he fails in theſe reſpects, let him be publicly attacked; let public vengeance purſue and overtake him; let the noble pair indulge for once their paſſions in a juſt cauſe. If they have no complaints, of this nature, to make againſt him, from whence does this particular animoſity proceed? Have they complaints of any other kind to make, and of a private nature? If they have, why is the public troubled on this account?—I hope the remarker's maſk is now taken off; that the true drift of all this perſonal railing is enough expoſed; and that the attention of mankind will be brought back to thoſe more important ſubjects, which have been already ſtarted, and to thoſe which every day may furniſh.

After what has been here ſaid, the gentleman, in whoſe defence I have appeared, can have no reaſon of honor to enter, by himſelf, or his friends, into theſe altercations; and if my opinion can prevail, ſhould theſe libellers continue to ſcold, and to call names, they ſhould be left to do it, without reproof, or notice. The anſwer now given ſhould ſtand as a "Final anſwer to all they have ſaid, and to all they "may think fit to ſay hereafter."

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